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Jus Post Bellum
and the Nature of Peace
Lonneke Peperkamp
What should be done after war? This book deals with the timely and important topic of 
post war justice, or jus post bellum. Just war theory is a thriving part of legal and political 
philosophy, and the leading normative theory on issues of war and peace. Traditional just 
war theory consists of two branches: jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Aside from regulating 
the initiation of war and the conduct in war, there is now a growing interest in regulating 
the aftermath of war. As a result, jus post bellum is the welcomed third branch of just war 
theory. The aim of this book is twofold. First, to analyze the concept of jus post bellum and 
contribute to an adequate understanding of this new branch. Second, to critically assess 
and further develop jus post bellum. 
This book delves into the historical roots of jus post bellum, the question of responsibility, 
the distinction between minimalist and maximalist positions, and the nature of peace 
as the overall goal of just war theory. Ultimately, the book pleads for modesty in post 
war justice. What should be aimed for after war is a decent peace; a peace that is ‘just 
enough’ instead of perfectly just. A medium conception of jus post bellum that emphasizes 
responsible duty bearers is the best way to achieve that. Medium jus post bellum wants to 
create a decent and safe society after war, is concerned with fundamental human rights, 
and includes limited political reconstruction and provisions such as food and shelter. As 
opposed to minimalist and maximalist understandings of jus post bellum, it is argued that 
medium jus post bellum improves just war theory, does not exceed its limited character, is 
internally coherent, and above all, is most effective in limiting the horrible effects of war.
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Your will ought to aim at peace; war should be waged only as a necessity, and 
waged only that God may set us free from necessity and preserve us in peace. 
For we do not seek peace in order to stir up war, but we wage war in order to 
acquire peace. Be, therefore, a peacemaker even in war in order that by 
conquering you might bring the benefits of peace to those whom you fight.  
Augustine, Letter 189 to Boniface, 418, par. 6. 
Hermocrates says, The glorious thing is, not to conquer, but to use victory with 
clemency and moderation. In order to make a right use of victory, the saying of 
Tacitus ought always to be remembered, that We cannot finish a war in a more 
happy and glorious manner than by pardoning the vanquished. Julius Cesar, in a 
letter he wrote when dictator, says, Let this be the new way of conquering, to secure 
ourselves with mercy and liberality.  
Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, 1625, book III, chapter XV, par. XII.  
All of us who argue about the rights and wrongs of war agree that justice in the 
strong sense, the sense that it has in domestic society and everyday life, is lost as 
soon as the fighting begins. War is a zone of radical coercion, in which justice is 
always under a cloud. 
Michael Walzer, Arguing about War, 2004, p. x. 

Contents 
Preface  xi 
1. Justice after War 1 
1.1 Introduction 1 
1.2 Jus Post Bellum 4 
1.3 Just War Theory 7 
1.4 Limitations 10 
1.5 Structure 11 
2. Inter Arma Silent Leges? About the Law's Problematic
Relationship to War 17 
(Ars Aequi 2009, 7/8, p. 458-466.) 
2.1 Introduction 17 
2.2 The Morality of War 18 
2.3 The Elements of a Just War 20 
2.4 Course of the Gaza war 25 
2.5 The Debate on the Justness 28 
2.6 Conclusion 36 
3. Just War Theory in Historical Perspective and 
the Roots of Jus Post Bellum 39 
3.1 Introduction 39 
3.2 Classic Just War Theory 40 
3.2.1 Cicero 40 
3.2.2 Augustine 41 
3.2.3 Aquinas 42 
3.2.4 Vitoria 43 
3.3 Transition to the Law of Nations 46 
3.4 The Heyday of Positivism 51 
3.5 The Era of International Organizations 52 
3.6 Conclusion 55 
4. The Blurry Boundaries between War and Peace.
Do we Need to Extend Just War Theory? 57 
(Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 2016,
102/3, p. 315-332.) 57 
4.1 Introduction 57 
4.2 Jus Ante Bellum 62 
4.3 Jus Post Bellum 66 
4.4 A Four Partite Just War Theory? 72 
4.5 Conclusion 78 
vii
JUS POST BELLUM AND THE NATURE OF PEACE 
5. On the Duty to Reconstruct after War.
Who is Responsible for Jus Post Bellum? 81 
(Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 2016, 29/2, p. 403-430.) 
5.1 Introduction 81 
5.2 Miller’s Collective Remedial Responsibility 86 
5.2.1 Outcome versus Remedial Responsibility 88 
 5.2.2 Individual versus Collective Responsibility 90 
5.3 The Foundation of Post War Duties 94 
5.3.1 Moral Responsibility 95 
5.3.2 Outcome Responsibility 97 
5.3.3 Causality 99 
5.3.4 Benefit 101 
5.3.5 Capability 103 
5.3.6 Community 105 
5.4 Role Responsibility 105 
5.5 A System for Assigning Post War Duties 108 
5.5.1 Step One 109 
 5.5.2 Step Two 110 
5.6 Conclusion 113 
6. Jus Post Bellum. A Case of Minimalism versus Maximalism? 117 
(Ethical Perspectives 2014, 21/3, p. 255-288.) 
6.1 Introduction 117 
6.2 Positions on Jus Post Bellum 119 
6.2.1 Minimalism 119 
6.2.2 The Middle Ground? 124 
6.2.3 Maximalism 129 
6.3 The Opposition between Minimalism and Maximalism 132 
6.4 Jus Post Bellum in a Larger Perspective 136 
6.4.1 Situation 137 
6.4.2 Perspective on International Relations 139 
6.4.3 The Various Degrees of Maximalist Jus Post Bellum 142 
6.5 Conclusion 143 
7. A Just and Lasting Peace after War 147 
7.1 Introduction 147 
7.2 The Nature of Peace 150 
7.2.1 Temporal Element 150 
7.2.2 Spatial Element 151 
7.2.3 Character 153 
7.3 Five Concepts of Peace 155 
7.3.1 Purely Negative Peace 155 
viii
CONTENTS 
7.3.2 Largely Negative Peace 158 
7.3.3 Decent Peace 159 
7.3.4 Largely Positive Peace 161 
7.3.5 Fully Positive Peace 165 
7.4 Peace as Goal of Just War Theory 167 
7.4.1 Feasibility and Desirability 168 
7.4.2 Elimination: the Outside Boundaries of the Peace  
  Continuum 169 
 7.4.3 Comparative Assessment 171 
7.5 What Peace? 172 
7.5.1 Walzer’s Largely Negative Peace 174 
7.5.2 Walzer’s and Coady’s Decent Peace 177 
7.5.3 Orend’s Comprehensive Decent Peace 180 
7.5.4 Evans’s, Allman & Winright’s and Fabre’s Largely 
    Positive Peace 182 
7.6 Decent Peace 186 
7.6.1 Justice in Just War Theory 187 
 7.6.2 Defence of Decent Peace 190 
7.7 Conclusion 192 
8. Decent Peace and Medium Jus Post Bellum 195 
8.1 Introduction 195 
8.2 Key Findings 196 
8.3 A more Consistent, Coherent and Effective Jus Post Bellum 199 
8.4 Challenges and Further Research 201 
8.5 Relevance 204 
Bibliography 205 
English Summary  235 
Dutch Summary (Nederlandse samenvatting) 249 
About the Author 269 
ix

Preface 
When the war is over, that’s when 
the real war will begin.  
When everyone else has forgotten 
there was a war, when the news is talking  
about other wars. When the war is over 
there will be the war of remembering  
and forgetting, the war  
of trying to sleep and trying to awaken, the war  
of standing each morning at the window 
where the sunlight still enters and floods the room, 
and looking outside 
one more day at all  
that is not there to return to.1  
Since I began my studies at Radboud University – and as a result of my many 
travels – I have been interested in various global issues. After Thomas Mertens’ 
inspiring course on Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust Wars, the morality of war 
and peace stuck in my mind. For quite some years now, I have been working on 
this subject as I prepared my doctoral thesis about jus post bellum; justice after 
war. With mixed feelings, I must admit. On the one hand, this subject is as 
interesting to me as ever before. Never during the course of my research have I 
found my topic to be dull or did I feel as if I could not go on (as plenty of PhD 
candidates seem to experience). Justice after war is an important topic, both 
theoretically under-examined, and extremely relevant given our current reality. 
The news broadcasts from around the world show us the moral dilemmas and 
practical complexities of warfare and peace building. There are many examples 
in which it truly seems that, as the poem above expresses, the real war only 
began when the official war was over. It felt rewarding to work on the topic of 
post war justice; a topic of genuine significance. On the other hand, it is an 
indisputably grave topic and there were moments when I struggled with this. At 
times, I was intensely sad in the realization of the horrific things that happen in 
war, and the devastation, grief and regret that reign in war’s aftermath. The 
poem also reflects that human side of war. And although this research is 
1 Anita Barrows, ‘Poem in Time of War, 2006 (Lebanon, Palestine)’, in: Ontario Review 
2014, 68/ 16, p. 76. 
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theoretical, I always realized that it deals with real and intense suffering of 
people like me, my children, family and friends, that happen to live in one of the 
world’s many (former) warzones.  
In spite of such mixed feelings, I feel very fortunate for having had the 
opportunity to write this doctoral thesis. Writing this would not have been 
possible without help, and it gives me enormous pleasure to thank those people 
who supported me. It was (and is!) wonderful to work at the Law Faculty of the 
Radboud University. My gratitude goes out to Thomas Mertens, whose 
enthusiasm in teaching the various courses in the field of philosophy of law was 
contagious. He had confidence in me and my capability to write a doctoral 
thesis (more than I had in myself at the time), helped me set up the research 
proposal, supervised my work, and continued to demonstrate this confidence 
and support throughout the research project. I very much appreciate the bond 
that we have developed in these years, and would like thank him for his ongoing 
support. A special thanks also goes out to Ronald Tinnevelt. Since the moment 
that I felt confident enough to actually let him read my work, he has been a 
tremendous help in the writing process. Top-notch when it comes to analytical 
thinking, he was always critical, but helped me structure my thoughts and 
getting my line of argument more coherent. His door is always open for silly 
(and sometimes rather bold) jokes or serious discussions (although the earplugs 
might be a sign to the contrary).   
Additionally, I would like to thank my other (former) colleagues of the 
Philosophy of Law section: Peter Bal, Eric Boot, Edith Brugmans, Edwin van 
Dijk, Thea van den Dobbelsteen, Sebastiaan Garvelink, Sylvie Loriaux, Mathijs 
Notermans, Maria Stadelman, Pol van de Wiel, Robert Jan Witpaard, Petra van 
Valkenburg, and Derk Venema. Although there is quite a high turnover, the 
sense of comradery in our department remains strong, including enjoyable 
informal dinners and excursions in the past years. Many at the Law Faculty 
know my guilty pleasure: DE Café’s ‘Tre Montane’ (strong coffee with an 
excessive helping of real whipped cream). Thanks to Janine van Dinther, 
Patty Emaus, Saskia Hillegers, Mirjam Krommendijk, Maarten Kuipers, and 
Ellen Nissen for our great coffee breaks. Thanks to Ricky van Oers, Naima 
Qoubbane, Janine and Saskia for all the fun evenings with our ‘book club’ 
(actually a glorified excuse to enjoy some good food and wine) over the past 8 
years. I would also like to express my gratitude to Joseph Fleuren, who always 
makes time for small discussions and questions, both theoretical and practical 
dissertation issues. My gratitude also goes out to Eva Rieter, who found time in 
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her extremely busy schedule to read a chapter of this book and offered very 
useful comments on the legal aspects. Thanks to Leon Trapman for helping me 
put everything together into one book. 
When the doctoral thesis was finished (if such work is ever actually 
‘finished’) and Thomas Mertens gave his approval, a reading committee was 
formed. I am extremely honored that Ybo Buruma, Brian Orend, Bart 
Raymaekers, Carsten Stahn, and Ronald Tinnevelt were willing to be part of 
the reading committee. I would like to thank them for taking time to read the 
manuscript, sending their reports filled with insightful comments, and above 
all, for approving the thesis. Thanks to Marcel Becker for his willingness, along 
with the members of the reading committee, to be part of the Doctoral 
Examination Board. Not in the least, I want to extend my gratitude to the 
NWO, the Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek. After a 
nerve-wracking trip to The Hague shortly after my graduation, they generously 
rewarded my research proposal with a Toptalent Grant. Although I always felt 
uncomfortable with this label, I am greatly indebted for their financial support.   
There are some amazing people in my personal life as well. For over 20 
years (!), I have been fortunate to be part of a group of friends. I do not know if 
they all ever fully grasped what I was doing: “What is it that you do in your office 
at the university all day?” And although (or perhaps especially because) we 
hardly ever talk about work, they are a source of much joy, laughter, and 
distraction, which was a delightful balance to the discipline needed for my 
research. Those who did understand and who were always interested are my 
good friends: Femke Derks (even verstand op nul) and Mar Huiskamp-Robillard. 
Mar read the majority of this book, was always in the mood for a good debate 
about the material, and – being an ‘American girl’ – helped me enormously on 
the language front during the first years of this project (and occasionally still 
today). My fellow villager Deirdre Angenent and former classmate Mark 
Coolen are other dear friends who were always interested and supportive, for 
which I want to thank them. Many thanks to Sjaan Dennissen en Bep de Man 
for their heartfelt care.    
The people in my life that I am most grateful for are my mom and dad, Maria 
and Jack, for their love and for always being there for me. My brother Koen 
who, despite the fact that he lives in Singapore, is very close to me. My sister 
Saskia, who really is my soulmate. I am very proud to have her and Mar as my 
paranimfen; to be there right behind me at the moment suprême. I could not be 
any happier with the family that I grew up in, and for the bond that we still have 
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today. Jos, for his love and everlasting support, who managed, in the last 
stressful year of this doctoral thesis, to work a little less so that I could work a 
little more. Lastly and most importantly, my children: Lila, Nolan and Jade. The 
lights of my life. I am deeply grateful for the fact that they grow up in peace.  
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1. Justice after War  
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
6 July 2016: The Iraq Inquiry report finds that UK planning and preparation for 
post war Iraq were “wholly inadequate”.1 Although it took less than a month to 
remove Saddam Hussein, the UK – and this equally counts for its coalition 
partners – were unprepared for the subsequent task of peace building.2 There 
was no proper plan for postwar administration, security and reconstruction.3 
Tony Blair declared during the Inquiry, “(…) with hindsight, we now see that 
the military campaign to defeat Saddam was relatively easy; it was the aftermath 
that was hard”.4 But according to the Inquiry, hindsight was not required. 
Before the invasion in 2003, Blair was warned for the significance of the post 
war phase as the strategically decisive phase of the military operation. And at 
the same time, serious risks existed regarding the likelihood of internal conflict 
in Iraq and political disintegration, the potential scale of the political, social, 
economic and security challenges, the need for a comparison of the benefits of 
the operation and the burdens of protracted and costly peace and nation 
building, and the scarcity of international partners willing to assist.  
As is well-known, these risks materialized. Lawlessness broke out in Iraq as 
soon as the regime fell: widespread looting in Basra, Bagdad and other places in 
the absence of Iraqi police forces and criminal justice system, and a following 
crime wave that could not be brought under control.5 As expected, the UN did 
not step in and the UK and US became joint Occupying Powers in control of 
the Coalition Provisional Authority, and responsible for reconstruction and 
political development.6 In effect, de-Ba’athification of the political system and 
the dissolving of the army lead to a power vacuum which was not properly 
addressed. Security deteriorated, sectarian divisions heightened, food shortages 
                                                             
1 The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary 2016, p. 122. Online: 
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/.  See further John Chilcot et al., The Report 
of the Iraq Inquiry, HMSO, 12 vols. 
2 E.g. Michael Walzer, Arguing about War, New Haven: Yale University Press 2004, p. 
163-168. Also published in: Dissent 2004/51, available at:  
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/just-and-unjust-occupations.  
3 See also Philippe Sands, ‘A Grand and Disastrous Deceit’, in: London Review of Books 
2016, 38/15, p. 9. 
4 Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary 2016, p. 83. 
5 Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary 2016, p. 86-88. 
6 Security Council Resolution 1483, S/RES/1483. 
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increased and essential services such as electricity and water failed. Together 
with the lack of political progress, the hopes of the population for better life 
soon evaporated.7 Furthermore, as a result of disagreements between the UK 
and US (and Blair’s apparent lack of influence), oil revenues were not (as was 
planned) used for the benefit of Iraq.8 News on the abhorrent abuse of 
prisoners by US militaries in Abu Ghraib prison only fueled resentment against 
the coalition partners. The following years saw an increase in violence in Iraq: 
attacks on the coalition forces, IED’s, attacks on civilians by Islamic extremists, 
and the rise of Islamic State – amounting to a full scale civil war. To date, the 
security situation in Iraq is dramatic. On the day the Iraq Inquiry report was 
released – 13 years after the invasion – a terrorist attack on a market in Bagdad 
killed dozens, and one week earlier 300 people were killed in a busy shopping 
street.9 Although Iraq is a democracy, as was planned by the coalition partners, 
it is one of the most corrupt states in the world.10  
Iraq is not the only example of a war with a disastrous aftermath; Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Libya also demonstrate the importance and complexities of 
post war peace building.  These situations raise three crucial questions: What do 
we want to do after war? What can we do? And what should we do? The first is a 
matter of hopes and ideals, the second a matter of strategy, and the third is a 
matter of post war justice. Post war justice has come to the forefront of 
contemporary debates in the last decade, and the increased attention can be 
explained by three factors. First is the growing significance of the post war 
phase for military operations. Many argue that the character of war has 
changed. The conventional picture of war as international war of aggression 
and self-defense between two state armies, formally declared and ending with a 
peace treaty, is not representative for today’s political reality.11 Contemporary 
international wars are waged to e.g. change an oppressive regime, to protect the 
population of another country against grave human rights violations, or to 
stabilize so-called ‘failed states’. Humanitarian considerations and individual 
human rights protection have become increasingly important. This means that 
                                                             
7 Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary 2016, p. 93. 
8 Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary 2016, p. 89. 
9 http://nos.nl/artikel/2117135-doden-bij-aanslag-op-markt-bagdad.html.   
10 http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015.   
11 See further: Human Security Center, Human Security Report 2013. The Decline in Global 
Violence. Evidence, Explanation, and Contestation, Vancouver: Human Security Press 
2013.  
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the situation after the war is part of the end of the war itself, and a return to the 
status quo ante bellum is often impossible, undesirable or both.  
The second factor is the complexity of peace building. The aftermath of war 
is often extremely complex and poses a variety of more specific issues and 
moral dilemmas. What are legitimate goals after war? Providing peace and 
security for civilians,12 securing human rights, creating democracy? And how 
can we achieve that? Through occupation, purging state institutions of 
members of the previous regime, setting up a transitional government? How 
should we balance the sovereignty of states with the protection of individual 
human rights? Who are ‘we’, i.e. who is responsible for realizing these goals; the 
victor, other states, the UN? Additionally, who should benefit from post war 
action, the vanquished citizens or the victor’s companies? To complicate things 
even more, the reality on the ground is almost certain to be obstinate, confusing 
and difficult. As the situation in Iraq shows, the (ambitious) goals that are set 
prove extremely difficult to realize in practice, due to the messy reality of war 
and the different and competing interests at play.  
And third, there is a lack of guidance on the morally right course of action 
after war. Just war theory is a thriving part of political and legal philosophy, and 
is a leading normative theory on issues of war and peace. Traditional just war 
theory consists of two sets of norms: jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Satisfaction of 
the first justifies a certain war as a whole, and satisfaction of the second justifies 
the different acts that compose a war. The theory is premised upon the 
conventional conception of war between two states.13 The paradigmatic ‘just 
war’ is self-defense against unjustified military aggression. After a repulsion of 
the aggression and restoration of territorial boundaries, the just cause is 
considered effectuated, and that means the end of it. This implies that 
traditional just war theory paid hardly any attention to the aftermath of war, 
with the exception of criminal justice, i.e. the prosecution and punishment of 
violations of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. A return to the status quo ante bellum 
was long considered the just end of war – something no longer sufficient today.  
                                                             
12 For what that peace might mean, see chapter 7.  
13 Anthony Coady rightly notes that just war theory might be thought of as premised 
upon conventional state versus state wars, but that this is not essential to the operation 
of just war theory, for the system of nation states is a relatively modern invention, 
which is predated by just war theory by many centuries. Anthony Coady, Morality and 
Political Violence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008, p. 4. However, the 
modern revival of just war theory after the Second World War – ‘traditional’ just war 
theory – is state-centered and premised on international wars.  
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Hence, the situation in Iraq clearly shows the relevance of post war justice 
and illustrates a bigger picture: the changing character of war and the 
significance of its aftermath, coupled with the complexities of post war peace 
building (the first two factors). As James Turner Johnson argues: “perhaps the 
most difficult problem posed by contemporary warfare (…) is the difficulty of 
achieving a stable, secure ending to it”.14 Given these two factors, the lack of 
guidance in traditional just war theory on the aftermath of war (the third factor) 
is now seen as a problem. Because of the urgent need for a coherent and 
effective body of norms governing the situation after war, just war theorists 
note that the theory is incomplete.15 Integrating an additional branch that 
provides the needed guidance is seen as a solution to (some of those) post war 
challenges. This has led to a newcomer in just war theory: jus post bellum. This 
third branch is supposed to offer similar norms for the complex aftermath of 
war; satisfaction justifies the peace after war. That is the subject of this research: 
post war justice in just war theory, or jus post bellum.  
 
1.2 Jus Post Bellum 
 
Jus post bellum is welcomed today as part of the solution to post war challenges 
such as those in Iraq, and at first eye this is perfectly understandable.16 The first 
proposal for jus post bellum dates from 1994 and since around 2004 there is a 
steady trickle of publications on this new branch.17 In general, jus post bellum 
                                                             
14 James Turner Johnson, Morality and Contemporary Warfare, New Haven: Yale 
University Press 1999, p. 191. 
15 E.g. Walzer 2004, p. xiii.  
16 As one of the earliest advocates of jus post bellum, Brian Orend made a “case for having, 
and not ignoring, jus post bellum”. The arguments for that claim are that: this branch 
conceptually completes just war theory by regulating the end phase of war, next to the 
beginning and middle phases; it would enable just war theory to consider war in a 
sufficiently deep and systematic way; considering the justness of a war as a whole must 
include the justness of its aftermath; to fail in achieving a just peace after the war 
undermines good results from the war, even if the war itself can be called just; and 
being a practical guidance, just war theory must offer an ethical exit strategy, 
prohibiting unconstrained war termination and victor’s justice and limiting the 
negative effects of war by reducing the likelihood of internal chaos, failing of the state 
or the start of a civil war. See: Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum. A Just War Theory 
Perspective’, in: Carsten Stahn & Jann Kleffner, Jus Post Bellum. Towards a Law of 
Transition From Conflict to Peace, The Hague: TMC Asser Press 2008, p. 35-37. 
17 See for example: Michael Schuck, ‘When the Shooting Stops. Missing Elements in Just 
War Theory, in: Christian Century 1994, 111/30; Gary Bass, ‘Jus Post Bellum’, in: 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 2004, 32/4; Louis Iasiello, ‘Jus Post Bellum. The Moral 
4
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determines permissible action after war, and consists of norms that can roughly 
be divided into different categories: safety and security; political justice; 
criminal justice; restitutions, reparations and compensation; general 
reconstruction; and reconciliation. But despite that important theorizing, there 
remains a problem in jus post bellum and the reflection thereon. As this third 
branch of just war theory is relatively new, it is not fully constructed or 
crystallized and there remains substantial vagueness e.g. on the conceptual 
consistency with just war theory, the content and scope of these norms and the 
relevant duty bearers. Furthermore, it is well-established that the goal of just 
war theory is a just peace,18 but it is far from clear what that exactly is. As jus 
post bellum regulates the transition to peace, it is crucial to have a better grip on 
the concept of a ‘just peace’ in addition to the concept of a ‘just war’. Ergo, 
although jus post bellum is embraced by the majority of just war theorists, it is 
not yet quite mature as a full-fledged body of norms.19  
                                                                                                                                               
Responsibilities of Victors in War’, in: Naval War College Review 2004, LVII/(3-4); 
Richard DiMeglio, ‘The Evolution of the Just War Tradition. Defining Jus Post 
Bellum’, in: Military Law Review 2005, 186; Robert Williams and Dan Caldwell, ‘Jus 
Post Bellum. Just War Theory and the Principles of Just Peace’, in: International Studies 
Perspectives 2006, 7; Carsten Stahn & Jann Kleffner (eds.), Jus Post Bellum. Towards a 
Law of Transition from Conflict to Peace, The Hague: TMC Asser Press 2008; Mark 
Evans, ‘Balancing Peace, Justice and Sovereignty in Jus Post Bellum. The Case of “Just 
Occupation”’, in: Millennium – Journal of International Studies 2008, 36/3; Doug 
McCready, ‘Ending the War Right. Jus Post Bellum and the Just War Tradition’, in: 
Journal of Military Ethics 2009, 8/1; Inger Österdahl and Esther van Zadel, ‘What will 
Jus Post Bellum Mean? Of New Wine and Old Bottles’, in: Journal of Conflict and Security 
Law 2009, 14/2; Mark Allman & Tobias Winright, After the Smoke Clears. The Just War 
Tradition and Post War Justice, New York: Orbis Books 2010; Eric Patterson (ed.), Ethics 
beyond War’s End, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press 2012; Larry May, 
After War Ends. A Philosophical Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2012; Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday & Jens Iverson (eds.), Jus Post Bellum. Mapping 
the Normative Foundations, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014; Cecile Fabre, 
Cosmopolitan Peace, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016. 
18 E.g. Augustine already stated: “And hence it is obvious that peace is the end sought for 
by war”. Philip Schaff (ed.), St. Augustin’s City of God and Christian Doctrine, (A Select 
Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, first series, 
vol. 2), Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1887, (De Civitate Dei, early 5th century, translated by 
rev. Marcus Dods), p. 930. Available online: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf102.  
19 Mark Evans argues that we might try to trace back the origins of jus post bellum into 
distant reaches of just war theory, as I will do in the third chapter, but “as a substantive 
field of moral inquiry in its own right, it is still maturing”. Mark Evans, ‘At War’s End. 
Time to Turn to Jus Post Bellum?’, in: Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday & Jens Iverson 
(eds.), Jus Post Bellum. Mapping the Normative Foundations, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2014, p. 26. 
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The central problem that this research addresses is jus post bellum’s 
vagueness and lack of clarity. This leads to the following central question: How 
to clarify and develop the concept of jus post bellum? This general question 
results in more specific sub questions: How do we apply just war theory’s 
norms on specific wars? What was the status of (what is now called) jus post 
bellum throughout the history of just war theory? Would jus post bellum 
conceptually fit into the contemporary theory? Who are the relevant duty 
bearers? What is the content and scope of jus post bellum? What are the 
strengths and weaknesses of the main positions? And what is the ultimate goal 
of just war theory and jus post bellum? These questions demand serious 
attention.  
The aim of this research is twofold. The first aim is to flesh out the concept 
of jus post bellum. That way, this book reduces vagueness and aims to contribute 
to a good understanding of just post bellum. As a part of this analytical part of the 
research, the research topic is contextualized and pays attention to just war 
theory’s challenges (shortly discussed below). The second aim is a more critical 
assessment of jus post bellum. In order to really improve the theory, jus post 
bellum should be consistent with just war theory as a whole, form a coherent 
body of norms, should be well tailored for the political reality of today and 
effective in limiting the negative effects of war. This is the normative part of this 
research. This book ultimately pleads for modesty in post war justice, and 
defends a moderate understanding of jus post bellum, emphasizing the 
importance of allocating post war duties to responsible duty bearers. As such, 
this book contributes to the development of a consistent, coherent and effective 
jus post bellum.  
This book builds mainly on existing literature concerning just war theory 
and jus post bellum. The debate on jus post bellum is mapped and analyzed, key 
concepts, arguments and positions are systemized, and aspects of general just 
war theory (e.g. the goal and foundations of just war theory) and political and 
legal philosophy more generally (e.g. on responsibility and feasibility) are 
applied to questions of post war justice as a way to address unresolved issues or 
dilemma’s. At different points, it is shown that apparent dichotomies should be 
nuanced. Instead of opposing positions or distinct concepts, certain positions 
(e.g. on jus post bellum) or concepts (e.g. different types of peace) are better 
understood as related, to be located on a sliding scale or continuum with merely 
gradual differences. This results in a better insight in the concept of jus post 
bellum.  
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1.3 Just War Theory  
 
As this research approaches the topic of post war justice from the perspective 
of just war theory, a general outline of this theoretical framework is in order. 
Just war theory is a connected body of norms governing the different phases of 
war.20 It takes a sensible middle position between the extreme conclusions of 
realism – ‘all is fair in love and war’ and pacifism – war is never justified.21 Just 
war theory begins with a strong presumption against war, but determines that it 
can be justified to override this presumption in exceptional circumstances.22 In 
these cases, war remains an evil, but it is the lesser of two evils that is justified 
because it halts or prevents something worse. According to Steven Lee: “In its 
most general form, the basic moral issue lying behind just war theory is: what is 
a state permitted to do through the use of military force to those outside its 
borders?”23 
There is a large ‘overlapping consensus’ on the basic ideas of just war theory, 
as the correct account of the morality of war and peace.24 The theory dates back 
to Greek and Roman antiquity and while it temporarily remained under the 
radar, there was a strong revival of just war theory after the Second World War. 
And particularly since the Vietnam War, just war theory became an academic 
                                                             
20 Chapter 4 addresses this temporal conceptualization of just war theory. 
21 As nicely formulated by Inis Claude: “The issue of the justifiability of international war 
can be examined with reference to three logically possible positions. The first is the 
position that war is always justified, morally or legally, on both sides, which is to say 
that resort to violence requires no justification. The second position is that war is never 
justified, on either side; it can have no justification. The third, falling between the first 
two, holds that war is sometimes justified, on one side or the other and conceivably, 
though improbably, on both sides. It argues that, in short, war does require and can 
have a justification.” Inis Claude, ‘Just War. Doctrines and Institutions’, in: Political 
Science Quarterly 1980, 95/1, p. 84. 
22 Not all just war theorists agree with that starting point, e.g. James Turner Johnson 
opposes such restrictive view on just war theory and argues that pacifism begins with a 
presumption against war, while just war theory is about correcting injustice and hence 
begins with the presumption against injustice. See: James Turner Johnson, ‘Comment’, 
in: The Journal of Religious Ethics 1998, 26/1, p. 221-222. 
23 Steven Lee, Ethics and War. An Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2012, p. 290. 
24 Alex Bellamy, Just Wars. From Cicero to Iraq, Cambridge: Polity Press 2006, p. 4, and 
Jeff McMahan in the New York Times in 2012:  
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/rethinking-the-just-war-part-
1/?_r=0.  
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subject again.25 Michael Walzer consolidated the revival of just war theory in 
modern times with his seminal work Just and Unjust Wars in 1977. In the words 
of another well-known just war theorist, Brian Orend, just war theory is “the 
most comprehensive consideration of the ethics of war”.26 Its norms appeal to 
moral intuitions widely held by many around the world. Walzer even argues 
that just war is the theoretical version of ideas of our common heritage.27 The 
basic ideas of just war theory are not only accepted by many theorists28 – the 
theory is widely taught in universities and military academies alike – political 
leaders also use its criteria to argue whether or not to undertake military action. 
Just war vocabulary is widely used in public debates. An example of the 
prominent role of just war theory is Barack Obama’s 2009 Nobel Peace Prize 
lecture, in which he invokes just war theory and states: “that all nations – strong 
and weak alike – must adhere to standards that govern the use of force.” 29  
Just war theory has had a tremendous impact on international law. Its norms 
have been codified to a large extent, e.g. the UN Charter echoes the 
paradigmatic just cause for war and allows self-defense against an armed attack. 
The Geneva Conventions codify jus in bello norms such as the discrimination 
principle, which stipulate that a distinction must be made between combatants 
and civilians, and that the latter cannot be directly targeted. In essence, just war 
theory offers the moral foundations for the laws of war. Whenever there are 
gaps in international law, just war theory has a role in filling in these gaps. In 
this way, just war theory can also set a certain course for the development of 
international law. Hence, while they are certainly not identical, there is a strong 
relation between the moral and legal framework.  
Perhaps the strongest value of just war theory is its practical guidance for the 
real world. While realism and pacifism do not regulate war because they either 
allow all wars which benefit national interests or prohibit war categorically, just 
war theory attempts to restrict war and warfare. This way, just war theory is a 
                                                             
25 Walzer 2004, p. 8. 
26 Brian Orend, The Morality of War (second edition), Peterborough: Broadview Press 
2013, p. 9. 
27 Walzer 2004, p. x. 
28 Jeff McMahan, ‘Just War’, in: Robert Goodin, Philip Pettit & Thomas Pogge (eds.), A 
Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell 2007, p. 
669. 
29 In this speech, Obama defends just war theory and invokes its norms to explain the 
United States defense policy. See:  
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-
lecture_en.html.   
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balance between political realism and the pacifist idealism;30 it is founded on 
crucial ethical values, usually a combination of collective and individual rights, 
but at the same time it remains realistic about the possibilities of realizing these 
values in the midst of war. Accordingly, to be most effective in limiting 
war(fare), just war theory is a compromise between prudential considerations 
and such values: its norms do not want to diverge too much from realistic 
possibilities and national interests, because demanding the impossible will 
render the norms irrelevant. By proscribing realistically attainable norms, just 
war theory has the best chance in limiting the suffering of war and preventing 
the worst excesses. As such, just war theory is a balance between the desiderata 
of desirability and feasibility.  
Nevertheless, just war theory is neither perfect nor unproblematic. Three 
challenges are raised in this book, because they have an impact on jus post bellum 
as well. First, there are epistemic problems and risks of misuse. While there may 
be general consensus on the abstract norms constituting just war theory, 
applying these norms to the messy reality of war is difficult. The norms are 
open to interpretation, which means that there is a serious risk that the norms 
are manipulated or misused. Second, as noted above, the character of war has 
changed. Traditionally, just war theory is premised upon a conception of war as 
conflict between two state armies, but now the question is raised whether just 
war theory is relevant for the current political climate.31 As was pointed out, jus 
post bellum can be a partial solution to this particular challenge. Third, the 
reigning traditional (Walzerian/ orthodox/ conventional) just war theory is 
today challenged by so called revisionists as Jeff McMahan, David Rodin and 
Cecile Fabre.32 Revisionists depart from the foundation of just war theory in 
individual human rights, and question its state centric perspective, which leads 
                                                             
30 To be more precise, two distinct continua are combined here: just war theory is both 
the middle between the conclusions of political realism and pacifism (allowing or 
prohibiting war), and the middle between the theoretical doctrines of realism and 
idealism. These continua generally come together, as e.g. most pacifists reject war on 
the basis of certain moral principles and an ideal (not necessarily utopian) conception 
of a peaceful world. Nevertheless, one could imagine that these continua come apart, 
e.g. when a political realist defends the pacifist conclusion not based on moral 
principles but because that is the best way to further the national interests of states.  
31 See e.g. Coady 2008, p. 4-5. 
32 E.g. Jeff McMahan, Killing in War, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009; David 
Rodin, War and Self-Defense, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2003; Cecile Fabre, 
Cosmopolitan War, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012. See further e.g. the 
excellent Stanford entry on War by Seth Lazar: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/.  
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to different conclusions on the relation between and content of norms of jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello.  
 
1.4 Limitations 
 
As the research topic is quite broad and expansive, it needs to be limited in 
certain respects. The attention for post war justice manifests itself in other areas 
and disciplines as well: e.g. theoretical debates on transitional justice, restorative 
justice, the political promise of the responsibility to rebuild, the foundation of 
the Peace Building Commission in 2005, and the international policy strategy 
based on the three D’s: Diplomacy, Defense and Development. This research 
leaves these areas aside and operates instead, as noted earlier, within the 
confines of just war theory. This research does not address the broader 
discussions within political and legal philosophy, but nevertheless uses some 
elements of these discussions to the extent that they are helpful in clarifying the 
concept of jus post bellum within the framework of just war theory. 
Furthermore, this research confines itself to the moral framework on war, and 
so it leaves out positive international law on just war theory and jus post 
bellum.33 There is also a vast literature on the specific categories of jus post 
bellum. For example, there is an extensive debate on criminal justice; its 
instruments, the balance between achieving peace or criminal justice, and the 
legitimacy of amnesties.34 These subjects will not be taken on board; this 
research focuses on the branch of jus post bellum in general without delving into 
the specifics of these categories.  
                                                             
33 In Leiden, Prof. Carsten Stahn leads a comprehensive legal jus post bellum project 
parallel to this research. See e.g. Stahn & Kleffner (eds.) 2008 and Stahn, Easterday & 
Iverson (eds.) 2014. 
34 E.g. Ruti Teitel, Transitional Justice, New York: Oxford University Press 2000 (chapter 
2); Robert Rotberg and Dennis Thompson (eds.), Truth v, Justice. The Morality of Truth 
Commissions, Princeton: Princeton University Press 2000; Andrew Rigby, Justice and 
Reconciliation. After the Violence, Boulder: Lyanne Rienner 2001; Davida Kellogg, ‘Jus 
Post Bellum. The Importance of War Crimes Trials’, in: Parameters 2002, 32/3; Gary 
Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance. The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 2002; Trudy Govier, Forgiveness and Revenge, London: 
Routledge 2002; Rachel Kerr and Eirin Mobekk, Peace and Justice. Seeking 
Accountability After War, Cambridge: Polity Press 2007; Antonio Cassese (ed), The 
Oxford Companion to International Criminal Justice, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2009; Nicola Lacey and Hanna Pickard, ‘To Blame or to Forgive? Reconciling 
Punishment and Forgiveness in Criminal Justice’, in: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
2015, 35, p. 665-696.  
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An important note on the starting position of this research. Despite the 
revisionist challenge, which is undisputedly to be taken seriously, Walzerian 
just war theory still remains the default position in just war theory today. As 
this research aims to develop the concept of jus post bellum, it starts from this 
default position. To decide otherwise would have meant reconstructing just war 
theory as a whole before turning to jus post bellum. In order to start with this 
subject right away, the choice is made to remain within the existing framework. 
Yet, the revisionist challenge is recognized, and this book contributes to the 
adjustment of existing just war theory so that it is hopefully better equipped to 
meet that challenge. Furthermore, this choice expresses the wish of just war 
theory (as action guiding theory) to strike a balance between political realism 
and moral idealism. Overall, traditional just war theory tends to be practically 
focused and wants to be in line with international law.   
This starting position entails several premises: traditional just war theory 
focuses on international wars and has a statist perspective; its foundation is 
based on a combination of collective and individual human rights; it uses 
historical examples (as opposed to abstract simplified situations such as the 
‘trolley problem’ and the ‘fat man’35); and it is based on exceptionalism: war is 
considered an exceptional moral domain that cannot be judged using ‘normal’ 
morality, i.e. norms that regulate interpersonal relations. This starting position 
does not mean that the Walzerian perspective is fully defended here, but rather 
that it takes this as the best platform from which to launch the present 
exploration of the concept of jus post bellum.  
 
1.5 Structure  
 
This research consists of four published articles and four additional chapters. 
Most of these articles are – qua substance – included in their original version in 
this book. All the articles are adapted qua form; one article is translated from 
Dutch into English, the abstracts are omitted, the style and citations are made 
consistent, the reference system is unified, and the separate bibliographies are 
combined into one. Unnecessary repetitions are omitted, but some repetition 
                                                             
35 E.g. Judith Jarvis Thomson,  ‘ K illing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem’, in: The 
Monist 1976, 59/2; and Rodin 2003, p. 80. Helen Frowe explicitly rejects the use of 
real-life examples in just war theory, and claims that “using fictional examples helps us 
to identify principles that can be obscured by the complexities of historical cases”. 
Helen Frowe, The Ethics of War and Peace. An Introduction (second edition), New 
York/London: Routledge 2016, p. 2. 
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unfortunately remains, mainly for reasons of readability of the separate 
chapters.  
The book moves from a general to a specific level, and ultimately connects 
these two levels. This means that it begins with just war theory and then focuses 
more and more on its third branch. Towards the end jus post bellum is 
reconnected with general just war theory through peace as its end. After this 
introduction, the second chapter discusses just war theory in general, including 
an application of its norms to a particular war, and raises two challenges: the 
epistemic problems and the complex reality on the ground.36 It is argued that 
just war theory offers the most important building blocks for discussions about 
particular wars. The alternatives of pacifism and realism are presented and 
rejected in favor of just war theory. Moral principles are applicable to the issue 
of war, and they can help us judge a particular war. The norms of jus ad bellum, 
jus in bello and jus post bellum are discussed in more detail, and these norms are 
subsequently applied to the Gaza war in 2008/2009. The debate on the justice 
of that war is considered, which shows the problematic character of just war 
theory’s norms: the application of these abstract norms to the complex reality 
of today proves to be quite difficult. Since they are very general, their 
application depends to a certain extent on a reading of the facts and on political 
preferences. In other words, while norms such as self-defense, proportionality, 
and non-combatant immunity are widely used in the public debate, one should 
realize that their application is often contested, and that they are susceptible to 
manipulation. 
The third chapter provides an historical overview of just war theory. It 
outlines four major periods in the history of just war theory: classic just war 
theory; the transition to the law of nations; the heyday of positivism; and the 
revival of just war theory. The goal of this chapter is threefold: first, it provides 
the historical context for just war theory. Second, it demonstrates how the 
revival of just war theory in general – its doctrinal changes and the 
reappearance of familiar moral principles – created space for a revival of the 
third branch. And third, while it might be true that a comprehensive theory on 
jus post bellum did not exist two decades ago, this historical overview shows that 
jus post bellum is not quite new, but is rooted in the classic just war theory. This 
yields some valuable leads for a modern jus post bellum; e.g. Vitoria’s and 
                                                             
36 Thomas Mertens & Lonneke Peperkamp, ‘Inter Arma Silent Leges? Over de Moeizame 
Verhouding van het Recht tot Oorlog’, in: Ars Aequi 2009, 7/8. I have translated and 
considerably revised this article.  
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Grotius’ principle of moderation is an inspiration for the perspective on peace 
as the goal of just war theory defended in this book. This historical 
contextualization with a focus on the research topic, marks the beginning of a 
more specific focus on jus post bellum.37 
The general question as to whether just war theory needs to be extended is 
answered in chapter 4.38 As noted above, a challenge to just war theory consists 
in the theory’s struggle to keep up with the new political reality: the changed 
character of war(fare), and the often blurry boundaries between war and peace. 
One solution for this is an extension of the bipartite conception of the theory. A 
branch called jus ante bellum, preventive peacemaking, is sometimes suggested 
to precede jus ad bellum. And jus post bellum, justice after the war, is the 
welcomed branch that could provide guidance after war. This chapter explores 
what it means to integrate these branches. It is presumed that it would benefit 
the goal of just war theory that Saint Augustine already pointed at: limiting war 
and realizing a ‘just and durable peace’. However, here it is argued that there are 
several reasons why we should be hesitant to include these arguably important 
issues within the parameters of just war theory. This chapter concludes that 
only a certain form of jus post bellum conceptually fits into the just war 
framework.  
Chapter 5 focuses exclusively on jus post bellum and raises a question that is 
often overlooked in the debate: after war, how should post war duties be 
distributed?39 This question deserves attention, because uncertainty about 
specific duty bearers might lead to a situation in which no one will properly 
acquit these duties, and the critique could be raised that jus post bellum is in fact 
merely empty rhetoric. This chapter aims to answer that question by directly 
addressing the foundation for responsibility after war, using David Miller’s and 
H.L.A. Hart’s theories on responsibility, with an eye to developing a system for 
assigning post war duties in concrete situations. After an analysis of Miller’s 
theory on remedial and outcome responsibly, the conditions he suggests for 
                                                             
37 As this book is a collection of articles, it might be noted that chapters 2 and 3 were 
prepared in the earlier stages of this research. Although these chapters map the field, I 
do not claim originality or groundbreaking relevance here. They are rather included as 
contextualization of the research topic and as a stepping stone for the following 
chapters.  
38 Lonneke Peperkamp, ‘The Blurry Boundaries Between War and Peace. Do we Need to 
Extend Just War Theory?’, in: Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 2016, 
102/3. 
39 Lonneke Peperkamp, ‘On the Duty to Reconstruct After War. Who is Responsible 
for Jus Post Bellum?’, in: Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 2016, 29/2. 
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assigning remedial responsibility are analyzed in light of their potential role as 
foundation for post war duties. One additional condition is explained through 
Hart’s concept of role responsibility. The next step is determining how to weigh 
these conditions when they clash or when they point to different actors. In 
applying a hierarchy between the different conditions, a step is made towards 
developing a system for assigning post war duties. Only with such a system in 
place is there a realistic prospect that jus post bellum can function as a useful tool 
in the creation of a just and stable peace. 
Chapter 6 addresses the substance of jus post bellum.40 While it seems 
possible and desirable to integrate jus post bellum in just war theory, there is no 
agreement on the content and scope of these norms. Often, the debate on jus 
post bellum is presented as debate between so-called ‘minimalists’ and 
‘maximalists’. This chapter analyzes these main positions and the supposed 
differences between them, and argues that this distinction is no longer relevant. 
No clear opposition between two positions can be upheld, but there are mere 
gradual variations qua content and scope of jus post bellum. In order to pinpoint 
these variations, a larger perspective is chosen. It is shown that the content and 
scope of post war norms depend on two factors: the particular situation to 
which just war theory applies and the general perspective on just war theory 
and international relations that is adopted. These factors explain the general 
shift towards a maximalist understanding of jus post bellum. However, a critical 
assessment of this shift requires more clarity on the concept of peace. 
This task is taken up in chapter 7. By delving into the concept of peace, jus 
post bellum and just war theory are reconnected. As jus post bellum regulates the 
transition from war back to peace, it is crucial to have a thorough understanding 
of what that peace – as the normative goal of just war theory – should look like. 
But because just war theorists rarely explore the goal of peace and its 
implications, there are fundamental disagreements on what exactly constitutes 
the ‘just and lasting peace’ that they all endorse. This chapter offers a general 
sketch of the nature of peace. This is the basis for the construction of a 
continuum of five concepts of political peace, ranging – qua character – from 
purely negative to fully positive. After determining which concepts of peace can 
be a part of just war theory, this conceptual tool kit is used to map the debate, 
reveal and characterize implicit disagreements, and demonstrate a shift in just 
war theorizing towards a more positive concept of peace. Based on just war 
                                                             
40 Lonneke Peperkamp, ‘Jus Post Bellum. A Case of Minimalism versus Maximalism?’, in: 
Ethical Perspectives 2014, 21/3. 
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theory’s role as practical guidance for real world problems, its limited nature as 
applicable to specific domain of war, and the risk for moral imperialism, this 
chapter defends a modest understanding of a ‘just and lasting peace’. 
In a short conclusion, the last chapter returns to the three general challenges 
to just war theory. Some of these challenges remain serious areas of concern, 
and key areas of future research are pointed out. Most importantly, the 
conclusion evaluates the concept of jus post bellum and takes stock of the 
analysis in this book. Based on the arguments made throughout the different 
chapters, the shift to a more positive understanding of peace as normative goal 
and correspondingly to a maximalist jus post bellum is followed to a certain 
extent, but this book opposes a too radical shift. In the same way as just war 
theory itself seeks the middle ground between political realism and moral 
idealism, balancing feasibility and desirability, this middle ground is chosen 
when it comes to the most appropriate form of jus post bellum. This is in line 
with an important lesson drawn by the Iraq Inquiry, that it is better to have 
objectives which are realistic and if necessary limited, rather than idealistic and 
based on overly optimistic assumptions.41 This third branch can be part of the 
solution to the challenges that just war theory copes with; and is a consistent, 
coherent and effective body of norms if it is understood as moderate jus post 
bellum. 
 
                                                             
41 The Inquiry report warns for ‘optimism bias’. Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary 2016, 
p. 134-136. 
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2.  Inter Arma Silent Leges? About the Law's Problematic 
Relationship to War  
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
Heikelien Verrijn Stuart’s contribution to the Dutch legal journal Nederlands 
Juristenblad regarding the Gaza war in 2008/2009, expressed not only criticism 
of Israel’s war in Gaza, but also of the Dutch government.1 In her view, 
politicians in The Hague have the tendency to place politics above the law. A 
cynical government official, confronted with the occupation of Jordan’s West 
Bank, noted the total absence of law seeing only ‘realpolitik’. According to 
Verrijn Stuart, the reactions to the war in Gaza were covered in political 
rationalizations and deliberations, and allowed little to no room for law. One 
could however disagree with her conclusion that the ‘law’ played merely an 
insignificant role in the government’s assessment of that situation. After all, the 
fundamental criteria that were used to judge both Israel and Hamas, namely: 
self-defense, proportionality and discrimination (otherwise known as non-
combatant immunity), are all based in just war theory that could be said to form 
the basis of modern international law. Therefore, those who wish to debate the 
Gaza war cannot suffice with taking up Machiavelli without considering this 
normative framework.2 
This chapter provides an introduction to just war theory, highlights certain 
problematic aspects of (the application of) its norms, and raises some 
important questions. The following section briefly outlines two main 
alternatives to just war theory, pacifism and realism. The third section sketches 
just war theory’s three branches and the norms that compose these branches. 
These norms are subsequently applied to the Gaza War, of which the basic facts 
are described in section 4. In the next section the debate on the justness of that 
war is taken under consideration, which shows the problematic character of just 
war theory’s norms: the application of abstract norms to the complex reality of 
                                                             
1 Heikelien Verrijn Stuart, ‘Wij zullen Disproportioneel Geweld Gebruiken…’, in: 
Nederlands Juristen Blad 2009, p. 243-250.  
2 While the term ‘war’ is commonly used in philosophical debates , I am aware that it has 
been abandoned in legal terminology; ‘armed conflict’ and ‘the use of force’ are the 
appropriate legal terms (see also chapter 3). In this chapter (as in the rest of the book) I 
mostly use the term ‘war’ except when referring to legal norms.  
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today proves to be quite difficult.3 Additionally, they are very general and their 
application depends on a certain reading of the facts and on political 
preferences. Still, these considerations do not mean that one’s assessment 
would be substantially different from Verrijn Stuart’s judgment of events 
during the days in which the war was waged and what happened prior to this, 
but it does increase the dilemma’s that we are confronted with in times of war. 
After all, the problem is not between politics and the law, but lies within the law 
itself and the application thereof: international law (that is to a large extent 
based on just war theory) must be applied to complex situations in the real 
world and allows for multiple interpretations, depending on political 
preferences.  
 
2.2 The Morality of War 
 
The main modern representative of this theory, Michael Walzer, spoke of “the 
triumph of just war theory”.4 He himself contributed significantly to this 
triumph with the publication of his very influential Just and Unjust Wars.5 
Nowadays the moral concepts of this theory dominate the way many people 
think about war and peace, because it is an attractive alternative for political 
realism without resorting to the equally unattractive pacifism.  
Pacifism takes the moral prohibition on killing – especially in conflicts 
between political communities – so seriously, that it rejects war. Although a 
broad range of views fall under the heading of pacifism,6 the best known 
version is absolute principled pacifism: the categorical rejection of violence 
under any circumstances, at least the collective violence of war. More than in 
the interpersonal context, there is a great risk that violence escalates in the 
                                                             
3 As we are – in the words of Michael Walzer – ‘arguing about war’, arguing about the 
enduring conflict between Israel and Palestine is particularly fierce and heated. Michael 
Walzer, Arguing about War, New Haven: Yale University Press 2004. See further on the 
legal qualification of this conflict e.g. Susan Akram et. al., International Law and the 
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. A Rights Based Approach to Middle East Peace, New 
York/London: Routledge 2011.  
4 Walzer 2004, p. 11-12.  
5 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations 
(second edition, or. 1977), New York: Basic Books 2000. 
6 It is even stated that pacifism is not a theory but a collection of related theories. Jenny 
Teichman, Pacifism and the Just War, Oxford: Basis Blackwell 1986, p. 1. See further: 
Peter Brock, Varieties of Pacifism. A Survey from Antiquity to the Outset of the Twentieth 
Century, New York: Syracuse University Press 1998. 
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collective political context. Pacifists are usually, but not exclusively, inspired by 
Jesus’ teachings from the New Testament: ‘those who use the sword, will die by 
the sword’ and ‘if anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn to them the other 
cheek also’.7 Furthermore, there is a tendency to emphasize the negative effects 
of war. Erasmus for example, states that peace can actually never be so unjust 
that people need to opt for war. “War always brings about the wreck of 
everything that is good, and the tide of war overflows with everything that is 
worst.”8 That means, as prescribed by Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. in the 
20th century, that one must always seek nonviolent measures to address 
injustice.9 There are, however, few who accept such principles of nonviolence. 
Sometimes people are forced to use violence for self-defense or the defense of 
others, as noted by Augustine.10 Moreover, one cannot generalize all forms of 
violence (in wars), according to Thomas Aquinas.11 Pacifism fails to make 
morally relevant distinctions. It really does make a difference whether violence 
is used for self-defense or takes the form of genocide and terror.  
For a similar reason, the school of so-called realism does not suffice. Realists 
reject the idea that moral principles are altogether applicable to international 
affairs. By stating that moral distinctions do not matter, violence is reduced to 
some unavoidable aspect of human nature, not held in check by anyone’s free 
will. Consequently, the international arena is characterized by struggle and 
power; and war is simply a part of this political reality. This resembles 
Machiavelli’s impression of political history as a combination of virtu and 
                                                             
7 Holy Bible, New International Version 2011,  Matthew 26.52 and 5.38-5.39. 
8 Desiderius Erasmus, The Education of a Christian Prince, New York: Colombia 
University Press 1936 (Institutio Principis Christiani, 1532, translated by Lester Born), 
p. 234. 
9 See e.g. Michael Nojeim, Gandhi and King. The Power of Nonviolent Resistance, 
Westport: Praeger Publishers 2004; Mohandas Gandhi, An Autobiography or the Story 
of my Experiments with Truth, Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House 1959 (1927-
1929, translated by Mahadev Desai); Mohandas Gandhi, Non-Violence in Peace and 
War, Ahmedabad: Navajihan Publishing House 1962 (1942-1949, translated by 
Mahadev Desai); Martin Luther King, Why We Can’t Wait, New York: The American 
Library 1963.  
10 Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 1993 
(De Libero Arbitrio, late 4th century, translated by Thomas Williams), Book 1, 5, p. 8-10. 
11 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, New York: Benzinger Brothers 1947 (1265, 
translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province), question 64, art. 7. 
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fortuna, over which people have little control.12 Some, like Hobbes, believe that 
violence between men can only be tamed to a certain degree through repression 
in the hands of a ‘Leviathan’, but this is not possible between sovereign nations. 
Here, all that matters are national interests; the raison d’Etat.13 This position is 
also unpersuasive, since it disregards the significance of moral dimensions in 
war, as war is clearly continuously presented as either just or unjust. Moreover, 
moral arguments seem to influence the course of battle. According to Walzer, 
the Vietnam War debate was held in the vocabulary of just war theory, namely 
by appealing to just or unjust causes and to certain military strategies and means 
of warfare which were considered either just or unjust. In a recent interview, the 
former Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud Olmert, declared that in times of war 
public opinion on the justness of war is of the greatest importance.14 
 
2.3 The Elements of a Just War 
 
According to just war theory, moral principles are applicable to the 
international realm. The issue of war is therefore subjected to morality, 
contrary to the premise of realism. But, contrary to pacifism, the application of 
moral principles to the issue of war does not mean that war is never justified. 
Although war is morally problematic for both pacifists and just war theorists, 
and the latter are reluctant to approve of war, they do acknowledge that there 
are exceptional situations in which a war can be justified. At times, a war is 
simply a necessary evil in order to prevent a greater evil. That is why it is 
justified to wage a war in such circumstances. Furthermore, it is important that 
the war is conducted in accordance with certain moral criteria; after all, not all 
violence is allowed in war. Only under these conditions can one speak of a justly 
waged war. Lastly, just war theory acknowledges that peace needs to be 
reestablished after the war. Hence, three branches today compose just war 
theory: jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum.15  
                                                             
12 Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, London: Penguin 1961 (Il Principe, 1532, translated by 
George Doll). 
13 Richard Tuck (ed.), Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2007 (Leviathan, 1651). 
14 Ehud Olmert, ‘The Time has Come to Say these Things’, in: The New York Review of 
Books 2008, 55/19.  
15 It must be noted here that there is no unanimity on the precise contents of just war 
theory. Throughout history, the meaning of all of just war theory’s norms is debated, 
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First, the criteria that determine whether waging a war is justified need to be 
specified. These criteria are: just cause; legitimate authority; right intention; last 
resort; reasonable chance for success; and proportionality. The just cause 
criterion is considered the most important element of jus ad bellum. Surely, war 
is a morally tricky and sensitive undertaking and arms should be taken up only 
for very serious reasons. Throughout the history of just war theory, various 
causes have been granted such importance. In Thomas Aquinas’ age, freeing the 
Holy Land; later, standing up for the rights of oppressed fellow Christians or 
fellow nationals outside territorial borders; securing commercial interests 
abroad or the principle of the open sea; but what always counted was the 
protection of territorial integrity and political independence of a political 
community. To this day, responding to aggression is seen as a just cause for 
war.16 Aggression is a violation of the ‘law’ – that is, both international law and 
morality – and is thus an evil that can justifiably be addressed by war as a way of 
righting the wrong.  
Regarding the criterion of legitimate authority: a decision on something as 
serious as initiating war can only be taken by the highest, legitimate power. Of 
course the question who this highest power is, has long been debated within 
just war theory. In the medieval context of feudal, vertical division of power, 
many claimed that highest power: royalty and bishops, counts and kings. Since 
the rise of nation states in the modern era and the resulting horizontal division 
of sovereignty, the answer for the question on legitimate authority seems to 
have been found in the (nation) state. Each state is sovereign, which means that 
it is not subject to outside powers.17 Being the highest power would grant each 
state the authority to declare war. However, an international legal order has 
developed in the meantime. According to the Charter of the United Nations, 
the use of force can be justified only in two ways, i.e. in accordance with the 
Security Council’s authority and as a self-defensive response to an armed attack 
from another state.18  
                                                                                                                                               
and this is still the case today. The aim of this section is to outline the general consensus 
on traditional (Walzerian) just war theory and its central arguments.   
16 Article 51 UN Charter and e.g. Walzer 2000, p. 51-73.  
17 The concept of political sovereignty is complex and controversial; this will be 
addressed in more detail in chapter 5.  
18 The question whether the right to national self-defense can be seen as parallel to 
personal self-defense will not be addressed here. For a powerful piece against this so-
called ‘domestic analogy’ see e.g.: David Rodin, War and Self-Defence, Oxford: 
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The other just war criteria are also important.19 They determine that a war 
can only be initiated with the right intention. The intention behind the use of 
force must lie in repairing injustice, i.e. addressing the just cause for war, and 
not in private gain, revenge or the seeking of glory. Those who want to wage a 
just war, must do so with pure intentions. Furthermore, waging war is only 
justified when all other alternatives for repairing the injustice have been 
exhausted. War is an ultimum remedium: all non-violent methods to right the 
wrong must be exhausted. Precisely because of the risk of escalation once war is 
unleashed, and the high amount and severity of the damage, destruction and 
deprivation it causes, the instrument of war can only be used as a last resort. 
The final two criteria are strongly linked. The use of military force is only 
justified when there is a reasonable chance that the war will be a success. 
Pointless wars and mass violence are a waste of human lives and resources, and 
are therefore prohibited. Moreover, the damage that a war will cause must be 
weighed against the future benefits of war. In other words, the costs of waging 
the war need to be outweighed by the benefits it will achieve. This criterion is 
also known as ‘macro’ proportionality. In theory, it should not be easy to meet 
these criteria. War is a heavy instrument that should be used restrictively and 
with extreme caution.  
Secondly, one can debate whether a war has or has not been justly waged. 
Based on jus in bello, maximal efforts must be made to minimize the violence of 
war as much as possible. Three criteria fall under jus in bello: necessity, 
proportionality and discrimination.20 The necessity criterion generally implies 
that a specific military action can only be employed when it is useful and 
necessary from a strategic perspective. No more violence may be used than 
necessary to achieve the goal, for example gaining military advantage or 
                                                                                                                                               
Clarendon Press 2003. In general, the revisionist challenge to traditional just war 
theory is discussed (in a little more detail) elsewhere in this book.  
19 In international law, the criteria of necessity and proportionality are not codified in the 
Charter but recognized in customary international law, reaffirmed by the International 
Court of Justice in: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment, ICJ Reports, 1986 ICJ 14, 181; Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996; Oil Platforms 
(Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), ICJ Reports 2003; and Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2005. See further Christine Gray, ‘The Use of Force and the 
International Legal Order’, in: Malcolm Evans (ed.), International Law, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2014, p. 628. 
20 Chapter 3 shortly highlights the historical roots of these principles.  
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winning a certain battle. In addition, proportionality demands that the 
consequences of a specific military action must be weighed against the objective 
that it will achieve. Proportionality, in this case, is applied at a ‘micro’ level. The 
criteria of necessity and proportionality are closely related:21 they are 
consequentialist motivations for limiting the violence of war, and so the 
number of casualties and the level of destruction. They determine that the use, 
amount and sort of the military violence are in accordance with its objective. 
Neutralizing a small battalion of rebels only justifies the use of violence that is 
necessary and proportional to do just that. 
The principle of discrimination determines that a distinction must be made 
between legitimate and illegitimate targets; i.e. between combatants and non-
combatants. Since civilians (or non-combatants) are ‘innocent’,22 their 
immunity from the violence of war must be respected. That is why the principle 
of discrimination is also referred to as non-combatant immunity. This involves 
a deontological limitation of violence: the parties waging the war must 
distinguish sharply between those who are and those who are not involved in 
battle, i.e. those who are ‘innocent’ and those who are not. Hence, non-
combatants are immune even if such an attack could have strategic benefits. Just 
war theorists usually argue that combatants are considered to have renounced 
their right not to be killed when they join the army, bear arms and pose a threat 
to other combatants.23 This way, combatants enter an alternative moral domain 
when deployed in which they can be targeted and potentially hurt or killed. The 
acts of violence in war are therefore limited to tactical-military targets; war 
should be an affair restricted to soldiers and may not be extended to the civilian 
population or civilian targets.  
Hence, jus in bello determines that targets can only be deemed legitimate if 
they truly contribute to the military operation and ensure minimum hindrance 
to civilians. However, it is impossible to completely avoid civilians and civilian 
targets in war and accordingly, categorically prohibiting civilian casualties 
                                                             
21 But not identical, see Helen Frowe, The Ethics of War and Peace. An Introduction (second 
edition), New York/London: Routledge 2016, p. 110-117. 
22 Obviously, not necessarily ‘innocent’ in any moral sense. See further: Steven Lee, Ethics 
and War. An Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012, p. 168. 
23 See e.g. Brian Orend, The Morality of War (second ed.), Peterborough: Broadview Press 
2013, p. 112-119, and the excellent Stanford entry on War by Seth Lazar: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/.  
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would make war impossible to wage.24 Just war theory is ‘realistic’ enough to 
acknowledge this and accepts an exception to the non-combatant immunity. 
Sometimes ‘collateral damage’ is unavoidable and to a certain extent civilian 
casualties and destruction of civilian objects is the price that must be paid in a 
just war. The recognition of such unavoidable collateral damage does not make 
it acceptable to directly (intentionally) attack the civilian population. Such 
damage is only allowed when it is an ‘indirect effect’ of a certain necessary and 
proportional military act.  
The third branch of just war theory is jus post bellum, which offers criteria 
that prevent the occurrence of ‘victor’s justice’. It so contributes to limiting the 
negative effects of war, by proscribing that efforts are made to avoid e.g. taking 
economic advantage of the defeated enemy, installing a puppet regime, or 
generally imposing unjust and punitive peace terms. While jus post bellum 
existed in classic just war theory, it is a relative newcomer in contemporary just 
war theory. Therefore, its criteria are not fully crystallized. Nevertheless, often 
considered essential for jus post bellum are: creating safety and security in the 
war affected area, achieving some form of reconstruction, compensation and 
reparations for the damage of war, and pursuing criminal justice for crimes that 
have been committed both before and in the war. In conclusion, these criteria of 
jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum create an image of a just war that is 
initiated by one of the parties with just cause, waged by both parties in a limited 
fashion, and which ends with a just and lasting peace.  
Finally, it is important to emphasize that according to most just war 
theorists, the criteria of the branches are generally independently valid. As such, 
it is possible that a war is started without meeting the jus ad bellum criteria, but 
waged in accordance with jus in bello and jus post bellum. Similarly, it is possible 
that a just war, waged in accordance with jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
nevertheless violates jus post bellum etcetera.25 The demands of each branch 
exist separately from each other and there are good reasons for this. In 
principle, a war cannot be just from both sides; there is likely to be at least one 
just and one unjust party. If jus in bello and jus post bellum would depend on the 
jus ad bellum, there would be a more serious risk of noncompliance (of the 
unjust party) with the laws of war. Moreover, the combatants fighting the war 
                                                             
24 Lee 2012, p. 173-175. 
25 In general, this ‘independence thesis’ is today challenged by the revisionists as Jeff 
McMahan.  
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are usually not able to determine whether the cause they are fighting for is just 
or not. They are merely ordered to engage in battle. The best way to ensure that 
the war does not escalate, is by regarding the branches as independent.26 The 
warring parties will be more inclined to comply with the rules of military 
necessity, proportionality and discrimination and the rules of jus post bellum 
after the war when the independence of these branches is emphasized. 
 
2.4 Course of the Gaza war  
 
Before examining the debate triggered by this war, a basic rendering of the facts 
is provided.27 The war started on December 19, 2008 when the six-month truce 
between Hamas and Israel ended. Both parties blamed each other for violating 
the conditions of this truce: Israel was accused of not (sufficiently) re-opening 
the border and of launching a military attack into Gaza territory on November 
4,28 and Hamas was accused of failing to stop rocket attacks on Israel. After an 
increase in the numbers of (now more sophisticated) rocket attacks on Israel 
after the end of the truce, Israel launched ‘Operation Cast Lead’ on December 
27, with air attacks on Gaza.29 On January 3, 2009 a ground offensive was 
dispatched: Israeli troops crossed the border. The war lasted for about three 
weeks. Although discussion remains regarding the exact number of victims, it is 
clear that the fighting resulted in over 1300 Palestinian and 13 Israeli deaths.30  
                                                             
26 See e.g. Henry Shue, ‘Laws of War’, in: Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas (eds.), in: 
The Philosophy of International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010, p. 511-530. 
Despite those arguments, Brian Orend in fact does make this point: “failure to meet jus 
ad bellum results in automatic failure to meet jus in bello and jus post bellum. Truly: once 
you’re an aggressor in war, everything is lost to you, morally.” Orend 2013, p. 188.  
27 Unfortunately, a substantive simplification of the complexity of the situation is 
inevitable here.  
28 Due to Israel adopting the controversial ‘targeted killings’ policy, there were regular 
attacks throughout, see e.g.: Thomas Mertens, ‘De Hoornen van het Altaar. Het Hoog 
Gerechtshof van Israël over “Doelgericht Doden”’, in: Olaf Tans et al. (eds.), De 
Grenzen van het Goede Leven, Nijmegen: Ars Aequi Libri 2009, p. 117-126.  
29 According to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that operation had two objectives: “to 
stop the bombardment of Israeli civilians by destroying Hamas' mortar and rocket 
launching apparatus and infrastructure, and to reduce the ability of Hamas and other 
terrorist organizations in Gaza to perpetrate future attacks.” See: Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, ‘FAQ: The Operation in Gaza – Factual and Legal Aspects, 16 August 2009, 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Pages/FAQ-Operation_in_Gaza-
Legal_Aspects.aspx.  
30 Israel’s position is that there were 1166 Palestinian deaths. According to the OCHA 
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On January 17 and 18, Israel and Hamas respectively declared a unilateral 
ceasefire. Israel was evidently the ‘victorious party’, and achieved its goal of 
destroying the military capability of Hamas and reducing rocket attacks into 
Israeli territory. In addition to the casualties and many more people that were 
otherwise injured, houses, government buildings, factories, roads and health 
facilities were destroyed (e.g. nearly half of the health facilities in the Gaza 
Strip).31 Around 51.000 Gazans were left homeless.32 Hence, the following 
humanitarian crisis in Gaza was the direct result of the three week war.33 Due 
to the continued blockade, international organizations encountered major 
difficulties in delivering humanitarian assistance, despite the fact that 
international organizations and over fifty states donated money to provide such 
assistance.  
The violence between Israel and Hamas immediately led to a series of 
reactions, in which the language of just war theory was regularly used. The 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ban Ki Moon, condemned both 
Israel’s ‘excessive violence’ which victimized civilians and Palestinian militants’ 
constant rocket attacks. The Security Council drafted Resolution 1860 that 
dictated, amongst other things, an immediate ceasefire and Israel’s withdrawal 
                                                                                                                                               
report, the death toll stands at 1383; according to B’Tselem at 1387 and Richard Falk, 
the United Nations special rapporteur on Palestinian human rights, puts the number at 
1434. See respectively: http://www.jpost.com/Israel/IDF-releases-Cast-Lead-casualty-
numbers; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
Occupied Palestinian Territory (OCHA-oPt), Locked in. The Humanitarian Impact of 
Two Years of Blockade on the Gaza Strip, 2009 (Special Focus Report), p. 12; B’Tselem, 
The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, 
B’Tselem’s Investigation of Fatalities in Operation Cast Lead, 2009; and Richard Falk, 
Human Rights Situation in Palestine and other Occupied Arab Territories: Report of 
the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories 
Occupied since 1967, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/20, 2009 (Falk Report), p. 6. See further 
Human Rights in Palestine and other Occupied Arab Territories, Report of the United 
Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict, A/HRC/12/48 2009 (Goldstone 
Report), p. 90-92.  
31 The Special Focus Report 2009 further describes the devastating impact of the Cast 
Lead Operation on different aspects of the livelihoods of the Gazans such as 
destruction of the private sector, rise of unemployment, food insecurity, health 
insecurity.  
32 Falk Report 2009, p. 7. 
33 International Committee of the Red Cross, Gaza. 1.5 Million People Trapped in Despair, 
2009. See: https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/gaza-report-icrc-eng.pdf.  
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from Gaza.34 The United States abstained from voting on the Resolution, as 
former President Bush blamed Hamas for causing the conflict and recognized 
Israel’s appeal to self-defense.35 Many other nations called for an immediate 
end to the violence and international legal scholars were critical of Israel’s claim 
to self-defense.36  
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Palestinian human rights, Richard 
Falk, sharply accused Israel, particularly in his final report on February 11, 
2009.37 Although Falk’s position was controversial, since some accused him of 
being biased against Israel, many of his findings were later confirmed by the 
United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict lead by Richard 
Goldstone.38 Falk’s legal arguments can easily be translated into just war 
language. According to Falk there were no just grounds for the Israeli attack on 
Gaza; the jus ad bellum was violated. He based this conclusion on the following 
considerations: first of all, the war was not a “last resort” and Israel was the 
initial aggressor because of the earlier military intervention in November 
2008.39 Secondly, there was no just cause and thus a casus belli lacked. The truce 
was reasonably successful: for the most part, Hamas kept to the agreement to 
stop rocket attacks, in spite of the fact that Israel did not fulfill its commitment 
to open trade zones to Gaza. Falk furthermore states that being an occupying 
                                                             
34 United Nations Security Council Resolution, UN Doc. SC/9567 (2009). This is a 
strong indication of the illegality of operation ‘Cast Lead’, as “it is generally accepted 
that a condemnation (by the General Assembly or Security Council) of a use of force is 
strong evidence of its illegality”. Gray 2014, p. 620. 
35 For example, see: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/ 01/05/ 
AR2009010501150.html?wprss=rss_world.  
36 In the US for example, a group of international lawyers and academics, among them 
e.g. Ian Brownlie, stated in a letter to the Sunday Times that they “categorically reject” 
Israel’s claim to self-defense as recognized in article 51 UN Charter. Reprinted e.g. at: 
http://www.juancole.com/2009/01/this-letter-of-attorneys-and-academics.html.  
37 Falk Report 2009.   
38 Goldstone Report 2009. With hindsight, Goldstone (but not the other authors) 
withdraws some of the conclusions drawn in this report (e.g. that Israel intentionally 
targeted civilians) in 2011. See:  
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/reconsidering-the-goldstone-report-on-
israel-and-war-crimes/2011/04/01/AFg111JC_story.html?utm_term=.54f4d0a155d2. 
For the Israeli response to the Goldstone Report see the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
‘Gaza Operation Investigations. An Update’:  
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Pages/Gaza_Operation_Investigatio
ns_Update_Jan_2010.aspx.  
39 Falk Report 2009, p. 8-10. 
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power makes Israel’s claim to self-defense problematic.40 Third, the war was 
“grossly disproportionate” both at the macro and micro level.41 Because of the 
difficulty to discriminate between civilians and combatants in the densely 
populated Gaza and sealing off Gaza’s borders so that civilians could not flee 
the war zone, it is well possible that Israel’s bombardments were ‘inherently 
illegal’.42 Hereby, Falk suggests – and that is not self-evident – that jus ad bellum 
fails when the war cannot be waged in accordance with jus in bello.  
 
2.5 The Debate on the Justness  
 
The language of just war theory also resounds in the Dutch debate on Israel’s 
military operation in Gaza and revolved mainly on the elements of self-defense, 
proportionality and non-combatant immunity. This section shows that these 
criteria can be used either to claim that the war was just, or to claim that it was 
unjust. Here lies the problematic nature of the just war criteria: they are very 
general, are applied to extremely complex situations, and that application 
depends on how facts and circumstances are evaluated.  
Former Prime Minister Balkenende called the conflict a difficult issue, but he 
still attributed the breakdown of the truce to Hamas’ rocket attacks.43 In a letter 
to the House of Representatives, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote 
that Israel was certainly attacked by rockets and mortars prior to the military 
actions in Gaza. Israel had the right to use military action to defend itself.44 As 
far as the Netherlands was concerned, Israel had met the most important jus ad 
bellum criterion of a just cause. Furthermore, proportionality played a major 
role in the Dutch government’s reaction and the public debate. The former 
Prime Minister was adamant in not calling Israel’s actions disproportional, even 
                                                             
40 “There exists here a complex and unresolved issue as to whether an occupying Power 
can claim self-defense in relation to an occupied society”. Falk Report 2009, p. 14.  
41 Falk argues that “it would appear that the air, ground and sea attacks by Israel were 
grossly and intentionally disproportionate when measured against either the threat 
posed or harm done, as well as with respect to the disconnect between the high level of 
violence relied upon and the specific security goals being pursued”. Falk Report 2009, 
p. 10.  
42 Which would constitute “a war crime of the greatest magnitude under international 
law”. Falk Report 2009, p. 6. 
43 NOS interview with the Prime Minister on January, 9 2009:  
www.minaz.nl/Actueel/Radio_ en_televisieteksten/2009/ Januari/Minister_ president 
_Balkenende_ over_de_situatie_in_de_ Gazastrook.  
44 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 23 432, nr. 266, p. 5.  
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though he acknowledged that certain images were “painful to watch”.45 
According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ letter to the House of 
Representatives Israel’s actions needed to be “proportional and necessary”.46 
Still, the government generally refrained from concrete comments and wanted 
to await a formal investigation.47 In general, the reactions of various Dutch 
ministers suggest that the war was considered self-defense against Hamas’ 
aggression and that the violence was not directly aimed at the population in 
Gaza. Ergo, the Gaza war could be considered a just war.  
As Falk’s Report indicates, the position taken by the Dutch government is 
not self-evident. The exceptional relationship between the two political 
communities involved implies that this is not a typical case of one state 
defending itself against another state’s aggression.48 Palestine/ Gaza is not an 
independent sovereign state, but was occupied territory at least until 2005.49 
This raises the question whether it is possible for Israel to invoke ‘self’-defense 
against Gaza?50 The right to self-defense in the UN Charter is directed at states 
engaged in international armed conflicts.51 As the relationship between Israel 
and Gaza is not between two independent states, it can easily be interpreted 
differently: as a relationship between the occupier and the occupied, or between 
the besieger and the besieged. According to the International Court of Justice in 
                                                             
45 NOS interview 2009.  
46 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 23 432, nr. 266, p. 5. 
47 Verrijn Stuart 2009; Despite the fact that Israel had announced, both before and after 
the Gaza War, its willingness to use disproportional violence. Former Prime Minister 
Ehud Olmert himself supposedly declared that: “The government's position was from 
the outset that if there is shooting at the residents of the south, there will be a harsh 
Israeli response that will be disproportionate.”  
See: http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL1506825._CH_.2400.  
48 See also Marko Milanovic’s comments on the jus ad bellum of ‘Operation Cast Lead’: 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/?s=gaza+milanovic.  
49 There are developments in this respect. Since 2012, Palestine appears to be a de jure 
sovereign state based on its status of a non-member ‘observer state’ in the United 
Nations, and is a party to various human rights and laws of war treaties. The topic 
remains however controversial. One could question whether this de jure statehood now 
implies the right to self-defense for Palestine under the UN Charter. The armed wing 
of Hamas can also be considered a non-state actor, and then the relevant question is to 
what extent its actions can be attributed to Palestine.  
50 According to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs: “there is no question that Israel was 
legally justified in resorting to the use of force against Hamas”.  
See: http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Terrorism/Pages/FAQ-Operation_in_ Gaza 
-Legal_Aspects.aspx.  
51 Gray 2014, p. 620. 
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its Wall Opinion, Israel occupied Gaza.52 Admittedly, Israel denies any such 
occupation since its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005. 
However, according to various declarations from the UN since 2005, Israel 
remained the occupying power because access to Gaza and all aspects of life 
there remained under Israeli control.53 Gaza was de facto occupied by Israel.54 
Does an occupying power have the right to go to war in order to defend itself 
against an attack that originates from its occupied territory? It rather appears as 
if the law of belligerent occupation would apply.55  
Even if one would claim that Israel is no (longer) occupying the Gaza Strip, 
the self-defense argument is still questionable: can a state invoke this argument 
when it is being attacked by non-state actors, such as the armed wing of Hamas? 
Although the International Court of Justice confirms that the right to self-
defense cannot be invoked against non-state actors, individual opinions within 
the Court differed and neither is there consensus among international law 
scholars.56 For this reason, is it not surprising that Israel invoked the term 
                                                             
52 “Under customary international law, these were therefore occupied territories in which 
Israel had the status of occupying Power. Subsequent events in these territories (…) 
have done nothing to alter this situation. All these territories (including East Jerusalem) 
remain occupied territories and Israel has continued to have the status of occupying 
Power.” Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, par. 165-167. 
53 For example, A/HRC/8/17; Security Council Resolution 1860. See further: Falk 
Report 2009, p. 5.  
54 See e.g. Iain Scobbie, ‘An Intimate Disengagement. Israel’s Withdrawal from Gaza, the 
Law of Occupation and of Self-Determination’, in: Victor Kattan (ed.), The Palestine 
Question in International Law, London: British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law 2008, p. 637; Yoram Dinstein, The International Law of Belligerent 
Occupation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2009, p. 275-278; Gray 2014, p. 
633. New developments – i.e. two judgments of the European Court of Human Rights 
(Chiragov and Others v. Armenia and Sargsyan v. Azerbaijan) indicate that Israel today is 
not occupying Gaza.  
See the comments of Marko Milanovic: http://www.ejiltalk.org/european-court-
decides-that-israel-is-not-occupying-gaza/.  
55 One can also qualify the situation as a blockade or a siege. Israel controlled practically 
all of the Gaza territory’s access points. It would be in violation with what certain just 
war theorists hold, namely that the party who lays sieges may only do so from three 
sides so that civilians can escape. For example Walzer 2000, p. 163.  
56 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 
Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004, par 193-194. This opinion was controversial, and 
the ICJ was criticized because of its failure to accommodate the impact of international 
terrorism on international law. Individual judges placed question marks: the separate 
opinions of judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Owada pointed to the problems inherent in 
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terrorism. Developments since the 9/11 terrorist attacks seem to point to an 
expansion of the notion of an armed attack to cover attacks by terrorist 
organization, even without substantial state involvement.57 State practice 
appears to be accepting the possibility of self-defense against an armed attack 
by a terrorist organization.58 And does any armed attack suffice as a just cause, 
or need it be of a certain scale and seriousness? The International Court of 
Justice distinguishes between an armed attack and “a mere frontier incident”.59 
Only the most grave forms of the use of force amount to an armed attack as 
required by article 51 of the UN Charter.60 It is questionable whether the rocket 
attacks from Gaza constitute a sufficiently grave armed attack.  
If Israel had a just cause for the Gaza War, the war needs to be proportional. 
As discussed earlier, proportionality has two sides. As a jus ad bellum criterion, 
macro proportionality determines that the negative and positives effects of 
waging war should be weighed against each other before a war is initiated. This 
criterion is related to the criteria of last resort and likelihood of success; these 
criteria played no role in the Dutch government’s reaction. However, was it 
self-evident that the offensive into Gaza was proportional? Surely, the rocket 
attacks were illegitimate and had seriously damaging effects, but was the threat 
posed by these rockets serious enough to provoke war? Special Rapporteur 
Falk’s statistics show that merely 11 rockets were fired in a four-month period. 
Henry Siegman reports that Hamas was in part to thank for stopping suicide 
attacks and for an unprecedented level of law and order that had been achieved 
in Gaza.61 Israel could however argue that these rocket attacks were not only a 
threat in itself, but that they posed an existential threat to Israel, a threat which 
appears to allow a much firmer response.  
                                                                                                                                               
the chosen position. See further e.g. See e.g. Gray 2014, p. 627-635. 
57 Gray 2014, p. 629, 631-633. E.g. the UN expressed the right of self-defense in 
resolutions following the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  
58 See: SC Res 1368 (12 September 2001) and SC Res 1373 (28 September 2001).  
However, the ICJ did not allow self-defense in response to terrorists attacks from the 
occupied West Bank. 
59 Case Concerning the Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicaragua v. United States), Judgment, ICJ Reports, 1986 ICJ 14, 181. 
60 Cumulative acts, such as the rockets attacks from Gaza, neither have to amount to an 
‘armed attack’. Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), ICJ 
Reports 2003. 
61 Henry Siegman, ‘Israel’s Lies’, in: London Review of Books, 2009, 31/2. Siegman is the 
‘former national director of the American Jewish Congress’. See: www.lrb.co.uk/ 
v31/n02/sieg01_.html.  
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Micro proportionality regarding the justness of the violence in war was 
widely debated. International humanitarian law prohibits “an attack which may 
be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to 
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation 
to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”.62 The idea that 
proportionality in war could be evaluated by comparing numbers and ‘types’ of 
victims – a comparison that would not be in Israel’s favor – was rejected by the 
former Prime Minister: assessing proportionality should not be a matter of 
calculation.63 Others went a step further: Harvard Law Professor Dershowitz, 
known for his defense of torture warrants,64 claims that Israel’s actions were 
‘perfectly proportional’.65 It is not about numbers: the laws of war allow 
neutralizing random numbers of combatants in order to prevent the murder of 
innocent civilians.  
Walzer also refuses to understand micro proportionality as a matter of a 
simple calculation; it is not ‘tit for tat’. Proportionality in war boils down to a 
comparison between the damage done and the thereby averted future damage, 
which is always an estimation because one can never be sure of the future.66 
Proportionality is therefore to a certain extent a subjective matter; military 
generals could argue that destroying a particular rocket installation is militarily 
so valuable that it justifies a large number of civilian casualties as collateral 
damage; others could argue that even a small amount of civilian casualties is 
disproportionate compared to such military goal.67 These are serious epistemic 
problems. Walzer therefore argues the question should rather be about 
‘responsibility’. Blame can only be assigned based on responsibilities.68  
                                                             
62 Article 51(5)(b) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions.  
63 NOS interview 2009.  
64 See also: Sebastiaan Garvelink, ‘Folteren met Schone Handen? Over het Verraderlijke 
Karakter van Enhanced Interrogation Techniques’, in: Filosofie en Praktijk 2009, 2. 
65 See: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123085925621747981.html.  
66 This was posed by Walzer in his 2007 Thomas More lecture; for this lecture and 
Mertens’ reaction, see: Michael Walzer et al., Oorlog en Dood, Budel: Damon 2008. See 
also: http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2009/05/14/israel-civilians-combatants/.  
67 Michael Walzer, ‘Israel Must Defeat Hamas, but also Must Do More to Limit Civilian 
Deaths’, online at: New Republic, July 30, 2014. See: 
 https://newrepublic.com/article/118908/2014-gaza-war-how-should-israel-fight-
asymmetrical-war-hamas.  
68 Michael Walzer, ‘On Proportionality’, online at: New Republic, January 8, 2009. See: 
https://newrepublic.com/article/64580/proportionality.  
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This is all the more pressing in asymmetric wars such as the Gaza War, in 
which there is an imbalance of military strength between the belligerents. In the 
complexities of such contemporary conflicts, applying the principles of 
proportionality and discrimination are usually not simple. An important 
characteristic of these conflicts is that distinguishing combatants from non-
combatants is difficult: insurgents operate from within the civilian population; 
they easily shift from being a civilian (e.g. in daytime) to an insurgent (e.g. at 
night); and they launch attacks from within civilian objects. If attacks in war 
need to be discriminating and proportionate, it almost seems that asymmetric 
wars can never be fought. According to Walzer therefore, a criterion of 
responsibly is more appropriate than a calculation of proportionality. 
Responsibility requires that an attacker makes a serious effort to minimize the 
risks for enemy civilians and this includes the requirement that combatants take 
risks for themselves in order to achieve that.69 Echoing Walzer’s criterion of 
responsibility, the Dutch government expected from Israel that it would make 
genuine efforts to prevent civilian causalities during their military actions. 
Causing civilian causalities must be avoided as much as possible.70   
Although the Dutch ministers were reluctant to prematurely comment on 
the war, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was certain – without a shadow of a 
doubt – that Hamas’ rocket attacks qualified as war crimes.71 Israel claimed that 
these rockets from Gaza were consistently launched from urban areas and that 
civilians were used a ‘human shields’.72 That was allegedly also the case in the 
attack on the United Nations school.73 Nevertheless, many others regarded 
Israel’s large-scale military attack as an action against a community of one-and-
half-million people, especially civilians, who could barely defend themselves or 
escape the battlefield.  
Crucial questions must be answered. Were civilians intentionally exposed to 
the dangers of war by Hamas, supposedly the defensive party? Did the 
supposedly attacking party, Israel, make serious efforts to minimize civilian 
                                                             
69 Walzer 2014. 
70 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 23 432, nr. 266, p. 4.  
71 Appendix Handelingen II 2008/09, nr. 2236. 
72 For example: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7818122.stm. A similar defense 
was used by Israel in connection to the many victims during the war in Lebanon. This 
defense was disregarded by Human Rights Watch, see:  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6981557.stm.  
73 E.g. https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/01/07/gaza-israeli-attack-school-needs-full-un-
investigation.  
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causalities? It seemed that the Minister of Foreign Affairs already knew the 
answer: the large number of Palestinian civilian causalities74 is “partially the 
result” of the fact that “Hamas intentionally positioned and concealed its 
military installations and weapons amongst the people of Gaza”.75 Thus Hamas 
was deemed responsible for the large number of causalities. Still, how 
important is the general duty to avoid civilian casualties? 76 Is hiding amongst 
the civilian population already a violation of that duty? Margalit and Walzer 
reject the argument that the duty to avoid civilian causalities might be less 
pressing in a war on terror. Using civilians as a ‘human shield’ is certainly a 
violation of the laws of war, but that fact does not diminish the duty to respect 
non-combatant immunity on the other side.77 It is important to determine who 
is responsible for blurring the boundaries between combatants and non-
combatants, but this is still no excuse for parties to violate their legal and moral 
responsibility. It seems unlikely that Hamas can be blamed entirely for the large 
number of civilian causalities; Israel’s duty to avoid civilian risks as much as 
possible is unconditional.  
Indeed, Special Rapporteur Falk suggests that this duty is so important that 
Israel should have never started the attack because of the impossibility to 
respect the principle of discrimination. However, the view that the 
impossibility to respect jus in bello might make jus ad bellum impossible, is not 
uncontested. Some, including Walzer, maintain that under extreme 
circumstances, the jus in bello can be put aside by jus ad bellum considerations. In 
its 1996 Advisory Opinion, the International Court of Justice addressed the 
issue of the legitimacy of the threat or use of nuclear arms.78 Can nuclear 
weapons, since they eo ipso violate jus in bello, be used even when conditions of 
                                                             
74 There is also debate about these numbers. According to Israel, 709 of the 1166 
Palestinian victims qualify as ‘terrorists’. According to B’Tselem, of the 1387 
Palestinian casualties, 330 took part in the hostilities, and 248 were police officers. Falk 
concludes that 235 of the 1434 casualties were combatants and 239 police officers. 
According to this report, there were approximately 960 civilian causalities. See 
respectively: http://www.jpost.com/Israel/IDF-releases-Cast-Lead-casualty-numbers; 
B’Tselem’s Investigation of Fatalities in Operation Cast Lead 2009; and Falk Report 
2009, p. 6. Again, see further the Goldstone Report 2009, p. 90-92.  
75 Kamerstukken II 2008/09, 23 432, nr. 266, p. 6. 
76 Lee calls this the ‘duty of due care’. Lee 2012, p. 213. 
77 Avishai Margalit & Michael Walzer, ‘Israel. Civilians & Combatants’, in: The New York 
Review of Books 2009, 56/13.  
78 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, 
par. 95-97. 
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jus ad bellum are fulfilled? The Court did not confirm that international law 
categorically prohibits the use of nuclear weapons in extreme situations. The 
question whether it is legally possible to use nuclear weapons for self-defense 
where the existence of a state is at stake was left unanswered. It remains 
questionable whether the impossibility to comply with jus in bello can invalidate 
the fundamental right to self-defense.  
Given the amount and scale of the damage, destruction and deprivation in 
Gaza, one can question who is under the obligation to rebuild Gaza. This is a 
typical issue of jus post bellum. Because of the humanitarian crisis, Hamas and 
the Gazan population were incapable of rebuilding the Gaza Strip. There is a 
strong moral presumption to attribute the duty to remedy certain damage to the 
one who caused that damage; whoever ‘breaks it, owns it’.79 Walzer states: 
“once we have acted in ways that have significant negative consequences for 
other people, (…) we cannot just walk away.”80 And while it is not entirely clear 
what sort of legal obligations exist regarding post war reconstruction,81 a 
judgment of the Israeli High Court of Justice on the supply of electricity in Gaza 
suggests that Israel is indeed obligated under international humanitarian law to 
allow into the Gaza Strip “those goods necessary to meet the vital humanitarian 
needs of the civilian population”.82 The fact that Israel de facto occupied Gaza 
and controlled its borders, air space and sea access, creates more 
responsibilities towards the Gazan population than would be the case after war 
between two sovereign states.  
Nevertheless, Israel did not rebuild Gaza after the war, but quite to the 
contrary, it even blocked the import of reconstruction materials (such as 
cement) on the grounds that they can be used to make new tunnels used by 
Hamas to smuggle illegal goods and weapons. As a result, many of the relief 
programs set up by international organizations and funded by states like the 
Netherlands could not be executed.83 A report on rebuilding Gaza drafted by 
79 Chapter 5 explores the issue of responsibility for jus post bellum.  
80 Michael Walzer, Arguing about War, New Haven: Yale University Press 2004, p. 20. 
81 See e.g. Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum. Mapping the Discipline(s)’, in: Carsten Stahn 
& Jann Kleffner 2008, Jus Post Bellum. Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to 
Peace, The Hague: TMC Asser Press 2008. 
82 Jaber Al-Basyouni Ahmad et al. v. The Prime Minister et al., 2007, HCJ 9132/07. 
83 Special Focus Report 2009. See also Gaza 2009 and e.g. Sabrina Tavernise, ‘In Gaza, 
the Wait to Rebuild Lingers’, 25 January 2009,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/26/world/middleeast/26mideast.html?ref=middlee
ast. 
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16 organizations, among them Amnesty UK and Oxfam International, stated 
that only 41 trucks of reconstruction materials were allowed into Gaza one year 
after the initiation of operation ‘Cast Lead’.84 As thousands of truckloads were 
in fact needed for repairing the damage, most of the houses, government 
buildings and factories were not rebuilt and many people remained homeless. It 
thus appears that Israel did not fulfill the minimal post bellum duty to 
reconstruct and provide security for the population in the war affected area.  
 
2.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter shows that various elements in the just war theory played a role in 
the debate on the Gaza War. It, however, also demonstrates two problematic 
aspects of that theory. First, the application of the just war criteria to the 
complex reality of today proves to be more difficult than it might appear at first 
sight. While depicted as a clear cut case of aggression and self-defense, the Gaza 
war and the particular relationship between two political communities involved 
show that matters are complicated: can Israel claim to defend ‘itself’ against 
occupied territory, against a non-state actor, and in response to this type of 
aggression? With regard to jus in bello, can norms of proportionality and 
discrimination be stretched in order to make waging certain types of war 
possible? Walzer suggests that Israel must make serious efforts to minimize 
civilian casualties, but that Hamas is responsible too for civilian deaths because 
it intentionally blurs the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, 
e.g. by launching rocket attacks from a school building. Does his replacement of 
the proportionality criterion with a ‘responsibility’ criterion mean that in bello 
norms are relaxed? That would immediately introduce a dangerous slippery 
slope.  
The final question concerns jus post bellum: how should post war obligations 
be distributed? It seems that the one who ‘broke it’ is responsible for the 
reconstruction of the defeated state. The special occupational relationship 
between Israel and Gaza would yield even more responsibilities for Israel than 
would be the case after a war between two sovereign states. Hamas lacked the 
material resources and Israel blocked the import of reconstruction materials 
                                                             
84 Oxfam International, Failing Gaza. No Rebuilding, No Recovery, No more Excuses, 2009. 
See: https://www.oxfam.org/en/research/failing-gaza-no-rebuilding-no-recovery-no-
more-excuses.  
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into Gaza, which resulted in ongoing suffering after ‘Operation Cast Lead’. 
This shows the difficulties regarding the distribution of post bellum duties.  
Second, the analysis of the debate makes clear that the application of these 
criteria to the complex reality depends on a certain interpretation – often 
politically motivated – of the facts. The application of just war criteria is 
susceptible to manipulation and abuse. Owing to the ‘flexibility’ of the criteria, 
different conclusions can be reached: why not argue that self-defense is based 
on the value of political self-determination, and that in the case of the people of 
Gaza this value was largely compromised by Israel’s policy of a de facto 
blockade and occupation?85  Should not the Gazans invoke the right to self-
defense in pursuit of self-determination?86 Just war theory is all about the rights 
and duties of a political community to affirm itself, i.e. not just Israel’s position 
is at risk, but also the population in Gaza. For this reason, Falk states that the 
safety of Israel and the Palestinian right to self-determination are fundamentally 
connected. In other words, the Gaza war cannot be separated from its context: 
the history of the Israel Palestinian Conflict.87 It does not suffice to blame only 
those who fired the rockets for causing the war. By ignoring parts of 
international law, from Security Council Resolution 242 to the International 
Court of Justice opinion on the so-called ‘security wall’, Israel forms part of a 
much larger problem.88 And although a simple ‘body count’ might not do, a war 
that killed at least 1300 Palestinians – including many civilians – as a reaction to 
                                                             
85 To get an idea of the severity of the situation, one might read e.g.: David Hare, ‘Wall. A 
Monologue’, in: The New York Review of Books 2009, 56/7, or Avishai Margalit, ‘A 
Moral Witness to the ‘Intricate Machine’, in: The New York Review of Books 2007, 19. 
86 Christine Gray argues that the legal question as to whether force can be used in pursuit 
of self-determination became less practically significant after the decolonization. It 
remains however extremely significant with regard to the Palestinian struggle for self-
determination against the illegal occupation by Israel. But even in this context, she 
argues, there was little debate on this issue with regard to the Gaza War in 2008/2009. 
Gray 2014, p. 623.   
87 As Scobbie notes, the Gaza war is an episode “in the broader context of hostilities 
involving Gaza and Israel.” Iain Scobbie, ‘Gaza’, in Elizabeth Wilmhurst (ed.), 
International Law and the Characterization of Conflicts, Oxford University Press: 2012, p. 
283. 
88 UN Doc. S/RES/242 (1967) and Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 2004. In that advice the 
Court found by an overwhelming majority that: “The construction of a wall built by 
Israel, the occupying power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory ... [is] contrary to 
international law.”  
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these moderately harmful rocket attacks, does really give the impression of a 
disproportional and indiscriminate use of force. 
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3.  Just War Theory in Historical Perspective and the Roots of Jus 
Post Bellum  
   
3.1 Introduction 
 
Today’s armed conflicts, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan but also in Gaza, show 
the need for a branch of norms governing the aftermath of war.1 Therefore, jus 
post bellum is welcomed as ‘new’ part of just war theory. However, while it 
appears to be a modern invention, some theorists have rightly pointed out that 
this branch is not quite so new.2 This chapter consists of a short historical 
overview of just war theory, with an eye to jus post bellum. It outlines four major 
periods: classic just war theory; the transition to the law of nations; the heyday 
of positivism; and the present revival of just war theory. Through this overview, 
this chapter provides a historical contextualization of just war theory and places 
the general research topic in perspective. In order to evaluate the contemporary 
concept of jus post bellum, it is useful to indicate its historical roots. As will be 
shown, this third branch is indeed not entirely new; there certainly was 
attention for post war justice in the history of just war theory.  
Additionally, in support of the emergence of contemporary jus post bellum, 
this chapter shows that the revival of just war theory created the conceptual 
space for this third branch. While attention was given to post war justice in the 
first two periods, it evaporated nearly completely during the subsequent period. 
Only after the revival of just war theory post First and Second World War, war 
became anew a matter of moral judgment. During this period, the theory’s first 
branches, jus ad bellum and jus in bello, were largely codified in international law. 
And although jus post bellum was not codified to the same extent, the doctrinal 
                                                             
1 See e.g. Louis Iasiello, ‘Jus Post Bellum. The moral Responsibilities of Victors in War’, 
in: Naval War College Review 2004, LVII/(3-4), p. 39; Alex Bellamy, ‘The 
Responsibilities of Victory. Jus Post Bellum and the Just War’, in: Review of International 
Studies 2008, 34/4, p. 601; Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum. A Just War Theory 
Perspective’, in: Carsten Stahn & Jann Kleffner, Jus Post Bellum. Towards a Law of 
Transition From Conflict to Peace, The Hague: TMC Asser Press 2008, p. 36. 
2 E.g. Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum. Mapping the Discipline(s)’, in: Carsten Stahn & 
Jann Kleffner 2008, Jus Post Bellum. Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to Peace, 
The Hague: TMC Asser Press 2008, p. 93-94; Larry May, ‘Jus Post Bellum, Grotius, 
and Meionexia’, in: Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday & Jens Iverson (eds.), Jus Post 
Bellum. Mapping the Normative Foundations, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014, p. 
15; Cecile Fabre, Cosmopolitan Peace, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016, p. 1. 
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changes and the reappearance of the moral principles of just war theory created 
space for a similar revival of the theory’s third branch.3  
 
3.2 Classic Just War Theory  
 
3.2.1 Cicero  
 
Throughout history, just war theorists tried to formulate the circumstances in 
which war – despite its inherent evil – is justified. In ancient Greece, Aristotle 
(384-322 BC) already considered the types of wars that he thought of as 
legitimate. Furthermore, war should always be waged for the sake of peace.4 A 
more comprehensive account of the idea of a just war, based on universal 
natural law, was developed by the Roman statesman and philosopher Cicero 
(106-43 BC). While war is wrong in principle according to Cicero, the brute 
violence of war can be justified by the end of war, which is peace. He thus 
connects jus ad bellum with the situation after the war, in which the cause for the 
war should be removed. This shows the teleological character of war: war as a 
means to achieve a certain end. It is precisely this end that justifies the often 
brutal occurrence of warfare.  
 This conception of war implicates that the victor is only entitled to stop the 
aggressor from wrongdoing, but not more than that. As such, the jus ad bellum 
limits what can be done after war. When the war is over, the situation that 
existed before the war – the situation quo ante bellum – must be restored. Cicero 
furthermore argues that consideration for the conquered people is required, 
and that those who behaved humanely during warfare should be spared.5 These 
requirements points to a spirit of benevolence on the side of the victor. Finally, 
Cicero identifies an important and central idea of just war theory, namely that 
the normal state of affairs is peace, and that war forms the exception that can 
only be justified as an instrument to protect or reestablish that peace.6  
 
                                                             
3 Hence, this chapter’s goals are modest; it opens the field by outlining the general 
historical lines, for which I gratefully made use of Stephen Neff, War and the Law of 
Nations. A General History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005.  
4 Aristotle, Politics, London: Harvard University Press 1944 (Politika, 4th century BC, 
translated by H. Rackham) book 7, 1333a, book 1, 1255a.  
5 Cicero, On Duties, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1913 (De Officiis, 44 BC, 
translated by Walter Miller), p. 37. 
6 Neff 2005, p. 29-34. 
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3.2.2 Augustine 
 
In the early centuries of the Christian era, pacifism gained the upper hand, 
primarily based on the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth in the New Testament.7 
Early Christian church fathers like Tertullian preached absolute nonviolence.8 
The Christian commitment to pacifism changed in the fourth century AD. The 
church acclaimed political power and the pacifist rejection of war formed an 
obstacle to these new political aspirations. Saint Augustine (354-430) can, 
together with Cicero, be seen as one of the first proper just war theorists. He 
attempted to unite the Christian pacifist tradition with the wish to 
accommodate military force. He thereto interpreted the gospels in a way that 
allowed for both defensive wars protecting the Christian community and 
offensive wars punishing evil.  
 As Cicero, Augustine emphasizes that peace is the ultimate end of war, 
confirming that war must be perceived as a goal directed activity. All people are 
by nature focused on peace; even men who wage war do not do so because they 
desire war itself, but because they desire peace with glory, writes Augustine.9 
Defensive wars are justified because of the necessity to protect peace. Offensive 
wars are sometimes justified because some forms of peace are not worthy of the 
name ‘peace’ and can therefore rightly be replaced with a better form of peace 
in which a particular wrong is avenged. Peace is not a neutral concept for 
Augustine, referring merely to the absence of collective violence. True peace is 
the tranquility of order; peace characterized by order and justice.10  
                                                             
7 It must be noted that there is much discussion on Jesus’ perceived ideas on war and 
violence. There are theologians that reject the idea that Jesus took a pacifist position, 
based on other quotations from the New Testament which seem to suggest 
permissibility of violence. Most scholars however seem to believe that Jesus did 
advocate nonviolence, but among them there is no agreement on which kind of 
pacifism Jesus preached. See further: Peter Brock, Varieties of Pacifism. A Survey from 
Antiquity to the Outset of the Twentieth Century, New York: Syracuse University Press 
1998, p. 3-4.  
8 E.g. Tertullian, ‘On Idolatry’, translation and revision by Sydney Thelwall, available 
online: http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/text/tertullian02.html. 
9 Philip Schaff (ed.), St. Augustin’s City of God and Christian Doctrine, (A Select Library of 
the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, first series, vol. 
2), Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1887, (De Civitate Dei, early 5th century, translated by rev. 
Marcus Dods). Available online: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf102.  
10 “It comes to this, then; a man who has learnt to prefer right to wrong and the rightly 
ordered to the perverted, sees the peace of the unjust, compared with the peace of the 
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3.2.3 Aquinas  
 
Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), the famous just war theorist of the late Middle 
Ages, regularly refers to Augustine in the Summa Theologica.11 Indeed even 
those who seek war desire peace; they want to replace a ‘defective peace’, in 
which they are at peace on terms contrary to their desires, in order to achieve a 
‘more perfect peace’.12 For Aquinas however, a ‘true peace’ is not merely the 
contingent harmony between people; true peace “is only in good men and 
about good things”.13 Securing true peace should be the object of a just war, and 
so the one waging a just war must have the intention to promote the good and 
to avoid evil.14 This requirement of right intention is part of his jus ad bellum 
criteria, alongside of the requirements that war must be waged on the 
command of an authority and for a just cause. For Aquinas, a just cause for war 
is present when a wrong is committed by the opposing actor, in which case 
punishment and restoration after the war is permitted.15 Aquinas therewith 
allows for both defensive and offensive wars.16  
In the Middle Ages, war was seen as a matter of right versus wrong and good 
versus evil. War was justified to right a wrong, more specifically, when it was 
necessary to protect a population from external enemies and to punish any 
wrongdoing. The blame for the violence was placed on the side of the unjust 
actor. As a result, Stephen Neff concludes that the waging of war was 
considered as a form of law enforcement. This law enforcement character of 
war in traditional just war theory had implications for the post bellum phase. For 
                                                                                                                                               
just, is not worthy even of the name of peace.” Augustine, City of God 1887, p. 932. See 
also James Turner Johnson, ‘Moral Responsibility After Conflict. The Idea of Jus Post 
Bellum for the Twenty-First Century’ in: Eric Patterson (ed.), Ethics beyond War’s End, 
Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press 2012, p. 21. The concept of peace is 
explored in chapter 7. 
11 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, New York: Cosimo 2007 (1265, translated by 
Fathers of the English Dominican Province). 
12 “… There is no peace when a man concords with another man counter to what he 
would prefer. Consequently, men seek by means of war to break this concord, because 
it is a defective peace, in order that they may obtain peace, where nothing is contrary to 
their will.” Aquinas, Summa Theologica 2007, p. 1308 (question 29, art. 1), 
13 Aquinas, Summa Theologica 2007, p. 1308-1309 (question 29, art. 2). 
14 Aquinas, Summa Theologica 2007, p. 1353-1354 (question 40, art. 1). 
15 Aquinas, Summa Theologica 2007, p. 1353-1354 (question 40, art. 1). 
16 Except his clear jus ad bellum criteria, Aquinas discusses important jus in bello norms as 
well, such as the non-combatant immunity, the idea of double effect, and the obligation 
to accept surrender. See: Orend 2006, p. 15. 
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one, it means that in a system like that, all actors, both the just and unjust side of 
the conflict, maintain their normal legal rights during periods of war.17 All are 
seen as members of the international community and subject to the (same) 
universal law of nature. They maintain their basic rights in the same way 
criminals remain members of the community despite their criminal acts.  
Furthermore, the law enforcement system limits the measures that any 
victor could impose on a wrongdoer. The just cause requirement implicates that 
it was considered the right of the just actor to avenge the wrong for which the 
war was waged,18 but that the war never gave rise to new rights or entitlements. 
The reason for war was the re-enforcement of legal rights that already existed, 
such as the taking back of an occupied territory.19 After repelling the 
aggression, punishing the wrongful act and extracting compensation for the 
damage done, the situation quo ante bellum was restored and an unjust actor 
resumed its normal standing in the international society.20 Postwar measures 
were restricted and should – already according to Augustine – be imposed in a 
spirit of benevolence and fairness.21 In conclusion, we can say that jus post 
bellum was present in this phase, but while jus post bellum is indeed not quite 
‘new’ in just war theory, the post bellum norms were still quite general, implied 
in the other two categories of the just war framework. This changed with the 
theory of Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1546). 
 
3.2.4 Vitoria 
 
Vitoria provides a comprehensive and clear account of all three branches of just 
war theory.22 He confirms the law enforcement character of war. To Vitoria, 
                                                             
17 Neff 2005, p. 57-58. 
18 Stephen Neff, ‘Conflict Termination and Peace-making in the Law of Nations. A 
Historical Perspective’, in: Carsten Stahn & Jann Kleffner (eds.), Jus Post Bellum. 
Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to Peace, The Hague: TMC Asser Press 2008, 
p. 78-79.  
19 Neff 2005, p. 67 and Neff 2008. 
20 See further on the implications of the law enforcement system Neff 2005, p. 57-66. 
21 Augustine, Letter 138. Augustine to Marcellinus, in: Margaret Atkins and Robert Dodaro 
(eds.), Augustine. Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 30-42 
(Epistula 138, 411/412, translated by Margaret Atkins). 
22 Vitoria was also the first to have a truly universal conception of just war theory; the 
right to wage war with a just cause applied to the Spanish as well as the Native 
Americans. Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance (eds.), Vitoria. Political Writings, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001.  
43
JUS POST BELLUM AND THE NATURE OF PEACE 
 
 
there is only one basis for a just war, namely, a wrong that has been done.23 
With Augustine and Aquinas, he holds that the purpose of such a just war 
consists in avenging a wrong. There has to be, in other words, a preceding fault 
and guilt, since “(…) we may not use the sword against those who have not 
harmed us, to kill the innocent is prohibited by natural law”.24 The decision to 
go to war can only legitimately be taken by a proper authority. Because of the 
severity of the evils inflicted in war, this authority should only wage war when 
the preceding wrongfulness is of a certain degree.25 In other words, not all 
wrongful acts are sufficient reasons for war; the heavy instrument of war has to 
be proportionate to the wrong it means to right.26 Vitoria also considers the 
proper behavior during war. He stresses the importance of non-combatant 
immunity, and states that the deliberate killing of innocents in war is, in 
principle, unlawful.27 But he acknowledges that sometimes, the circumstances 
leave no other option than to violate this principle and to attack innocent 
people.28  
His account of jus post bellum is in line with the earlier theorists of the 
Middle Ages, but unlike his predecessors, Vitoria was quite specific on 
obligations after war. The war should not ruin the people of the wrongdoing 
state, and the victor is limited to regaining pre-existing rights, defending the 
country, and establishing peace and security.29 For Vitoria – like Alberico 
Gentili (1552-1608) a few years later30 – moderation after the war is needed, as 
well as humility and proportionality. The victor can apply these principles by 
understanding himself as “a judge sitting in judgment between two 
                                                             
23 Francisco de Vitoria, On the Law of War, in: Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance 
(eds.), Vitoria. Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001 (De Indis 
Relectio Posterior, Sive de Iure Belli, 1539, translated by Jeremy Lawrance),p. 303 
(question 1, art. 3, par. 13). 
24 Vitoria On the Law of War, 2001, p. 304 (question 1, art. 3, par. 13). 
25 In chapter 2 this is called ‘macro proportionality’. 
26 Vitoria On the Law of War, 2001, p. 304 (question 1, art. 3, par. 14). 
27 Vitoria On the Law of War, 2001, p. 314-315 (question 3, art. 1, par. 34-36). 
28 This exception builds on the concept of double effect that Augustine’s introduced in his 
analysis of jus in bello norms. Vitoria On the Law of War, 2001, p. 315-316 (question 3, 
art. 1, par. 37). 
29 Vitoria On the Law of War, 2001, p. 327 (second canon). Additionally, Vitoria discusses 
other jus in bello norms, regarding the legitimate targets in war and the treatment of 
enemy soldiers.  
30 Alberico Gentili, The Law of War, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1933 (De Jure Belli 
Commentatio Prima, 1598, translated by John Rolfe).  
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commonwealths, one the injured party and the other the offender; he must not 
pass sentence as the prosecutor, but as a judge”.31 Gentili agreed that the victor 
should take the role of judge whose job it is to ensure that justice is done.32  
On top of these general post bellum principles – moderation, humility and 
proportionality – Vitoria mentions three other aspects of jus post bellum: 
compensation and punishment; treatment of hostages and captives; and regime 
change. Firstly, the just victor is entitled to recover the violated rights and – 
because the blame is placed with the wrongdoing enemy – to extract 
compensation for the damages and the expenses of the war.33 All that is 
captured in a just war becomes property of the just actor. Even if this exceeds 
compensation, objects or territory rightfully taken or occupied in war by the 
just actor do not need to be returned, according to Vitoria.34 This is justified by 
the right to punish the wrongdoer. When the just actor cannot regain its rights, 
for example what was wrongfully taken does no longer exist, it can extract 
compensation for the damage from every person in the vanquished state, 
irrespective of him being a soldier or civilian, guilty or innocent.35  
Secondly, the proper way to deal with hostages and captives after victory 
according to Vitoria, is that those guilty may be killed as punishment for the 
wrongs committed and as prevention of future dangers. This is subject to the 
proportionality principle and should be applied without cruelty and 
inhumanity.36 If however, the soldiers of the unjust actor sincerely assumed that 
they fought for a just cause – if they entered the strife in good faith – they 
should not be killed after the war.37 Thirdly, on the issue of forcible regime 
change after war, Vitoria holds that this is not permitted for a just actor. To 
violate the sovereignty in such a manner is an inhumane measure. It would 
exceed the degree and nature of the offence.38 However, there can be situations 
                                                             
31 Vitoria On the Law of War, 2001, p. 327 (third canon). 
32 Neff 2008, p. 79. 
33 Vitoria On the Law of War, 2001, p. 317 (question 3, art. 2, par. 39). 
34 Vitoria On the Law of War, 2001, p. 322 (question 3, art.7, par. 51). 
35 Vitoria On the Law of War, 2001, p. 318 (question 3, art. 2, par. 41). 
36 “We ought, then, to take into account the nature of the wrong done by the enemy and 
of the damage they have caused and of their other offenses, and from that standpoint to 
move to our revenge and punishment, without any cruelty and inhumanity.” Vitoria On 
the Law of War, 2001, p. 320-321 (question 3, art. 6, par. 47).  
37 The difficulty for combatants to assess the justness of ‘their’ war is part of the 
epistemic problems addressed in this book.  
38 Vitoria On the Law of War, 2001, p. 325 (question 3, art. 9, par. 58). 
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in which a wrongful act is so severe, or the peace and security so jeopardized, 
that the disposition of the authority and regime change is legitimate.39 Vitoria’s 
account of obligations in the postwar phase confirms that war is a matter of 
right and wrong. His just war theory embodies very much the law enforcement 
character of war. As was pointed out, this conception of war limits what the 
victor can do post war: only righting the received wrong and restoring the 
situation that existed before the wrong was committed was allowed.  
 
3.3 Transition to the Law of Nations  
 
A clear shift in theorizing about war and peace took place after the brutal 
religious wars in Europe. The Peace of Westphalia gave rise to modern nation-
states. These sovereign states needed to regulate their external affairs, which led 
to the development of certain customs and to the codification of international 
rules: the so-called law of nations. This newly developing law of nations 
differed in important respects from the moral norms of the law of nature as 
discussed by earlier theorists. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) marks the difference 
between traditional natural law and the law of nations (jus gentium), the latter 
being international law based on the will of independent nations.40 Grotius’ The 
Rights of War and Peace (1625) quickly became, and still is, one of the classic 
writings in just war theory.41 Worried by the atrocities during the brutal 
warfare in his days, especially during the Thirty Years War, the goal of his 
theory of war and peace was to minimize that brutality and lawlessness.42 
Therefore, Grotius’ point of departure was that the situation of war should be 
governed by the law.43  
                                                             
39 Vitoria On the Law of War, 2001, p. 326 (question 3, art. 9, par. 59). 
40 Being the most famous theorist to draw that distinction, but certainly not the first. See 
further Stephen Neff, Hugo Grotius. On the Law of War and Peace. Student Edition, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012, p. xxxiv. 
41 He is often referred to as the ‘father of international law’. See e.g. Lassa Oppenheim, 
International Law. A Treatise, London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1905, p. 58; and Arthur 
Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations, New York: The MacMillan 
Company 1962, p.113. 
42 See for example Arthur Eyffinger & Ben Vermeulen, Hugo de Groot. Denken over 
oorlog en vrede, Baarn: Ambo 1991, p. 17. It will become clear later in this section that 
this goal, in relation to his construction of the law of nations based on state practice, 
brings Grotius in a difficult position. 
43 “If ‘laws are silent among arms’, this is true only of civil laws and of laws relating to the 
judiciary and the practices of peacetime, and not of the other laws which are perpetual 
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In the new ‘dualist’ system, the law of nature is distinct from the law of 
nations.44 The law of nature consists of eternal and universal principles that are 
unchangeable. The law of nations consists of manmade, legal, often formalistic 
principles dealing with practical matters that are based on state practice.45 As 
the outcome of the free will of those states Grotius calls it ‘volitional law’ 
(referred to as ‘voluntary law’ by later theorists). Since these norms are based 
on the will of states, they can be changed accordingly. “As the law of nations 
permits many things, (…) which are not permitted by the law of nature, so it 
prohibits some things which the law of nature allows.”46 The law of nations is 
used by Grotius to fill in the blanks left by natural law but natural law is also 
used as a moral correction or adaptation of the law of nations. While the law of 
nations plays an important role in governing the external relations between 
states, the natural law remains highest in Grotius’ hierarchy of norms.47 It 
should be noted however, that this system of norms is not simply a dichotomy. 
Natural law is subdivided into the secular natural law derived from the rational 
and social nature of men and the divine volitional law based on God’s will.48 
The divine law has its own function next to the secular natural law, applicable 
only to Christians and representing high moral ideals. The law of nations can 
further be subdivided into the law of nations based on state custom, deriving its 
validity from consent between them,49 and Roman law jus gentium, which arose 
out of unilateral enactments by states.50  
                                                                                                                                               
and appropriate to all circumstances.” Richard Tuck & Jean Barbeyrac (eds.), Hugo 
Grotius. The Rights of War and Peace, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 2005 (De Jure Belli ac 
Pacis, 1625, translated by John Morrice), p. 1752. Online available at:  
http://www.constitution.org/gro/djbp_321.htm. 
44 E.g. Nussbaum 1962, p. 109 and Neff 2005, p 98. 
45 On the difference between the law of nature and of nations see the Prolegomena to 
Grotius’ De Jure Belli ac Pacis, see Grotius 2005, p. 1741-1763. 
46 Grotius 2005, p. 1290.  
47 Neff 2005, p. 98-99. 
48 See further Tanaka Tadashi, ‘Grotius’ Concept of Law’, in: Yasuaki Onuma (ed.), A 
Normative Approach to War. Peace, War, and Justice in Hugo Grotius, Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 2001. This is in accordance with the categorization of the types of law made in 
Eyffinger & Vermeulen 1991. 
49 Tadashi 2001, p. 17 and G.I.A.D. Draper, ‘Grotius’ Place in the Development of Legal 
Ideas about War’, in: Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury & Adam Roberts (eds.), Hugo 
Grotius and International Relations, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2002, p. 200-201. 
50 Neff 2012, p. xxxii. Hence there are three types of volitional law. The separation 
between the different norms is not always clear; it is not always obvious to what type of 
norms Grotius appeals to. Tadashi 2001, p. 23.  
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Grotius starts from the assumption – in line with classic just war theory – 
that the state of peace is the normal state of affairs. In exceptional 
circumstances when certain rights are violated, a war is justified. Regarding jus 
ad bellum, the focus is on natural law and several just causes are accepted: 
defense against (the threat of) aggression; the recovery of what is due to the 
state (restitution of a possession, executing contractual agreements or 
compensation of an injury); and the punishment of a wrong committed.51 
Additionally, Grotius considered it necessary that there be a reasonable chance 
of winning (now called the probability of success criterion). New is that a war 
can also be ‘just’ according to Grotius in another sense, namely, when the 
codified principles of the law of nations are fulfilled – for example when states 
follow the formal requirements like issuing a declaration of war.52 Interestingly, 
the result is that a war can be just and unjust at the same time: just or unjust 
according to natural law, and just or unjust – perhaps better called ‘legal’ or 
‘illegal’ – according to the law of nations. These two levels of argumentation 
seem independent.53 
Since it was Grotius’ goal to minimize the negative effects of war, he 
emphasized that the belligerents follow the same rules. This 
‘indiscriminateness’ of the jus in bello is considered one of Grotius’ most 
important contributions to international law. It demarcates the transition from 
the classic conception of just war theory to this new period. According to 
Grotius, jus in bello is based on the volitional law of nations, and belligerents 
have an equal right to harm and kill enemy combatants. While according to 
natural law it is unjust for unjust combatants to kill just combatants, this 
practice is ‘legal’ according to the law of nations.54 Hence, jus in bello becomes 
independent from jus ad bellum. Soldiers committing legal acts are immune 
from punishment, because the acts have so called ‘external effects’: they bring 
about consequences that are to be respected by others.55 As a result of this shift 
                                                             
51 Grotius 2005, p. 389-420. See for example also: Eyffinger & Vermeulen 1991, p. 18 or 
– formulated slightly different – Neff 2005, p. 97 and Neff 2012, p. xxv. Pufendorf 
confirmed these just causes a few years later. Samuel Pufendorf, On the Law of Nature 
and Nations (vol. 2, 8 books), Oxford: Clarendon Press 1934 (De Jure Naturae et 
Gentium Libri Octo,1672, translated by Charles Oldfather and William Oldfather). 
52 E.g. Grotius 2005, p. 1253. 
53 Nussbaum 1962, p. 110. 
54 That this is morally speaking problematic is pointed out by Jeff McMahan.  
55 See further Tadashi 2001, p. 45. Grotius 2005, p. 1360. 
Grotius 2005, p. 1366-1373. 
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towards volitional law to create an indiscriminate jus in bello, Grotius seems to 
leave belligerents virtually unrestrained and to permit cruelty and brutality. Yet, 
at the same time, he stresses the need for moderation, which leads him to 
correct and restrain these agreed principles in the light of natural law and divine 
law principles.56 Both just and unjust combatants are bound, writes Grotius, by 
the moral principle of moderation in warfare.57 While any citizen of the enemy 
may be killed, this principle implicates that women, children and old men 
should be spared.58 In general, all combat which does not contribute to justice 
or the reestablishment of peace, is contrary to the duties of Christians.59  
What does Grotius offer in terms of jus post bellum? At first glance, the 
situation after the war is governed by the law of nations and the broad legal jus 
in bello entitlements have an important impact on the jus post bellum. It seems 
that there are few legal restraints on belligerents: goods, territory, people and 
sovereignty can be acquired and belligerents are equally entitled to harm each 
other’s people and country. Similar to the jus in bello, the jus post bellum hardly 
imposes any restrictions after the war. It is left to the discretion of the former 
belligerents to arrange all sorts of issues in bilateral peace treaties. The power of 
consolidating the peace rests with the authority who has also the power to start 
a war, for example the king of a monarchy.60 This victorious ruler is permitted 
to take the radical decision to renounce the complete or partial sovereignty of 
its territory in concluding the peace. The moral principles based on natural law 
only come into play when difficulties arise regarding the interpretation of peace 
                                                             
56 “I must now reflect, and take away from those that make war almost all the rights, 
which I may seem to have granted them; which yet in reality I have not. For when I first 
undertook to explain this part of the law of nations, I then declared, that many things 
are said to be of right and lawful, because they escape punishment, and partly because 
courts of justice have given them their authority, tho’ they are contrary to the rules, 
either of justice properly so called, or of other virtues, or at least those, who abstain 
from such things, act in a manner more honest and more commendable in the opinion 
of good men.” Grotius 2005, p. 1411. See further Draper 2002, p. 198. 
57 Nussbaum 1962, p. 110-111.  
58 Grotius 2005, p. 1439-1443. 
59 Grotius 2005, p. 1456 and further Tadashi 2001, p. 284. A similar argumentation is 
followed regarding moderation in the spoiling of the land of the enemy. While spoiling 
and wasting their land and property is legal according to the law of nations, it should 
only be done when it results in some advantage for the other actor, for example when it 
quickly enforces the peace. In order for it to be a justified action, it should be necessary; 
a satisfaction for a debt owed; or should be a punishment for an injury. See: Grotius 
2005, p. 1457-1458.  
60 Grotius 2005, p. 1551-1552.  
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treaties. For example, an ambiguous treaty should be interpreted in such a 
manner that the just actor regains the rights he had before the war, and recovers 
his costs and damages according to natural law principle that everyone is 
restored his own possessions.61  
However, Grotius realizes that the jus ad bellum is often disputed due to 
what we would now call ‘epistemic problems’. In case there is doubt on the 
justness of the war, it is better to “make the balance even on both sides; which is 
generally done two ways”.62 However, Grotius definitely breaks with the 
traditional idea that war cannot be a source of new rights. The war is in his view 
no longer aimed at the restoration of the situation quo ante bellum, but can now 
lead to a radically different situation. This is what it may take to build and 
consolidate the peace. The goal of peace often requires, from a practical point of 
view, holding onto the law of nations. As practical solution, it is important to 
avoid future disagreement and to accept the status quo after the war.63  
It would seem that these broad post bellum entitlements conflict with 
Grotius’ other important goal: avoiding cruel measures and suffering. But, 
Grotius also stresses that jus post bellum should further be limited by natural 
law. An example is the case of an unconditional surrender. When the people of 
the defeated actor surrender unconditionally, the law of nations would allow 
the victor to do virtually everything he wants. According to Grotius, the victor 
should however be guided by the moral principles of moderation and 
clemency.64 The same counts for the treatment of hostages: according to the 
law of nations they may be killed, but not according to considerations of what 
Grotius calls ‘internal justice’. In general, it is essential to keep in mind the 
prospect of peace in the midst of a war, and therefore to let considerations of 
                                                             
61 Here it is clear, as also in many other issues, that in the law of nature, the different 
branches of just war theory are strongly connected. In many ways, the jus ad bellum 
determines both the jus in bello obligations as well as the postwar obligations. In the law 
of nations however, these branches are strictly separated which results for example in 
the indiscriminate character of the jus in bello. In this case, regarding the damages done 
in the war, the just actor to the conflict can justly destroy property of the enemy by way 
of punishment. On the other hand, the state that is engaged in an unjust war is 
responsible for the losses of the war, and based on natural law obligated to compensate 
them.  
62 And consequently, the possessions and land legally acquired in war according to the 
law of nations will remain in place. Grotius 2005, p. 1558-1560. 
63 This presumption counts for many issues that come up during the post war phase. See 
further: Grotius 2005, p. 1558-1567. 
64 Grotius 2005, p. 1585-1586.  
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humanity govern the hostilities and the period after the war.65 Thus, moral 
principles are invoked to restrict the permissive and potentially cruel 
implications of the law of nations and of arrangements made in peace treaties.  
Evidently, the new political order of independent nation states and the trend 
towards secularization in the 17th and 18th century set the stage for a different 
way of theorizing about war. The work of Grotius marks the development of 
the law of nations as distinct from the law of nature. But he never lets natural 
law out of sight. The principle of moderation plays an important role in 
Grotius’ understanding of jus in bello and jus post bellum.66 In the 18th century 
we find a further development, continuing the shift towards a voluntary law of 
nations which then becomes the dominant framework concerning issues of war 
and peace.67  
 
3.4 The Heyday of Positivism  
 
The shift towards the voluntary law of nations led to a view on international law 
as purely legal, separated from theology and moral philosophy. That positivism 
led to major legal codifications, and the validity of these norms was considered 
to be derived exclusively from the will of states. Questions of war and peace 
were seen from this purely legal framework and classic just war theory became 
marginalized.68 Regarding jus ad bellum, war became an accepted instrument of 
states in the pursuit of their national policy goals.69 This instrumentalist view 
on war is evident in the theory of Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831).70 The 
acceptance of war as a national policy instrument turned it into a mechanism 
subject to rational cost-benefit analysis.71 This led to a picture of the 
international arena as composed of independent states, solely concerned with 
                                                             
65 Grotius 2005, p. 1638-1644. 
66 Neff 2008, p. 81. 
67 See further Neff 2005, p. 86-87.   
68 Neff 2005, p. 171.  
69 After Napoleon was defeated, a new political order needed to be established at the 
Congress of Vienna in 1814 and 1815. The Vienna Congress and its Final Act are an 
important milestone in the development of codified international law. The practice of 
international slave trade was prohibited and it arranged for the free navigation on 
international rivers and certain diplomatic issues. See: Oppenheim 1905, p. 65. 
70 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1989 (Vom Kriege, 
1832, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret). 
71 Therefore Neff states that such positivism has a “powerfully utilitarian aura” about it. 
Neff 2005, p. 161-163.  
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their national interests. Peace became a matter of (a balance of) power.  
Consequently, war was seen as a ‘normal’ condition in international relations, 
in sharp contrast with the traditional assumption that peace is the normal state 
of affairs.72 
What does this mean for jus post bellum? Since jus ad bellum considerations 
were hardly relevant anymore, the limitations for the post bellum phase inherent 
in the law enforcement paradigm became absent during this period. War was 
considered to be a legitimate source of new rights.73 In the words of Neff, “the 
era of ‘victor’s justice’ had well and truly arrived”.74 Restricting post war rights 
by principles such benevolence, moderation, humility and proportionality were 
hardly taken serious during this period of positivism. Peace treaties were seen 
as a normal way to consolidate a new situation, as the outcome of unequally 
positioned former belligerents. The victor’s prerogative after the war seemed 
unlimited. The heyday of positivism set the stage for modern positive 
international law, which led to an enormous growth of codified legal rules, 
especially with regard to jus in bello. Yet, its contribution to moral theorizing on 
war and peace was meager, especially with regard to post war justice.  
 
3.5 The Era of International Organizations 
 
It could be argued that the outbreak of the First World War marks the 
beginning of a new period in the history of just war theory because of the 
establishment of international organizations such as the League of Nations and 
its later successor the United Nations. War became a matter of legal and moral 
consideration again. Traditional just war principles regained relevance. Since 
then, both legal norms and norms derived from just war theory are invoked in 
discussions on war and peace.75 Certain key principles of traditional just war 
theory reappear, such as just cause, and space is opened for (the revival of) jus 
post bellum. Gradually, war is rejected as a normal instrument in the hands of 
states; war is now rather perceived as a matter of global concern.  
                                                             
72 Neff 2005, p. 177. 
73 Neff 2005, p. 198-199. 
74 Neff 2008, p. 83. 
75 The precise relationship between the legal and moral norms of just war theory is of a 
complex nature, to which these brief remarks do not do justice.  
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The first step towards this new era is perhaps best located in the Treaty of 
Versailles.76 It imposed far-reaching ‘peace’ terms on Germany, because 
Germany supposedly imposed the war upon the Allies.77 Remarkable here is 
the reemergence of the vocabulary of just war theory: Germany was considered 
the ‘unjust enemy’. The treaty also entailed provisions on the individual 
criminal responsibility of German leaders, especially the former German 
Emperor, for violations of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.78 Furthermore, the 
treaty dealt with issues now considered part of jus post bellum, although 
principles like benevolence, moderation, humility and proportionality were 
largely absent. The peace created by the Treaty of Versailles is therefore 
regularly called the prime example of an ‘unjust peace’.79  
The emergence of just war theory also became evident in the establishment 
of the League of Nations.80 Article 10 of the League Covenant obliges states to 
respect each other’s territorial integrity and political independence, on the basis 
of the general principle that the use of force by one state against another is 
unlawful.81 While the perception of war as a legitimate policy instrument was 
not radically abolished by the League of Nations, it definitely lost its 
credibility.82 The traditional idea that peace, and not war, is the normal state of 
international affairs reemerged. The Covenant further determined that any 
war, or the threat thereof, was a matter of concern for the whole League.83 
Thus, war became a matter of relevance to the international community as a 
whole. This important notion did not exist in the previous century.84 If the 
prohibition on war was violated, the Covenant allowed for sanctions against 
the ‘aggressor’. Even though this mechanism did not work properly, it signifies 
the reappearance of the law enforcement character of war.85  
                                                             
76 http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/versailles_menu.asp  
77 Treaty of Versailles, part 8, article 231. 
78 Treaty of Versailles, part 7, article 227-230.  
79 See e.g. Helen Frowe, The Ethics of War and Peace. An Introduction (second edition), 
New York/London: Routledge 2016, p. 241 and Orend 2013, p. 22. 
80 Treaty of Versailles, Part 1.  
81 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
1963, p. 62-65. 
82 E.g. article 15.7 Covenant of the League of Nations, and Brownlie 1963, p. 56. 
83 Article 11 League Covenant. 
84 Neff 2005, p. 290.  
85 Article 16 League Covenant. As many other provisions in the Covenant, this did not 
work exactly as intended by the drafters. See further: Brownlie 1963, p. 58-59. 
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Although these developments are important, they do not constitute a full 
return of jus ad bellum. The Covenant provides only a rather vague general 
prohibition on war. It seems that it merely restricted war instead of outlawing 
it.86 The option of war remained open once certain procedural conditions were 
met.87 Another important weakness of the League system lies in its 
terminology, using the term ‘war’, whereas states often qualified their military 
actions otherwise (e.g. as ‘reprisal’).88 The resulting restriction of war had 
therefore only a limited impact. Many types of military force were not covered 
by the Covenant, and it was relatively easy for states to evade the prohibition on 
war. 89 Without a substantive jus ad bellum, the jus post bellum was limited as 
well. A further step was made by the ‘Locarno Treaties’ (1925), in which 
France, Germany and Belgium declared to refrain from aggression against each 
other, even though the Locarno Treaties still refer to self-defense as a just cause. 
Article 2 states that the prohibition on war does not apply in case of a legitimate 
self-defense.90 A few years later, the ‘Pact of Paris’ (otherwise known as 
                                                             
86 See e.g. Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2008, p. 1121-1122 and Brownlie 1963, p. 56-58. Brownlie claims in this respect, that 
the Covenant derogates from the customary rule that was already established at that 
time, entailing a general prohibition on the use of force except in cases of aggression 
and self-defense. 
87 Neff 2005, p. 292-293. He rightly states that in the medieval just war doctrine, there 
needed to be a valid substantive ground for waging war, the jus ad bellum thus was a 
positive concept. In the League system, the jus ad bellum was merely a negative concept, 
because it still allows war after the peaceful means of dispute settlement are exhausted.  
88 These variety of military actions that were not defined by states as ‘war’, generally fall 
under the heading of the so-called ‘measures short of war’. For example, military 
operations were said to be a situation of aggression and self-defense instead of war. See 
further: Neff 2005, p. 291-292. 
89 Brownlie 1963, p. 59-62 and Neff 2005, p. 296-303. 
90 See for example online: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/locarno_001.asp. The 
1930 war between Japan and Manchuria lead to a confirmation of a principle logically 
following from the prohibition on war: the Stimson Doctrine of Nonrecognition. This 
principle is important for the jus post bellum. After Japan invaded Manchuria in 1931, 
the American Secretary of State, Henry Stimson, stated that the United States would 
not recognize the legality of a situation, in this case the annexation of territory, 
established by aggression. The principle means, in other words, that actions illegal 
according to international law cannot lead to new legal rights. E.g. available online at: 
http://courses.knox.edu/hist285schneid/stimsondoctrine.html. This doctrine was 
confirmed by a resolution of the League Assembly and a Declaration on the Chaco 
War between several American states later that year. See further Brownlie 1963, p. 92-
93. 
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‘Kellogg Briand Pact’91), was concluded. It reiterated the rejection of war as a 
permitted national policy instrument,92 thus strengthening the Covenant’s 
restriction of war and putting into place a more firm general prohibition, which 
is still valid today.93  
The League of Nations was unable to prevent the Second World War. After 
the Second World War, the League of Nations was succeeded by a new and 
improved coalition of states, the United Nations. Under the United Nations 
system, the restriction of war was further strengthened. The Charter confirms 
the prohibition, codified in the Pact of Paris, of the use of military force. It 
specifically required from all its members to refrain from “the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state”.94 The 
United Nations does not solely focus on the restriction of war, but also stresses 
the development of friendly relations between states and the need to establish 
international co-operation and to promote human rights.95 The United Nations 
system consolidated not only (the revival of) jus ad bellum, but was also 
important for jus post bellum. Now that war is seen as a problem for the entire 
international community of states, peace building too is no longer seen as a 
‘private’ matter. The spirit of an international community did not only inform 
jus ad bellum, but is also relevant for the aftermath of war. The way states act 
after war is no longer a matter of discretion of the states involved.96 The 
emphasis on jus ad bellum and jus post bellum indicate that in the system of the 
UN Charter, peace has (again) become the normal ‘default’ state of affairs.97  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
 
It goes without saying that the UN Charter’s jus ad bellum system is far from 
perfect. The right to self-defense is easily invoked and the Security Council has 
turned out to be a highly politicized body. Nevertheless, the United Nations 
plays an increasingly important role in post war peace building. Its focus on a 
                                                             
91 The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, available online for example at: 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm.  
92 Nussbaum 1962, p. 254. 
93 Shaw 2008, p. 1122. 
94 Article 2.4 UN Charter. 
95 Article 1 UN Charter. 
96 See further on this argument Neff 2008, p. 85-87. 
97 In this system war again became a matter of right versus wrong. Shaw 2008, p. 1235-
1266. 
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durable peace after a war led to the 1995 ‘Agenda for Peace’ and the 2005 
‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine. A Peace Building Commission was 
established to help states in the transition from war to a durable peace.98 These 
developments show the contemporary emphasis on postwar justice.  
According to classic just war theory, jus post bellum depended on jus ad 
bellum. This meant that jus post bellum had a limited character. Today such a 
limited understanding of jus post bellum has been left behind. Jus post bellum now 
entails broader post war duties, such as the ‘responsibility to rebuild’ as part of 
the ‘responsibility to protect’, involving a “genuine commitment to helping to 
build a durable peace, and promoting good governance and sustainable 
development”.99 The UN Charter’s emphasis on cooperation between states to 
ensure international peace and security and the growing emphasis on human 
rights protection suggests that contemporary jus post bellum becomes a more 
independent branch of just war theory. Now that norms of jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello are increasingly codified, it seems time to do the same for jus post 
bellum.100 In order to do so, clarity of its underlying norms and objectives is 
needed. 
                                                             
98 UN General Assembly, World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1 2005 (World Summit 
Outcome Document), par. 97-105. Online: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-
RES-60-1-E.pdf.  
99 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect, 2001, par. 5.1-5.7. See: http://www.iciss.ca/report2-en.asp#chapter_5. See 
further Carsten Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect. Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal 
Norm?’, in: The American Journal of International Law, 2007, 101/1. 
100 Brian Orend pleads for a new post war Geneva Convention. Carsten Stahn notes 
however that contemporary international law already contains many norms that 
belong to the body of jus post bellum. “The substantive components of peace-making 
(…) are governed by certain norms and standards of international law derived from 
different fields of law and legal practice.” See Stahn 2008(2), p. 104.  
56
 
 
 
4.  The Blurry Boundaries between War and Peace. Do We Need to 
Extend Just War Theory? 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Just war theory is often said to be the leading position on the morality of war. 
The previous chapter shows that theory dates back to Greek and Roman 
antiquity and remains popular up to date. One can safely argue that this theory 
is significant and has proven sustainable.1 Its criteria appeal to moral intuitions 
widely held by many around the world. In the words of Michael Walzer, the 
leading contemporary just war theorist, just war is the theoretical version of 
ideas of our common heritage, “designed to help us resolve, or at least to think 
clearly about, the problems of definition and application”.2 Many theorists 
today accept the basic premises of just war theory.3  
Located in between the two ‘extreme’ conclusions of pacifism and realism,4 
just war theory provides principles with which to judge war. Contrary to 
realists, just war theorists believe that war is subjected to moral principles. As 
pacifists, they argue that this means that war is principally immoral, mainly 
because of the wrongfulness of the intentional taking of human life – the killing 
of non-combatants in particular. But while just war theorists are reluctant to 
approve of war, they do think, contrary to pacifists, that there are situations in 
which a war can nevertheless be justifiable.5 To avenge a greater wrong, it is 
possible that the ends justify the means. In that case, war is perceived as the 
‘lesser’ of two evils.6 But while it is – at least theoretically7 – considered possible 
                                                             
1 According to Larry May “It has stood the test of time.” See: Larry May, Eric Rovie & 
Steve Viner (eds.), The Morality of War. Classical and Contemporary Readings, Upper 
Saddle River: Pearson Education 2006, p. ix. Although the previous chapter also 
showed that this does not mean that the theory was always popular to the same extent 
as today.  
2 Michael Walzer, Arguing about War, New Haven: Yale University Press 2004, p. x. 
3 Jeff McMahan, ‘Just War’, in: Robert Goodin, Philip Pettit & Thomas Pogge (eds.), A 
Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell 2007, p. 
669. 
4 Which were highlighted in chapter 2.  
5 Which does not mean that in general for just war theorists, war is considered as 
something good or properly just; in war, “justice is always under a cloud”. Walzer 
2004, p. x. 
6 Alex Bellamy, Just Wars. From Cicero to Iraq, Cambridge: Polity Press 2006, p. 3.  
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that a war is justified, the general goal of just war theory is a just and durable 
peace.8 It means that just war theorists are concerned with limiting the 
occurrence of war, and when it does occur, with ensuring that the conduct of 
war is as humane as possible.9 These concerns correspond with the two main 
branches of just war theory: jus ad bellum, determining under which conditions 
war is justified, and the jus in bello, determining what the proper behavior is 
during a war.  
But while this theory might remain the leading position on the morality of 
war, there is another side to that story. Just war theory is in fact struggling to 
keep up with the changing international reality. It is premised upon a certain 
conception of war – as armed conflict between two states – and on a clear 
demarcation line between the situation of war and the situation of peace. And 
this seems no longer typical for the political reality. Many agree that war itself 
and the way in which it is waged are different today as compared to earlier in 
history.10 It is claimed that particularly since the end of the Cold War, the 
character of war has changed significantly. There is a large body of literature on 
this subject, an important part of which revolves around the debate on the so-
called ‘old and new wars’.11 An important trend is that the number of wars 
between the armies of two states have declined since the Second World War, 
                                                                                                                                               
7 For some, this is remains merely a theoretical possibility, a position called contingent 
pacifism. According to John Rawls: “The possibility of a just war is conceded but not 
under present circumstances.” See: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press 1971, p. 382. Larry May argues that nearly all wars with just 
causes will nevertheless be unjust because of the (expected) failure to meet the 
proportionality principle. See: Larry May, After War Ends. A Philosophical Perspective, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012. He calls this position contingent 
pacifism, a position which is criticized by Jeff McMahan: Jeff McMahan, ‘Pacifism and 
Moral Theory’, in: Diametros, 2010, 23. For a discussion of the different variations of 
contingent pacifism, see e.g. Andrew Fiala, The Just War Myth. The Moral Illusions of 
War, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2008, p. 163-168. 
8 E.g. Mark Evans, ‘Moral Responsibilities and the Conflicting Demands of Jus Post 
Bellum’, in: Ethics & International Affairs 2009, 23/2, p. 149 and May 2012, p. 10. 
9 Bellamy 2006, p. 4. 
10 For an overview of the nature of war throughout history see e.g. John Keegan, A 
History of Warfare, New York: Vintage Books 1993. 
11 Important contributions to the debate are Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of 
War, New York: Free Press 1991; Herfried Münkler, The New Wars, Cambridge: Polity 
Press 2004; and Mary Kaldor, New & Old Wars, Stanford: Stanford University Press 
2007. 
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particularly since the early 1990s.12 These so-called ‘conventional wars’, 
commencing with a declaration of war, fought between two professional 
armies, and ending with a peace treaty, almost seem to have become a thing of 
the past.  
In many situations, it is not even clear whether something qualifies as war. 
The situation in Afghanistan, is that still a war? The operation in Mali? The 
drone attacks in Pakistan? The Russian presence in the Ukraine? In legal 
terminology, the term ‘war’ is abandoned. And contemporary wars (or armed 
conflicts; acts of war; or military actions) have many shapes and sizes: peace 
enforcement operations, military occupation, the ‘war against terror’, airstrikes 
outside areas of war, guerrilla attacks and targeted killings. Obviously, it has 
become difficult to separate the paradigm of war and the paradigm of peace. 
More often than not, we find ourselves in a grey area.  
The decline of these conventional wars also means that there are different 
actors in contemporary wars, who play different roles and have different 
interests (e.g. financial, or control and power). The actors in wars are both state 
actors as well as non-state ‘belligerents’ such as war lords, militias, mercenaries 
and private military companies.13 The result is that some wars can be 
characterized as asymmetric, meaning that there is an imbalance of military 
strength between the belligerents, e.g. when non-state militias are fighting a 
guerrilla war against a national army.14 The growing involvement of non-state 
actors in war makes it less likely that wars start after an official declaration 
made by state representatives at a given point in time. It is well possible that a 
period of civil unrest or rebellion develops – more fluently – into a situation that 
can qualify as war or armed conflict. And if the war starts with a political 
decision, who makes this decision? Political representatives of the state, or of a 
different political entity, military leaders, a war lord? It appears that today’s 
wars are more likely to develop from the bottom, instead of top-down. The 
asymmetric character of contemporary wars and the fact that war is more and 
more commercialized – making it a potentially profitable endeavor for 
belligerents and other actors – furthermore means that the war can drag on (at a 
                                                             
12 Human Security Center, Human Security Report 2009/2010. The Causes of Peace and The 
Shrinking Costs of War, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011.  
13 The activities of these non-state actors blur the line between soldiers and civilians. See 
further: Kaldor 2007, p. 9. 
14 Münkler 2004, p. 19-20. 
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high or low intensity) for a long time.15 This also indicates that fewer wars have 
a clear beginning and end today.  
This political reality, the changed character of war(fare), and the often blurry 
boundaries between war and peace, pose serious challenges to just war theory. 
More specifically, it raises questions of relevance and applicability. Is just war 
theory still tailored for the ‘new’ political reality?16 Can we apply just war 
principles to contemporary armed conflicts? Do they still offer the required 
moral guidance?17 And perhaps most importantly, are they able to advance the 
goal of a just and durable peace? Being pessimistic, one could argue that these 
developments mean that just war theory is outdated and should be discarded. 
But it is worth exploring potential solutions to these challenges.  
This chapter analyzes one solution: an extension of the bipartite conception 
of just war theory. It is plausible that in the contemporary reality, just war theory 
has become incomplete. The principles of the two existing branches are no 
longer sufficient to provide moral guidance and to realize the goal of a just and 
durable peace. Therefore, in order to keep up with changing circumstances, 
many argue that just war theory needs to be extended beyond the familiar jus ad 
bellum and jus in bello. In the last decade, arguments for incorporating one or two 
additional branches to complete just war theory are heard.18 There are other 
                                                             
15 Münkler 2004, p. 19-20. 
16 This critique is heard before at several points in history, for example during the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, when the risk of a ‘total war’ which could 
not be limited in any way became a serious threat. As Evans points out, many thinkers 
thought this to be the end of just war theory because it was considered hopelessly 
outmoded and irrelevant. Mark Evans (ed.), Just War Theory. A Reappraisal, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press 2005, p. 5-6.  
17 For example, as discussed briefly in chapter 2, the discrimination principle means that 
in war, there is a morally relevant distinction between soldiers and civilians; 
combatants and non-combatants. In principle, non-combatants enjoy immunity; which 
means they must be spared from the violence of war. It is easy to understand that the 
application of this principle has become problematic in wars where it is difficult to 
make that distinction – e.g. when a national army fights irregular militias, who refrain 
from wearing uniforms and attack from within densely populated areas. Michael 
Walzer argues that the responsibility to discriminate and protect civilians can no 
longer fully be put on the national army fighting these militias. See further Walzer’s 
Thomas More Lecture, ‘War and Death. Reflections on the Just War Theory Today’, in: 
Michael Walzer et al., Oorlog en dood, Budel: Damon 2008.  
18 Arguments for several additional branches are made. For example: Darrel Moellendorf 
and David Rodin argue that just war theory should consist of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, 
jus ex bello (governing the process of war termination and agreement on the terms of 
peace), and jus post bellum (governing the situations after the termination of the war); 
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important issues, so it is argued, that should also be regulated by just war theory. 
Issues that are vital in limiting war and realizing a just and durable peace.  
The most common argument is that just war theory must be completed with 
a branch called jus post bellum.19 This branch could provide the required guidance 
after the end of war. As Brian Orend argues: “Conceptually, war has three 
phases: beginning, middle and end.” Just war theory is therefore only complete 
when we include jus post bellum in the theory.20 But if ‘justice after war’ must be 
included, should we then not consider ‘justice before the war’ as well? Just war 
theory can namely be extended both ways: at the end and at the beginning.21 A 
branch called jus ante bellum is sometimes suggested to precede jus ad bellum. 
This first additional branch is discussed in the third section. The second 
                                                                                                                                               
Mark Allman and Tobias Winright claim that the theory should consist of jus ante 
bellum (preventive peacemaking), jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum; and 
Steven Lee argues that the theory should consist of jus in abolitione belli (the abolition 
of war altogether, overlapping with jus ante bellum), jus ad bellum, jus in bello, jus 
extendere bellum (the justice of the continuation of the war, overlapping partly with jus 
ex bello), and jus post bellum. In this chapter, I will focus on two common, and in light of 
the outlined changing circumstances the most relevant additional branches: jus ante 
bellum and jus post bellum. I must acknowledge that jus ex bello would also be interesting 
to explore, however, that is not undertaken in this chapter. See further: Darrel 
Moellendorf, ‘Jus Ex Bello’, in: Journal of Political Philosophy 2008, 16/2; Mark Allman 
& Tobias Winright, After the Smoke Clears. The Just War Tradition and Post War Justice, 
New York: Orbis Books 2010; David Rodin, ‘Ending War’, in: Ethics and International 
Affairs 2011, 25/3; Steven Lee, Ethics and War. An Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2012; and Cecile Fabre, Cosmopolitan Peace, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2016. 
19 See e.g. Michael Schuck, ‘When the Shooting Stops. Missing Elements in Just War 
Theory, in: Christian Century 1994, 111/30; Louis Iasiello, ‘Jus Post Bellum. The Moral 
Responsibilities of Victors in War’, in: Naval War College Review 2004, LVII/(3-4); 
Richard DiMeglio, ‘The Evolution of the Just War Tradition. Defining Jus Post 
Bellum’, in: Military Law Review 2005, 186; Camilla Bosanquet, ‘Refining Jus Post 
Bellum’, lecture at the International Symposium for Military Ethics, January 2007, 
available online: http://isme.tamu.edu/ISME07/Bosanquet07.html; Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus 
Post Bellum. Mapping the Discipline(s)’, in: Carsten Stahn & Jann Kleffner 2008, Jus 
Post Bellum. Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to Peace, The Hague: TMC Asser 
Press 2008; and Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum. A Just War Theory Perspective’, in: 
Carsten Stahn & Jann Kleffner, Jus Post Bellum. Towards a Law of Transition From 
Conflict to Peace, The Hague: TMC Asser Press 2008. 
20 Orend 2008, p. 36.  
21 This is referred to by Mark Allman and Tobias Winright as the “growing edges of just 
war theory”. See: Mark Allman & Tobias Winright, ‘Growing Edges of Just War 
Theory. Jus Ante Bellum, Jus Post Bellum, and Imperfect Justice’, in: Journal of the Society 
of Christian Ethics 2012, 32/2. 
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additional branch, jus post bellum, is discussed in the fourth section. This chapter 
explores what it would mean to integrate these branches in just war theory. 
What can an extension of the theory bring us? An important advantage is that it 
is likely to benefit the general goal of just war theory: limiting war and realizing a 
just and durable peace. But is an extension really a good idea? We have to 
critically consider the question as to what should fall under the scope of just war 
theory. It will appear that there are several reasons why we should be careful to 
regard these arguably important issues within the parameters of just war theory.  
 
4.2 Jus Ante Bellum 
 
The first potential branch regulates the situation prior to war and is often 
named jus ante bellum. Its norms apply in peacetime, in the absence of a 
particular war or threat of war. It that sense, it precedes jus ad bellum, which 
applies to the start of war. The content of what is proposed for this branch 
varies: jus ante bellum is proposed in order to train the armed forces and prepare 
for war in general; or it is proposed in order to prevent war from occurring at 
all. This latter conception of jus ante bellum is also referred to as jus in abolitione 
belli or ‘just peacemaking’. It is remarkable that this additional branch, often 
titled jus ante bellum, is used to argue for the realization of two seemingly 
contrary goals: the preparation or prevention of war.  
Jus ante bellum is used in the preparatory sense to describe a branch of norms 
that regulate the general preparation for war. It deals with military policy and 
action before war, such as the maintenance of the armed forces, longer-term 
preparation for war and education and training of combatants.22 George Lucas 
argues that, together with jus post bellum, this branch completes just war theory. 
Jus ante bellum as he understands it “encompasses the appropriation of 
resources for military preparedness, training, and education of troops; 
provisions to develop requisite military leadership; appropriate management 
and oversight of military and defense apparatus; and the general preparedness 
for future war”.23 These are practical issues to do with the development and 
                                                             
22 Especially focused on the training of military personnel is Roger Wertheimer in: Roger 
Wertheimer (ed.), Empowering Our Military Conscience. Transforming Just War Theory 
and Military Moral Education, London: Ashgate Press 2010. 
23 George Lucas, ‘Jus Ante and Post Bellum. Completing the Circle, Breaking the Cycle’, 
in: Eric Patterson (ed.), Ethics beyond War’s End, Washington D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press 2012, p. 56. 
62
THE BLURRY BOUNDARIES BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE.  
DO WE NEED TO EXTEND JUST WAR THEORY?  
 
maintenance of a functioning defense system. According to Lucas such norms 
complete the conceptual circle because jus ante bellum also involves the planning 
of post war behavior. Leaders should prepare for war, including a proper 
consideration of the implications of war and the exit-strategy. And similarly, 
combatants are trained both to ensure that they fight justly, and also that they 
conclude the war justly. When lessons are learned from the aftermath of war, 
which in turn infest considerations of jus ante bellum, the circle is complete.24  
What remains rather unclear in Lucas’ discussion of pre-war justice is the 
substance of this branch. Which type of norms are to govern these preparatory 
activities? It seems wise to properly consider the maintenance, education and 
training of the military. If wars occur, the soldiers that are deployed should be 
thoroughly informed and trained on the rules of war, just behavior in its 
aftermath, and the protection of human rights. However, it seems that what 
Lucas’ understands to be preparatory jus ante bellum are simply practical 
guidelines that flow from jus in bello. The obligations of jus in bello namely 
demand commitment not only in war, but also before war, or even in the 
absence of a particular war. Military personnel is not educated and trained ‘on 
the spot’, but must be generally prepared for war in order to comply with jus in 
bello norms when they are deployed. For instance, the principle of 
discrimination requires that military personnel is educated on the rules of war, 
trained to distinguish military from civilian targets, and that they have weapons 
at their disposal with which they are able to make the distinction. This way, jus 
in bello norms require preparations for war in general during times of peace. 
These issues are therefore – in a sense – already part of just war theory’s moral 
framework. These preparatory activities entail nothing essentially different 
than the existing jus in bello responsibilities. This consequently means that jus 
ante bellum in the preparatory sense need not constitute an independent branch 
of just war theory.  
Others argue that jus ad bellum must be preceded by norms on preventive 
peacemaking – in an effort to prevent all war. Instead of preparing for war 
when there is a particular occasion for war at hand, Allman and Winright state 
that jus ante bellum is concerned with reducing the chance that wars break out in 
                                                             
24 Lucas 2012, p. 58-60. And with the completion of this conceptual circle, the cycle of 
perpetual violence and war can be broken, according to Lucas. It appears that this way, 
his understanding of preparatory jus ante bellum tends towards preventive jus ante 
bellum. However, I find it hard to understand how he concludes that the cycle of war 
can be broken based on the presented reasoning.  
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the first place.25 This can be done by addressing the root causes of potential 
conflicts in the period before war. According to them, the two branches of jus 
ante bellum and just post bellum complete the ‘equation’ of just war theory. 26 
This understanding of justice before the war is similar to Steven Lee’s proposal 
for an additional branch, which he titles jus in abolitione belli.27 He uses this term 
to refer to a branch of just war theory aimed at the prevention of all wars by 
formulating the right methods to abolish war. Lee proposes the following three 
maxims for jus in abolitione belli: “maximize feasible non-military alternatives to 
achieving justice”, “bring greater legitimacy to international institutions”, and 
“accept national sovereignty as a necessary moral fiction”.28  
The ‘just peacemaking ethic’,29 which forms the basis of preventive jus ante 
bellum, is more elaborate and provides us with ten practices of preventive 
peacemaking: “support nonviolent direct action”, “take independent initiatives 
to reduce threat”, “use cooperative conflict resolution”, “acknowledge 
responsibility for conflict and injustice and seek repentance and forgiveness”, 
“advance democracy, human rights, and religious liberty”, “foster just and 
sustainable economic development”, “work with emerging cooperative forces 
in the international system”, “strengthen the United Nations and international 
efforts for cooperation and human rights”, “reduce offensive weapons and 
weapons trade”, and “encourage grassroots peacemaking groups and voluntary 
associations”.30  
Would it be possible to incorporate preventive jus ante bellum in just war 
theory? As preparatory jus ante bellum, preventive jus ante bellum is related to the 
other criteria of just war theory. It flows from the jus ad bellum criteria of last 
resort and right intention; criteria which are particularly aimed at the limitation 
of war, and meant as a blockade against starting war. The above makes clear 
                                                             
25 Allman & Winright 2010, p. 7.  
26 Allman & Winright 2010, p. 10.  
27 Lee 2012, p. 300. 
28 Lee 2012, p. 300-306. 
29 This ‘just peacemaking ethic’ can be integrated in just war theory as an additional 
branch, but can also be part of the pacifist position (depending on the position on what 
to do when peacemaking fails; can it be justified to wage war or is the nonviolence 
proscription absolute?), and it is also presented as alternative to pacifism and just war 
theory; i.e. as another paradigm. See further one of the most important spokesmen of 
this position: Glenn Stassen (ed.), Just Peacemaking. the New Paradigm for the Ethics of 
War and Peace, Cleveland: Pilgrim Press 1998. 
30 Stassen 1998 and online at: http://justpeacemaking.org/the-practices/.  
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what type of norms are considered part of preventive jus ante bellum. And while 
they are related to other just war criteria, they are not simply the concrete and 
practical guidelines to fulfill such criteria. Rather, they constitute a broad 
strategy to realize the abolition of war. As such, they entail something different 
than what is already part of just war theory.  
 Furthermore, unlike the two established branches of just war theory, jus ante 
bellum does not apply to a particular war. This might be a problem when trying 
to incorporate this branch in the theory. Namely, the central idea to just war 
theory, dating back to Cicero, is that the ‘normal’ state of affairs is peace, and 
that war is an exception to that.31 In this exceptional state of affairs when the 
war is raging – this state of emergency – some of our most important moral 
principles are on hold. The premise of just war theory is that even this 
exceptional state of war is governed by certain moral norms, protecting the 
most essential values. However, jus ante bellum does not apply in this 
exceptional state of war. It applies in peacetime, dealing with the general 
practice of preventing war. But this problem might not be as serious as it 
appears. The introduction namely showed that today, it is not easy to separate 
the war- and peace paradigm. The line between war and peace is often blurry in 
our contemporary world. Therefore, it might be might not be necessary to hold 
onto this strict temporal conceptualization of just war theory.32  
And lastly, it is obvious that jus ante bellum is very much in line with just war 
theory, as it is particularly focused on the theory’s general goal: limiting war and 
realizing a just and durable peace. It therefore makes the achievement of this 
goal more likely and efforts to support this goal and realize the abolition of war 
from the world must be praised. These three reasons: the relationship with 
other branches; the blurry boundaries between war and peace, making the 
peacetime application less problematic; and the focus on the just war theory’s 
goal, constitute rather compelling arguments to integrate jus ante bellum in the 
theory.  
 
 
 
                                                             
31 Stephen Neff, War and the Law of Nations. A General History, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2005, p. 29-34. 
32 It will however appear later in this chapter that this does in fact constitute a problem 
when trying to integrate jus ante bellum. 
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4.3 Jus Post Bellum 
 
The second additional branch that is proposed is jus post bellum, ‘justice after 
war’. Jus post bellum should function as a moral framework regulating the 
situation after the war. Jus post bellum is used to refer to a either a body of legal 
or moral norms, or both, aimed at regulating the transition from war back to a 
‘normal’ state of peace. As such, it provides a framework guiding political and 
military action, and it forms a standard which can be used to evaluate and judge 
particular post war situations. While many agree on the importance of a branch 
of jus post bellum in just war theory, there is no agreement on the content of 
such a branch. Often, the debate on jus post bellum is presented as a debate 
between two opposing positions: minimalism and maximalism. Minimalists, as 
Michael Walzer, are said to endorse a restricted version of jus post bellum, as 
they are particularly concerned with respect for the sovereignty of states and 
limiting what victors are allowed to do after war. Maximalists, as Mark Evans, 
are concerned that victors will do too little after war. Consequently, they 
propose broader and more comprehensive obligations.  
 The norms that are proposed could be roughly divided into different 
categories: safety and security; political justice; criminal justice; reparations and 
compensation; general reconstruction; and reconciliation.33 The first and 
foremost priority after war, acknowledged in all accounts of jus post bellum, is 
halting the aggression and ensuring safety and security in the war affected area. 
This has two components: guaranteeing international peace and security, 
through the consolidation of peace and the prevention of future external 
aggression; as well as guaranteeing the security of the citizens of the defeated 
state itself, which means the prevention of future internal aggression.34 This 
requires disarmament, arms control and the reintegration of soldiers in the 
society.35  
                                                             
33 In this chapter, I will focus on three theorists, which also represent distinct positions 
on the subject: Michael Walzer (minimalism); Brian Orend (‘in between’); and Mark 
Evans (maximalism). The distinction between so-called minimalism and maximalism is 
further explored in chapter 5. 
34 The priority of these goals is highly dependent on the nature of the war or conflict. In 
case of a classic self-defensive war the focus will be on international peace and security. 
In case of a civil war, the people of that war torn state form the main concern. But 
international security issues, like migration, international crime, and destabilization of 
the region, do demand attention in civil wars as well.  
35 Gary Bass, ‘Jus Post Bellum’, in: Philosophy & Public Affairs 2004, 32/4, p. 394. 
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Political justice encompasses norms regarding the influence on the political 
system of the defeated state. Post war activities in this category are: institutional 
reform; legislative reform; reformation of the security sector; the realization of 
human rights; and replacement of (members of) the prior regime. In all 
proposals for jus post bellum, political justice is part of jus post bellum. However, 
as pointed out earlier, there is considerable disagreement on the proper scope 
of political justice after a war. The central question is: when and to what extent 
is coercive political change justified? There are different values which are at 
stake here: on the one hand international security and the protection of human 
rights, and on the other hand sovereignty of states and self-determination of 
peoples. It appears as if the character of the defeated regime determines when 
one set of values can overrule the other. This is true for most authors: the more 
unjust the regime, the more likely it is that political reconstruction is justified. 
However, the turning point is different for all, and is dependent on the value 
that is attached to each of those values. E.g., for the ‘minimalist’ Walzer, 
sovereignty and self-determination are so important that political 
reconstruction of the defeated state is only allowed in case of inherently 
aggressive and murderous regimes.36 Orend, tending more towards 
maximalism, disagrees with Walzer. He does not attribute the same value to 
sovereignty and consequently, the turning point appears in an earlier stadium, 
namely, when a state fails to be ‘minimally’ just.37 As result, political 
reconstruction of the defeated state is considered a post war obligation in a 
wider range of situations.  
The category of criminal justice entails norms on how to deal with 
international crimes that have occurred before and/ or during the war. Criminal 
justice can serve a variety of more specific goals, as retribution, deterrence of 
future crimes, closure for the victims, fostering reconciliation; and symbolically 
reclaiming values. There are different instruments to establish individual 
criminal responsibility: e.g. through national trials, international criminal 
tribunals, the International Criminal Court, and truth and reconciliation 
                                                             
36 Michael Walzer, ‘The Aftermath of War. Reflections on Jus Post Bellum’, in: Eric 
Patterson (ed.), Ethics beyond War’s End, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press 2012, p. 39. 
37 Orend defines that as: “A minimally just community makes every reasonable effort to: 
(i) avoid violating the rights of other minimally just communities; (ii) gain recognition 
as being legitimate in the eyes of the international community and its own people; and 
(iii) realize the human rights of all its individual members.” Orend 2008, p. 43. 
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commissions. Again, there are different values at stake here, and that potentially 
makes this operation difficult. On one hand, the value of criminal justice – 
punishing the guilty – and the achievement of the above mentioned goals, and on 
the other hand the value of national and international peace and security. To put 
it shortly, this means that in some situations, a conflict can arise between justice 
and peace.38 While criminal justice is widely considered part of jus post bellum, 
disagreement exists on the question of how to deal with such a conflict: should 
the value of justice be sacrificed when necessary in order to achieve peace?  
The proportionality principle, well-known in just war theory, is invoked by 
some authors to determine the operation of norms within this category. 
According to Walzer and Orend, the punishment of international crimes is 
subjected to such a proportionality test. This means that prosecution should be 
reconsidered if it extends the war, increases the casualties or endangers the 
peace.39 Walzer states: “sometimes security might require amnesties and public 
forgetfulness”.40 But other theorists argue that proportionality cannot function 
as a mediating factor here. The realization of criminal justice is valued so highly 
that responsible individuals should always be held accountable in war crimes 
trials.41  
Reparations and compensation constitute the next category of jus post 
bellum norms. The specific goals here are both economic redistribution, which 
seeks to materially compensate the victims of aggression for inflicted damage, 
as well as psychological reparation, aimed at righting past wrongs in order to 
support the mental transformation and to provide closure. Post war 
instruments falling in this category are the restitution of confiscated property, 
the extraction and payment of compensations, and formal apologies. The 
principle of proportionality can reappear here to determine the scope of 
reparations. When it does, it proscribes that the extracted reparations should 
not be overly punitive. Responsible people and/ or the state must be realistically 
capable of paying the reparations.42  
                                                             
38 There is an extensive debate in the literature on this issue. I will only highlight the 
controversy here, and analyze the opinions of the discussed authors regarding this 
question in relation to jus post bellum only.  
39 Walzer 2012, p. 45, Brian Orend, ‘Justice after War’, in: Ethics & International Affairs 
2002, 16/1, p. 53. 
40 Walzer 2012, p. 45.  
41 E.g. Iasiello 2004, p. 47-48 and DiMeglio 2005, p. 153-158. 
42 E.g. Brian Orend, The Morality of War (first edition), Peterborough: Broadview Press 
2006, p. 166-167. 
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Sometimes it is perfectly clear who should return the property or who is 
responsible for compensation of that lost property or other inflicted damage. 
But it is not always easy to determine who is responsible and liable for damage 
done. And who then should pay for the reparations? Walzer and Orend 
disagree on this matter. According to Orend, we should discriminate when 
extracting reparations: only those who were responsible for the aggression 
should pay. Walzer however, argues that these reparations can be extracted 
from the citizens of the former aggressor state through a tax system. In that 
view, the people bear collective responsibility for the damage done by the 
aggression.43 Unlike the previous categories of jus post bellum, reparations and 
compensation are not an established part of jus post bellum. While that appeared 
to be so, in recent years some theorists, as ‘maximalist’ Mark Evans, argue that 
instead of extracting compensation, the victor must invest in the defeated state 
in order to foster reconstruction.44 In fact, Orend now also seems to oppose 
compensation, and instead focuses more on economic reconstruction. As a 
result the victor cannot extract reparations for damages done by the war, but 
must instead invest in the defeated country, rebuilding its economy.45 
The next category of jus post bellum is put forward particularly by so-called 
maximalists. While safety and security; political justice (to a certain extent), and 
criminal justice (balanced in a certain way) seem to make up what can be called 
the ‘core’ of jus post bellum, general reconstruction consists of norms that are 
broader and more comprehensive. Therefore, they are often said to be part of 
maximalist jus post bellum. The category of general reconstruction entails 
obligations regarding economic reconstruction and development,46 rebuilding 
infrastructure like road, rails and electrical grids,47 and cleaning up the 
environment. The fact that Orend and Evans stress the importance of economic 
reconstruction, and the related duty of the victor to take responsibility for their 
share of the material burdens, explain the rejection of compensation on the part 
of the defeated highlighted above.  
                                                             
43 Walzer 2012, p. 42. 
44 Mark Evans, ‘“Just Peace”. An Elusive Ideal’, in: Eric Patterson (ed.), Ethics beyond 
War’s End, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press 2012, p. 207-208. 
45 Brian Orend, ‘Justice after War’, in: Eric Patterson (ed.), Ethics beyond War’s End, 
Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press 2012, p. 188. 
46 Evans 2012, p. 208 and Alllman & Winright 2010, p. 160-163. 
47 Evans 2012, p. 207-208; Allman & Winright 2010, p. 161; and Orend 2002, p. 52. 
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The last category is also characteristic for the maximalist position. 
Forgiveness and reconciliation is not specifically recognized by minimalist 
accounts of jus post bellum. However, Evans argues that repairing the 
relationships between former enemies is an extremely important aspect of post 
war justice.48 Therefore, part of Evans’ jus post bellum is the obligation to “take 
full and proactive part in the ethical and socio-cultural processes of forgiveness 
and reconciliation that are central to the construction of a just and stable 
peace”.49 Because the obligation to achieve forgiveness and reconciliation 
seems very demanding, Evans argues that these concepts should be understood 
in thin, narrow terms: reconciliation “refers only to the business of developing 
means by which former enemies can live on the same planet without fighting 
each other”.50 More theorists recognize the importance of reconciliation as part 
of jus post bellum. And while Evans interprets these obligations in a limited way, 
further reaching obligations are recognized by others.51 
Would it be possible to incorporate jus post bellum in just war theory? As 
preparatory jus ante bellum, jus post bellum is connected to the other criteria of 
just war theory. There are many ways in which the norms of jus post bellum are 
related to other just war norms. The category of criminal justice for example, 
directly flows from other justum bellum obligations. It determines how to deal 
with those guilty of violating jus ad bellum and those guilty of war crimes – 
violating jus in bello.52 And these activities, the investigation of crimes, 
prosecution and punishment of individuals is usually something turned to when 
the war is over. Furthermore, there are theorists that argue that jus post bellum in 
general is strongly related to just war theory. Walzer claims that failing to 
                                                             
48 A “potentially serious deficiency” Evans 2012, p. 210. 
49 Evans 2012, p. 208. 
50 Evans 2012, p. 211. 
51 Mark Allman and Tobias Winright for example, argue even stronger that reconciliation 
is a vital part of jus post bellum. They present a richer religious understanding of 
reconciliation. The main goal of reconciliation is not only to make sure former enemies 
can continue to live on the same planet together, but to create relationships of respect, 
trust and friendship. “The reconciliation phase seeks to turn enemies into friends and 
to bring emotional healing to the victims of war.” They stress that reconciliation is not 
about forgive-and-forget, but is instead is about true reconciliation between people, for 
which the truth is essential. Allman & Winright 2012, p. 102.  
52 As Walzer states, if there was aggression, there must be aggressors and if war crimes 
were committed, there are war criminals. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral 
Argument with Historical Illustrations (second edition, or. 1977), New York: Basic Books 
2000, p. 287-288. 
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achieving a just peace after the war undermines good results from the war, even 
if the war itself can be called just (meaning that an unjust peace can undermine 
an otherwise just war).53 Thus, although there is no agreement on the exact 
influence, it is clear that there is a connection between jus post bellum and the 
other two branches.  
Furthermore, like preparatory jus ante bellum, jus post bellum applies in 
peacetime; not in the exceptional state of war but after the war. However, as 
noted above, that obstacle seems to have become quite irrelevant because of 
today’s blurry boundaries between war and peace. And this new political 
reality, in which the paradigm of war and peace can no longer be separated 
easily and the character of war has changed, in fact shows the value of a branch 
of jus post bellum. Today, international military action is – more often than 
before – employed to protect the population of another state against grave 
human rights violations; to change an oppressive regime (and create a 
democracy); to stabilize so-called ‘failed states’; or a combination of such 
reasons. These considerations are different, and more comprehensive than was 
often the case earlier in history, or so it is argued.54 An important consequence 
of these comprehensive aims is that a particular situation has to be realized after 
the war, and the bipartite conception of just war theory does not offer much 
guidance on this matter. Return to the status quo ante bellum as post war 
principle, which was part of classic just war theory, is not sufficient anymore. 
This shows why just war theory needs, now more than before, an additional 
branch of norms that apply after the war.  
                                                             
53 Orend agrees that there is a strong connection between the branches. He however 
points to something else, arguing that violating jus ad bellum automatically results in a 
failure to achieve jus post bellum. An unjust cause infects the conclusion of the war 
according to Orend. Walzer disagrees and states that after a debatable war (a 
premature pre-emption or misguided military intervention that topples tyrannical 
regime) the war would remain unjust, but nevertheless, a just peace can be created post 
bellum. See: Walzer 2004, p. 163 and Frowe 2016, p. 241. 
54 Michael Walzer argues that the reconstruction of Germany and Japan after the Second 
World War was something new in the history of war. And also in the decennia after the 
Second World War, the goals of war were more limited than today. He mentions the 
example of the Gulf War: the war ended with the removal of Iraqi troops from 
Kuwait’s territory, and thus the restoration of the status quo ante bellum. No attempt 
was made to change the regime in place. Today’s wars, he argues, and especially 
humanitarian interventions, require something more after the war than the restoration 
of the situation that existed prior to the outbreak of the war. Walzer 2004, p. 18-20. 
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And lastly, similar to jus ante bellum, jus post bellum would probably benefit 
the general goal of limiting war and ensuring a just and durable peace. A lack of 
post war norms could allow for ad hoc policy and measures, with the danger a 
so-called ‘victor’s justice’, in which the victor determines justice in his 
advantage. This leaves room for the political interests of the victorious state to 
determine post war conduct and to profit economically from the benefits of 
war. These activities are not helpful for the transition to a state of peace. In 
general, it seems that failure to plan a just post war situation can prolong the 
war, or lead to internal chaos after the war, failing of the state or the start of a 
civil war. These scenarios mean that the damage and casualties are increased. 
Planning an exit strategy based on norms of jus post bellum therefore means 
better prospects for a just peace.  
  
4.4 A Four Partite Just War Theory? 
 
What do we envision for just war theory? If we acknowledge its value and 
refuse to discard just war theory altogether, it is worth trying to adapt just war 
theory so that it fits in with contemporary circumstances. When reflecting upon 
this ‘new’ political reality, in which just war theory needs to realize its goal – 
limiting war and realizing a just and durable peace – it appears as if an extension 
of just war theory is a sensible way to ‘modernize’ just war theory. A prima facie 
case for a four partite just war theory was presented in the third and fourth 
section of this chapter. Both jus ante bellum and jus post bellum turned out to be 
related to the other branches of the theory, even though these additional 
branches do not simply consist of practical guidelines to realize these existing 
principles. Rather, they flow from traditional just war theory, but nevertheless 
constitute independent criteria. Furthermore, while they apply in peacetime, 
and are in that sense at odds with jus ad bellum and jus in bello, this might not 
pose a serious problem precisely in light of today’s blurry boundaries between 
war and peace. Since a clear demarcation between those two paradigms can 
rarely be made, it is no longer necessary to strictly adhere to this distinction.  
 Also, the general goal of just war theory could greatly benefit from an 
extension of just war theory. Although jus ante bellum and jus post bellum apply 
in peacetime, all four branches aim to limit war: jus ante bellum aims at general 
prevention, jus ad bellum limits the number wars, jus in bello limits the damage, 
and jus post bellum aims at peacemaking, reconstruction and prevention. While 
jus ante bellum is strictly forward looking in character, jus post bellum is mainly 
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backward looking, since it deals with things that happened right before and 
during the war. In some respects, the latter is also forward looking, as e.g. 
political reconstruction and the prevention of future wars are essential for jus 
post bellum. We could indeed say that these four branches are not neatly 
separated. Rather, each of them flows into the next. When jus post bellum deals 
with peacemaking, reconstruction and prevention, it eventually flows into jus 
ante bellum, indeed closing the circle.  
However, despite these arguments, and the praiseworthy efforts to integrate 
norms on preventive peacemaking and post war reconstruction and 
peacemaking into just war theory, difficulties will come up when trying to 
integrate these additional branches. These difficulties relate to various 
elements: the character of the norms; the addressees/ duty bearers; the content; 
and the foundation. Before welcoming these new branches, we must seriously 
consider these – at the very least.  
First, the character of jus post bellum is – to a certain extent – similar to the 
two established branches. While it deals with rather concrete areas of post war 
justice, the norms that are put forward are not entirely different from the 
traditional ones. For a large part, jus post bellum consists of moral norms 
regulating a particular post war situation. For example, if jus in bello insists on 
upholding certain rules, violations of these rules must be prosecuted, although 
the value of justice and the value of peace must be balanced using the 
proportionality principle, well-known in just war theory. The character of jus 
ante bellum however, seems different from the other branches. The proposed 
norms are not abstract moral norms or principles but this branch consists 
rather of general strategies to prevent war. Jus ante bellum reflects the best 
methods and practices to prevent wars from breaking out, such as 
strengthening international organizations and reducing weapons trade.  
The second difficulty that needs to be considered regards the addressees of 
the additional branches. Who are the duty bearers?55 Similar to jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello norms, which are addressed to the (would be) belligerents – the 
parties that are involved in the war – jus post bellum primarily addresses the 
(former) belligerents. Post bellum obligations are generally assigned to the states 
that took part in that war.56 On these states, the obligation rests to fulfill these 
                                                             
55 This is addressed in the following chapter.  
56 There is some disagreement on the distribution of these responsibilities between the 
victorious and the vanquished. Some argue that the post bellum norms apply differently 
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duties, such as the creation of a certain level of safety, the responsibility to 
reconstruct a war torn society and the achievement of criminal justice, even 
though admittedly, this branch need not be exclusively directed at the 
belligerents. While the first and foremost responsibility to fulfill jus post bellum 
rests on the former belligerents, it is plausible that other parties – states that 
were not directly involved in the war or international organizations – assist in 
post bellum activities. Walzer e.g. strongly argues that the burdens of 
reconstruction need to be wider distributed, for example in the situation of 
Iraq.57 And Walzer is not the only one arguing that post bellum obligations are 
not exclusively assigned to the belligerents, but that this branch is characterized 
by collective, international obligations, assigned e.g. according to the ability to 
fulfill these obligations.58 Still, jus post bellum remains primarily focused on the 
parties that were involved in the war.  
This is not true for jus ante bellum; those duties cannot be addressed at 
discernible actors. Rather, it seems that the international community in general 
would be responsible for realizing this branch. The problem that arises here is 
that jus ante bellum duties, as well as potentially some jus post bellum duties, are 
considerably less determinate than jus ad bellum and jus in bello duties. The 
specific duty bearers are namely hard to identify. The fact that there is less 
agreement on the specific norms of these additional branches, than these of jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello, only reinforces that. Which state or international 
organization should take up the responsibility to comply with these rather 
indeterminate duties? Compliance is already a serious concern for just war 
theory’s established branches, but this problem is only increased by integrating 
such indeterminate norms. Walzer acknowledges this concern, referring in this 
context to the ‘collective action problem’. When we might be inclined to think 
that post bellum justice is better served by multilateralism (even if the ad bellum 
decision was unilateral) it is still questionable that post bellum obligations are 
better fulfilled when taken up collectively.59 As a result, integrating these 
additional branches into the theory, especially jus ante bellum, brings with it 
problems of indeterminacy which decreases its clarity and consistency, and 
                                                                                                                                               
and some argue that these responsibilities need to be – in principle – shared between 
the involved parties. See further e.g. May 2012, p. 14-19. 
57 Walzer 2004, p. 167-168. 
58 James Pattison, ‘Jus Post Bellum and the Responsibility to Rebuild’, in: British Journal of 
Political Science 2015, 45/3. 
59 Walzer 2012, p. 41-42. 
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therewith its feasibility. This makes it really difficult to identify jus ante bellum as 
a viable part of just war theory.  
Third, the content of jus ante bellum is different from the content of the other 
branches of just war theory. This becomes clear when we examine the 
application of modern just war theory. Earlier in this chapter, it appeared that it 
is not problematic that jus ante bellum and jus post bellum actually apply in 
peacetime, because the line between war and peace is often blurry in our 
contemporary world. In the grey zone between war and peace it can be hard to 
determine whether a particular situation qualifies as ‘war’; and when this war 
began and ended. Therefore, it was argued, just war theory should cover the 
whole of such situations. However, with this difficulty to demarcate the time of 
war from the time of peace arises the difficulty to determine which branch of just 
war theory is applicable. It could be argued that in situations like this, we should 
be flexible in the application of just war theory, e.g. using just war theory without 
there being an ‘official war’, or applying two branches at the same time. For 
example, it would seem useful to apply jus in bello norms together with norms of 
jus post bellum when the war is ‘officially’ over, but large scale violence remains.  
For this reason, we could assume that the strict temporal conceptualization 
of just war theory is no longer the best way to understand the operation of 
modern just war theory. We should change our perspective and understand just 
war theory as applicable to the exceptional practice of war, not to the time of 
war.60 It is the activities that need to be justified. The branches do not regulate 
specific periods in time, but rather war related activities. And while these 
activities do usually take place during a certain period, they are not confined to 
them. This conceptualization of just war theory, that Jann Kleffner dubs the 
‘functional conceptualization’,61 creates room for the required flexible and 
overlapping application of justum bellum norms. But what activities are 
                                                             
60 Seth Lazar similarly argues in an unpublished working paper that the different 
branches regulate specific practices instead of that they are separated by an ‘arbitrary 
timeline’. See: Seth Lazar, ‘Endings and Aftermath in the Ethics of War’, CSSJ 
Working paper series 2010, p. 13. Online at:  
http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/cssj/working-papers.html.  
61 ‘In such a conceptualization (with functionality as the leitmotiv), it would be the facts 
on the ground that determine whether and to what extent jus post bellum starts or 
ceases to apply, and which of its constituent elements.’ Jann Kleffner, ‘Towards a 
Functional Conceptualization of the Temporal Scope of Jus Post Bellum’, in: Carsten 
Stahn, Jennifer Easterday & Jens Iverson (eds.), Jus Post Bellum. Mapping the Normative 
Foundations, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014, p. 296. 
75
JUS POST BELLUM AND THE NATURE OF PEACE 
 
 
regulated by the additional branches? When assessing their content, it is clear 
that while jus post bellum indeed deals with war related activities, jus ante bellum 
does not.62 On the contrary, jus ante bellum does not have anything to do with 
the issue of war, as it arises not in the context of a particular war but offers a 
strategy to foster peace. This functional conceptualization of just war theory 
therefore reveals that while the content of jus post bellum matches the theory, 
the content of jus ante bellum is entirely different.  
A fourth difficulty for both jus ante bellum and jus post bellum is that, 
although they are both related to the other branches, it is questionable whether 
their foundation can be located in just war theory. Because jus ad bellum and jus 
in bello apply in that exceptional state of war, it is governed by certain moral 
norms, protecting the most essential values. This ‘core’ of fundamental norms is 
the radically dressed down version of what could be simply called our ‘normal 
morality’. For example, while the intentional killing of other human beings is 
almost universally considered morally wrong, this can be justified in times of 
war. And while it can be justified as inherent part of war, just war theory tries to 
regulate this by proscribing that attacks must be proportional to the military 
goal aimed for, and by proscribing that only deliberate attacks on combatants 
are justified.  
Now the fact that jus ante bellum and jus post bellum apply to future and past 
activities in peacetime – outside that emergency situation – suggests that it is 
inadequate to ground the norms in the limited moral framework of just war 
theory, determined by the exceptional state of war. The foundation of the 
norms is located in that ‘normal morality’, consisting of general principles of 
justice based on e.g. global justice, international political morality, 
cosmopolitanism and/ or human rights. Walzer argues that: “Democratic 
political theory, which plays a relatively small part in our arguments about jus ad 
bellum and in bello, provides the central principles of this account (post war 
justice). They include self-determination, popular legitimacy, civil rights, and 
the idea of a common good.”63  
Seth Lazar makes a similar, rather convincing argument against integrating 
                                                             
62 In this, I disagree with Seth Lazar, who argues that jus post bellum does not regulate the 
same aspects as jus ad bellum and jus in bello, but the practice of peace building. On the 
contrary, I am inclined to think that jus post bellum applies to war related activities, 
since most issues that are regulated are direct consequences of the war, for example 
criminal prosecution, compensation and political reconstruction.  
63 Walzer 2004, p. 164. 
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jus ante bellum and jus post bellum. He claims that: “In the period before a threat is 
raised, we should follow the full gamut of moral reasons, not this polarized 
set.”64 Indeed, jus ante bellum cannot be reduced to the moral framework of just 
war theory. It is obvious that its limited framework is not sufficient as 
foundation for duties as: “advance democracy, human rights, and religious 
liberty”; “foster just and sustainable economic development”; and “strengthen 
the United Nations and international efforts for cooperation and human 
rights”.65 This is only partially true for jus post bellum. Jus post bellum is mainly 
backward looking as most of its duties are related to (a violation of) jus ad bellum 
and jus in bello norms, as the example of criminal justice proves: these norms are 
backward looking in that they are directly related to crimes committed before 
and in the war. Also, reparations and compensation are directly related to the 
war; they are owed when e.g. property is seized or destroyed in war. Since a 
substantial part of the post bellum norms and duties directly flow from the war, it 
is plausible that its norms are grounded in just war theory’s moral framework.  
However, this framework is an insufficient foundation to guide the more 
extensive, forward looking post bellum norms. For example, general principles of 
justice come into play when considering comprehensive political reconstruction, 
as Walzer and Lazar rightly argue. The broader and more comprehensive post 
war obligations are understood, and thus the more maximalist the interpretation 
of jus post bellum is, the more obvious the shift to general principles of justice is 
and the connection to just war theory is loosened. The broad post war activities 
of economic reconstruction; rebuilding infrastructure; and fostering 
reconciliation cannot be grounded in the limited moral framework of just war 
theory. These activities are therefore inevitably guided by the full range of moral 
reasons, however those are understood.66 If these additional branches are meant 
to be fully integrated, just war theory can no longer be separated from general 
theories of justice.67 And when general principles of global justice, international 
political morality, cosmopolitanism and/ or human rights are integrated into the 
theory, the indeterminacy is complete.  
                                                             
64 Lazar 2010, p. 22. 
65 http://justpeacemaking.org/the-practices/  
66 Lazar 2010, p. 22. 
67 This does not constitute a problem for Cecile Fabre. She notes that this would only 
make just war theory ‘richer’, which opens the way for including maximalist jus post 
bellum. Cecile Fabre, ‘War’s Aftermath and the Ethics of War’, in: Helen Frowe and 
Seth Lazar (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Ethics and War, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2016. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
We can conclude that while arguments for an extension of just war theory into a 
four partite conception appear strong, we should reconsider adopting these two 
additional branches. Conceptually, jus ante bellum does not fit into just war 
theory, as it is a general strategy consisting of guidelines as opposed to moral 
norms; the regulated activities and the addressees deviate from the established 
branches; and the foundation must be located entirely outside just war theory. 
While it was expected that the general goal of just war theory – realizing a just 
and durable peace – would benefit from an integration of jus ante bellum, the 
contrary would be true. While jus ante bellum provides praiseworthy guidelines 
in an effort to prevent wars from breaking out, they seem to be too 
indeterminate, idealistic and demanding compared to traditional just war 
theory. Jus ante bellum, as it is now understood, could therefore hardly be 
perceived as realistically attainable part of just war theory. And aside from the 
conceptual difficulties and the infeasibility, adopting jus ante bellum would run 
the general risk of inflating just war theory as a whole. Integrating norms on 
preventive peacemaking entails a substantial expansion of the theory. And the 
more issues are integrated, the more drastic and fundamental this expansion 
will be. The risk of inflating just war theory, with a considerate devaluation of 
the theory as a whole as result, is significant and must be acknowledged. 
These arguments against integrating jus ante bellum are not entirely valid for 
jus post bellum. Jus post bellum fits better into the concept of just war theory. The 
character and the content of the norms is similar; the addressees are primarily 
those who took part in the war (while an involvement of other states or 
organizations is also possible); and the foundation can be located in just war 
theory, although general principles of justice creep in. Jus post bellum seems to 
have one foot in just war theory and one foot out. What turns out to be relevant 
here is the way how jus post bellum is interpreted. A minimalist jus post bellum is 
more tightly connected to just war theory than a maximalist jus post bellum. The 
more comprehensive post bellum norms are considered to be, the further this 
branch conceptually drifts away from the just war paradigm, and the less 
realistically attainable it appears to be. Therefore, the idea of integrating only a 
limited, minimalist account of jus post bellum into the theory sounds convincing. 
This way, just war theory is more ‘complete’ in offering the required moral 
guidance in the contemporary political reality while at the same time 
conceptually leaving just war theory intact, and minimizing the risk of inflating 
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and devaluating the theory. This by no means reduces the importance of the 
issues regulated by jus ante bellum and maximalist jus post bellum. It merely 
means that these issues should not be regarded within the parameters of just 
war theory but rather, should be perceived from the wider perspective of global 
justice or an ‘ethics of peace building’. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
79
80
 
 
 
5.  On the Duty to Reconstruct after War. Who is Responsible for 
Jus Post Bellum?   
  
5.1 Introduction  
 
War can easily be classified as the most destructive of all human activity. After 
the smoke clears, one side of the coin might be a picture of parades and smiling 
faces. However, the other side of the coin is likely to be a picture of damage, 
destruction and deprivation. As the following chapter makes clear in more 
detail, the exact tasks and scope of norms proposed under the heading of jus 
post bellum vary and have changed in the course of its relatively short existence. 
In traditional just war theory, the conception of (what is now called) jus post 
bellum was limited. This ‘minimalist’ jus post bellum was premised upon the idea 
that just wars are conservative in character.1 The restoration of the situation quo 
ante bellum is the just outcome of war.2 As such, norms of such just post bellum 
are primarily backward looking, focusing on the former belligerents, 
particularly limiting what victors are allowed to do after war.  
 This conception of jus post bellum has changed and today, there is a general 
tendency towards a ‘maximalist’ conception of jus post bellum. This means that 
the body of jus post bellum has grown; more tasks are taken up under this 
heading.3 As a result, the scope of jus post bellum can be quite comprehensive, 
post bellum tasks require a fairly long timeframe, and involve a broad set of 
positive duties. Norms of maximalist jus post bellum are therefore no longer 
mainly backward, but also forward looking: not aimed at restoring the previous 
situation, but rather aimed at improving the situation of deprivation in the 
defeated state. Correspondingly, it is not exclusively addressed to the former 
belligerents.  
This short assessment leads to an important question which has not received 
sufficient attention in the jus post bellum literature: After war, how should we 
distribute post war duties and how can we assign them to the appropriate 
                                                             
1 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations 
(second edition, or. 1977), New York: Basic Books 2000, p. 121. 
2 Michael Walzer, ‘The Aftermath of War. Reflections on Jus Post Bellum’, in: Eric 
Patterson (ed.), Ethics beyond War’s End, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press 2012, p. 36. See further chapter 3. 
3 The distinction between minimalism and maximalism is further explored in the 
following chapter.  
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actors? In other words, who are the addressees of jus post bellum – the duty 
bearers? The development regarding jus post bellum’s content and scope brings 
to light a very serious problem: it is far from clear who is responsible for 
realizing jus post bellum. This uncertainty about specific duty bearers might lead 
to a situation in which no one will properly acquit these duties, and the critique 
could be raised that jus post bellum is in fact merely empty rhetoric.4 If 
responsibility for the duty to reconstruct cannot be assigned, does this third 
branch of just war theory exist? For the theory to be action guiding and 
effective, it is crucial that it is possible to determine who is responsible after 
war. 
 It appears that this question is not to be answered easily. While it is clear 
that the (would be) belligerents are the addressees of jus ad bellum and jus in bello 
norms, this seems different for the third branch of just war theory. The general 
shift towards maximalist jus post bellum means that this branch entails positive 
duties, is both backward and forward looking, and that post war reconstruction 
is of the essence for building a just and lasting peace. In light of the interest of all 
states in a lasting peace, it seems inappropriate to address only former 
belligerents for jus post bellum based on the fact that they were engaged in this 
war. Rather, it seems that the contemporary maximalist view on jus post bellum 
entails that the international community as a whole is responsible for post war 
reconstruction. But in that case, how do we determine more precisely who the 
specific duty bearers are? 
In the contemporary debate on jus post bellum, responsibility is assigned to 
different actors, based on different moral or prudential arguments. Two main 
positions can be distinguished. The first position holds that post bellum duties 
should be assigned to the states that took part in the war: the former 
belligerents. Michael Walzer is an important representative of what James 
Pattison calls the ‘belligerents rebuild thesis’;5 Walzer holds that the just victor 
is primarily responsible for jus post bellum. Analogue to individuals who do 
good in the world and as result have more obligations than people who do 
nothing, states who do the right thing also acquire more responsibilities, so 
Walzer argues.6 The jus ad bellum decision entails positive post war duties that 
                                                             
4 See also: Pattison 2015, p. 636; Alexandra Gheciu & Jennifer Welsh, ‘The imperative 
to rebuild. Assessing the normative case for postconflict reconstruction’, in: Ethics & 
International Affairs 2009, 23/2, p. 137. 
5 Pattison 2015, p. 636. 
6 Walzer 2012, p. 40. 
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need to be fulfilled. On top of that, unilateral action of the victors is most 
effective in this respect, particularly if regulated by an international 
organization.7 Brian Orend agrees that post bellum duties are implied in the 
cause for war and puts forward another important argument for this position: 
the just victor is responsible based on the Pottery Barn Rule: ‘you break it, you 
own it’.8 Walzer urges that we are sensitive to the needs and sentiments of the 
local population, which means that we have to involve the population of the 
defeated state to gain legitimacy.9  
Among others, Pattison rejects the ‘belligerents rebuild thesis’, because 
assigning post bellum duties to belligerents leads to unfair and imprudent 
outcomes, e.g., that humanitarian interveners should rebuild; that belligerents 
are often not the most appropriate actors to fulfill these tasks; that belligerents 
can cease to exist; that it might be difficult to distribute duties between 
belligerents; and that they can refuse to fulfill them.10 The concern that 
belligerents might not be the most appropriate actors to reconstruct the war 
torn state is voiced more often. This can be the result of a lack of political will or 
a lack of material capacity of belligerents.11 Seth Lazar argues that in general, 
assigning post bellum duties (solely) to the just victor would place a too heavy 
burden on them.12 Therefore, these theorists defend the second position, 
namely that the international community as a whole is responsible. One might 
call this the ‘universal rebuild thesis’, since it is argued here that post bellum 
                                                             
7 Walzer 2012, p. 41.  
8 Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum. A Just War Theory Perspective’, in: Carsten Stahn & 
Jann Kleffner, Jus Post Bellum. Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to Peace, The 
Hague: TMC Asser Press 2008, p. 49.  
9 Walzer 2012, p. 43-44. 
10 Pattison 2015, p. 638-641.  
11 The potential lack of political will and material capacity of just victors is also 
mentioned by Alex Bellamy. See: Alex Bellamy, ‘The responsibilities of victory. Jus Post 
Bellum and the Just War’, in: Review of International Studies 2008, 34/4, p. 623; George 
Clifford similarly argues: “Nations that win a war may not have the resources, political 
will, or acceptability required to build a just peace unilaterally.” George Clifford, ‘Jus 
post bellum. Foundational principles and a proposed model’, in: Journal of Military Ethics 
2012, 11/1, p. 44; Gheciu and Welsh further explain why belligerents might not be the 
most appropriate actors: they generally have high stakes; can be biased; and might not 
be in the best position to act. See: Gheciu & Welsh 2009, p. 134, 136. 
12 Particularly with regard to just interventions. Seth Lazar, ‘Scepticism about Jus Post 
Bellum’, in: Larry May & Andrew Forcehimes (eds.), Morality, Jus Post Bellum, and 
International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012, p. 216-217. 
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duties are universal.13 This position would then reflect contemporary 
international practice, in which states are considered to hold a shared 
responsibility for human security. E.g., part of the ‘responsibility to protect’, 
now widely endorsed, is the ‘responsibly to rebuild’ after war.14 It is argued that 
“peacemaking has become an international affair”.15  
It is clear that there is disagreement in the current debate and that the two 
main positions resemble a more limited and a more extensive understanding of 
jus post bellum. Different and often competing arguments are used as 
foundation for post war responsibility, often without an elaborate explanation. 
For the first position, assigning responsibility seems to be fairly 
straightforward: post war duties are implied in the just cause of war; whoever 
‘breaks’ something for a just cause is responsible for repairing what has been 
broken. But this is not as simple as it appears. Whereas the just victor might 
indeed, so to say, have broken something which consequently needs repairing, 
it is the unjust belligerent who is the prime ‘breaker’. How should we distribute 
responsibility between just and unjust belligerents?16 And what if either or both 
of these belligerents are not willing or able to effectively reconstruct after war? 
The second position raises questions on the distribution of responsibility as 
well and even more profoundly. If the international community as a whole is 
indeed responsible, then there need to be certain conditions that can distribute 
specific duties (e.g. to reconstruct) to specific actors. This means that we need a 
comprehensive theory on responsibility for jus post bellum.  
                                                             
13 Lazar argues that in case of a humanitarian intervention, the duty to reconstruct is 
universal, since the original intervention was a universal duty and everyone should help 
one in need. Lazar 2012, p. 216. 
14 UN General Assembly, World Summit Outcome, A/RES/60/1 2005 (World Summit 
Outcome Document). Online: http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ods/A-RES-60-1-
E.pdf.  
15 Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum. Mapping the Discipline(s)’, in: Carsten Stahn & Jann 
Kleffner 2008, Jus Post Bellum. Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to Peace, The 
Hague: TMC Asser Press 2008, p. 100. In the words of Clifford: “In a world 
increasingly tied by global interests and linkages, responsibilities for achieving 
progress toward peace are international and entail situationally determined elements 
and commitments.” Clifford 2012, p. 44.  
16 Larry May argues that the burdens of jus post bellum should be shared between 
belligerents. They have to work together to reestablish the rule of law and secure that 
just and lasting peace. The condition of proportionality is helpful in distributing 
responsibility between former belligerents. Larry May, After War End. A Philosophical 
Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012. 
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Alexandra Gheciu and Jennifer Welsh encountered this theoretical lacuna.17 
They mapped and analyzed the various ethical imperatives that are put forward 
in the public debate by international actors that set out to rebuild war torn 
states. It appears that these imperatives entail problematic dilemmas, and that 
the underlying principles have the potential to clash in particular situations. For 
example, regional states could have special obligations due to their proximity, 
but they might not be in the best position to act due to the nature of existing 
relationships. These authors do not resolve these dilemmas, since that “would 
require arguments that present a compelling case for privileging one guiding 
principle over others”.18 James Pattison builds on this and attempts to theorize 
responsibility for jus post bellum in such a way that it is possible to privilege one 
specific guiding principle. He claims that jus post bellum is characterized by 
collective, international obligations, which should be assigned according to the 
ability to fulfill these obligations.19 Because belligerents are often not the most 
capable actors, he even argues that there should be a “presumption against 
belligerents rebuilding”.20 While these two analyses are important steps in 
closing the theoretic lacuna regarding post war responsibility, Gheciu and 
Welsh leave the way open for further development, and Pattison’s thought 
provoking argumentation leads to an unsatisfying conclusion, in which capacity 
and efficiency essentially determine who bears the duty to reconstruct.21  
Therefore, while the debate on the content and scope of jus post bellum is far 
from settled, this chapter explores the issue of responsibility, which deserves 
more attention than it has received so far. Jus post bellum can only be considered 
a full-fledged third branch of just war theory if it is clear who bears the 
responsibility for it, i.e.  if it is clear who is addressed by the duties under jus post 
bellum. This means that at least two main questions need answering. First: 
                                                             
17 Gheciu & Welsh 2009, p. 121-123.  
18 Gheciu & Welsh 2009, p. 143. 
19 Pattison 2015, p. 635. 
20 Pattison 2015, p. 658. 
21 Pattison raises justified concerns against the ‘belligerents rebuild thesis’. However, his 
main argument against this thesis is its supposed relation to the ‘dependence 
approach’, according to which the justness of the war is dependent on jus post bellum. 
And as Pattison rightly rejects the latter approach, he rejects the ‘belligerents rebuild 
thesis’ as well. I am not convinced by this line of argument, particularly because of that 
supposed relation. Aside from Gary Bass, most theorists defending the ‘belligerents 
rebuild thesis’ do not rely on the ‘dependence approach’ but use other arguments. His 
argumentation does not therefore invalidate the claim that former belligerents are the 
prime duty bearers after war.  
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Which conditions can serve as the foundation for post war duties? Second: 
How to weigh these conditions when they clash or when they point to different 
actors? This chapter directly addresses the foundation for responsibility after 
war with an eye to developing a system for assigning post war duties in concrete 
situations. The focus is mostly on the duty of post war reconstruction, as 
arguably the most comprehensive task after war and widely acknowledged as 
essential for contemporary jus post bellum.22  
In the following section, David Miller’s theory on responsibility is taken as a 
proper venue to address the questions mentioned, since the question on how to 
assign the duty to reconstruct is essentially a question about collective remedial 
responsibly, the issue that is central in Miller’s approach. Section 3 analyzes the 
conditions that Miller distinguishes for assigning remedial responsibility and 
apply them to post war situations. This will bring out the strengths and 
weaknesses of these conditions as foundation for jus post bellum duties. A 
condition that is not prominent in Miller’s taxonomy, and which can be 
approached through Hart’s concept of role responsibility, is explored in section 
4. Obviously, it is most important to take stock of the value of the various 
conditions, and to try and determine how they should be applied in real life. 
Section 5 takes up this task. The goal is to contribute to developing a system for 
assigning the duty to reconstruct to specific actors that can claim general 
agreement. This requires that a hierarchy is set up which enables us to balance 
these conditions in particular post war situations. Only with such a system in 
place is there a realistic prospect that jus post bellum functions as a useful tool in 
the creation of (somewhat resembling) a just and lasting peace.  
5.2 Miller’s Collective Remedial Responsibility  
The duty to reconstruct after war is a matter of collective remedial 
responsibility: it is argued that a certain actor, e.g. the victorious state, is 
collectively responsible for remedying post war deprivation. But while just war 
theorists usually assume that states can bear duties, collective responsibility is 
not undisputed. The problem of collective responsibility not only arises with 
regard to postwar situations; this issue has been raised with regard to problems 
22 I am aware that there are major differences among theorist about what is part of 
reconstruction and what the appropriate scope of reconstruction must be. In this 
chapter however, I want to leave this matter aside and delve into the issue of 
responsibility instead.  
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of global justice, and a promising solution in this regard is provided by David 
Miller.23  
 In general, Miller defends the idea of national responsibility in the sense that 
individuals have special duties towards fellow nationals, but that they have also 
duties of global justice beyond those resulting from violations of the rights of 
others. Put simply, Miller eloquently defends a position in the global justice 
debate similar to that of John Rawls, in which special duties to one’s community 
are asserted but in which at the same time duties of justice towards the global 
community are defended. It is an alternative to both cosmopolitan 
egalitarianism such as defended by Simon Caney which denies the relevance of 
national borders,24 and nationalism such as defended by Thomas Nagel, who 
distinguishes duties of justice for fellow citizens and much weaker global duties 
of charity or humanity.25 Despite contemporary developments in our 
globalized world, Miller argues that there remain significant differences 
between the national and international context. Therefore, national principles 
of social justice cannot extend to global relations: the nation state remains the 
privileged context for social justice.26 But this does not mean that no strong 
duties exist beyond the boundaries of the nation state. These are duties of justice 
and not merely duties of charity or humanity, and they go beyond those 
resulting from the violation of the rights of others. These duties of global justice 
are generated by basic human rights. It means that for Miller, human 
deprivation and suffering is something that cannot be tolerated; it requires 
collective efforts and thus collective responsibility. 
David Miller’s theory on responsibility, developed in the context of the 
global justice debate, can help us theorize the issue of responsibility in other 
situations: i.e. after war. His concept of remedial responsibility as opposed to 
outcome responsibility, and the concept of collective responsibility as opposed 
                                                             
23 David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 2007. Miller’s study on national responsibility is well constructed and complex, 
and unfortunately I can only discuss parts of his argument in this chapter. 
24 Simon Caney, Justice beyond Borders, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005. 
25 Thomas Nagel, ‘The Problem of Global Justice’, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs, 2005, 
33/2. For an extensive discussion of the difference between duties of justice and duties 
of charity see: Allen Buchanan, ‘Justice and Charity’, in: Ethics 1987, 97/3, p. 558-575. 
Miller positions himself in the global justice debate as ‘social liberalist’, following the 
terminology of Charles Beitz. This position is contrasted with cosmopolitan liberalism 
on the one hand and laissez-faire liberalism on the other. Miller 2007, p. 20-21. 
26 Miller 2007, p. 15-16. 
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to individual responsibility are particularly useful. Miller explains the first 
distinction by using an example in which a teacher returns to an overturned 
classroom.27 The teacher might want to know who is responsible for producing 
the mess, but also who is responsible for clearing up that mess. The first 
question refers to the agent producing the outcome (outcome responsibility), 
the other question to the agent who has the duty to put the bad situation right 
(remedial responsibility). Both these concepts can be applied in individual 
contexts such as Miller’s example of the classroom, but also in collective 
contexts: the second important distinction Miller makes is between individual 
and collective responsibility. In so far as the concepts of outcome and remedial 
responsibility are applicable to collectives, they can be used for our 
understanding of just war theory, which deals primarily with collective 
responsibilities.28 There are good reasons to take Miller’s perspective when 
considering the issue of responsibility for jus post bellum. These reasons and the 
two preliminary issues are briefly discussed below: Miller’s conceptions of 
outcome and remedial responsibility and that of collective responsibility.  
 
5.2.1 Outcome versus Remedial Responsibility  
 
For Miller, the conceptual difference between outcome responsibility and 
remedial responsibility is essential. The first type, outcome responsibility, refers 
to the person that produced the outcome, e.g. who made the mess in the 
classroom. It is the responsibility that a person bears for his own decisions and 
actions.29 This type of responsibility is backward looking and answers the 
question who is responsible for a certain problem. Outcome responsibility has 
a strong causal component but cannot be identified with causality: causal 
responsibility questions why something has happened, whereas outcome 
responsibility properly questions “whether a particular agent can be credited or 
debited with a particular outcome – a gain or a loss, either to the agent herself or 
to other parties”.30 Usually, when an individual is responsible for a certain 
                                                             
27 Miller 2007, p. 83-84. 
28 At least in the ad bellum phase just war theory deals with collective responsibilities, but 
even violations of the in bello rules might point at collective responsibilities, when, e.g., 
the army does not provide sufficient training for its soldiers in Geneva rules or, worse, 
actively encourages brutalities.  
29 Miller 2007, p. 81.  
30 Miller 2007, p. 87. 
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outcome, we feel that the gains and losses that fall upon that actor should stay 
where they are, whereas gains and losses that fall upon others should be shifted, 
e.g. compensated. In general, there is a presumption that agents are permitted 
to enjoy the benefits of their actions, as well as bear the burdens of those 
actions.31   
The second type is remedial responsibility, which refers to the person that 
has the duty to remedy a certain problem. It is thus forward looking and 
questions at whom fixing the problem can be attributed; who is in that sense 
responsible. The focus is on the problem that needs remedy. As such, remedial 
responsibility is the responsibly that a person may have to help those who are in 
need of our help, although the person who is supposed to help did not 
necessarily bring about the need. Solving the problem is often connected to 
outcome responsibility since outcome responsibility is in many circumstances 
the most obvious basis for remedial responsibility. This means that the person 
who was responsible for the outcome, is also remedially responsible.  
However, actors can be remedially responsible even when they are not 
outcome responsible for the deprivation, and then their responsibility is based 
on other conditions. Miller argues that when global problems occur, initially, 
“there is a moral requirement that falls on everybody else to provide the help or 
the resources that are needed.”32 But how do we distribute such a duty? It is 
important to single out some particular actor (or actors) who is obligated to put 
the bad situation right.33 This is what it means to be remedially responsible: 
there is a special responsibility to remedy a problem that is not equally shared 
with all agents, and this agent is liable to sanction if the responsibility is not 
properly discharged.34 Thus, this meaning of responsibility is concerned with 
remedying a problematic situation, and therefore it is important to single out 
the actor (or actors) that has a special responsibility to end this problematic 
situation, e.g. of deprivation. To do that, Miller proposes a taxonomy of six 
different conditions which are relevant when distributing remedial 
responsibility. As this type of responsibility is precisely what we need for jus 
                                                             
31 Miller 2007, p. 87. 
32 Miller 2007, p. 98. 
33 David Miller, ‘Distributing Responsibilities’, in: Journal of Political Philosophy 2001, 
9/4, p. 469.  
34 This sanction is not necessarily punishment but can entail blame as well. Miller 2007, 
p. 98-99. 
89
JUS POST BELLUM AND THE NATURE OF PEACE 
 
 
post bellum, Miller’s taxonomy might serve as a base for the development of a 
system for assigning the specific duty to reconstruct after war.  
 
5.2.2 Individual versus Collective Responsibility  
 
Next to the distinction between outcome and remedial responsibility, Miller 
distinguishes between individual and collective responsibility. Whereas 
individual responsibility might not pose too many problems, collective 
responsibility is more contested.35 Miller defends the idea of collective 
responsibility; he holds that different  collectives might be responsible, but he 
focuses on the nation state who he considers either collectively outcome and/ or 
collectively remedially responsible.36 This nationalist position would help us 
enormously with understanding just war theory in general, and jus post bellum in 
particular. Most just war theorists presume such a collective perspective when 
they consider states, nations, or armies as the addressees of just war theory, 
who consequently bear the related duties.37 International organizations also 
                                                             
35 There is an extensive and extremely interesting debate on collective responsibility. 
However, in this chapter I want to shed light on responsibility for jus post bellum, rather 
than fully defend the issue of collective responsibility as such. This is not to deny that 
there are other positions that are eloquently defended, focusing on individuals and 
individual responsibly, also for the issue of war (e.g. Cecile Fabre, Cosmopolitan War, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012). For Miller’s defense of national responsibility 
based on the ‘like-minded group model’ and the ‘cooperative practice model’ see Miller 
2007, p. 111-134, for critique, e.g., Roland Pierik, ‘Collective Responsibility and 
National Responsibility’, in: Helder de Schutter & Ronald Tinnevelt (eds.), Nationalism 
and Global Justice. David Miller and his Critics, New York/London: Routledge 2011, and 
for a defense against criticism David Miller, ‘Collective Responsibility and Global 
Poverty’, in: Ethical Perspectives 2012, 19/4, p. 631-635. For the purpose of this chapter, 
I assume that there is something like collective responsibility, or that it is at least a 
useful fiction, and that as such, nations and states can be responsible actors.  
36 According to Thom Brooks, we can widen Miller’s focus and extend remedial 
responsibilities to other groups with a shared identity such as religious groups. Thom 
Brooks, ‘Remedial Responsibilities beyond Nations’, in: Journal of Global Ethics 2014, 
10/2, p. 156, 166. 
37 One might think in this context of the recent revisionist turn in just war theory, 
initiated by theorists such as Jeff McMahan, which is based on an individualist account 
of the theory as opposed to the traditional statist account. This challenges mainly the 
traditional account of jus in bello, as it argues that combatants are not morally equal, but 
that their individual moral standing depends on the justness of ‘their’ war. Space 
precludes me from elaborating further on this topic. See, e.g. Jeff McMahan, Killing in 
War, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009; David Rodin, War and Self-Defense, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press 2003; Frowe 2016, p. 31-51, 123-145. 
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play a role in just war thinking, particularly the United Nations. However, it 
must be noted that the United Nations do not act as a genuine collective body 
but rather via the medium of its member states.  
 Adopting the perspective of collective responsibility as conceived by Miller 
is useful in developing an account of jus post bellum which might work in 
practice. The international arena consists indeed of sovereign (nation) states 
that decide upon matters such as war, peace building and development aid. As 
such, this perspective is ‘reality based’ and might improve the existing global 
realm by attributing responsibility to these collective actors. When we want to 
consider post war duties in a world without a world state, and without the 
United Nations which can robustly impose responsibilities and enforce 
compliance, (nation) states remain the prime international actors. Given our 
present purpose, namely to develop an account of responsibility for jus post 
bellum, it is assumed that there is something like collective responsibility.  
This is not to say, however, that no difficulties exist as it comes to assigning 
collective responsibility in concrete cases, which is readily acknowledged by 
Miller. Accepting collective responsibility in the abstract is one thing and 
distributing it in the concrete an entirely other thing. Miller foresees problems 
when attributing collective responsibility to individuals for the policy and 
actions of a specific nation state, because of their role in the decision making 
process. Therefore, collectively responsibility can be attributed to individuals 
who represent that collectivity, to varying extents. In other words, collective 
responsibility is a matter of degree, depending on what Miller calls the ‘control 
dimension’ and the ‘constraint dimension’.  
The first dimension looks at the degree of control individuals have over the 
policy of their collective, i.e. the nation. Obviously, the claim that all citizens 
share in national responsibility is difficult to uphold when the state is as 
authoritarian in nature as North Korea, where the population has hardly any 
influence over state policy. Here responsibility resides only with the ruling elite. 
In democratic states and in authoritarian states which enjoy popular support, its 
members do share in the collective national responsibility. The more 
democratic the state is, the more it makes sense to identify acts by the state as 
genuine national acts, and to spread responsibility among the population.38  
                                                             
38 Margaret Moore, ‘Global Justice, Climate Change and Miller’s Theory of 
Responsibility’, in: Helder de Schutter & Ronald Tinnevelt (eds.), Nationalism and 
Global Justice. David Miller and his Critics, New York/London: Routledge 2011, p. 133. 
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The second dimension, the constraint dimension, takes into account the 
external environment of the nation. Is the nation able to execute the policy of 
their choice and to what extent is it constrained by its external environment, e.g. 
by a lack of natural resources or by being small and thus not very influential? 
With regards to problems of global justice, Miller follows Rawls in arguing that 
external and physical factors – constraints so to speak – do influence the 
economic wellbeing of the nation, but domestic factors – the economic and 
political system and the national cultural values – have by far the most 
significant impact. Therefore, the constraint factor never fully takes away 
collective (here national) responsibility although national responsibly is always 
a matter of degree. Therefore, national responsibility is the norm rather than 
the exception, and individuals share in this national responsibility by virtue of 
their membership of nations.39  
A special difficulty with collective responsibility, which is particularly 
relevant for jus post bellum, arises with the distinction between states and 
nations. Miller seems to refer deliberately to the nation state as main collective 
actor, but that obscures the obvious problem that not all international actors are 
nation states. The terms state and country refer to legal and political entities 
that are sovereign, internationally recognized, and self-governing over a certain 
territory (noting that the geographic location is emphasized with the term 
‘country’).40  A nation on the other hand refers to a large group of people that 
share a culture, language, religion and/ or history. When a state encompasses 
such a unity, it is referred to as a nation state. But, as is well known, there is a 
plurality of cases in which state and nation do not coincide: there are stateless 
nations (e.g. the Kurdish nation) and multinational states (e.g. the former 
Yugoslavia, Canada, and Iraq).  
Miller defines a nation state in a similar matter: “The people who belong to 
it are subject to a common set of coercively imposed laws; they are engaged in a 
co-operative practice regulated by a common set of economic and social 
39 David Miller, ‘National Responsibility and Global Justice’, in: Critical Review of 
International Social and Political Philosophy 2008, 11/4, p. 386-387.  
40 The definition of statehood in international law is described as follows: “The state as a 
person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a permanent 
population; a defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with 
the other states.” Article 1 Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933 
(Montevideo Convention, entered into force 26 December 1933), online: 
http://www.cfr.org/sovereignty/montevideo-convention-rights-duties-states/p15897.   
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institutions; and they share a common national identity.”41 In short, its 
characteristics are sovereignty, economic co-operation and national identity. 
This enables Miller to focus on nation states as bearers of collective 
responsibility, but it seems more fair, especially for jus post bellum purposes, to 
keep in mind both entities.42 The state as institution is usually the actor that 
formally decides on international matters. As such, it will be mainly (nation) 
states that are outcome responsible for war and post war deprivation.43 States 
can also formally accept outcome responsibility for a particular situation.44 
However, nations can be held responsible in this respect as well; Miller agrees 
when stateless nations “carry out a form of ethnic cleansing precisely in order to 
constitute a territorial state of their own”.45 One might also think of Islamic 
State, perhaps best viewed as stateless nation despite its self-chosen name, as 
being responsible.  
Considering remedial responsibility, it is relatively easy to assign remedial 
responsibility to states in terms of identification, and indeed states are the 
prime actors to discharge remedial responsibilities. However, this might well 
mean that we assign responsibility vicariously, according to Miller. Think of the 
responsibility of the German Nazi state as distinct from the responsibility of 
the German people.46 Miller admits that this matter remains somewhat opaque: 
“it may not be clear which of the two relationships – citizenship or nationality – 
is doing the work when arguments about the importance of the nation state are 
being advanced”.47  
                                                             
41 Miller 2008, p. 390. 
42 This has to do with Miller’s foundation for collective responsibility, which are both the 
‘like-minded group model’ and the ‘cooperative practice model’. Together, they can 
serve as foundation for the responsibility of nations and nation states, however, the 
foundation of mere state responsibility would rely solely on the ‘cooperative practice 
model’ which Miller considers fragile. David Miller, ‘David Owen on Global Justice, 
national responsibility and transnational power: a reply’, in: Review of International 
Studies 2011, 37/4, p. 2030.  
43 This might be somewhat different for the problem of global poverty. Miller argues that 
nations are often outcome responsible for global poverty, since “it is not states, but 
peoples, who deforest land or deplete fish stocks, for example”. Miller 2012, p. 643. 
44 Miller 2012, p. 643. 
45 Miller 2011, p. 2030. 
46 Miller 2012, p. 644. 
47 Miller 2011, p. 2029. Similarly, when Miller considers the difference between 
compatriots and citizens in the nation-state, he states that while “there is much to be 
said for making nation-states the primary bearers of global responsibilities, even here 
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Miller’s analysis is highly relevant for the topic of post war justice, both 
because of his distinction between outcome and remedial responsibility and for 
his emphasis on collective (national) responsibility for global problems, arguing 
that even when actors were not involved in bringing about a problem, they 
might nonetheless be responsible for solving it. This is extremely helpful: it 
became clear that jus post bellum faces a serious problem, not only because 
formerly warring parties might not be the best placed to discharge post war 
duties, but also because of the uncertainty regarding the distribution of 
responsibility among other actors. To simply state that the just victor must 
rebuild while it clearly lacks the mental or the material capacity, or to state that 
the responsibility for jus post bellum falls indeterminately on ‘the international 
community’, does not bring us further; “(…) an undistributed duty such as this 
to which everybody is subject is likely to be discharged by nobody”.48  
Remedying the post war damage, the war’s destruction and deprivation and 
the building up of a just and durable peace should be the main concern after 
war. Analogue to Miller’s example of the teacher returning to an overturned 
classroom, that consequently needs to be cleared up, the war torn state needs to 
be ‘cleared up’ as well. 49  Since it is urgent to have a theory of responsibility for 
jus post bellum, it is adamant to apply Miller’s theory to jus post bellum, and to 
come up with a system that provides the conditions for assigning post bellum 
remedial responsibility. In the next section, an effort is made analyze Miller’s 
taxonomy in the context of post war situations. 
 
5.3 The Foundation of Post War Duties 
 
To address global problems in general, Miller holds, firstly, the concept of 
remedial responsibility to be central (because global problems need to be 
addressed in any case) and proposes, secondly, what he calls a connection 
theory of remedial responsibility: the nation that is connected in one or more 
ways to global problems, say deprivation, can be held responsible for 
remedying or improving that situation. Given that it is intolerable to leave 
deprivation and suffering to continue, it is the aim of the theory to come up 
                                                                                                                                               
the fit between the group that is collectively responsible and the institution to which 
responsibility is assigned will be imperfect”. Miller 2012, p. 648. 
48 Miller 2007, p. 98. See also: David Miller, ‘Distributing Responsibilities’, in: Journal of 
Political Philosophy 2001, 9/4, p. 469. 
49 Miller 2007, p. 83-84. 
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with a proper way to assign responsibility to at least one actor. This leads Miller 
to propose six conditions which can constitute the foundation for remedial 
responsibility: moral responsibility, outcome responsibility, causal 
responsibility, benefit, capacity, and community. All these conditions are 
considered equally important and they need to be balanced against each other 
in concrete situations by using moral intuition, according to Miller: “We have to 
rely on our intuitions about the relative importance of different sources of 
connection.”50 In short: the various links that these conditions establish 
between an actor and a particular situation should be considered in distributing 
remedial responsibility.  
 It will become clear that the arguments for assigning post war duties to 
certain duty bearers, put forward by just war theorists, largely correspond with 
these conditions. It is therefore useful to analyze these six conditions and so 
help our thinking about the distribution of duties after war. It is argued that in 
this particular context some conditions do seem to weigh stronger than others, 
and that there are specific difficulties involved in using these conditions as a 
foundation for post bellum responsibilities. Three types of cases are used to 
explain how these conditions could work: self- or other-defense, humanitarian 
intervention, and ‘debated wars’, wars of which the justness is contested. 
 
5.3.1 Moral Responsibility 
 
The first condition Miller discusses is ‘moral responsibility’, When applied to 
post war situations, this condition is an intuitively strong argument for 
assigning responsibility.51 While it might be difficult in the case of global 
problems such as poverty to appoint a particular agent that is to blame, this 
seems to be easier in the case of war. In general, war is prohibited: modern just 
war theory holds that war is principally immoral, but can be justified in 
exceptional circumstances, and there is a legal prohibition on the use of force by 
states.52 Therefore, something has clearly gone wrong if war does occur. This 
means that usually, there will be at least one unjustified aggressor bearing the 
moral guilt for the war and subsequent deprivation. As in individual situations 
of responsibility, it makes sense to hold remedially responsible the actor that 
                                                             
50 Miller 2007, p. 107. 
51 Miller 2007, p. 100. 
52 Article 2.4 United Nations Charter.  
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was at fault for the war. This restores the moral balance between the ‘aggressor’ 
and the ‘victim’.53 In a case of an unjustified attack and legitimate self- or other 
defense, such as the first Gulf War, the aggressor, Iraq, was morally responsible 
for the war and subsequent deprivation in Kuwait. As they were unjustified in 
their attempt to annex Kuwait, they are morally to blame for the damage. Based 
thereon, Iraq appears a likely candidate for being remedially responsible for 
deprivation in Kuwait. 
How does this first condition work for the deprivation resulting from a 
humanitarian intervention? The situation which leads to a humanitarian 
intervention is characterized by internal instead of external aggression. Here, 
we stumble upon the difficulties that were foreseen by Miller when addressing 
collective responsibility. These type of cases involves a humanitarian 
catastrophe (or the imminent threat thereof) due to aggression usually 
performed by the state, i.e. governmental elites in power, against (parts of) the 
population, such as occurred in Cambodia or Libya. Clearly, the Khmer Rouge 
and the Ghaddafi clan were morally responsible for the severe harm inflicted 
on the population. In these cases however, it is difficult to hold the nation or the 
population collectively responsible for the deprivation and suffering. We could 
assess the extent to which the population had control over the national policy 
and its collective action (could the Cambodians have prevented the uprising of 
the Khmer Rouge in some way?), but in both situations, it would give rise to a 
minimal degree of collective responsibility at best. Therefore, it is rather 
difficult to use the condition of moral responsibility to pin down remedial 
responsibility after humanitarian interventions: while the state was 
(presumably) morally responsible, the morally responsible elites will – after the 
intervention – no longer make up that state; and the population of, say, 
Cambodia bears no (or minimal) collective national responsibility for the 
deprivation.  
The third type of case shows another difficulty with using moral 
responsibility as foundation for remedial responsibility: can we always 
determine who bears moral guilt? While it might on some occasions be clear 
who was to blame for the war – i.e. who violated jus ad bellum – that is often not 
the case. In many cases, the justness of wars is debated and it takes years to 
determine who was justified ad bellum and who was the aggressor, if ever. We 
need only to bear in mind the disagreement on the justness of the Iraq or 
                                                             
53 Miller 2007, p. 100. 
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Afghanistan war to illustrate this point. Clearly, Al Qaida was responsible for 
the terrorist attack on the USA, and there was a connection between Al Qaida 
and the Afghan Taliban regime. But was that enough to justify war? Obviously, 
it is not quite easy to determine who is morally responsible for the war and 
destruction in Afghanistan and thus to assign remedial responsibility using that 
condition. Nevertheless, also for debated wars, moral responsibility is 
presented as strong argument for assigning post war duties to belligerents.54 As 
such, its intuitive appeal is why opponents of the 2003 Iraq war are of the 
opinion that the USA and its coalition partners, having unjustly invaded Iraq, 
are responsible for reconstructing that state. 
 
5.3.2 Outcome Responsibility 
 
The second backward looking condition is ‘outcome responsibility’. Obviously 
the actor that is morally responsible for a particular outcome is also outcome 
responsible. However, other actors can also be outcome responsible even 
though they are not at the same time morally responsible.55 This condition 
enables us to bring many other actors into the picture, which is especially useful 
with regard to post bellum situations. Namely, not only the unjust aggressor but 
both (or all) of the belligerents are outcome responsible for the damage to a 
certain extent. Considering the first Gulf War, Iraq was morally and outcome 
responsible for the post war deprivation in Kuwait, but the USA and its 
coalition partners were outcome responsible as well. While they were justified 
in defending Kuwait against Iraqi aggression, damage was caused while doing 
that. Therefore, Kuwait’s deprivation is partly a side effect of the USA’s 
otherwise justified intervention, making it outcome responsible to some 
degree.  
 This way, responsibility can be assigned to the ‘other defender’ (here also 
the just victor) as many theorists do. The war was justified but still, it remains 
the lesser of two evils, i.e.: it is an evil for which the actor is responsible.56 We 
could even assess whether Kuwait is partly outcome responsible itself as well. 
                                                             
54 Pattison rightly points out that: “non-belligerents may have also been culpable for the 
war, such as those that finance the war and provide military equipment.” Pattison 
2015, p. 639. 
55 Miller 2007, p. 89. 
56 See also: Mark Evans, ‘Moral Responsibilities and the Conflicting Demands of Jus Post 
Bellum’, in: Ethics & International Affairs 2009, 23/2, p. 153.  
97
JUS POST BELLUM AND THE NATURE OF PEACE 
 
 
Kuwait’s actions prior to august 1990, such as not respecting the oil quota, were 
an important reason for Iraq to attack Kuwait. Iraq made no secret of its plans 
for the military attack. Kuwait could have foreseen this outcome and by not 
adjusting its policy, it could be argued that although it is not morally responsible 
for the war, it is nevertheless (partly) outcome responsible since it contributed 
to that particular course of events. This way, the ‘just defender’ itself, which is 
also the ‘victim’ can be held responsible.  
This condition of outcome responsibility works similarly for humanitarian 
interventions: while Vietnam was arguably justified in intervening in Cambodia 
to stop Khmer Rouges’ massacre, forcing them back to jungle rebellion, it 
attributed to the damage nonetheless. While the Cambodian state, by way of 
Khmer Rouges’ representatives, was both morally and outcome responsible for 
many deaths, damage, destruction and deprivation, Vietnam is outcome 
responsible as well because it intervened. As such, this condition can serve as a 
foundation for assigning remedial responsibility to the humanitarian 
intervener.  
As we have seen, outcome responsibility (which is broader than moral 
responsibility) and remedial responsibility are often connected when the 
former is the basis for the latter. In the context of war, this condition can also be 
used as a foundation to hold belligerents responsible for reconstruction after 
war, based on their contribution to that particular outcome, whether their 
actions were justified or not. This is what it means to be responsible based on 
the adage ‘you break it, you own it’. Being in the Pottery Barn, the one who 
caused the damage and created the problem is responsible for putting it right, 
even if the person breaks something by accident.57 Therefore, outcome 
responsibility is particularly useful for debated wars such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan, because it does not presuppose moral guilt for the war. Rather, the 
actor’s share in producing the outcome – the post war situation – is used to 
attribute responsibility.  
                                                             
57 A metaphor often accredited to Secretary of State Colin Powell, who supposedly 
warned President George Bush that he would ‘own’ all Iraq’s problems after the 
invasion. See e.g. Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, New York: Simon & Schuster 2004. 
In reality, the retail chain of home furnishing stores Pottery Barn does not have such a 
rule. Additionally, it should be noted that contrary to Pattison’s reference to this motto, 
it seems not to refer to moral guilt for damage as basis for the obligation to put it right 
(Colin Powell did not think at that point that the US would be the unjust aggressor), 
but rather to outcome responsibility for certain damage. Pattison 2015, p. 637-639. 
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This, of course, does not decide to what degree belligerents are responsible. 
It would appear that states who are morally responsible for the war are often 
largely responsible for the outcome as well, whereas other belligerents who are 
merely outcome responsible, are so to a lesser extent. We could question 
whether, since they were ad bellum justified, their share in causing the particular 
outcome is large enough to serve as foundation for assigning remedial 
responsibility. It seems odd to hold the ‘just defender’ responsible for the 
damage done in defending itself, since it was both justified in doing so, and it 
had no choice.58 The ‘other defender’ and ‘humanitarian intervener’ were 
justified also, but made a deliberate choice to intervene, knowing that it would 
cause damage despite its expected positive effects. It was, so to say, a ‘war of 
choice’. Nevertheless, such war of choice is one that is aimed at helping others 
(so we assume), which is why some argue that, since they already helped others 
by intervening, to require them to reconstruct after war is overly demanding or 
even unfair.59  
 
5.3.3 Causality 
 
Next to these two backward looking conditions for assigning post war 
responsibility, causality is the third and final backward looking foundation. 
‘Causality’ constitutes an important element of the previous two conditions, 
but it is introduced as an independent condition by Miller.60 While outcome 
responsibility is in many respects broader than moral responsibility, pure 
causality is even broader.61 As such, it is possible that causal responsibility 
brings more actors into the picture than solely those who are morally and/or 
outcome responsible. However, this condition can function independently as a 
foundation for remedial responsibility only in exceptional circumstances. 
                                                             
58 Assuming here that letting an aggressor annex the victim’s state is not a viable option.  
59 Lazar 2012, p. 20. Mark Evans, ‘At War’s End. Time to Turn to Jus Post Bellum?’, in: 
Carsten Stahn, Jennifer Easterday & Jens Iverson (eds.), Jus Post Bellum. Mapping the 
Normative Foundations, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014, p. 36; Pattison 2015, 
638. 
60 Although Miller rightly acknowledges that it can be difficult to separate pure causal 
responsibility from relationships of outcome and/or moral responsibility. Miller 2007, 
p. 102. 
61 This progressive scale is an oversimplification, think, e.g., of the type of moral 
responsibility that results from an omission to act, which I will elaborate upon in the 
next section. Miller 2001, p. 456.  
99
JUS POST BELLUM AND THE NATURE OF PEACE 
 
 
Miller describes the example of someone who acts under coercion: “B says he 
will kill P, unless A first punches her in the face.”62 Also, one can think of rare 
occasions when the causal link between an action and a result is so 
unpredictable that it would be unreasonable to hold that actor outcome 
responsible.63 Suppose that Iraq did not openly threaten to attack Kuwait, and 
suppose the attack was a totally unforeseen reaction to the aforementioned 
Kuwaiti policy. Kuwait was not morally or outcome responsible, but could be 
perceived as partly causally responsible for the damage done in the war. Also, it 
is possible to imagine a situation in which a just intervener prevents a genocide 
in state A, while this unexpectedly causes a civil war to erupt in state B. 
Nevertheless, while this might be possible in theory, causality does not 
constitute a serious independent condition for the duty to reconstruct.  
Taken together, these three backward looking conditions for attributing 
post war duties are based on what Gheciu and Welsh call a ‘compensation 
rationale’, i.e. the strong moral intuition that one has to compensate for the 
consequences of one’s actions and to ensure the well-being of those affected by 
them.64 As backward looking conditions – and consequently focused on the 
former belligerents – difficulties are nonetheless encountered when using these 
conditions as foundation for post war responsibility. Here one has to mention, 
first, the problem of assigning national responsibility insofar as it is collectively 
owed by the state and the individual members of the population. Some states 
are so organized that it is unfair to hold the population collectively responsible. 
Second, serious epistemic problems exist with regard to the indeterminacy of 
moral guilt. While initially, it seemed relatively easy to determine the actor that 
is morally blameworthy, the reality shows many debated wars: war is often not 
a situation of the ‘good guys’ against the ‘bad guys’. Both sides usually claim to 
be justified ad bellum. But who is? 65 It is well possible that insufficient 
information is available to make such judgment, both before, in and after the 
war – and it is possible that both (or all) actors have some justness on their 
side.66 Therefore in practice, moral guilt is likely to be a matter of degree.67  
                                                             
62 Miller 2007, p. 101. 
63 Miller 2007, p. 101. 
64 Gheciu & Welsh 2009, p. 124. 
65 See further on the idea of comparative justice: Steven Lee, Ethics and War. An 
Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012, p. 104-106. 
66 See e.g: Anthony Coady, Morality and Political Violence, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2008, p. 90. 
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An important third difficulty exists with regard to distributing post war 
duties solely on the basis of backward looking conditions. Gheciu and Welsh 
rightly argue that: “Backward looking ideas of causal responsibility relate 
imperfectly to the forward looking task of addressing a problem, since the actor 
who caused another actor to be in danger is not always best placed to rectify the 
situation.”68 In other words, it is not at all clear that former belligerents are 
adequate duty bearers in the sense that the problem of post war deprivation 
gets solved. Former belligerents can have high stakes in terms of their own 
interests and can also be seen as biased. Many Kosovars, to mention just one 
example, “remain suspicious of the motives and likely effectiveness of EU peace 
building”.69 Obviously, the way the population in a post war situation perceives 
the actor that is willing to reconstruct is important for the effectiveness thereof. 
This is why Walzer argues that the just victor should always seek the consent of 
the defeated. Furthermore, belligerents might not be best placed to remedy post 
war deprivation because they simply lack the capacity to do so. This means that, 
despite the powerful intuitive appeal of these backward looking conditions as 
foundation for post war duties, they are probably not sufficient to solve the 
problem of distributing responsibility for jus post bellum.  
 
5.3.4 Benefit 
 
Therefore, it is important to present the other conditions for remedial 
responsibility. Miller’s fourth condition, ‘benefit’, combines backward and 
forward looking elements. Applied to the issue of war, it points to actors that 
benefited from the war. Belligerents might have benefited from the war, but 
there might also be actors who are not morally, outcome or causally responsible 
for the war or subsequent deprivation, but who have nonetheless benefited 
from that process – the so called ‘innocent beneficiaries’.70 Benefit can thus 
serve as an additional as well as independent condition for assigning remedial 
                                                                                                                                               
67 These two difficulties are equally valid for outcome and causal responsibility; the 
actors’ share in a certain outcome can be difficult to trace back or to determine: it is 
nearly impossible to accurately determine the exact degree of responsibility. See 
further, e.g., Pattison 2015, p. 638-641. 
68 Gheciu & Welsh 2009, p. 134. 
69 Gheciu & Welsh 2009, p. 135. 
70 Miller mentions e.g., that it is possible that A played no causal role but nevertheless 
benefited from the process that led to P’s deprivation because “resources that would 
otherwise have gone to P have been allotted to A”. Miller 2007, p. 102-103.  
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responsibility as it points to belligerents or outsiders who are the beneficiaries 
of the action or policy that caused harm. In case of the Iraq war, the USA is 
considered by many morally and outcome responsible for the war, and on top 
of that, it benefited from the war in terms of securing their oil interests and in 
terms of acquiring profitable oil contracts for US corporations.  
Considering non-belligerents, one could even argue that not merely those 
who have benefitted are responsible, but also those who would benefit from the 
remedy in the longer run. Some just war theorists argue that the results of a 
particular war can bring wider benefits than for those directly involved in terms 
of national and international security.71 For example, a stable non-Taliban 
Afghanistan – not yet realized at this point – which is no breeding ground for 
international terrorism is in everybody’s interest. In this line, reconstructing 
states – preferably as democracies that respect basic rights – as a strategy in the 
fight against terrorism, brings wide benefits so that everyone might be 
considered as responsible for bringing about this result. The reconstruction of 
failed states is “something fundamental to the pursuit of regional and 
international security”.72 Obviously, in case of a humanitarian catastrophe, the 
deprived nation is itself the main beneficiary of an intervention,73 but the 
surrounding states also benefit from this reconstruction, e.g., from establishing 
a stable state and halting refugee flows. It could be argued that the international 
community as a whole benefits from reconstruction of a failed state after a 
humanitarian intervention; left in chaos, a collapsed or failing state destabilizes 
its environment and constitutes a potential breeding ground for international 
terrorism. What remains difficult here as well, is to determine the precise 
amount of benefit: which benefits weigh strong enough for attributing to those 
beneficiaries the duty to reconstruct?  
Gheciu and Welsh describe such considerations under the heading of 
‘benefit’ as the ‘defense of society rationale’, based on a broad understanding of 
national interests. They present Kosovo as the example to show that 
international actors taking up their responsibility can build institutions based 
                                                             
71 E.g. Michael Walzer, Arguing about War, New Haven: Yale University Press 2004, p. 
43, 44. 
72 Gheciu & Welsh 2009, p. 129-131. 
73 Which is why Helen Frowe argues that they should bear the burdens of reconstructing 
as well. “So, if an intervening state inflicts collateral harms in the course of a 
humanitarian war, we might think that the burden of making good those harms falls to 
those who are the beneficiaries of the intervention, and not to the intervening state.” 
Frowe 2016, p. 244. 
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on democratic values, respect for human rights and a market based economy 
and that therewith international security is advanced.74 This condition seems to 
be a weaker foundation for assigning remedial responsibility than the backward 
looking conditions. Furthermore, Gheciu and Welsh point to two 
disadvantages when applying this condition in order to establish remedial 
responsibility to reconstruct. First, since it is difficult to calculate the benefits 
and their value for any state’s national interest and since this benefit might 
change over time, there is the danger of inconsistency. The foundation for the 
duty to reconstruct could cease to exist during the course of the reconstruction 
efforts. Second, if the duty to reconstruct is based on the actor’s national 
interests, it might lead to a lowering of standards.75 For example, it is 
questionable whether making sure that Afghanistan is no breeding ground for 
international terrorism requires the same degree of reconstruction as ensuring 
that the Afghan people can lead a minimally decent life.  
 
5.3.5 Capability 
 
The fifth condition for attributing remedial responsibility is fully forward 
looking: the ‘capability’ of a future duty bearer. Who would practically be 
capable of remedying the post war deprivation?76 The underlying moral 
principle is well-known and says: who can help should help. A contemporary 
and often used example is Singer’s example of the child that is almost drowning 
in the pond. Whoever is present when this happens, is remedially responsible to 
save the child. Obviously, since the goal is reconstruction of the war-torn state 
in order to remedy the deprivation and achieve a just and lasting peace, capacity 
to actually perform that task is essential.77 This is a consequentialist condition 
which focuses both on the desired result and the actor (or actors) that is most 
likely to achieve that aim. Whereas in an individual situation, it is possible that 
only one actor is capable to provide a remedy (e.g. when one person is close 
                                                             
74 Gheciu & Welsh 2009, p. 130. 
75 Gheciu & Welsh 2009, p. 139-140. 
76 Miller 2007, p. 130. 
77 According to Pattison, this foundation trumps the other foundations for assigning the 
duty to reconstruct. This consideration is more important than the other factors, 
because they relate to less morally urgent concerns. Namely, the goal is to properly 
rebuild the war torn state and protect the population’s basic rights. Pattison 2015, p. 
656. He therewith disagrees with Miller, who claims there is no hierarchy between the 
discussed variables.  
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enough to prevent someone from falling from a steep cliff or when one person 
is able the save the child from drowning), which makes him alone remedially 
responsible, in post war situations there will be many ‘capable’ actors. 
Therefore, this condition requires an assessment of the capability of actors of 
reconstructing after war, given the particular circumstances. This probably 
entails balancing capability, effectiveness and costs and as such, it requires an 
analysis of, e.g. financial costs and resources, and knowledge of the local 
situation and experience in reconstruction missions.  
Using capacity as a foundation for assigning remedial responsibility in 
postwar situations has strong intuitive plausibility. We do not tend to hold an 
actor remedially responsible when this is unrealistic or overly demanding in 
terms of capability. Suppose Tanzania would have intervened in Rwanda to 
stop Hutu extremists from further executing their plan. However, they would 
not have the financial and material means to effectively reconstruct Rwanda 
afterwards. It seems imprudent to assign remedial responsibility to Tanzania, 
because it could not effectively remedy the deprivation, but it is also 
unreasonable since they already taken up the task of intervening and additional 
duties would bring too much costs for themselves.  
This condition is presented by Miller as one among the six conditions for 
assigning remedial responsibility. Nonetheless, it seems that this condition is of 
a different order. We have already encountered several difficulties when 
applying the previous conditions as foundation for remedial responsibility and 
noted as an important problem precisely this requirement of capacity. A state 
might be linked in several ways with post war deprivation, e.g. it is both morally 
and outcome responsible, and may have benefited from the war. But despite 
these strong links, if it does not have any capacity to fulfill such duty, remedial 
responsibility cannot be assigned to that state. In those situations, moral and 
outcome responsibility do not lead to the duty to make it right. In such cases, 
Miller argues that “since the whole purpose of identifying remedial 
responsibilities is to get help to P, picking the agent who is actually able to 
provide that help makes obvious sense”.78 Thom Brooks too argues that “the 
ability to provide a remedy is central to the possibility of possessing a remedial 
responsibility.”79 This means that the condition of capability works as a 
                                                             
78 Miller 2007, p. 103. 
79 Thom Brooks, ‘Rethinking Remedial Responsibilities’, in: Ethics & Global Politics 2011, 
4/3, p. 200. 
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precondition for assigning remedial responsibility, rather than as one among 
the other conditions. Despite Miller’s insistence on there not being a hierarchy 
between the six conditions, he writes that: “we have no alternative but to 
consider each of the agents (…) able to provide a remedy and then to assess 
how strongly each is connected to the impoverished group”.80  
 
5.3.6 Community 
 
The final condition for assigning post bellum duties is ‘community’. Some states 
are located within the same region as the war torn state, or states may share the 
same religion or culture with the war torn state. Therefore, they are linked in 
such a way so that remedial responsibility can be assigned to these states. It 
seems convincing that relations based on shared communities give rise to 
special obligations. For example, it would seem right that other states in the 
region, but also Belgium, are more responsible than others to contribute to the 
building up of Rwanda after the Rwandan genocide. Sharing a geographical 
region or a history together generates shared responsibilities, in this case 
towards post war Rwanda.81 Gheciu and Welsh argue in a similar vein that the 
shared identity of European countries with the Balkans was used as foundation 
for Europe to have a special duty to reconstruct this area.82 
 
5.4 Role Responsibility  
 
Miller’s taxonomy helps us gain insight into the foundation for remedial 
responsibility after war. However, the reasons just war theorists give for 
assigning the remedial duty to reconstruct to certain actors are not completely 
explained by the above analysis. An important issue is still absent: a special type 
of moral responsibility which can be approached through Hart’s concept of role 
responsibility. Hart explains role responsibility in the context of his 
comprehensive account of individual responsibility in the national legal system. 
His famous example of the drunken captain who lost his ship at sea with all 
aboard serves as an illustration of the fact that responsibility can refer to “a wide 
                                                             
80 Miller 2007, p. 107. 
81 Miller 2001, p. 462. 
82 Gheciu & Welsh 2009, p. 126. 
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range of different, though connected, ideas”.83 One of these types of 
responsibility is role responsibility: the responsibility that is based on the 
fulfillment of a specific role, in this case, that of a captain who is responsible for 
the safety of the passengers. By getting drunk and not making the required 
effort, he is violating his role responsibility and thus responsible for the loss of 
the ship and passengers. In short, with a certain role come specific duties, e.g. 
for captains to ensure the safety of the passengers and to deliver the cargo, or 
for parents to bring up their children. Hart has a rather broad understanding of 
role responsibility, as it also involves duties that come with temporary tasks, 
assigned to someone by agreement or otherwise.84  
Because of the importance of role responsibility for jus post bellum, as 
distinct from moral responsibility discussed above, it is necessary to present it 
as a separate seventh condition. The above shows that the most obvious reason 
for moral responsibility in post war situations is the moral guilt for the war 
itself – the moral responsibility related to unjustified aggression. However, an 
actor can also be morally responsible based on either an omission to act in 
accordance with a certain formal role, or based on an (usually more informal) 
ad bellum assumed role. As such, role responsibility is a subspecies of moral 
responsibility. Miller states that one can be morally responsible for failing to 
fulfill a pre-existing obligation.85 And although Miller does not discuss this type 
of moral responsibility in detail, he mentions an example which resembles the 
type of responsibility that is meant here: a dad takes two kids to the park, where 
one breaks the other’s arm by accident, while he reads a newspaper. Dad is not 
causally responsible but he is morally responsible because he failed in his duty 
to take care of the kids, something that he assumed when he offered to take 
them to the park.86 He did not himself inflict the damage, but this specific role 
as supervisor comes with duties which he is bound to fulfill.  
This concept of moral role responsibility must serve as an additional 
condition for assigning the duty to reconstruct in two ways. First, actors might 
have duties attached to a specific formal role and be role responsible when they 
fail to discharge the attached duties ad bellum or in bello. Consider again the 
Rwandan genocide: clearly, Hutu extremists were morally responsible for the 
                                                             
83 H.L.A. Hart & John Gardner, Punishment and Responsibility. Essays in the Philosophy of 
Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 211.  
84 Hart & Gardner 2008, p. 212-213. 
85 Miller 2007, p. 100. 
86 Miller 2001, p. 456. 
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deaths and damage in 1994. However, Belgium and other members of the 
UNAMIR mission were present at the time. Despite their initial limited 
mandate, they were formally assigned the duty to protect the Rwandan 
population. As is painfully known, they withdrew after the first Belgian soldiers 
were killed, and manifestly failed in their mission because of this omission to act 
when it was necessary to do so. They are role responsible for failing to prevent 
the genocide,87 while they were not responsible in a causal way.88 Similarly, 
European countries intervened in the Balkans and took on the role of 
protecting the population. Their failing to properly discharge that 
responsibility during the war creates a strong foundation for remedial 
responsibility.89 
Second is the responsibility that lies entailed in jus ad bellum. Actors can be 
morally responsible not only because of their violation of jus ad bellum, or 
because of their omission to act in accordance with a certain role, but also based 
on a role that they self-adopted through a public ad bellum ‘promise’. Suppose 
that a state justifies its ad bellum decision to go to war, and that it makes 
promises about the post war situation as part of its just cause and chance of 
success. In that case it (informally) adopts a certain role which entails specific 
duties. Examples would be the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq: they were 
originally waged as self-defensive wars but humanitarian considerations were 
invoked as well in the justification for those wars. Particularly during the Iraq 
war, the emphasis shifted more and more towards ending the human rights 
violations and promoting democracy as main causes for war.90 By such a public 
statement, the state makes a promise with which it takes upon itself a distinct 
role that creates responsibility. It is then obligated to fulfill that role and the 
                                                             
87 Of course the UN itself was in the end responsible for failing to provide the necessary 
political authorization, manpower and material for effective military action.  
88 Although if we trace causality further back, we could argue that Belgium was causally 
responsible since they institutionalized the ethnic division between Hutu’s and Tutsi’s, 
which played a role in the animosity and subsequent aggression between the two 
groups.  
89 Gheciu and Welsh argue that: “The European Union’s current responsibility to rebuild 
in the Balkans stems from a dual source: perceived special duties vis-à-vis fellow 
Europeans, and the additional responsibility incurred by recent negligence in fulfilling 
those duties.” Gheciu & Welsh 2009, p. 126. 
90 George Bush declared “The goal in Iraq and Afghanistan is for there to be democratic 
and free countries who are allies in the war on terror. That's the goal. (…) we will stay 
there to get the job done.” See: George Bush, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United 
States, Book 2, July 1 to September 30, 2004, p. 1715. 
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duties that are attached to it; in other words, it is responsible for achieving the 
promised goal. Actors can also try avoid such moral role responsibility by 
refusing to make such a promise. When a coalition of states intervened in Libya 
in 2011, leaders were, contrary to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, anxious to 
stress the limited nature of the intervention. Barack Obama stated that the 
focus of the mission was to protect Libyan civilians, not regime change.91 This 
strategy of emphasizing the limited casus belli is aimed at limiting Western 
responsibilities after the war.  
In short: with specific commitments and the assuming of a certain role 
comes moral role responsibility. This last condition further explains our 
intuitions on how to distribute responsibly after war. It clarifies why we tend to 
hold the just victor remedially responsible after humanitarian interventions, or 
after debated pre-emptive wars that are aimed at regime change and protection 
of the population. That is not only because of moral and/ or outcome 
responsibility. Also, these states are responsible for post war reconstruction 
because of the adopted role and the promise of achieving certain results, which 
creates legitimate expectations.  
 
5.5 A System for Assigning Post War Duties  
 
The goal of this chapter was twofold: to shed light on the foundation for 
responsibility after war and to develop a system for assigning the duty to 
reconstruct to specific actors. In the above, various conditions were analyzed 
and an insight into the foundation for responsibility was given. As we have 
seen, most just war theorists pick one or more of these conditions to assign post 
war responsibility. For example, Orend argues that the victor is mainly 
responsible because if ‘you break it, you own it’.92 Pattison argues for a 
presumption against belligerents rebuilding, and claims that the most capable 
rebuilder is remedially responsible instead.93  
                                                             
91 See, e.g., http://news.sky.com/story/844653/obama-libya-mission-is-not-regime-
change. A national security advisor further explained that “it's the Libyan people who 
are going to make their determinations about the future."  
See: http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/151191-white-house-suggests-regime-
change-is-goal-of-libya-mission.  
92 Orend 2008, p. 49.  
93 Given that this actor also has the ‘right’ to rebuild, which is so when there is a just cause 
for rebuilding and the effort is likely to be effective. Pattison 2015, p. 652. Pattison 
further argues that the UN Security Council should generally carry out the rebuilding 
108
ON THE DUTY TO RECONSTRUCT AFTER WAR.  
WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR JUS POST BELLUM?  
 
 However, it seems overly simplistic to rely on one condition and expect that 
this singles out the appropriate duty bearer in all situations, as these authors do. 
Neither of these conditions is decisive by itself. Given the international reality 
of today, and the contemporary view on jus post bellum, there is a need for a 
system that combines both backward and forward looking conditions. It seems 
right for a comprehensive system to both do justice to the morally relevant 
considerations, while at the same time remaining focused on the aim of halting 
post war deprivation. Regarding international problems in general, Miller holds 
that all six conditions are relevant for remedial responsibility and that they must 
be balanced in concrete situations. These conditions are relevant for post war 
deprivation as well, supplemented by the seventh condition that is added to 
Miller’s taxonomy. However, when these conditions are balanced in concrete 
post war situations, it would nevertheless be helpful if we could say something 
about their relative weight. Therefore, an attempt is made to systemize them.  
 
5.5.1 Step One 
 
What would a system for distributing the duty to reconstruct look like? For jus 
post bellum, it became clear that these conditions are not of equal weight and it 
seems therefore possible to attain a certain hierarchy between them. The 
condition of capability has the special function of precondition for assigning 
remedial responsibility. In order to achieve a just and lasting peace – the 
axiomatic goal of jus post bellum94 – it is prerequisite that an actor is capable to 
achieve (part) of this goal. The condition of capability preselects which actors 
are potential duty bearers and which are not.95 An actor cannot be held 
                                                                                                                                               
process after war, an argument of which I am rather skeptical since contemporary 
reality forces us to be modest in our expectations of existing global institutions. While 
the UN might be generally perceived as a legitimate actor in the eyes of the deprived 
nation, it is questionable whether it is indeed the most capable actor to carry out 
reconstruction. Surely, when the UN and the Peace Building Commission would work 
as envisioned, they are in a good position to at least oversee post war duties. Exploring 
this line of global institutional reform would require however more space than is 
available in this chapter. Pattison 2015, p. 656-659. 
94 E.g. Evans 2009, p. 149. 
95 Thom Brooks similarly argues that Miller should correct his connection theory of 
remedial responsibility. He argues that his system is better understood as a ‘two tiered 
procedure’ asking different questions: “The first tier would ask which nations possess 
capacity.” Thereafter, we should “select a nation or nations from this pool of nations 
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remedially responsible for reconstruction if it is not capable of achieving that 
result, even if this actor is connected in other ways with the deprived war torn 
state. On that basis many poor states are excluded from post bellum duties. How 
do we determine which particular states are excluded? In Miller’s perspective 
on global justice, duties are generated by basic human rights, which constitute a 
certain ‘minimum’. Some essential human rights must be fulfilled “if a person is 
to have a minimally decent life in the society to which he or she belongs”.96 It 
seems that this could function as threshold for duties regarding jus post bellum: 
whenever a state is not capable of reconstructing the war torn state without 
(further) infringing its own citizens’ minimally decent lives, they are not 
required to do so.  
This precondition will thus exclude certain actors from post war duties, but 
it then obviously also determines the remaining actors as potential duty bearers. 
Should we try to determine who is most capable and then assume that any state 
that has the most resources and knowledge is remedially responsible for post 
war reconstruction? This would seem unlikely. Merely assigning post war 
duties to the most capable state(s) would not work; capacity cannot function as 
the sole foundation for assigning remedial responsibility after war, as Pattison 
suggests. It would mean that the same actors – presumably the richest and most 
developed states – are always remedially responsible for post war 
reconstruction around the world. Capacity is the necessary condition, but not 
the sufficient or decisive condition. For answering the question of which states 
capable of assuming post war duties should be picked out in a particular case, 
one has to look at the other conditions.   
 
5.5.2 Step Two 
 
War is a human activity involving intentional and collectively inflicted 
destruction, and because of this great evil of war, moral and outcome 
responsibility must remain important considerations when assigning the duty 
to reconstruct. In individual situations, we are considered to be responsible for 
the consequences of our actions. This means that when we do damage to 
others, we are liable for that damage. Hart writes: “He is thus liable to be ‘made 
                                                                                                                                               
capable of being remedially responsibly according to Miller’s conditions.” 
Consequently, “there is an algorithm after all.” Brooks 2011, p. 200-201. 
96 See: Miller 2008, p. 391. 
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to pay’ for what he has done.”97 There is a presumption that actors bear the 
burdens of their own actions.98 As we have seen, aggressive states are both 
morally and outcome responsible for post war deprivation, but just belligerents 
nonetheless bear responsibility for the outcome as well. This means that there is 
a presumption that belligerents are themselves responsible for post war 
reconstruction.  
 What about the relative value of these two conditions? It appears that being 
merely outcome responsible constitutes a weaker foundation for the duty to 
reconstruct than being both outcome and morally responsible. Damage and 
destruction as a result of actions that are justified – and which thus results in 
outcome responsibility only – are less blameworthy than damage and 
destruction as a result of evil or unjustified actions – resulting in moral 
responsibility as well. In the former case, the damage might be foreseen, but it is 
the side-effect of actions that are in themselves justified. Furthermore, the 
strength of outcome responsibility depends on whether a war was a ‘matter of 
choice’ or not: the outcome responsibility of an actor that had no choice but to 
defend itself is weaker than that of the other defender or humanitarian 
intervener that chose to get involved and was able to consider the implications 
of that act, despite their possible good intentions.  
But while moral and outcome responsibility could serve as foundation for 
post war duties, the precondition of capability might stand in the way. 
Considering moral responsibility first; while it might be clear who is morally 
responsible after a self-defense against aggression,99 that aggressor might not 
be capable of successfully reconstructing after war, either because of a lack of 
resources and knowledge, or because the hostility between the former 
belligerents hinders effective reconstruction. We can imagine, to mention an 
example, that Kuwaitis would not ravish at the prospect of Iraq being assigned 
the duty to reconstruct after the 1990 war.100 After a humanitarian 
intervention, it might also be difficult to use this condition for the distribution 
                                                             
97 Hart & Gardner 2008, p. 215. 
98 Miller 2007, p. 87. 
99 While this is the case in our example of the first Gulf War, it is surely not always easy to 
determine whether a self-defense is indeed a legitimate self-defense. Consider e.g., 
preemptive or preventive self-defenses: the distinction between a legitimate self-
defense, a defense before its time, and a war of aggression is not always easy to make. 
100 It should be noted that this does not mean that Iraq cannot be held liable for financially 
compensating Kuwait. But this is a question that is separated from the question as to 
who is responsible for halting the deprivation and reconstructing the war torn area.    
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of responsibility. Here the aggressor was the regime that targeted its own 
population. That population does not have a share in the collective 
responsibility of the state, for reasons addressed by Miller. And the responsible 
regime itself was presumably removed by the intervention and unable to bear 
the duty to reconstruct. As we have seen, while moral responsibility is an 
intuitively-strong foundation for post war duties, it will be difficult to use it to 
pin down duty bearers in practice.  
Turning to outcome responsibility brings other belligerents into the picture, 
and as such, it can be used to assign the duty to reconstruct to the ‘other 
defender’ and the ‘humanitarian intervener’. Presuming that these just 
belligerents have sufficient resources, they are the likely candidates for bearing 
the duty to reconstruct because they are partly responsibility for that particular 
outcome. Against the argument that it is unfair or overly demanding to assign 
reconstruction to these actors, one might argue that this (heavy) burden could 
and should (under the ad bellum condition of reasonable chance of success) have 
been foreseen in advance. States are indeed required to carefully consider the 
weight of this burden before they embark on war or intervention. If they are not 
willing to fulfill their post war duties, the war should not have been undertaken. 
In this way, it is indeed possible that states who perform morally good actions 
acquire more responsibilities than they would have had otherwise, as Walzer 
argues.101  
Finally, Hart’s concept of role responsibility is an important condition for 
assigning the remedial duty to reconstruct. This type of responsibility follows 
either from an ad bellum or in bello omission to act in accordance with a certain 
role, or from an ad bellum promise that shapes a special role. Moral role 
responsibility does not exist in all situations of war, for example when a self-
defense is merely aimed at repelling an aggression. Furthermore, the strength of 
role responsibility depends on the nature of the promise made: was it made 
once or repeatedly, was it publicly announced and recorded in official 
documents, addressed at the actor’s population, and/ or at the population of the 
war torn state directly? The stronger the commitment, the stronger the role 
responsibility.  
Again, role responsibility is particularly strong in case of a humanitarian 
intervention, where the intervener assumes the role of rescuer. Inherent in the 
just cause of the intervener is the adoption of a humanitarian role: the duty to 
                                                             
101 Walzer 2012, p. 40. 
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indeed halt the catastrophe and to remedy the deprivation. Provided the 
humanitarian intervener is capable to help reconstruct after the intervention, 
which they are whenever they can do so without infringing its own citizens’ 
minimally decent lives, outcome and role responsibility constitute a strong 
foundation for remedial responsibility.102 However, when a state is willing but 
not capable of post war reconstruction, it seems that it should nevertheless be 
able to justly intervene to prevent or stop a humanitarian catastrophe. Alex 
Bellamy rightly argues that to claim otherwise “dramatically reduces the 
number of potential agents who might save strangers in urgent peril”.103 For 
that reason, humanitarian emergencies are an exception to obligations to build 
the peace afterwards, according to Bellamy.104 States can legitimately intervene 
despite them not having the means to reconstruct after the war. If this should be 
the case, the intervening state should prevent the creation of legitimate 
expectations by making statements about their limited aims.  
 
5.6 Conclusion 
 
Some steps are made towards developing a comprehensive system of 
conditions that can serve as foundation for the duty to reconstruct as part of jus 
post bellum. This chapter argues in favor of a system that combines both 
backward and forward looking conditions, wherein forward looking capability 
functions as a precondition. Backward looking moral, outcome and role 
responsibility function then as the most important conditions, and finally the 
conditions of causality, benefit and community further help in the distribution 
of the duty to reconstruct after war. This system thus presumes that belligerents 
are responsible for reconstruction after war. But while the conditions seem to 
                                                             
102 It seems to me that when a state is willing but not capable of post war reconstruction, it 
can nevertheless justly intervene to prevent or stop a humanitarian catastrophe. Alex 
Bellamy rightly argues that to claim otherwise “dramatically reduces the number of 
potential agents who might save strangers in urgent peril”. Therefore, humanitarian 
emergencies are an exception to obligations to build the peace afterwards, according to 
Bellamy. Bellamy 2008, p. 620-621. If this should be the case, the intervening state 
should prevent the creation of legitimate expectations by making statements about 
their limited aims, thereby limiting their role responsibility.  
103 In general, Alex Bellamy points to the danger inherent in requiring humanitarian 
interveners to bear the duty to reconstruct after the intervention: not every intervener 
has the means to fulfill that duty. Bellamy 2008, p. 620-621. 
104 Bellamy 2008, p. 620-621. 
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work quite straightforwardly in theory, real world scenarios are always 
complex, making it difficult to pin down remedial responsibility to belligerents 
in practice. Recalling Miller’s claim that it is morally unacceptable for people to 
be left in a deprived situation, “there is a moral requirement that falls on 
everybody else to provide the help or the resources that are needed”.105 Along 
with the shift towards a maximalist jus post bellum, this means that in concrete 
situations, the aim of halting post war deprivation and building a just and 
durable peace compels us to widen the scope of responsibility beyond the 
belligerents.  
 The ‘belligerents rebuilt thesis’ must therefore be understood in a more 
nuanced way than it initially appeared: belligerents are not solely 
responsible.106 If they cannot bear the duty to reconstruct themselves, other 
actors are remedially responsible instead. In that case, the duty to remedy post 
war deprivation does not shift to an indeterminate ‘everybody else’ or 
‘international community’. Rather, the various conditions can be used to assign 
the duty to reconstruct to other specific actors. One can think of a humanitarian 
intervention in which the aggressive regime is toppled, while the intervener is 
not capable of reconstructing the state and securing a just peace (alone). Other 
states must be assigned the duty to reconstruct based on, e.g. their share in the 
moral guilt (e.g. by indirectly supporting the aggressive regime), their proximity 
and received past or future benefits. Ideally, the United Nations and 
organizations such as the Peace Building Commission have a distinct role in 
reconstruction after war, mainly one of coordination and overview.  
Unfortunately, there are still reasons to be skeptical about the effectiveness 
of jus post bellum. Whereas just war theories’ principles, both jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello, are codified in international law to some extent, jus post bellum 
remains essentially a mere moral theory. One can be sympathetic towards 
Orend’s vivid plea for a new Geneva Convention, but the development of 
international law takes much time and effort and a new jus post bellum treaty is 
not expected in the near future.107 Furthermore, even if such treaty would be 
created, an authority – a ‘global teacher’ – to assign remedial responsibility and 
enforce compliance is absent in the international context. Pattison’s plea for 
                                                             
105 Miller 2007, p. 98. 
106 In other words: the ‘belligerents rebuild thesis’ is the first right answer, but is it by itself 
an incomplete answer to questions of responsibility for jus post bellum. See further also 
Pattison 2015, p. 641. 
107 Orend 2008, p. 52. 
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building a stronger UN system so that the responsibility to rebuild can be 
properly realized is therefore also welcomed.108 Institutional reform is most 
urgent. An institutional framework for distributing remedial responsibility 
would be highly valuable for jus post bellum. However, neither is expected in the 
near future. The reality is that, despite the fact that jus post bellum is welcomed 
as part of just war theory, international law and global institutions fall behind 
the moral theory. As a result, it remains somewhat noncommittal and duty 
bearers can ignore their post war responsibility.  
Nevertheless, jus post bellum can fulfill a useful role as moral framework. 
And precisely this current absence of a jus post bellum Geneva Convention and a 
capable global teacher makes it even more important to have a well-considered 
system (of which this sketch is merely the beginning) to assign remedial 
responsibility that can invoke general agreement. But could there be some sort 
of agreement on who bears the duty to reconstruct and if so, to what extent? As 
was pointed out, when it comes to real wars and post war situations, with all 
their nuances, complexities and ambiguities, things become complicated. Due 
to epistemological difficulties, it can often be difficult to determine the exact 
value of the various conditions for remedial responsibility. Given these 
inherent difficulties, it will not be easy to reach agreement between actors on 
who bears the duty to reconstruct. It is to be expected that the system developed 
here will not produce clear, self-evident results in concrete situations. Rather, 
these conditions can be used to ‘build a moral case’ to form an argument based 
on which the duty to reconstruct is assigned to specific actors. It is unlikely that 
one might indisputably determine who is responsible after war, but a case for a 
certain distribution of responsibility can be made, based on the hierarchy of 
conditions that is developed here. This means that the existence of jus post 
bellum is not quite secure. Yet, having a better grip on responsibility for jus post 
bellum is certainly helpful, and a necessary tool in the creation of a just and 
stable peace. 
108 Pattison 2015, p. 659. 
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6.  Jus Post Bellum. A Case of Minimalism versus Maximalism? 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
“Mission accomplished.” Former President George W. Bush’s famous speech, 
given on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln in 2003, is now infamous. 
The message to the world was clear: the major combat operations had ended, 
Saddam Hussein was removed from his post and the Iraqi people were free. It 
quickly became apparent that the message was, to say the least, premature. 
Numerous points of critique have been formulated regarding the justness of 
this war, an important one being the absence of a conscientious ‘exit-strategy’. 
There was no clear answer to the question: what needs to be done after the 
regime has been removed? In general, contemporary post war situations seem 
to pose new challenges. What responsibilities and obligations arise after war? 
Jus post bellum is the welcomed ‘new’ part of just war theory that aims to answer 
questions of post war justice, that have become so pressing in today’s political 
reality.1 In very general terms, jus post bellum aims at a just peace after war. But 
while many argue for this extension of just war theory, there is no agreement on 
the content and scope of jus post bellum.   
Often, the current debate on jus post bellum is presented as a debate between 
two opposing camps: the so-called ‘minimalists’ versus the ‘maximalists’.2 Some 
                                                             
1 Not everyone however welcomes jus post bellum. There are few authors who criticize 
this new branch of just war theory. Alex Bellamy, e.g., argues that we should be careful 
to insist that jus post bellum has become a third branch of just war theory, since its 
incorporation is by no means unproblematic. “As yet unresolved questions about its 
connection to the other just war criteria, their applicability in different types of war, 
their impact upon broader judgments about legitimacy, and relationship with the 
indeterminacy of the jus ad bellum criteria, suggest that it is premature to insist that jus 
post bellum has become a third component of the Just War tradition.” Alex Bellamy, 
‘The Responsibilities of Victory. Jus Post Bellum and the Just War’, in: Review of 
International Studies 2008, 34/4, p. 622. Seth Lazar is also skeptical and argues that we 
do not need jus post bellum as part of just war theory, because the issues it regulates are 
better perceived in the broader ethics of peace building. Jus post bellum needs to look 
forward to the task of peace building and is therefore grounded in a broader ethics of 
peace building instead of flowing from just war theory. Seth Lazar, ‘Endings and 
Aftermath in the Ethics of War’, CSSJ Working paper series 2010. Online at: 
http://www.politics.ox.ac.uk/cssj/working-papers.html.         
2 E.g. Bellamy 2008; Mark Evans, ‘“Just Peace”. An Elusive Ideal’, in: Eric Patterson (ed.), 
Ethics beyond War’s End, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press 2012; Mark 
Evans, ‘Moral Responsibilities and the Conflicting Demands of Jus Post Bellum’, in: 
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however, have stated that these positions make up two consecutive phases in 
the debate on jus post bellum.3 How are these two positions characterized and 
what is the difference between them? The minimalistic or restricted position on 
just post bellum supposedly aims to restrict post war behavior and, therefore, 
consists mainly of negative moral imperatives.4 For example, there is a 
presumption against reconstruction of the defeated state.5 Post war activities 
should be focused on “redressing the worst effects of military action, ensuring 
that enough resources and capability remain in place for the country to 
reconstruct itself”.6 Victors are permitted to secure the cause that justified the 
war, but nothing more than that. This stems from the wish to prevent excesses 
by victors acting out of self-interest.7 This restricted understanding of post war 
norms means that they are relevant during a fairly short time-span: they apply 
to the end of war and in its immediate aftermath.8 
The maximalist or extended position on jus post bellum seems much more 
ambitious. Jus post bellum is said to consist mainly of positive obligations, 
determining what actors are allowed or even obliged to do after war. Instead of 
fear for victors taking advantage of the defeated party after war, thus doing too 
much, maximalists fear that victors will leave having done too little.9 Maximalist 
jus post bellum therefore goes beyond addressing the injustice that was the 
reason for the war and thus securing the cause.10 Certain post war norms, such 
as political reconstruction, are more broadly interpreted. Also additional, 
different sorts of norms are identified as part of jus post bellum. They entail for 
example the achievement of forgiveness and reconciliation, reconstruction of 
infrastructure,11 economic development,12 and compensation for environmental 
damage. According to Alex Bellamy, the obligation to punish perpetrators of 
                                                                                                                                               
Ethics & International Affairs 2009, 23/2; Frowe 2016. 
3 Alexandra Gheciu & Jennifer Welsh, ‘The Imperative to Rebuild: Assessing the 
Normative Case for Postconflict Reconstruction’, in: Ethics & International Affairs 
2009, 23/2, p. 117; Frowe 2016, p. 240. 
4 Frowe 2016, p. 240; Evans 2009, p. 150. 
5 Gary Bass, ‘Jus Post Bellum’, in: Philosophy & Public Affairs 2004, 32/4, p. 387. 
6 Gheciu & Welsh 2009, p. 119. 
7 Bellamy 2008, p. 602; Gheciu & Welsh 2009, p. 119. 
8 Evans 2012, p. 206; Gheciu & Welsh 2009, p. 119. 
9 Frowe 2016, p. 240. 
10 Bellamy 2008, p. 612; Gheciu & Welsh 2009, p. 119. 
11 Evans 2012, p. 207-208. 
12 Bellamy 2008, p. 612; Mark Evans, ‘Balancing Peace, Justice and Sovereignty in Jus 
Post Bellum. The Case of “Just Occupation”’, in: Millennium – Journal of International 
Studies 2008, 36/3, p. 541. 
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war crimes through organizing trials is also a requirement typical for 
maximalists.13 As a consequence of these broad and varied commitments, more 
time will be needed for the acquittal of these obligations. Therefore, maximalist 
jus post bellum continues to be applicable for a longer period of time after the 
end of the war.14  
This chapter critically examines this commonly made distinction. Thereto, 
the general picture is painted in the second section by analyzing representatives 
of both positions, as well as Brian Orend’s position that might be situated ‘in 
between’. Despite the clean-cut characterization of the debate on jus post bellum 
in a minimalist and maximalist camp, it will quickly become clear that making 
this distinction is not as easy as it appears. More often than not, contributions 
to the debate can hardly be labeled as either minimalist or maximalist. The third 
section of this chapter returns to the common characterization of the two 
positions. It appears that the difficulty of distinguishing minimalism and 
maximalism results from the fact that this characterization is not entirely 
accurate. Which of the supposed features indeed differentiate the two positions, 
and which fail to do so? And can we then rightly present the debate on jus post 
bellum as opposition between minimalists and maximalists? This chapter argues 
that today, this division is no longer relevant. However, there are differences 
between the main positions. In order to pinpoint these differences regarding 
the content and scope of jus post bellum, a larger perspective is taken in the 
fourth section of this chapter. It then appears that these differences are in fact 
gradual variations which are determined by two factors: the particular situation 
to which just war theory applies; and the general view on just war theory and 
international relations that is adopted. These factors explain the general shift 
towards a maximalist understanding of jus post bellum.  
 
6.2 Positions on Jus Post Bellum  
 
6.2.1 Minimalism   
 
The most prominent representative of the minimalist conception of jus post 
bellum is Michael Walzer. When reviving moral just war theory in his classic Just 
                                                             
13 This is also the view of Russel Muirhead: Russel Muirhead, ‘The Ethics of Exit. Moral 
Obligation in the Afghan Endgame’, in: Hy Rothstein & John Arquilla (eds.), Afghan 
Endgame. Strategy and Policy Choices for America’s Longest War, Washington D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press 2012, p. 156. 
14 Evans 2012, p. 206. 
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and Unjust Wars a few decades ago, Michael Walzer did not pay much attention 
to jus post bellum.15 However, some of his ideas evolved through the years, 
which he states is due to developments in the world since 1977, when his book 
first appeared. Together with his gradual acceptance of humanitarian 
interventions and long-term military operations, he now acknowledges jus post 
bellum as the third branch of just war theory.16 Another representative of the 
minimalist position is Gary Bass, who has taken upon himself the task of 
creating an important place for jus post bellum within Walzer’s theory.17 Bass 
stresses the importance of restraining conquest and argues that after war, there 
is a presumption against political reconstruction.18  
Walzer’s and Bass’ minimalist accounts of jus post bellum are determined by 
the great value they put on sovereignty of states and the self-determination of 
peoples. A theory on the end of wars is shaped, Walzer states, by the same 
principles that apply ad bellum: the right to continued national existence and 
nationality. Just wars are conservative in character.19 What follows is what 
Walzer calls the ‘classic view’ on jus post bellum, which we could title 
‘minimalism proper’. When an aggressor breaks the normal order, that order 
has to be repaired. Consequently, in this view the restoration of the situation 
that existed prior to the war is the just outcome.20 But contrary to traditional 
just war theory, this does not need to be taken literally according to Walzer: the 
goal of war is a ‘better state of peace’.21 It means that it is not necessarily the 
exact status quo ante bellum that must be restored, but victors should aim for a 
situation that is more secure, less vulnerable to territorial expansion and safer 
than it used to be for civilians.22 It follows that, from this point of view, after 
typical ‘just wars’ of self-defense, “resistance, restoration, [and] reasonable 
prevention” is allowed. Obviously, post war justice permits repelling aggression 
and some form of demilitarization and arms control.23 It also entails the right to 
                                                             
15 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations 
(second edition, or. 1977), New York: Basic Books 2000. 
16 Michael Walzer, Arguing about War, New Haven: Yale University Press 2004, p. xiii. 
17 Bass 2004, p. 387. 
18 Bass 2004, p. 396. 
19 Walzer 2000, p. 121. 
20 Michael Walzer, ‘The Aftermath of War. Reflections on Jus Post Bellum’, in: Eric 
Patterson (ed.), Ethics beyond War’s End, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press 2012, p. 36. 
21 Walzer 2000, p. 121. 
22 Walzer 2000, p. 121. 
23 Bass 2004, p. 394. 
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prevent that from happening in the near future. Lastly, it includes the right to 
extract reparations from the aggressor, following from the aggressor’s duty to 
restore and repair the damage done to victims. In principle, post war justice 
does not allow for political reconstruction.24  
However, the current political reality – in which few wars are purely self-
defensive – poses situations that minimalism proper does not account for. That 
leads to the question: Is this framework still appropriate today? Already in 
1977, Walzer discussed an exception to that minimalist view. The exception is a 
Nazi-like regime, which threatens core international values and stands affront 
the conscience of mankind. The regime Walzer had in mind is extremely 
aggressive and genocidal, justifying an imposed political reconstruction.25 Bass 
argues that regarding these defeated genocidal states, there is no right but even 
a duty to reconstruct its political structure. Because of the extreme character of 
the regime, it loses its claim to be respected as state and therefore, imposed 
reconstruction does not constitute a violation of its sovereignty.26  
It is clear that today’s humanitarian interventions or wars against terrorism 
do not necessarily involve ‘Nazi-like’ regimes, but nevertheless political 
reconstruction is often aimed for after these wars, which can be accompanied 
by short or longer term occupation. That new political reality seems to have 
made Walzer broaden the type of regime qualifying for the exception: he states 
that “the classic view of post bellum justice is now subject to revision whenever 
we encounter inherently aggressive and murderous regimes”.27 After 
humanitarian interventions or interventions in order to stop inherently 
aggressive regimes more generally, a new regime must be created in order to 
halt the taking of human lives and to prevent it from happening in the near 
future.28 Obviously, it will be subject to debate which regimes qualify as such. 
Probably, Idi Amin’s Uganda would have qualified, as would have Slobodan 
Milosevic’s Yugoslavia. But was Saddam Hussein’s Iraq sufficiently aggressive 
and murderous? There are many situations in which it is unclear whether the 
                                                             
24 In self-defensive wars, Bass argues, there is little justification for reshaping a defeated 
society: Bass 2004, p. 393. 
25 Walzer 2000, p. 113. 
26 Bass 2004, p. 398-399. 
27 Walzer 2012, p. 39. 
28 An excellent article on Walzer’s understanding of humanitarian intervention was 
recently published in the European Journal of International Law, see: Terry Nardin, 
‘From Right to Intervene to Duty to Protect. Michael Walzer on Humanitarian 
Intervention’, in: European Journal of International Law 2013, 24/1. 
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regime’s character justified imposed political reconstruction. 
But let us assume that some regimes are inherently aggressive and 
murderous. What does this revision of that view on jus post bellum – minimalism 
proper – entail? Which other rights and obligations arise after wars with these 
regimes? According to Walzer, ‘provision’ is the primary obligation for victors. 
That entails the provision of immediate necessities for the people in the 
aggressor state, such as “law and order, food and shelter, schools and jobs”, 
provided together with local partners as much as possible.29 Next to the 
immediate provision of primary needs, post war justice requires political 
reconstruction, which is necessary to prevent further aggression in the future. 
The minimalistic nature of Walzer’s view on jus post bellum is clearly illustrated 
by the limitations he puts on political reconstruction. “The goal of 
reconstruction is a sovereign state, legitimate in the eyes of its own citizens, and 
an equal member of the international society of states.”30 The legitimacy 
restrains reconstruction efforts: they must be in strong accord with local 
partners in order to safeguard and embed the prevailing national values. Walzer 
is concerned about states imposing their own ideologies on foreign countries.31 
Bass is equally concerned with imperialism and consequently states that 
reconstruction efforts should always seek the consent of the defeated.32 A 
minimal conception of human rights is another factor determining 
reconstruction efforts.33 While a democratic government is preferred in light of 
individual human rights protection, post war justice must be conceived in the 
minimal sense: the goal is the creation of a safe and decent society.34 
The final norm of minimalist jus post bellum regards criminal justice. 
Contrary to what seems to be Bellamy’s view, the emphasis on criminal justice 
and therefore the organization of trials after a war is not reserved for 
maximalists.35 In practically all accounts of jus post bellum – including Walzer’s 
and Bass’ conceptions of just post bellum – it is argued that after a war, some 
                                                             
29 Walzer 2012, p. 43-44. 
30 Walzer 2012, p. 44. 
31 The justness of an occupation is determined by the political direction and the 
distribution of benefits provided by the occupation, Walzer claims in Michael Walzer, 
‘Just and Unjust Occupations’, in: Dissent 2006, 51/1. He criticizes the Bush 
administration for profiting and making money on the Iraqi occupation. This, 
according to Walzer, undermines the legitimacy of the occupation.   
32 Bass 2004, p. 392-395. 
33 Walzer 2012, p. 43. 
34 Walzer 2012, p. 45. 
35 Bellamy 2008, p. 612; Muirhead 2012, p. 156. 
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form of criminal justice must be achieved. “There can be no justice in war if 
there are not, ultimately, responsible men and women”, Walzer argued as early 
as 1977. If there was aggression, there must be aggressors and if war crimes 
were committed, there are war criminals.36 It is usually after the war that these 
persons, those guilty of the human rights violation(s) that started the war – 
violating jus ad bellum; and those guilty of war crimes – violating jus in bello, can 
be prosecuted, held accountable and punished.  
There are numerous reasons for prosecuting and punishing violations of jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello: retribution for committed crimes; prevention of future 
crimes; re-establishing the status of victims; fostering reconciliation; and 
symbolically reclaiming moral values, to summarize a few. For these reasons, it 
is widely argued that criminal justice forms an important part of jus post bellum. 
But to categorically demand that those responsible be punished is too easy. 
Aside from the moral importance of punishing the guilty, the realization of 
peace is important as well. And most theorists acknowledge that this value of 
peace sometimes collides with the value of criminal justice. In those situations, 
these values can be weighed against each other and, unsurprisingly, there is no 
general agreement on what must be the outcome. Bass however argues that the 
duty of peace has priority over the duty of justice.37 And more often, theorists 
allow that sometimes it is justified to grant amnesties to perpetrators in order to 
come closer to the goal of reconciliation and peace.38 Walzer argues that the 
first priority after war is to create a secure peace for the people living in the war 
affected area. Therefore, “sometimes security might require amnesties and 
public forgetfulness”.39  
To summarize, Walzer’s ‘classic view’ on jus post bellum − minimalism 
proper − is thus revised. Minimalist jus post bellum, as it is usually understood, 
includes different moral norms. It is allowed to draw back aggression and take 
measures in order to ensure that it does not happen again in the near future. It is 
also allowed to extract reparations from an aggressor in order to repair the 
damage done to victims. Furthermore, political reconstruction is allowed or 
even obligated after war with inherently aggressive and murderous regimes, 
including, but broader than Nazi-like regimes. In these situations, there are 
other positive obligations, that Walzer summarizes under ‘provision’. Bass adds 
                                                             
36 Walzer 2000, p. 287-288. 
37 Bass 2004, p. 405. 
38 Walzer 2012, p. 45. 
39 Walzer 2012, p. 45. 
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that these obligations of political reconstruction and provision of basic needs 
for the population, also arise after wars which leave a state in chaos. It is well 
possible that after a just war, the old regime (not inherently aggressive and 
murderous) no longer functions properly while the population lacks the power 
to establish new political structures. In those situations, Bass argues, the victors 
should assist in the reconstruction of the state.40 Finally, the establishment of 
criminal responsibility for violators of jus ad bellum and jus in bello constitutes 
the last norm of jus post bellum.   
 
6.2.2 The Middle Ground? 
 
In addition to Walzer and Bass, Brian Orend is presented as minimalist.41 
Orend, as one of the most prominent spokesmen of jus post bellum, argues that 
such norms must be codified into a new Geneva Convention.42 At first glance, 
it is easy to understand why Orend is put in the minimalist camp. But while 
Orend is presented as minimalist, an analysis of his account of jus post bellum 
sheds doubt on that claim. Orend is, to a large extent, influenced by Walzer. 
Indeed in 2001, Orend’s account of jus post bellum was very much in line with 
Walzer,43 offering a clear checklist of jus post bellum norms, which remained 
largely the same in his writings in the following years.44 That checklist is widely 
quoted by other authors on jus post bellum. However, Orend’s position changes 
over time. While the checklist seems to remain the same, Orend becomes more 
willing to allow for political reconstruction. Consequently, it becomes more 
and more implausible that he is a typical minimalist. If we hold on to the 
                                                             
40 Bass 2004, p. 402. This form of reconstruction is limited: Bass draws on the Rawlsian 
category of well-ordered peoples. There is no obligation to create a liberal democracy. 
Walzer similarly states that jus post bellum is about justice in the minimal sense: the 
creation of a safe and decent society. Walzer 2012, p. 45. 
41 Mark Evans, Alexandra Gheciu and Jennifer Welsh and Alex Bellamy refer to Orend as 
being a minimalist in the jus post bellum debate: Evans 2008, p. 539; Gheciu & Welsh 
2009, p. 117; Bellamy 2008, p. 605-606. While Frowe also cites Orend when 
explaining minimalism, she takes Orend’s account of jus post bellum as example for the 
maximalist position: Frowe 2016, p. 239. 
42 E.g. Brian Orend, ‘Justice after War’, in: Eric Patterson (ed.), Ethics beyond War’s End, 
Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press 2012. 
43 Brian Orend, ‘Justice after War’, in: Ethics & International Affairs 2002, 16/1. 
44 Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum: The Perspective of a Just-War Theorist’, in: Leiden Journal 
of International Law 2007, 20/3; Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum. A Just War Theory 
Perspective’, in: Carsten Stahn & Jann Kleffner, Jus Post Bellum, Towards a Law of 
Transition From Conflict to Peace, The Hague: TMC Asser Press 2008. 
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minimalism-maximalism division, Orend’s position is at least halfway on the 
sliding scale towards the maximalist conception of jus post bellum. And his 
recent article shows definitively that Orend cannot be characterized minimalist 
any longer.45 Because Orend is one of the most quoted authors on jus post 
bellum, and because his position illustrates the difficulty of framing the debate in 
terms of minimalism and maximalism, it is useful to present his position here.  
The main reason why Orend is often seen as minimalist, is his concern that 
victors will do too much after the end of war, leading to so-called ‘victors’ 
justice’. He thus limits what can be done after war, which characterizes the 
minimalist position. The aim of a just war, he states, “is the vindication of those 
rights whose violation grounded the resort to war in the first place”.46 After the 
vindication of these rights, for example when the aggression is repelled and the 
rights to life, self-determination and the state’s right to sovereignty are restored, 
the war must end. And as unconstrained fighting beyond the vindication of 
those rights, demanding unconditional surrender after war is prohibited as 
well.47  
Orend’s checklist of post bellum norms appears thus, in terms of content, to 
be rather similar to Walzer’s and Bass’ accounts of jus post bellum. He proposes 
the following norms: 1) rights vindication; 2) proportionality and publicity; 3) 
discrimination; 4) punishment; 5) compensation; and 6) rehabilitation.48 These 
are three different types of post war norms. The first norm of rights vindication 
is arguably central, as it limits jus post bellum in general. It implies that the cause 
of the war determines when the war must come to an end, and what can be 
aimed for after the war. Secondly, proportionality and discrimination are 
general norms, which function in different ways. They determine the nature of 
several other post bellum obligations. With the second norm of proportionality, 
Orend states that post war arrangements must be reasonable − which thus 
excludes e.g. unconditional surrender − and publicly announced and 
communicated. These arrangements can have the form of a peace treaty, but 
this is not absolutely necessary, since the legitimacy of the arrangement is not 
derived from a formal treaty.49 The norm of discrimination entails in general 
that the victor is obligated to distinguish between leaders, soldiers and civilians 
                                                             
45 Orend 2012. An updated edition of Orend’s The Morality of War consolidated his 
changed perception of jus post bellum. See: Orend 2013. 
46 Orend 2008, p. 39. 
47 Orend 2008, p. 39. 
48 Orend 2008, p. 40-42. 
49 Orend 2002, p. 55. 
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of the aggressor state. According to Orend, the population of that state must be 
excluded from punitive measures.50  
The following norms: punishment, compensation, and rehabilitation make 
up the third type of norms, because they represent concrete areas of post war 
justice. As in Walzer’s and Bass’ theories, criminal justice forms an important 
part of Orend’s jus post bellum. This norm deals with the punishment of both the 
leaders of the aggressor regime, as well as soldiers of both sides who committed 
war crimes.51 While Orend stresses the importance of criminal justice, he adds 
that “care should be taken” to balance the goal of retribution with the negative 
results of prosecuting former leaders, implying that punishment should be 
reconsidered when it endangers the peace.52 Proportionality − Orend’s second 
norm − plays a role here in balancing the values of peace and criminal justice.53 
Also, the victims of aggression should be compensated for the damaged caused 
by the war. This norm deals with another concrete area of post war justice. The 
amount of compensation that is due and the distribution of costs are 
determined by the principles of proportionality and discrimination. Following 
these principles, compensations should only be extracted to the extent that is 
realistically feasible, and only from actors who were responsible for the 
aggression. Orend excludes the civilian population from contributing to these 
payments. At this point, he disagrees with Walzer, who argues that reparations 
can be paid through a general taxation of the population of the aggressor 
state.54  
Finally, rehabilitation is a norm that concerns a specific area of post war 
justice. Orend’s interpretation of this last norm is particularly susceptible to 
periodic changes, in which he distances himself from Walzer’s position. 
Rehabilitation for Orend involves a broad range of activities such as 
disarmament, institutional reform, political reconstruction, rebuilding 
infrastructure, but also official apologies. The concept of rehabilitation is thus 
broader than political reconstruction alone. Some of these activities are 
                                                             
50 Orend 2008, p. 40-41. 
51 Orend 2008, p. 41. 
52 Orend 2002, p. 52-54. Negative effects resulting from prosecuting former leaders will 
arise especially when the accused remain popular among the local population. This can 
lead to destabilization and that is why Orend claims the advance of criminal justice is 
subject to the proportionality principle.  
53 Orend 2002, p. 53. 
54 Orend 2002, p. 47-49. In 2012, Orend totally rejects compensation as norm of jus post 
bellum.  
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prescribed by Walzer as well, for example when disarmament is needed in the 
prevention of future aggression. But while Walzer argues that we should be 
very stringent in allowing coercive political reconstruction of other states, 
Orend thinks that Walzer is too cautious here. Instead of allowing rehabilitation 
only in case of inherently aggressive and murderous regimes,55 Orend suggests 
that “there should be a presumption in favor of permitting rehabilitative 
measures in the domestic political structure of a defeated aggressor”.56 
However, regime change and full-fledged political reconstruction are not 
always allowed; the scope of rehabilitation − in Orend’s broad understanding − 
must be dependent on the character of the prior regime, and is subject to 
proportionality. But in all former aggressive states, reconstruction is allowed to 
a certain extent.  
The important question arises: in which cases is regime change and full 
political reconstruction allowed? To answer this question, we must first look at 
Orend’s concept of the ‘minimally just community’: “A minimally just 
community makes every reasonable effort to: (i) avoid violating the rights of 
other minimally just communities; (ii) gain recognition as being legitimate in 
the eyes of the international community and its own people; and (iii) realize the 
human rights of all its individual members.”57 In other words, it is a 
nonaggressive, internationally and internally legitimate, and rights respecting 
regime.  
Now the answer to the question as to the cases of legitimate regime change 
and imposed political reconstruction changes over the years. In 2002, he adds 
to the presumption in favor of permitting rehabilitative measures, that the 
further away a state is from being a ‘minimally just’ state, the more extensive the 
reconstruction may be. This clearly is a sliding scale. Total reconstruction is 
positioned at the very end of the scale and, as in Walzer’s theory, is only allowed 
in extreme cases. However, a few years later, Orend seems more willing to 
allow imposed regime change and political reconstruction, allowing it not only 
in extreme cases. A state that is not minimally just, he argues, can be forced to 
adopt a new minimally just regime through coercive political reconstruction 
                                                             
55 It should be noted that when Orend formulated his disagreement with Walzer on this, 
at that time, Walzer was even more cautious than in his later writings, reserving 
political reconstruction for ‘extreme cases’. This is discussed in the previous section. 
However, I think that his criticism would still be valid against Walzer’s current 
position.  
56 Orend 2002, p. 49-52. 
57 Orend 2008, p. 43. 
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after a just war. Clearly, Orend herewith creates much room for imposed 
regime change and political reconstruction. Especially the last criterion of 
‘realizing human rights’ seems to allow broad reconstruction. And which 
human rights is he referring to?58 He justifies political reconstruction with the 
argument that states who are not minimally just are not legitimate and 
therefore have no right to govern.59 And even if the people as a whole has the 
right to self-determination, this collective right is only valid insofar as it results 
in such a minimally just society.60             
Orend’s last article on jus post bellum confirms the conclusion that he leaves 
much room for coercive political reconstruction. Here, Orend does not 
mention his earlier checklist of jus post bellum norms. Instead, he presents us 
two models for post war justice: the ‘revenge model’ and the ‘rehabilitation 
model’.61 As to be expected, he opts for the rehabilitation model, which leads to 
post bellum norms that are quite different from his earlier checklist. There is no 
longer any mention of the essential and limiting norm of rights vindication. 
Instead, Orend argues that the goal of post war justice is the construction of a 
minimally just regime in any defeated aggressor.62 He now openly argues that 
political reconstruction is the goal of post war justice in general.63 Therewith, 
political reconstruction has moved from being one of many aspects of jus post 
bellum, towards being central. After a just war, the defeated state must always be 
politically reconstructed. It seems that Orend now supposes that unjust 
defeated aggressors are never minimally just and thus ‘need’ political 
reconstruction in order to become so.  
                                                             
58 Which human rights does Orend mean? A few years earlier, he defined the rights 
which are satisfied by minimally just communities as the right to security, subsistence, 
liberty, equality and recognition. See: Brian Orend, The Morality of War (first edition), 
Peterborough: Broadview Press 2006, p. 163. In his last article, he argues that these five 
rights to him are the major objects of human rights claims. From these objects, 
concrete rights can be derived such as those in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. See: Orend 2012, p. 187-188. To me, this does not make entirely clear what 
Orend demands for the minimally just regime (i.e. that it respects at least these five 
rights or objects of human rights claims or that it respects the full range of particular 
human rights).   
59 Orend 2008, p. 43-44. Orend refers also to Immanuel Kant’s short reflection on jus 
post bellum and regime change in The Metaphysics of Morals to show that states failing 
minimal justice forfeit rights of existence.  
60 Orend 2008, p. 44. 
61 Orend 2012, p. 179-186. 
62 Orend 2012, p. 187. 
63 Orend 2012, p. 187. 
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Another significant change in his position is the rejection of compensation 
for victims. While he was always cautious on this point, subjecting this norm to 
the principles of proportionality and discrimination, his fear of harming 
civilians was the reason that he left this norm out of his proposal for a new 
Geneva Convention. Instead, the focus now lies on investing in the defeated 
state in order to aid its rebuilding.64 It is clear that Orend’s position changed 
throughout the years. Now Orend occupies the middle ground in the 
minimalism versus maximalism debate. He clearly moved from leaning towards 
minimalism and Walzer’s cautious understanding of jus post bellum towards 
leaning more in the direction of maximalism.  
 
6.2.3 Maximalism  
 
Although the minimalism-maximalism dichotomy is at the forefront of the jus 
post bellum debate, not many authors are clear about their position. Mark Evans 
is one of the few who explicitly endorse the maximalist position, using the 
terminology ‘restricted’ and ‘extended’. According to Evans there are clear 
circumstances in which the minimalist position offers too little. He argues that 
the norms of minimalist jus post bellum are always applicable after war, but that 
in some cases, the scope of jus post bellum needs to be extended.65 Mark Allman 
and Tobias Winright also implicitly endorse maximalism, as in their account of 
jus post bellum several characteristics of that position can be recognized.66 
Although Evans and Allman and Winright acknowledge their dependence on 
Orend, they take his theory a step further and they will therefore be taken as 
representatives to discuss the maximalist position.  
What exactly does this extended or maximalist version of jus post bellum 
entail? Interestingly, Evans explains his position by demarcating it from 
Orend’s supposed minimalist checklist of post bellum norms. Sometimes, Evans 
                                                             
64 Orend 2012, p. 183. 
65 Evans 2008, p. 540-541. Evans gives several  reasons why he thinks that minimalism 
offers too little in the current political reality: 1) in occupation situations minimalist jus 
post bellum does not provide guidance on matters that are relevant; 2) if jus post bellum 
is to provide a moral foundation for – and work with – international law, it must 
acknowledge the legal obligations established under the ‘responsibility to protect’; and 
3) the fact that war is a great evil, in terms of its inherent destruction, deaths and 
suffering, constitutes a moral argument for post bellum obligations, next to the familiar 
‘pottery barn’ argument. See: Evans 2009, p. 150-155.  
66 Mark Allman & Tobias Winright, After the Smoke Clears. The Just War Tradition and Post 
War Justice, New York: Orbis Books 2010. 
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argues, this checklist offers all the relevant post war rights and obligations. 
However, in other situations, jus post bellum will need to go “beyond the 
immediate aftermath of war”.67 Especially in case of an occupation after a just 
war, post bellum norms must be extended, meaning that more sorts of norms 
come into play and that they can only be achieved in ‘the long run’. In Evans’ 
theory, the scope of jus post bellum is dependent on the type of war that was 
waged and the question whether or not it is followed by an occupation. This 
resembles Walzer’s argument that the scope and type of jus post bellum 
obligations depend on the particular situation.  
What other norms are identified by ‘maximalists’ as part of jus post bellum? 
Evans refers specifically to three more extensive obligations: reconstruction of 
the physical infrastructure; redistribution of material resources; and 
reestablishment of socio-cultural institutions, practices and relationships.68 But 
this ‘extension’ is not as significant as Evans wants us to believe. First, the 
reconstruction of the infrastructure in the defeated state is presented as an 
additional obligation of maximalist jus post bellum. Allman and Winright 
similarly argue that investments in “infrastructure reconstruction and 
development, including roads, ports, rail lines, electrical grids (...) is necessary 
for post war peace”.69 However, this obligation was already identified by Orend 
under the heading of rehabilitation.70  
Secondly, the obligation to redistribute material resources is equally 
presented as a norm of maximalist jus post bellum. Evans states that victors must 
take responsibility for their fair share of the material burdens.71 He argues that 
the victor should not extract the total costs of the war from the former enemy.72 
Allman and Winright agree that reconstruction of the economy of the defeated 
state is essential, and that the victor has thereto an important responsibility.73 
Yet again, the obligation to redistribute material resources and reconstruct the 
defeated state’s economy is found also in Orend’s theory, particularly in his 
most recent account of jus post bellum. According to Orend, the victor cannot 
extract reparations for damages done by the war, but must instead invest in the 
                                                             
67 Although I doubt that Walzer or Orend would disagree with that, but this will become 
clear in the following section.  
68 Evans 2012, p. 207-208. 
69 Allman & Winright 2010, p. 161. 
70 Orend 2002, p. 52. 
71 Evans 2012, p. 208. 
72 Evans 2008, p. 541. 
73 Allman & Winright 2010, p. 160-163. 
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defeated country, rebuilding its economy.74 These two broad, so-called 
additional norms of jus post bellum – reconstructing infrastructure and assisting 
the defeated state financially – are thus also recognized by Orend.75 
The third obligation that Evans thinks is part of jus post bellum, is indeed an 
extended addition. What the reestablishment of socio-cultural institutions, 
practices and relationships entails is not exactly clear, but forgiveness and 
reconciliation seem to make up the most important aspect of it. According to 
Evans, Orend’s and the so-called minimalist accounts of jus post bellum fail to 
acknowledge the importance of repairing the relationships between former 
enemies. Evans argues that this would be a “potentially serious deficiency”.76 
Therefore, part of Evans jus post bellum is the obligation to “take full and 
proactive part in the ethical and socio-cultural processes of forgiveness and 
reconciliation that are central to the construction of a just and stable peace”.77 
Because the obligation to achieve forgiveness and reconciliation seems very 
demanding, Evans argues that these concepts should be understood in thin, 
minimal terms: reconciliation “refers only to the business of developing means 
by which former enemies can live on the same planet without fighting each 
other”.78  
Allman and Winright argue even stronger that reconciliation is a vital part of 
jus post bellum. They present a richer religious understanding of reconciliation. 
The main goal of reconciliation is not only to make sure former enemies can 
continue to live on the same planet together, but to create relationships of 
respect, trust and friendship. “The reconciliation phase seeks to turn enemies 
into friends and to bring emotional healing to the victims of war.”79 They stress 
that reconciliation is not about forgive-and-forget, but is instead is about true 
reconciliation between people, for which the truth is essential.80  
                                                             
74 Orend 2012, p. 188. 
75 Generally however, they are not found in minimalists positions. At least, they are no 
explicit part of Walzer’s and Bass’ accounts of jus post bellum. It might however be 
argued that in some cases, such measures are part of what Walzer calls ‘provision’ in 
the defeated state.  
76 Evans 2012, p. 210. 
77 Evans 2012, p. 208. 
78 Evans 2012, p. 211. 
79 Mark Allman & Tobias Winright, ‘Growing Edges of Just War Theory. Jus Ante Bellum, 
Jus Post Bellum, and Imperfect Justice’, in: Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 2012, 
32/2, p. 102. 
80 They identify six areas important for a practical post bellum reconciliation: 1) the 
immediate post conflict period, in which the cease-fire is obviously a prerogative, and 
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Finally, extensive political reconstruction is often seen as norm of 
maximalist jus post bellum. Allman and Winright argue that the goal of post 
bellum regime change is more demanding than the realization of a minimally 
just state, as Orend holds.81 Based on the Christian tradition, they argue in 
favor of additional duties. Not only individual human rights, but the ‘common 
good’ is the state’s responsibility. After war, the victor has the responsibility to 
ensure that a government is in place which protects and guarantees human 
rights and pursues the common good. Consequently, they state that “a 
Christian understanding of post bellum regime change would aim for a just and 
lasting peace, inclusive of robust human rights, political sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity as well as social, political, economic, religious, and cultural 
conditions that allow citizens to flourish, to pursue lives that are meaningful 
and worthy of creatures made in the image and likeness of God.”82 Obviously, 
this requirement imposes broad obligations on victors of war. 
In general, what does an analysis of these positions – the minimalist position 
of Walzer and Bass, the middle-ground of Orend, and the maximalist positions 
of Evans and Allman and Winright – tell us? Evidently there are differences, but 
the positions are not as clearly separated as it appears. And since it is not easy to 
categorize them as either minimalist or maximalist, there is no agreement on 
what the most common position on jus post bellum is.83  
 
6.3 The Opposition between Minimalism and Maximalism 
 
To summarize where we stand so far: the supposed differences between 
minimalist and maximalist jus post bellum boil down to: 1) a short versus long 
                                                                                                                                               
where symbolic gestures expressing respect and restraint in post war celebrations are 
on its place; 2) acknowledgement, aimed at recovering the truth, completing public 
record on the past, and constructing a new narrative (subjects that in ‘transitional 
justice’ fall under the heading of historical justice); 3) apologies, made individually or 
collectively, ideally complements that acknowledgement of past wrongdoings; 4) 
punishment of crimes committed by both the aggressor and the victor is another key 
area of post war justice; 5) forgiveness is stated to be at ‘the heart of the reconciliation 
process’; and 6) the last key issue for post war justice is amnesty, which forms the last 
step in the reconciliation process. See: Allman & Winright 2010, p. 106-116. 
81 Allman & Winright 2010, p. 152- 160. 
82 Allman & Winright 2010, p. 159. 
83 For Bellamy, minimalism, with Brian Orend and Michel Walzer as most important 
spokesmen, is the most common position. See: Bellamy 2008, p. 602. Frowe argues 
that maximalism is ‘the dominant view of the role of victors’ and she discusses Orend’s 
account of jus post bellum as example. See: Frowe 2016, p. 240. 
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timeframe; 2) negative versus positive obligations; 3) a limited array of norms 
versus a large array of norms (limited or extensive norms); 4) the just cause as 
an end versus achieving more than that. The difficulty in distinguishing the 
positions results from the fact that this characterization was certainly 
appropriate for explaining the difference between minimalism proper and 
maximalism, but that it is less appropriate to explain contemporary positions 
on jus post bellum. It seems no longer useful to characterize the debate on jus post 
bellum in minimalism versus maximalism. This becomes evident when looking 
at the differences.  
The first characteristic that needs to be modified is the variation in 
timeframe. It is argued that minimalism focuses on the short term – the end of 
war and immediate aftermath – and that maximalism focuses on the long term. 
However, according to the recent positions of Walzer and Bass, post war 
activities can be stretched beyond the war’s immediate aftermath. Indeed, 
drawing back aggression and extracting reparations can be short term activities. 
However, the prevention of aggression; reconstruction of inherently aggressive 
regimes; and provision for the affected population are activities that will 
presumably need time. Also, it is doubtful whether criminal justice, which is an 
important requirement in of all proposals for jus post bellum, is something that 
can be restricted to the immediate aftermath. Experiences with national justice 
systems after war, as well as with international criminal tribunals such as the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and hybrid courts 
such as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, show that the 
organization and working of such courts often cost a large amount of time. The 
same goes for other mechanisms to deal with a violent past, such as truth and 
reconciliation committees. Since it is hard to claim that minimalist jus post 
bellum proposals exclude such provisions, the relevance of the short versus long 
timeframe becomes less important.  
The second characterization is the type of norms that are proposed. It is 
argued that minimalism consists of negative obligations and maximalism of 
positive obligations. In general, this is true. Minimalism is more concerned with 
restricting what victors can do after a war, as a result of fear for exploitation the 
defeated state, and the imposition of foreign values. It is, according to 
minimalists, prohibited to forcefully impose political reconstruction. But, as 
seen, situations that involve inherently aggressive regimes or states left in chaos, 
are exceptions. After wars involving such states, according to minimalists, 
victors do have responsibilities regarding post war reconstruction. For Walzer 
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e.g., the imperative to provide provision means that the victor must reconstruct 
that state politically, realize a safe environment, provide food and shelter for the 
population, and create education and employment possibilities. These 
imperatives obviously are positive obligations. Additionally, achieving some 
form of criminal justice also entails a positive obligation. Therefore, both 
minimalists and maximalists propose positive obligations. The difference 
between minimalism and maximalism cannot be that minimalist jus post bellum 
exclusively consists of negative and maximalist jus post bellum of positive 
obligations. The difference is merely a matter of degree: minimalists focus on 
negative obligations and positive obligations; maximalists, on the other hand, 
focus mainly on positive obligations.  
This leads us to the third – related – characteristic. It is argued that the array 
of norms is larger for maximalists than for minimalists. Still, there are some 
post bellum norms that we find in practically all proposals. This is the ‘core’ of jus 
post bellum. Halting aggression and creating safety and security; (assistance with 
the) reconstruction of the defeated state; and establishing some form of 
criminal justice seem to be essential parts of any proposal of jus post bellum. We 
should be careful to include the right to extract reparation payments from the 
former aggressor in this list, because that norm is part of minimalist accounts of 
jus post bellum, but not of all maximalist accounts. Evans and the later Orend in 
fact even turn this requirement around, arguing that victors should invest in the 
economy of the defeated state in order to rebuild its economy instead of 
demanding compensation. This means that debts due because of the war should 
be acquitted instead of claimed.  
Reconstruction in general is always part of jus post bellum, only the scope of 
reconstruction is debated. Theorists differ with regard to the extent to which 
reconstruction is necessary. Maximalists indeed argue for more obligations in 
this context: rebuilding infrastructure, cleaning up the environment and 
generally investing more in the economy of the defeated state are considered 
required after war. Another additional ‘maximalist’ norm of jus post bellum is 
the requirement of reconciliation. An evaluation of these first three 
characteristics shows that the most profound difference between the main 
positions on jus post bellum lies in the specific scope and content. Maximalist jus 
post bellum proposes additional norms, generally positive obligations.  
The fourth characteristic seems in accordance with that difference regarding 
scope and content: minimalists are said to restrict post war activities to 
achieving the just cause, and maximalists go beyond that. But again, the 
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minimalism maximalism dichotomy is not that obvious here. Both positions 
namely argue that the just cause works as a general constraint after war. Like 
Walzer, Allman and Winright state that the just cause for the war limits 
legitimate actions when the war is over.84 The war must end and the 
sovereignty of the enemy state restored when the cause for war is achieved, and 
thus the previously stated objectives are realized.85 Evans also argues that the 
sovereignty of the defeated state must be restored “as soon as is reasonably 
possible”.86 This requirement constitutes one of the five proposed criteria of jus 
post bellum.87  
At the same time, both minimalists and maximalists agree that post war 
activities usually go beyond simply realizing the just cause. Jus post bellum 
requires something more than a realization of that cause, e.g. halting the 
internal or external aggression, and a restoration of the status quo ante bellum.88 
It requires ‘a better state of peace’. A tension exists between those two claims, 
something which Evans acknowledges.89 There is a wish to restrict post war 
behavior and restore sovereignty as soon as possible, and yet positive post 
bellum norms are proposed in order to create that better state of peace.  
Exactly how much better that peace must be, and what it entails, are 
important questions that are addressed in the following section and chapter. In 
short, while it is clear that both positions in fact aim higher than achieving the 
just cause, the way that this goal is conceived marks an essential difference. 
Maximalists are more ambitious in their understanding of the goal of a just war. 
To illustrate this, Allman and Winright formulate: “Minimally, the goal of a just 
war must be to establish social, political, and economic conditions that are 
substantially more stable, more just, and less prone to chaos than what existed 
prior to the fighting. Maximally, it means a social political and economic 
                                                             
84 Allman & Winright 2010, p. 87-90. 
85 While they argue, in accordance with Orend, that the just cause works as a restraint 
after war, Allman & Winright criticize Orend for conflating the just cause and the right 
intention criteria. For them, the right intention criterion is important for jus post bellum 
in its own right, as it broadens and nuances the just cause principle. See: Allman & 
Winright 2010, p. 41-42, 86, 88-89.  
86 Evans 2008, p. 157. 
87 Brian Orend similarly argues that ‘the principle of rights vindication forbids the 
continuation of the war after the relevant rights have, in fact, been vindicated’. He 
stresses as the essence of justice after war, that there are firm limits and constraints 
upon its aims and conduct. See: Orend 2007, p. 579. 
88 Walzer 2000, p. 121-122; Orend 2007, p. 578-579; Allman & Winright 2010, p. 42. 
89 Evans 2008, p. 157-160. 
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environment that allows citizens to pursue lives of meaning and enables 
humans to flourish.”90 
Clearly, this last characteristic also fails to differentiate minimalism and 
maximalism in the way one would expect. It does show that both positions are 
confronted with a tension between two different requirements: limiting post 
bellum activities on the one hand, and achieving something better than simply a 
restoration of the status quo ante bellum on the other. There is no agreement on 
the definition of ‘something better’. It seems that the more comprehensive the 
goal is, the broader the content and scope of the proposed norms are, and the 
stronger the tension with the limitation of post war activities. Therefore, while 
this tension exists in both minimalist and maximalist proposals for jus post 
bellum, it seems to pose a more serious problem for maximalists. 
All in all, it is not hard to understand why it is difficult to distinguish 
minimalism and maximalism. Minimalism proper – aiming at the restoration of 
the previous situation, allowing resistance and prevention of aggression and 
extracting reparations – can indeed be characterized by the features that are 
mentioned. Minimalism proper and maximalism reflect opposing standpoints. 
The general characterization of the debate on jus post bellum as a conflict 
between two opposing camps, as presented in the introduction, is based on that 
distinction. Today however, one of those positions seems to have been 
abandoned, and consequently, that characterization has lost its usefulness. 
Contemporary so-called minimalists have clearly moved towards maximalism, 
and therefore current positions can no longer easily be divided in two opposing 
camps. In essence, all contemporary accounts of jus post bellum are maximalist – 
at least to a certain extent. Therefore, the conclusion is that maximalism is 
indeed the new standard of normative thinking about jus post bellum. But when 
we have to leave the minimalist versus maximalist distinction behind, how 
should we then characterize the contemporary debate on jus post bellum? What 
can explain the debate on the content and scope of post bellum norms?  
 
6.4 Jus Post Bellum in a Larger Perspective 
 
We came to the conclusion that the minimalist versus maximalist divide is no 
longer relevant; all contemporary contributions are in fact maximalist. There 
nevertheless seems to be a gradual difference in terms of content and scope of 
post bellum norms. So the question arises: what determines the content and 
                                                             
90 Allman & Winright 2010, p. 86. 
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scope of jus post bellum? And can we pinpoint these gradual variations? In order 
to answer these questions, it is clarifying to take a step back and create a larger 
perspective. So far jus post bellum is considered in relative isolation. However, 
the discussion of the last characteristic already indicated that the goal of just war 
theory is important. The following section takes a closer look at the connection 
between jus post bellum and just war theory in general. It is argued that the way 
jus post bellum is defined is particularly influenced by two factors: 1) the 
concrete situation to which the justum bellum applies; and 2) the general 
perspective on international relations. Those factors – one concrete and the 
other abstract – determine the content and scope of jus post bellum.  
 
6.4.1 Situation  
 
The first factor that influences the interpretation of just post bellum is the 
concrete situation in which the question of post war justice arises. The content 
and scope of jus post bellum depend in all proposals on the situation. Evans 
states this most clearly, when he argues that today’s post war situations 
contribute to the fact that jus post bellum now needs to entail more than what 
was originally envisaged.91 The relevant aspects of the situation are: the type of 
war and the nature of the involved state. For example, in case of a classic 
situation of attack and self-defense, jus post bellum is usually limited, and focuses 
on stopping the aggression and preventing it from happening again.92 The 
‘core’ of jus post bellum, in other words, is usually sufficient in such situations. 
But in the case of a humanitarian intervention, the aim is to stop internal 
aggression and protect the local population against its oppressive regime, which 
then leads to more elaborate responsibilities. This can be recognized in 
Walzer’s theory.  
Yet, this analysis is not confirmed by Orend, who argues that broad positive 
obligations – e.g. those regarding political reconstruction – apply irrespective of 
the type of war that was waged. And Allman and Winright too seem to argue 
for similar broad obligations after every type of war. Therefore it is plausible 
that not only the first, but also the second aspect is important. Jus post bellum 
                                                             
91 Evans 2008, p. 540-541. What aspects of those cases referred to by Evans exactly are 
relevant to determine the content and scope of just post bellum are not made clear. He 
only refers specifically to the situation of occupation, in which minimalist jus post 
bellum is not sufficient.  
92 Although, as we have discussed earlier, for all proponents of jus post bellum this 
involves more than a restoration of the status quo ante bellum.  
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depends on the nature of the state involved. That appears to be a common 
element shared by the various positions. Walzer for example, argues that even 
in case of self-deference there can be extensive positive obligations, namely, in 
the case of self-defense against an inherently aggressive regime. Bass points to 
the chaotic situation, e.g. when a regime has become dysfunctional. Such 
situations produce positive obligations regarding political reconstruction for 
the victors. According to Orend, political reconstruction is required whenever 
the state involved is not minimally just. And Allman and Winright claim that 
broad reformative activities are necessary whenever states are not able to 
promote the common good and provide their people with public services such 
as education, health care and electricity.93 It seems therefore, that the nature of 
the defeated state determines the content and scope of post war obligations. 
Here we can distinguish between three specific determinants: the nature of the 
state when it gets involved in the war (e.g. inherently aggressive?); the nature of 
that state as it comes out of the war (e.g. internal chaos?), and especially, the 
(foreseen) nature of that state in the future.  
This last determinant, the view on the nature of the state when post bellum 
activities end, seems to be an important determining factor. Look at the 
example of Iraq. Putting aside the justness of the war, ad bellum arguments 
especially focused on the aggressive nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime, 
leading to its removal and subsequent power vacuum. Apart from these facts, 
post bellum activities are determined by the question: what type of state does the 
coalition aim to realize? This aim can be modest, requiring the creation of a 
certain level of safety for the citizens after the overthrow of the regime, but 
leaving the task of political reconstruction to the people itself. Or the goal can 
be more ambitious, requiring that the Iraqi people are left with a democratic, 
stable regime that respects human rights.  
The higher the aspirations with regard to the nature of the defeated state, the 
more elaborate jus post bellum activities are. According to proponents of jus post 
bellum, victors must ensure that the state loses its inherently aggressive nature; 
that the state becomes minimally just as well, securing human rights; or that it 
becomes a state which secures human rights and pursues the common good. 
For Walzer, the goal of jus post bellum is not the restoration of the situation quo 
ante bellum, but the creation of a ‘safe and decent society’. This implies that 
some crucial human rights must be guaranteed in the defeated state, but it is 
not, according to Walzer, the task of the victor to establish democracy. Whether 
                                                             
93 Allman & Winright 2012, p. 15. 
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or not a democracy is realized in a post war situation is up to the people of the 
involved state themselves. With regard to Iraq, Walzer argues in this line that 
the most important requirement of jus post bellum is that “the post-Saddam 
regime be a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people”.94 And while Walzer 
assumes that a fully democratic Iraq is a utopia, something better than the Baath 
regime, which is politically decent, must be aimed at.95 As we have seen, 
Orend’s goal for jus post bellum is the construction of a minimally just regime in 
any defeated aggressor.96 Victors must ensure that the nature of the defeated 
state is nonaggressive, internationally and internally legitimate, and rights 
respecting. This view on the nature of the state in the future means that, 
compared to Walzer, more elaborate post bellum norms are required to achieve 
this. The same counts for Evans’ account of jus post bellum, which incorporates 
elements of a ‘just society’ in which democracy is promoted.97  
 
6.4.2 Perspective on International Relations 
 
Those aspirations regarding the nature of the state bring us to the second, 
related factor that influences jus post bellum: the perspective on international 
relations. Traditional just war theory is based on a certain view of the 
international community as a system of independent sovereign states. This 
sovereign state system is often referred to as the ‘Westphalian system’. One 
could call this the classic regime of sovereignty, which is based on principles 
such as territorial sovereignty, equality of states and non-intervention in other 
states’ domestic affairs.98 The emphasis on sovereignty means that just wars are 
particularly conceived as defensive wars against foreign aggression and jus post 
bellum as the return to the previous situation.  
                                                             
94 Walzer 2004, p. 161. 
95 Walzer 2004, p. 161-162, 164. 
96 Assumed that the state is cannot already be qualified as minimally just, which shows 
that it depends on the situation as well. See: Orend 2012, p. 187. 
97 Evans 2008, p. 545. 
98 David Held, ‘The Changing Structure of International Law. Sovereignty 
Transformed?’, in: David Held & Anthony McGrew (eds.), The Global Transformations 
Reader, Cambridge: Polity Press 2003, p. 162. In other words, territorial sovereignty 
has a positive aspect, meaning that states are exclusively competent regarding their 
own territory, and a negative aspect, meaning that they are obligated to respect other 
states’ rights. See: Malcolm Shaw, International Law, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 2008, p. 490. 
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 However, this view on the international community is changing in the past 
decennia, and thus just war theory as well. The Westphalian system and its 
concept of sovereignty are eroding. The general claim is that the world order 
moves more and more into the direction of a world community, in which states 
are connected in many ways, instead of being independent.99 Some important 
features of this new world order are the ongoing process of globalization; the 
increased emphasis on the value of individuals instead of states; and the 
proliferation of international legal norms (including human rights) and 
institutions. Due to these developments, the current international system is 
characterized by growing interdependence and mutual responsibilities. Of 
course, that has implications for the concept of sovereignty as well. Today, 
sovereignty is no longer perceived as unlimited state power. Instead, the idea 
that sovereignty carries with it responsibility is gaining ground. Sovereignty is 
seen as something conditional; the state’s right to represent its people is 
conditional upon the respect for their vital interests. States who disrespect 
those vital interests – often explained in terms of human rights – violate 
international standards and consequently forfeit their claim to sovereignty.100 
This argumentation is the foundation for the well-known responsibility to 
protect.101 
The question arises as to what substitutes the view on the international 
community as a system of independent nation states? Many argue that 
cosmopolitanism is emerging as the new conceptualization of international 
relations.102 According to Cecile Fabre, the central tenets of this new paradigm 
are: “a) individuals are the fundamental units of moral concern and ought to be 
regarded as one another’s moral equals; b) whatever rights and privileges states 
have, they have them only in so far as they thereby serve individuals’ 
fundamental interests; c) states are not under a greater obligation to respect 
                                                             
99 Jean Cohen, ‘Whose Sovereignty? Empire Versus International Law’, in: Ethics & 
International Affairs 2004, 18/3, p. 2. 
100 An interesting comparison could be made with Aquinas’ disobedience to an unjust 
ruler and his allowance of regicide. See his Commentary on the Sentences, 2, Distinction 
44, question 2, article 2, ‘Whether Christians are bound to obey secular powers, 
especially tyrants’. Available online: http://dhspriory.org/thomas/Sent2d44q2a2.htm.  
101 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect, 2001.  
102 Variants of the cosmopolitan view are defended by e.g. David Held, Democracy and the 
Global Order. From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance, Cambridge: Polity 
Press 1995; Simon Caney, Justice beyond Borders, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
2005; Kaldor 2007. 
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their own individual members’ fundamental rights than to respect the 
fundamental rights of foreigners”.103 Undoubtedly, the traditional concept of 
sovereignty is changing, states’ interdependence is growing and the emphasis 
on individual human rights as central focus of international relations is 
growing.  
The impact of these contemporary developments and the eroding 
Westphalian system on just war theory is evident. The emergence of an 
alternative changes the perspective on the role of the use of force as well. It 
means that the jus ad bellum is expanding beyond self-defense. Humanitarian 
intervention to protect foreign individuals against grave harms is now by many 
accepted as cause for war. Additionally, some argue that preventive wars can be 
necessary to eliminate threats for the international peace, e.g. regarding 
weapons of mass destruction or the dangers of terrorist organizations.104 This 
theoretical development can be recognized in the way contemporary wars are 
justified. It is not only the safety of the own state that is stressed, but the safety 
of the world population as well. Often, wars are initiated to protect a foreign 
population against grave human rights violations; to change an oppressive 
regime; to stabilize so-called ‘failed states’; or a combination of such reasons. In 
general, humanitarian arguments are becoming more and more important.105 
As a result, and as highlighted earlier, just war theory now applies to different 
situations than earlier in history.  
This changing view on international relations explains the general shift 
towards a more comprehensive jus post bellum.106 When Walzer developed his 
                                                             
103 Cecile Fabre, ‘Cosmopolitanism, Just War Theory and Legitimate Authority’, in: 
International Affairs 2008, 84/5, p. 964. 
104 E.g. Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil. Political Ethics in an Age of Terror, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press 2004; Eric Patterson, ‘Just War in the 21st Century. 
Reconceptualizing Just War Theory after September 11, in: International Politics 2005, 
42/1.This is of course one of the pillars of the so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’. 
105 The war in Afghanistan for example, was originally waged as a self-defensive action, 
launched by the USA and the UK in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks against 
Afghanistan for its connections with the terrorist network Al Qaeda. But aside from 
the reason of self-defense, humanitarian considerations were claimed to be important 
as well: the people of Afghanistan had to be ‘freed’ from their repressive regime. To 
that end, the regime had to be removed. See further e.g. Theodor Meron, The 
Humanization of International Law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006. 
106 Matthew Shadle wrote an interesting book on the origins of war, in which he compares 
Catholic thought on war and the establishment of peace with international relations 
theory. He argues that while Catholic ideas on war and peace in essence converged 
with liberal theory, constructivism in fact better harmonies with the theological 
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just war theory, the Westphalian system and its conception of sovereignty 
formed the cornerstone of his theory. Just and Unjust Wars reflects the 
international community as composed of independent sovereign states: 
aggression is forbidden, and if it does occur, states are allowed to repel the 
aggression and restore their sovereignty. The war of self-defense is 
consequently the typical ‘just war’. And after a just war, states are allowed to 
restore the pre-existing order, the situation quo ante bellum, and not much more. 
In this paradigm, there is no need for extensive post war norms. As a result of 
changing circumstances, Walzer’s view of international relations gradually 
changed. Sovereignty is no longer the cornerstone of his theory. When the 
situation is serious enough, sovereignty can be temporarily set aside.107 
Consequently, the post war situation entails more than what was originally 
envisaged. We have seen that as a result, contemporary proponents of jus post 
bellum cannot be called minimalist, not even Walzer. Having left the old 
paradigm behind, moving slightly towards a new paradigm in which the 
international order is viewed as a world community, we can call Walzer’s 
current position as ‘limited maximalist’.  
 
6.4.3 The Various Degrees of Maximalist Jus Post Bellum 
 
Those two factors: the situation – the type of war and the nature of the defeated 
state – and the perspective on international relations clearly influence the 
content and scope of jus post bellum. As a result of the changed international 
landscape and new ideas on the role of the use of force and the concept of 
sovereignty, jus post bellum has become richer. This shift towards maximalism 
thus coincides with the rise of a cosmopolitan morality, according to which all 
human beings have the right to the freedoms and resources they need to for 
their well-being and to live a flourishing life.108 Also, this development concurs 
with what was highlighted earlier: proponents of jus post bellum agree that the 
goal of a just war is not the restoration of the situation quo ante bellum, but a 
better state of peace.  
                                                                                                                                               
perspective. See: Matthew Shadle, The Origins of War. A Catholic Perspective, 
Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press 2011.  
107 Bass follows this line of reasoning. He now also endorses the concept of conditional 
sovereignty, and argues that extremely unjust states lose their ‘normal’ rights as state 
and cannot claim full sovereignty. And if sovereignty is temporarily forfeited, jus post 
bellum will need to become richer.  
108 Fabre 2008, p. 965-966. 
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The way that this peace is defined further determines the variations 
regarding content and scope of jus post bellum. When one assumes a more 
demanding and extensive goal regarding the nature of the peace, jus post bellum 
is necessarily more comprehensive. It then involves a larger array of positive 
obligations to achieve that goal. Walzer can be called ‘limited maximalist’, 
because he still understands peace in a limited, or negative way. Safety and 
security are essential and of the highest priority after the awfulness of war, as 
are the most basic human rights. For him, the sort of peace that is demanded by 
jus post bellum is a negative peace, particularly understood as the absence of the 
collective violence of war. In other words, the goal of a just war remains 
modest: a seizure of the violence of war and a state which is stable and no longer 
aggressive. And while this is a better state of peace, or a ‘decent peace’, it is not 
necessarily a just peace.109 For ‘full maximalists’ such as Evans and Allman and 
Winright, this is not enough. They aim for a positive peace. Democracy and 
respect for a wide range of human rights are considered essential for the 
establishment of peace. But other aspects of the peace are regarded as equally 
essential in this position. As we have seen, the two most important additional 
aspects are: a healthy economy in the defeated state; and forgiveness and 
friendly relationships between former enemies. Therefore, reconciliation is 
deemed a necessary requirement in jus post bellum, in order to transform 
relationships into respectful relationships, and to heal the emotional wounds of 
the parties of the war.110  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
This way, discussing jus post bellum leads towards a reflection on the goal of just 
war theory. In most contributions to the debate, that goal is described as ‘a just 
and durable peace’.111 And while this is generally accepted as axiomatic, the 
discussion of just post bellum sheds doubt on that claim. At least, the suggestion 
is made that this goal of just war theory demands more attention from 
                                                             
109 Walzer 2012, p. 37. Walzer refers to Avishai Margalit’s concept as a ‘decent peace’, 
who argues that this is all that can be demanded as responsibility for the victor after 
war. Walzer asks the questions whether victors should aim at ‘just any peace’. He 
argues that the connection between peace and justice is strong but minimalist, meaning 
that “peace itself is a value at which we can justly aim and sometimes live with, even if it 
is unjust”. 
110 Allman & Winright 2010, p. 102. 
111 E.g. Evans 2009, p. 149. 
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proponents of jus post bellum.112And more specifically the question: What is the 
nature of the peace we aim to realize after the war? Realizing merely peace, 
understood as the absence of collective violence of war and a certain level of 
security for the population, has proven to be difficult enough in practice. 
Should we indeed be modest and aim for a decent peace? Furthermore, the 
restriction of post war behavior and restoration of the sovereignty of the 
defeated state as soon as (reasonably) possible is best secured by a limited 
maximalist jus post bellum, focusing on a negative conception of peace. These 
are good reasons to argue that a limited conception of peace is worthwhile 
pursuing.  
But does that mean that we must settle for just any peace? While this limited 
conception of peace as goal for just war theory might be realistic and attainable, 
it could be too modest in the world we now live in. A fully maximalist 
understanding of jus post bellum, determined by a positive conception of peace – 
a just and lasting peace – accommodates the developments in the globalized 
world, and our contemporary conception of it, best.113 The effect of this 
position, as was pointed out, is that it becomes more difficult to restrict post 
war activities and restore sovereignty quickly, which in turn increases the 
danger of  exploitation and so-called ‘victor’s justice’.114 Perhaps however, that 
requirement, while it is still widely endorsed, is a remnant of the previous 
paradigm which does no longer fit in the new paradigm. As we have seen, the 
new perspective on international relations includes a new view on the role of 
force and the concept of sovereignty. When one fully adopts that new 
perspective, arguing that force can be used as a vector for human rights and 
good governance, and that sovereignty is conditional upon the discharge of 
responsibilities set out in the ‘responsibility to protect’, one must also embrace 
a broad and comprehensive jus post bellum, despite that inherent danger.115        
What then remains is the practical attainability of such a lofty goal. That 
difficulty is recognized by both Evans and Allman and Winright, and it means 
that they must compromise this idea of a ‘just and durable peace’: it does not 
necessarily need to be perfectly just, they state. Evans argues that in practice, 
                                                             
112 This is taken up in chapter 7.  
113 Evans makes this argument in support of his ‘extended’ version of jus post bellum. See: 
Evans 2008, p. 151. 
114 E.g. by leaving more room for the political interests of the victorious state to determine 
post war conduct, and allowing the victor to profit economically from the benefits of 
war. 
115 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer of Ethical Perspectives for suggesting this.  
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occupiers must be prepared to settle for a ‘suboptimal acceptable peace’.116 
Allman and Winright agree and state that in some occasions, we must indeed 
settle for a “tolerably just or ‘suboptimal acceptable’ post bellum peace”.117 The 
question comes to mind whether in effect, this lofty goal is any different from 
the sort of ‘decent peace’ Walzer has in mind. 
116 Evans 2009, p. 160. 
117 Allman & Winright 2010, p. 96. 
145
146
 
 
7.  A Just and Lasting Peace after War 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Wars are waged for the sake of peace. It is generally assumed that war has a 
teleological character; it not valued in itself but seen as an instrument to achieve 
a certain end.1 This instrumental conception of war is not only firmly 
entrenched in history, but is also one of the pillars of just war theory. Just war 
theory is premised upon the idea that war, given the scale of overall destruction 
and death it causes, is a great evil. In an ideal world, there would never be war. 
However, just war theory is pre-eminently a non-ideal theory which recognizes 
that in the real world, war might sometimes be necessary and justified in 
exceptional circumstances. And although some essential moral principles are 
set aside in times of war, morality does apply. This way, just war theory occupies 
the middle ground between political realism and moral idealism, and is a 
balance between the desiderata of feasibility and desirability. It sets a moral 
standard for war, in order to limit its negative consequences as much as 
possible. More specifically, jus ad bellum restricts the number of wars; jus in bello 
restricts the sort and scale of the violence, and jus post bellum is the relatively 
new branch that regulates the transition from war back to peace. The axiomatic 
goal of just war theory is a ‘just and lasting peace’.  
Strangely enough however, it is far from clear what a ‘just and lasting peace’ 
actually is. Peace is a complex and multifaceted concept, which cannot be 
defined in a straightforward way.2 Even so, just war theorists rarely explore the 
goal of peace and its implications.3 Consequently, as Mark Evans points out, 
                                                             
1 Exceptions who justify war for values as honor, courage and chivalry set aside. 
2 And contrary to the issue of war, relatively little conceptual thinking has gone into the 
issue of peace. Richmond states: “Peace is rarely conceptualized, even by those who 
often allude to it.” Oliver Richmond, The Transformation of Peace, New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan 2007, p. 2. Charles Weber and Johan Galtung similarly argue that “a 
philosophy of peace is still in its infancy”, and Nigel Dower that “the ethics of peace 
takes second place”. Charles Webel & Johan Galtung (eds.), Handbook of Peace and 
Conflict Studies, New York: Routledge 2007. See also: Cecile Fabre, Cosmopolitan 
Peace, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016, p. vii; Pierre Allan & Alexis Keller (eds.), 
What is a Just Peace?, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 1; Nigel Dower, The 
Ethics of War and Peace. Cosmopolitan and Other Perspectives, Cambridge: Polity Press 
2009, p. 3. 
3 Robert Williams and Dan Caldwell, ‘Jus Post Bellum. Just War Theory and the 
Principles of Just Peace’, in: International Studies Perspectives 2006,7, p. 312. 
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they might readily “disagree once they begin to spell the specifics of what they 
understand by it”.4 This is a fundamental problem: peace is central to just war 
theory, but is not explored in depth and remains therefore implicit and vague. 
What makes this problem even more pressing, is that developments in just war 
theorizing result in a shift towards a more comprehensive and demanding 
peace, which encompasses positive values such as a realization of human rights, 
reconciliation, and economic equity. But while that sounds attractive at first 
glimpse, it might be asked whether endorsing such comprehensive peace as 
normative goal is indeed a good idea.  
To consider this, a thorough analysis is required. As Evans argues, “we need 
to inspect further the concept of a “just peace” itself”.5 That task is taken up 
here. The central question is: how should a just war theorist understand peace, 
insofar that peace is the goal of just war theory, taking into account the theory’s 
middle position between political realism and moral idealism?6 To answer this 
question, this chapter takes a step back and explores the concept of peace in 
depth. With the conceptual tool kit here developed, we can map the 
contemporary debate, make the implicit positions on peace explicit, 
demonstrate the recent shift in understanding peace, and reveal crucial 
differences that have remained off the radar. Ultimately, a certain 
understanding of a ‘just and lasting peace’ is defended. This analysis of the 
concept of peace – both in general and as goal of just war theory – hopes to 
contribute to a better understand just war theory, and might also help forward 
the debate on jus post bellum.  
This chapter consists of three main parts. The first part addresses the 
general nature of peace and answers the following sub questions: What is the 
nature of peace? And what concepts of political peace can be distinguished? 
The following section presents a preliminary framework outlining the general 
nature of peace, distinguishing different facets: the spatial element, including 
the dimensions of peace (inner versus outer), the temporal element (temporary 
versus eternal), and the character of peace (negative versus positive). This 
framework provides the building blocks for the analysis in section three, which 
will focus on one form of outer peace: political peace. Five concepts of political 
4 Mark Evans, ‘At War’s End. Time to Turn to Jus Post Bellum?’, in: Carsten Stahn, 
Jennifer Easterday & Jens Iverson (eds.), Jus Post Bellum. Mapping the Normative 
Foundations, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014, p 28.  
5 Evans 2014, p. 28, 42. 
6 Or, as I posed in chapter 6: “What is the nature of the peace we aim to realize after 
war?” 
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peace are sketched and placed on a continuum determined primarily by the 
character of the peace. As it will appear, the character can range from a purely 
negative peace, e.g. the unjust peace of a brutal robber, to a fully positive peace: 
a lofty and comprehensive ideal of harmonious relations.  
The second part of this chapter analyzes peace as the normative goal of just 
war theory, and answers the following sub questions: Which of those concepts 
of political peace can function as the goal just war theory? And, having a better 
grasp of the concept of peace, can we now make more sense of the implicit 
positions on peace in the contemporary debate? The fourth section evaluates 
the peace continuum from the perspective of just war theory. A parallel is 
drawn between the peace continuum and David Estlund’s continuum of 
normative theorizing in political philosophy. This highlights just war theory’s 
position in between strict political realism and moral idealism, and 
consequently enables an elimination of two concepts of peace, and a 
comparative assessment of the remaining three concepts.  
A map of the contemporary debate and an assessment of various positions 
on peace (Michael Walzer, Anthony Coady, Brian Orend, Mark Evans, Mark 
Allman & Tobias Winright and Cecile Fabre) constitutes the fifth section. 
Although most theorists declare that a ‘just and lasting peace’ is the goal of just 
war theory, they in fact fundamentally disagree on what constitutes such a just 
peace. This section reveals these differences, and shows that the level of 
idealization (concessive or aspirational), the scope of just war theory (restrictive 
or permissive) and the balance between collective and individual rights 
determines how a particular just war theorist understands of peace. A shift in 
just war theorizing marks an accompanying shift towards a more positive 
concept of peace. The question is, how far should this shift go?  
The central question – How should a just war theorist understand peace? – 
is answered in the third part of this chapter. Given the underlying factors that 
determine how theorists understand peace, this is not a question answered 
easily. It namely involves passing judgment on the appropriate level of 
idealization in just war theory, the proper scope of just war theory, and the right 
balance between collective and individual rights. Before an attempt to answer 
the central question, it is noted that the differences between the two main 
positions on what constitutes a ‘just and durable peace’ (a decent or positive 
peace) are smaller than they appear. Nevertheless, these differences cannot be 
dismissed entirely. Based on just war theory’s role as practical guidance for real 
world problems, its limited nature as applicable to specific domain of war, and 
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the risk for moral imperialism, this section argues that a ‘just and lasting peace’ 
must be understood as a decent peace. Hence, this chapter warns for a too 
radical shift in just war theory. The conclusion takes stock and assesses the 
implications for jus post bellum. Shaped as it is by the goal of a modest just and 
lasting peace, it is suggested that jus post bellum is best considered in a similar 
modest way. 
   
7.2 The Nature of Peace   
 
7.2.1 Temporal Element  
 
Since peace is a complex and multifaceted concept, it can be understood in a 
variety of ways. In this section, three of these facets are discussed: the temporal 
element of peace, the spatial element of peace, and the character of peace. The 
first facet is the temporal element of peace, which regards the durability of the 
peace. The main distinction to be made here is between a temporary and a 
permanent peace. In a permanent peace, which is eternal and everlasting, the 
threat of war disappears completely. Contrary to permanent peace, temporary 
peace comes in many gradations. It might be a very short term peace, e.g. a truce 
or a seize fire, in which there is no stability but only a temporary seizure of the 
violence of war. This is a fragile peace in which the war can break out again at 
any minute. According to Thomas Hobbes, such fragile, temporary peace with 
the threat of war does not even constitute ‘peace’. Hobbes’ weather analogy 
nicely illustrates his claim: “For as the nature of foule weather, lyeth not in a 
showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many days together: So 
the nature of war, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known 
disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary. All 
other time is peace.”7  
But a temporary peace might also be a stable long term peace. The variations 
in between those two extremes are determined by the degree of stability and 
durability, and the question on if and how the underlying problems that gave 
rise to the war are solved. The less disposition to fight and the more harmony 
and reconciliation between former enemies, the more stable and durable the 
peace is. This also means that the more stable the peace, the more secure people 
are, and the more relieved from the fear of the violence of war. As will appear 
                                                             
7 Richard Tuck (ed.), Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2007 (Leviathan, 1651), p. 88-89. 
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later in this section, the degree of stability is often connected with the character 
of the peace. Usually, but not always, a positive peace is also more stable and 
durable.  
 
7.2.2 Spatial Element  
 
The second facet of peace regards the spatial element, and this entails the 
different dimensions of peace. The main distinction here is between inner and 
outer peace, and there are various forms of the latter. Inner peace is the 
personal dimension of peace. It deals with the mental and emotional life of 
individuals - their psychological wellbeing. Inner peace means tranquility, 
freedom from disturbance and ‘peace of mind’.8 Augustine points to the 
harmony between knowledge and action, in which an individual’s action is 
guided by his intellect, in which he is neither “molested by pain, nor disturbed 
by desire”.9 The opposite state of inner peace is inner conflict, unhappiness and 
misery.10 Inner peace is opposed to outer peace, peace outside the individual 
person; i.e. between people.  
 Outer peace can be subdivided into interpersonal peace and political peace. 
The interpersonal dimension of peace regards peace between individual people. 
This is referred to by Augustine as social peace, an example of which is 
“domestic peace” between the members of a family.11 The political dimension 
of peace regards peace between groups of people. It can be defined as “the more 
or less lasting suspension of violent modes of rivalry between political units.”12 
A political peace can again be subdivided; it exists within states, between 
particular states, or between all states. National or domestic peace is the peace 
between political groups and the state, international peace is the peace between 
states or political groups outside territorial boundaries and universal or world 
peace exists worldwide between all states. Political peace is often explained 
dialectically as the opposite of violent conflict or war, and so refers to a 
                                                             
8 Webel & Galtung 2007, p. 6. 
9 Philip Schaff (ed.), St. Augustin’s City of God and Christian Doctrine, (A Select Library of 
the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, first series, vol. 
2), Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1887, (De Civitate Dei, early 5th century, translated by rev. 
Marcus Dods), p. 935. Available online: http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf102.  
10 Webel & Galtung 2007, p. 6. 
11 Augustine, City of God 1887, p. 933. 
12 Raymond Aron, Peace and War. A Theory of International Relations, New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers 2003, p. 151. 
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situation in which states relate to each other without resorting to the use of 
arms.13  
This means that peace can have a personal, interpersonal and political 
dimension, but given our concern with just war theory, the focus in this chapter 
is on political peace after a specific war. In the traditional theory, the focus has 
been on one type of political peace; peace between two (or more) states after an 
international war. However, contemporary political reality shows many 
different sorts of war, not fitting the conventional symmetrical conception of 
war as taking place between two equal state armies. Conventional wars 
between two states are declining, whereas other sorts of war e.g. 
(internationalized) civil wars, asymmetric wars, humanitarian interventions and 
peace enforcement operations are increasing.14 Furthermore, the distinction 
between national and international wars is not always easy to make. 
Internationalized civil wars are one example, but additionally, a humanitarian 
intervention is an international war in which the national dimension is very 
important. The current political circumstances and the question on how just 
war theory can adept to current political circumstances is a serious challenge.15 
Ideally, just war theory provides guidance for various sorts of war. This chapter 
remains focused, as traditional just war theory, on international wars, but 
includes unconventional wars such as humanitarian interventions.16 
Despite this focus on political peace, there are outspoken connections 
between the different dimensions of peace. Inner peace is helpful to achieve 
outer peace, and it might even be considered to be an essential requirement. As 
a famous quote of Confucius illustrates: “To put the world in order, we must 
first put the nation in order; to put the nation in order, we must put the family in 
order; to put the family in order, we must cultivate our personal life; and to 
cultivate our personal life, we must first set our hearts right.”17 Also for 
                                                             
13 The Challenge of Peace. God’s Promise and Our Response, A Pastoral Letter on War 
and Peace by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1983, par 27, online at: 
http://www.usccb.org/upload/challenge-peace-gods-promise-our-response-1983.pdf.   
14 I have discussed the debate on ‘old’ versus ‘new’ wars in a little more detail in chapter 
four. 
15 Examples would be the applicability of just war theory on non-state actors. This 
subject needs further attention.  
16 Hence without directly addressing the issue of the specific application of jus post bellum 
on civil wars. This issue certainly demands more attention and is an interesting subject 
for further research.   
17 Popular quote credited to Confucius, see e.g. http://www.values.com/inspirational-
quotes/7086-to-put-the-world-right-in-order-we-must-first.  
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Augustine, inner and outer peace are connected since peace on the smaller scale 
is a requirement for peace on a larger scale. For example, the peace in a 
household bears reference to the integrity of the whole of which it is an 
element, and as such “domestic peace has a relation to civic peace”.18 But also 
the other way around, whilst outer peace is not strictly necessary to achieve 
inner peace, it would be difficult for individuals to be at peace when they do not 
live in peace. Outer peace is a precondition for individual wellbeing, and it 
consequently enables people to experience inner peace. As Webel argues: 
“Personal survival is the absolutely necessary condition, the sine qua non, for 
peace at the personal level. And national security, or the collective survival of a 
culture, people or national state, has in modern times become the macroscopic 
extension of individual defensive struggles (…).”19  
 
7.2.3 Character  
 
The third facet regards the character of peace, and the main distinction here is 
between a negative and positive concept of peace. In his ‘Letter from a 
Birmingham Jail’, Martin Luther King referred to “a negative peace which is the 
absence of tension to a positive peace which is the presence of justice”.20 This 
important distinction is usually credited to Johan Galtung, the so called 
‘founder’ of the field of peace studies.21 Applying this distinction to the 
different dimensions of peace shows more precisely what this distinction 
means. Negative inner peace refers to the freedom from inner conflict and 
disturbing thoughts or emotions. Positive inner peace is defined as 
psychological wellbeing or “calmness of mind and heart”.22 Negative outer 
peace refers merely to the absence of interpersonal conflict or war, while 
positive outer peace refers to a richer and more comprehensive concept of 
peace, in which desirable values and social structures are present.23  
Focusing on political peace, Galtung holds that positive political peace is 
characterized by certain desirable values; it entails not only an absence of direct 
                                                             
18 Augustine, City of God 1887, p. 939. 
19 Webel & Galtung 2007, p. 11. 
20 Online at: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html.  
21 Johan Galtung, ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, in: Journal of Peace Research 
1969, 3/3. 
22 David Barash & Charles Webel, Peace and Conflict Studies, Thousand Oaks: SAGE 
Publications 2013, p. 4. 
23 Barash & Webel 2013, p. 4. 
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violence (as in a negative peace) but also an absence of structural violence, by 
which he means the sort of indirect violence that can be embedded in the 
structure of (domestic or international) society, for example as during South 
Africa’s Apartheid. Such violence “(…) is built into the structure and shows up 
as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances.”24 So what are 
these desirable values and social structures? Usually, a positive political peace is 
characterized by harmonious relationships and solidarity, economic equity and 
political justice, satisfaction of needs, and a lack of economic exploitation or 
political repression. This is also the way in which peace is defined in 
contemporary peace studies: “not just as the absence of war, but also the 
presence of the conditions for a just and sustainable peace, including access to 
food and clean drinking water, education for women and children, security 
from physical harm, and other inviolable human rights”.25 In essence, these 
desirable values can be explained in terms of human rights.26  
War and peace are often presented as dichotomy: e.g. Hugo Grotius stated 
that there is either war or peace; there is nothing in between.27 But it rather 
appears here again that there is no clear demarcation line between war and 
peace – particularly not today. Mary Kaldor has famously shown that 
nowadays, the distinction between war and peace is often blurred.28 As noted 
above, there are a variety of different sorts of war and peace, and these are 
located on a continuum, ranging from total war to perfect peace.29 The tipping 
point at which a particular situation can be labeled ‘peace’ is the absence of 
                                                             
24 Galtung 1969, p. 171. 
25 Peace defined by the renowned Kroc Institute of Peace Studies at the University of 
Notre Dame. Online at: http://kroc.nd.edu/about-us/what-peace-studies   
26 This is in line with the different characteristics of the peace which are mentioned by 
just war theorists: the realization of human rights, the nature of the political regime in 
the defeated state, general reconstruction, and distributive justice and economic 
measures. Also mentioned are stability and reconciliation between former enemies, 
which fall under the temporal element of peace in my general framework. 
27 Richard Tuck & Jean Barbeyrac (eds.), Hugo Grotius. The Rights of War and Peace, 
Indianapolis: Liberty Fund 2005 (De Jure Belli ac Pacis, 1625, translated by John 
Morrice), book 3, chapter 21, par 2. Avalaible online at:   
http://www.constitution.org/gro/djbp_321.htm  
28 Mary Kaldor, ‘From Just War to Just Peace’, in: Charles Reed & David Ryall (eds.), The 
Price of Peace. Just war in the Twenty First Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2007, p. 266. 
29 Pierre Allan makes a similar international ethical scale, in which the destruction of 
mankind is one extreme, and agape paradise the other extreme. Allan & Keller 2008, p. 
95-100. 
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direct large scale violence, but given the blurred lines there is a large grey area. 
Different variations of peace can be distinguished on the ‘peace side’ of the 
continuum, ranging from a purely negative peace to a fully positive peace. The 
more positive qualities are embedded in a certain concept of peace, explained in 
terms of human rights, the richer it is, and the more it shifts from a negative to a 
positive concept. As the national context is the prime area where human rights 
can be secured, the national context becomes more relevant when the peace 
becomes more positive. This framework, outlining the facets of peace, 
contextualizing international political peace and explaining its character in 
terms of human rights, provides the building blocks for the subsequent political 
peace continuum.30 
 
7.3 Five Concepts of Peace  
  
With this insight in the elements of peace, we can sketch a continuum of five 
concepts of political peace. They are distinguished here as separate concepts: 
purely negative peace, largely negative peace, decent peace, largely positive 
peace, and fully positive peace. Obviously, there are variations within those 
concepts and they might also overlap in certain respects. But while admittedly 
this division is somewhat simplistic, a distinction such as this is useful to further 
clarify and analyze the subject of peace.  
 
7.3.1 Purely Negative Peace  
 
Let us look, first, at the concept of a purely negative peace. On the continuum, 
this concept is right at the tipping point from war to peace. It can be defined as 
peace, as there is no longer national or international war. But aside from the 
                                                             
30 Largely overlapping but distinguishing even more facets of peace: Catholic social 
philosophy teaches that peace is a multi-layered order, consisting of order in the 
universe; order in freedom and conscience, order among individual human persons, 
order between members of a political community and its authorities; order between 
political communities; and order between individuals, social groups and states to 
obtain a worldwide community. Pacem in Terris, Encyclical of Pope John XXII on 
Establishing Universal Peace in Truth, Justice, Charity, and Liberty, 1963, online at: 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_ 
11041963_pacem.html. See further also: Russell Hittinger, ‘Quinquagesimo Ante. 
Reflections on Pacem in Terris Fifty Years Later’, in: The Global Quest for Tranquillitas 
Ordinis. Pacem in Terris, Fifty Years Later, Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences, Acta, 
2003, 18, p. 46. 
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absence of war, this concept of peace entails no positive characteristics. An 
example is the sort of unjust repressive peace that is imposed after a 
(unconditional) surrender. It is a forced peace which entails, on the part of the 
vanquished, a submission to the power of the victor. Here, the direct violence of 
war is replaced with a system of structural violence, in which injustice is 
widespread and embedded in the political structure. One can think of annexed 
territory or a civil war that ends with a totalitarian regime in place which 
represses (parts of) the population, violating peoples basic human rights.31 
While there is no war, individual insecurity remains.  
Theorizing the concept of a purely negative peace, it appears that it can be 
related to the perception that war, and not peace, is the normal state of affairs in 
international relations. In the time of Plato and Aristotle, war was seen as 
inherent in the human condition and warfare was a normal characteristic of 
daily life. Therefore, although Aristotle claimed that peace is the goal of war, 
such a situation of peace was only a temporary interruption of war.32 
International relations were characterized by direct or indirect strive and 
hostilities. In one of Plato’s dialogues, the Cretan politician Clinias considers 
that: “For what most humans call peace he (the lawgiver of the Cretans) held to 
be only a name; in fact, for everyone there always exists by nature an undeclared 
war among all cities.”33  
For the Romans, war was the normal state of affairs as well. Although war 
was indeed aimed at peace, international peace (as opposed to peace within the 
city state or empire) was regarded as a negative concept. The Pax Romana 
remains the typical example of such peace to date: a period of relative peace 
through repressive order and unity, essentially a Roman hegemony over other 
nations.34 Pax then referred not to a positive peace but to the condition 
prevailing after victory.35 And after victory, the peace that was installed could 
entail unconditional surrender, slavery, and suppression of the vanquished. A 
vivid illustration of this conception of peace is Calgacus’ comments on the 
                                                             
31 E.g. as eloquently described in 1984 by George Orwell, but the situation in Gaza that 
was analyzed in chapter 2 also comes to mind here.  
32 Relations between city states was seen as competitive and hostile, and with ‘barbarians’ 
peace was even considered impossible. Stephen Neff, War and the Law of Nations. A 
General History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005, p. 30. 
33 Plato, The Laws of Plato, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1980 (De Legibus, 
around 350 BC, translated by Thomas Pangle), p. 4 (626a). 
34 See further e.g. Ali Parchami, Hegemonic Peace and Empire. The Pax Romana, Britannica 
and Americana, New York/London: Routledge 2009. 
35 Neff 2005, p. 31.  
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Romans preceding the Battle of Mons Graupius: “To ravage, to slaughter, to 
usurp under false titles, they (the Romans) call empire; and where they make a 
desert, they call it peace.”36 Therefore, although the telos of war was peace, this 
concept was primarily a situation that was advantageous for the victor, but far 
from just.  
During the development of just war theory, the perspective of war as the 
normal state of affairs changed: peace was now considered the normal 
condition of humanity.37 Christian just war theorists understood war to be part 
of earthly life, but tried to reconcile it with Christian pacifism – which teaches 
nonviolence and rejects the evil of war.38 This has led to just war theorists’ 
attempt to regulate war: war is an exception that can only be justified when 
necessary to protect or reestablish that peace.39 As one of the founders of just 
war theory, Augustine considers various concepts of peace.40 While he values 
positive concepts over the negative concept of peace, all are considered valuable 
in itself. Negative peace is characterized by an absence of collective violence and 
a certain order. It is a way to achieve political goals, it can be imposed by the 
victor, and can be unjust, but must nevertheless count as peace according to 
Augustine. As an example, Augustine states that even the brutal robber values 
peace with his associates, so “that they may with greater effect and greater 
safety invade the peace of other men.” At home this robber imposes peace on 
his family because “their prompt obedience to his every look is a source of 
pleasure to him”.41 The robber appreciates negative peace because it helps him 
achieve his own interests, i.e. robbing people, and because he finds pleasure in 
                                                             
36 Online at: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/7524/7524-h/7524-h.htm.  
37 Neff 2005, p. 38. 
38 Primarily based on the teachings of Jesus of Nazareth from the New Testament, e.g. in 
the Sermon on the Mount: “Do not resist an evildoer. But if anyone strikes you on the 
right cheek, turn the other also,” and, “Love your enemies and pray for those who 
persecute you.” (Matthew 5) See further on the form of pacifism preached by Jesus: 
Peter Brock, Varieties of Pacifism. A Survey from Antiquity to the Outset of the Twentieth 
Century, New York: Syracuse University Press 1998, p. 3-4. 
39 Neff 2005, p. 29-34.  
40 Augustine’s just war theory is part of an expansive and complex theological doctrine. It 
is impossible in this chapter to do justice to Augustine’s work, and I acknowledge that I 
do not attempt to do so. Rather than giving a thorough analysis of his philosophy, 
some elements of his arguments are used in this chapter to serve the purpose of 
analyzing concepts of peace. See further on the various conceptions of peace in 
Augustine’s theory the interesting analysis in: Anthony Coady, Morality and Political 
Violence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2008.  
41 Augustine, City of God 1887, p. 930. 
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imposing his will. This reflects a realist perspective on peace; the contribution 
to self-interest makes the robber value such peace.  
This purely negative peace, based on the idea that ‘might makes right’,  is 
close to the kind of international peace the Greeks and Romans had in mind. 
The value of this ‘victor’s peace’ is based on the satisfaction of personal or 
national interests. It is a matter of prudence: the victor has an interest in its 
national security, and therefore aims at the peace that benefits these national 
interests, if necessary at the expense of others. It means that this concept of a 
purely negative peace is characterized by the absence of war only, that the most 
basic human rights, e.g. to life, can be violated as national interest is what 
matters, and that the national context is not relevant aside from there being no 
war. Often, this purely negative peace will be unstable since there is no 
reconciliation between former enemies. However, a negative peace is not 
necessarily merely temporary and unstable. There can be purely negative, i.e. an 
extremely unjust peace, which is nevertheless relatively stable because of the 
oppression. 
 
7.3.2 Largely Negative Peace 
 
Let us secondly, move further on the continuum. There we find a concept of 
peace that we can call a largely negative peace. This concept of peace in not 
purely negative, since it is characterized by an absence of war, but also by an 
absence of an inhumane regime that violates the most fundamental human 
rights (e.g. to life). Like the preceding concept of peace, largely negative peace 
does not entail any form of reconciliation, but there is usually a certain level of 
(imposed) stability. The requirement that the political regime is humane means 
that the national context of the former enemy, usually the aggressor, comes into 
play here. In a largely negative peace, the new or remaining regime in place does 
not commit crimes against humanity; there is no systematic and large scale 
violation of the most fundamental human rights.  
Avishai Margalit’s theory of peace, justice and compromises is helpful in 
further outlining a largely negative conception of peace which sets a low 
threshold regarding realization of human rights and the nature of the political 
regime. Margalit argues that realism compels us to seek ‘just a peace’ instead of 
‘a just peace’.42 The urgency to establish peace prevails over the pursuit of 
justice, from which he draws that peace can be justified also if it is unjust. 
                                                             
42 http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2009/12/17/obama-and-the-rotten-compromise/.  
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Primarily for the sake of stability - a somewhat stable peace as opposed to a 
mere cease fire - it is justified to accept some injustices, Margalit argues.43 
However, not just any peace is justified: the exception for Margalit is peace 
based on a rotten compromise. A post war compromise which results in a 
situation where the political system is characterized by cruelty and humiliation 
is unacceptable. After war, the regime in place must – at least – treat people as 
human beings.  
The foundation for Margalit’s argument is his Kantian appeal to shared 
humanity; not respecting people as human beings would “erode the foundation 
of morality”.44 But despite the Kantian human dignity and shared humanity as 
foundation for his theory, what Margalit has in mind is a very limited minimum, 
as he invokes examples as Hitler’s third Reich, South African Apartheid or King 
Leopold the Second’s reign in Congo – i.e. crimes against humanity – as 
unacceptable. Aside from that required bare minimum, “everything else is 
negotiable” for Margalit.45 Clearly, this concept of peace excludes only the most 
extreme institutionalized injustices, i.e. large scale violations of the most 
fundamental human rights. Peace is still primarily seen as the absence of 
violence, but does usually entail a certain stability and a humane regime, which 
is not characterized by Galtung’s structural political violence to the extent that 
the regime is barbarous, cruel and humiliating towards its own population or 
the former enemies’ population.  
 
7.3.3 Decent Peace  
 
The third concept of decent peace moves further on the continuum towards a 
positive conception of peace, as it encompasses more positive characteristics 
than the concept of negative peace. It is likely that there is more stability in a 
decent peace. The underlying causes that gave rise to the war are solved to a 
large extent or at least a satisfactory status quo is reached. This means that the 
peace might not be everlasting, but it is expectedly durable or sustainable for a 
substantial period of time. Furthermore, in moving further on the continuum, 
the national dimension become more important. In a decent peace, the political 
system that is in place is not only humane, but respects the basic human rights 
                                                             
43 Avishai Margalit, ‘Decent Peace’, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values, delivered on 
May 4-5, 2005, p. 217. 
44 Avishai Margalit, On Compromises and Rotten Compromises, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 2009, p. 2. 
45 Margalit 2005, p. 223. 
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of its citizens. This includes the requirement that the first necessities of life are 
secured and that people are not below a minimal standard of living due to the 
deprivation of war.  
This concept of peace can be further sketched by making use of Rawls' 
theory of international justice. Securing certain important basic human rights 
for all people is one of the distinguishing marks of Rawls’ theory. This also 
limits internal political sovereignty of states and the reasons for war. Based on 
these important basic rights combined with the value of tolerance among 
peoples, Rawls holds that both liberal and decent peoples must be equally 
respected as members of the societies of peoples. A regime is decent when it is 
not aggressive in its external relations, it has (at least) a decent consultation 
hierarchy (its citizens are consulted in some way, but not necessarily through a 
democracy), and it respects the following basic human rights: the right to life, 
freedom and equality for the law.46 A part of the right to life is the right to a 
minimum of means of subsistence. These human rights represent for Rawls a 
special class of urgent rights that constitutes the threshold for decent political 
institutions.47  
As is well known, in the non-ideal theory, Rawls proscribes how to deal with 
other peoples: the outlaw states and burdened societies. In the ‘law of peoples’, 
and largely coinciding with just war theory’s just causes, there is a prohibition 
on war with the exception of self-defense against aggression (of outlaw states) 
and humanitarian intervention to rescue a people from grave violations of 
human rights. “The aim of a just war waged by a just well-ordered people is a 
just and lasting peace among peoples, and especially with the people’s present 
enemy.”48 More specifically, the goal is to make peoples comply with the law of 
nations, and to bring all peoples within the society of peoples, which is 
determined by this criterion of ‘decency’. Also, there is a duty to assist peoples 
who are living under unfavorable circumstances. This duty is not aimed at 
improving the economic standard of living, but is aimed at helping a people 
building just or decent institutions of their own, so that the national 
government can itself protect human rights.49 Freedom, equality and a people’s 
right to self-determination are essential, and paternalism should be avoided.  
Rawls’ reasons for proscribing to respect decent peoples, and prohibiting 
                                                             
46 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1999, p. 64-67, 
and further Samuel Freeman, Rawls, New York/London: Routledge 2007, p. 429-430. 
47 Freeman 2007, p. 435. 
48 Rawls 1999, p. 94. 
49 Rawls 1999, p. 7. 
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the forced transformation into liberal democratic peoples (in general or after 
war) comes from a sense of realism.50 Rawls wants his theory to be action 
guiding, which is why it must remain relatively close to the political reality, not 
being overly idealistic. It must not exceed what is normally seen as the boundary 
of practical political possibility.51 At the same time, the law of peoples he 
proposes is not merely descriptive of the political reality; in order to be action 
guiding, it must set the bar a little higher. His theory is a realistic utopia: it is 
idealistic but remains realistic and is therefore ambitious in a limited way.52 But 
also, Rawls wants to avoid the critique of being ethnocentric. As opposed to the 
full spectrum of human rights as e.g. codified in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, these basic human rights can, according to Rawls, be accepted 
by both liberal and decent peoples. Rawls theory of international justice shows 
us how can be thought of a concept of decent peace. After a self-defense or after 
a humanitarian intervention, the decent peace that shapes the aftermath is 
modest in the sense that it is focused on preventing future aggression and 
creating stability, helping a people or state build its own just or decent political 
institutions (i.e. not imposing), and securing the most basic human rights. 
Similar to the duty of assistance, economic redistribution beyond what is 
urgently needed after the war to protect the right to an adequate standard of 
living, is not a part of a decent peace after war. 
 
7.3.4 Largely Positive Peace  
 
Let us look now at the fourth conception of peace, in which there is a robust 
connection between peace and justice, not only at the institutional level, but also 
                                                             
50 And not so much by relativism, as he does not argue that it is justified that decent 
peoples do not reform their institutions in order to become liberal democratic. Rather, 
he departs from the acknowledgment of the imperfect international order that consists 
of a plurality of peoples. See further Freeman 2007, p. 426. 
51  Rawls 1999, p. 7-8. This can also be called the principle of tolerable divergence: the 
idea that morality can only offer practical guidance if the gap between the demands of 
morality and prudence is tolerable. Just war theory follows this principle as it does not 
proscribe norms of ideal justice, but it takes into account the ever difficult reality of war 
and as such, has incorporated some of the realists’ arguments. Just war theory occupies 
the territory between realism and idealism. From this perspective, it is very clear that 
just war theory is always, as Walzer puts it, justice under a cloud. See further: Steven 
Lee, Ethics and War. An Introduction, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012, p. 
21-22. 
52  Rawls 1999, p. 6. 
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at the interpersonal level.53 The concept of a largely positive peace entails the 
realization of a comprehensive set of human rights, with a strong emphasis on 
the national political structure of the former enemies. Historically, this concept 
of peace comes from a theological perspective. As we have seen, while 
Augustine argues that a purely negative peace, despite being flawed, 
nevertheless constitutes a sort of peace that is valuable, there is another sort of 
peace that is more valuable. Only the ‘peace of the just’ is truly worthy of the 
name peace. “He, then, who prefers what is right to what is wrong, and what is 
well-ordered to what is perverted, sees that the peace of unjust men is not 
worthy to be called peace in comparison with peace of the just”. 54  
 Regularly quoted among just war theorists, such a largely positive peace is 
the tranquillitas ordinis for Augustine; peace characterized by order and justice.55 
It has the form of a well-ordered concord; this again reflects the idea of peace 
being a compromise between the various interests of the people.56 The earthly 
city seeks an earthly peace, “and the end it proposes, in the well-ordered 
concord of civic obedience and rule, is the combination of men’s wills to attain 
the things which are helpful to this life”.57 This is the highest attainable goal in 
the early realm, and must be distinguished from the perfect eternal peace in the 
spiritual realm discussed hereafter.58 More specifically, the compromise 
between individual interests that constitutes the tranquility of order means: 
“that a man, in the first place, injure no one, and, in the second, do good to 
everyone he can reach”.59 As is clear, the interpersonal dimension of peace 
reappears here, as the relations between individuals are important for this 
concept of peace.  
The perception of peace as tranquility of order was brought up to date by 
the encyclical of Pope John XXII, Pacem in Terris, which is called the “magna 
charta of the Catholic Church’s position on human rights and natural law”.60 
The tranquility of order in a society rests on four pillars: “Its foundation is truth, 
and it must be brought into effect by justice; it needs to be animated and 
                                                             
53 Or in the terminology of Evans, this concept of positive peace means that justice is 
secured both at the society wide macro-level but also at the micro-level of the society in 
individual relationships. Evans 2014, p. 29-30.  
54 Augustine, City of God 1887, p. 932. 
55 Johnson 2012, p. 21. 
56 See also Coady 2008, p. 268. 
57 Augustine, City of God 1887, p. 940. 
58 Augustine, City of God 1887, p. 933 and Johnson 2012, p. 21. 
59 Augustine, City of God 1887, p. 935. 
60 Hittinger 2003, p. 39. 
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perfected by men’s love for one another, and, while preserving freedom intact, 
it must make for an equilibrium in society which is increasingly more human in 
character.”61 This means that peace is understood as a rich positive concept in 
the Catholic tradition, based on the values of truth, justice, love for one’s 
neighbor and freedom, and which supports the universal common good.62  
Unlike Margalit, who argues that peace and justice are not complementary 
as fish and chips but rather competing like tea and coffee,63 the Catholic 
tradition holds that “the harvest of justice is sown in peace”.64 Peace and justice 
are strongly connected and the realization of human rights is central to this 
conception of peace. Human rights are founded in human nature and the 
dignity of individual persons.65 All individuals are interdependent and part of 
the global human community.66 Furthermore, regarding social justice and 
stability, instead of remaining hostilities or a balance of power, the just peace 
involves mutual respect and collaboration between former enemies.67 The 
underlying causes for the war are solved and former enemies are reconciled. 
This means that this peace is a “peace by satisfaction”; instead of hostility there 
is consent and mutual confidence, and former enemies are satisfied with the 
status quo.68 Therefore, a largely positive peace is likely to be a lasting peace.   
In this fourth concept of peace, the various dimensions of outer peace come 
together. Up until now, we have focused on the international dimension of 
peace, but in a largely positive peace the interpersonal dimension is also 
important. Furthermore, the universal dimension of peace arises here as well. 
                                                             
61 Pacem in Terris 1963, par 37. 
62 The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, A Reflection of the National Conference of 
Catholic Bishops on the Tenth Anniversary of The Challenge of Peace, 1993, par 2. 
Online at: http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/catholic-
social-teaching/the-harvest-of-justice-is-sown-in-peace.cfm.  
63 Margalit 2009, p. 8. 
64 http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/catholic-social-
teaching/the-harvest-of-justice-is-sown-in-peace.cfm.  
65 The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response. A Pastoral Letter on War 
and Peace by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1983, par 15. See further 
on the dual foundation – human dignity or personhood and natural law – of human 
rights in Pacem in Terris: Hittinger 2003 and Roland Minnerath, ‘Pacem in Terris. Quid 
Novi?’, in: Mary Ann Glendon, Russel Hittinger & Marcelo Sánchez Sorondo (eds.), 
The Global Quest for Tranquillitas Ordinis, Vatican City: The Pontifical Academy of 
Social Sciences 2013.  
66 The Challenge of Peace 1983, par. 240. 
67 The Challenge of Peace 1983, par. 200, 234. 
68 Aron 2003, p. 161. 
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Namely, the Catholic tradition focuses not only on the regulation of national 
and international war, but also (and particularly, some might claim) on the 
abolition of war in general: the creation of universal peace. While one does not 
necessarily exclude the other, these goals reflect the two main strands of 
thinking on the ethics of war and peace within the Catholic tradition: just war 
theory and pacifism.  
The pacifist perspective can be used to further sketch a secular version of a 
largely positive peace. Institutional pacifism, as found in Immanuel Kant’s and 
Hans Kelsen’s proposals, aims to realize universal peace through the 
development of international law and institutions. This approach is primarily 
focused on the universal dimension and the temporal element of peace (i.e. the 
total and everlasting abolition of war) rather than focusing on the character of 
the peace. However, some interpretations of Kant can be used for a concept of a 
positive peace that is comprehensive qua character, using the democratic peace 
thesis.69 Based on Kant’s essay Perpetual Peace, the democratic peace thesis 
holds – in short – that democracies do not go to war with each other. Based 
on that empirical fact, it is argued that the key to a tranquil international 
order is a Kantian liberal democracy. For the concept of positive peace, this 
would mean that the requirements regarding the national context are quite 
comprehensive. 
According to Michael Doyle, a liberal democracy requires a political regime 
that respects the individual freedom of its citizens. This means that three sets of 
human rights are realized: the liberal freedoms rights such as the freedom of 
thought, opinion and expression, religion, and private property, the social and 
economic rights as the right to work, social protection and an adequate 
standard of living, and the political rights of democratic participation.70 Given 
the emphasis on individual freedom and property, the capitalist system of a 
market economy based on supply and demand is the economic system that fits 
the liberal democracy. Some recent theorists have taken on this democratic 
peace thesis, arguing that a stable international order can be realized by 
69 I absolutely realize that this interpretation of Kant’s theory is not shared by everyone, 
e.g. Howard Williams vigorously opposes such an extensive interpretation of Kant, and 
opposes that Kant would be a just war theorist. Thomas Mertens also points out the 
considerable distance between Kant and the just war theory. See: Thomas Mertens, 
‘Kant and the Just War Tradition’, in: Heinz-Gerard Justenhoven & William Barbieri Jr. 
(eds.), From Just War to Modern Peace Ethics, Berlin: De Gruyter 2012. 
70 Michael Doyle, ‘Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs’, in: Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 1983, 12/3,4 and further: Michael Brown, Sean Lynn-Jones & Steven Miller 
(eds.), Debating the Democratic Peace, Cambridge: The MIT Press 1996, p. xiv.  
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intervening – waging war – and realizing a broad spectrum of human rights in 
other states.71  
 
7.3.5 Fully Positive Peace  
 
And lastly, on the far end of the continuum there is the fully positive peace. This 
sort of perfect ideal peace is often but not exclusively connected to a theological 
world view. This concept of peace further builds on the preceding concept of 
positive peace and one could say that all the facets of the general concept of 
peace come together here: the peace is eternal and everlasting, inner and outer 
dimensions are united, and it is perfectly just. For example, the Confucian 
system distinguishes three stages which represent a system of social political 
progress or improvement in the world. The first stage is the ‘disorderly stage’, 
the second is the ‘small tranquility’ or ‘advancing peace stage’, and the third is 
the ‘great similarity’ or ‘extreme peace stage’.72 In this latter concept, inner 
peace, interpersonal peace and political peace come together. More specifically, 
the inner peace of individuals is perfected, the character of mankind is on the 
highest possible level, and everyone is happy. There is harmony between 
people, they treat each other lovingly and respectful. Additionally, there is 
eternal political peace; the world is one, national states are abolished, and war 
does no longer exist. In this extreme peace, all races have unified into one race, 
and people are truly equal.73 This utopian ideal is the final aim, “the golden age 
of Confucianism”.74 As Confucius is believed to have stated: “When the great 
principle prevails, the whole world is bent upon the common good. The 
virtuous and able are honored, sincerity is praised, and harmony is cultivated.”75 
It is a situation based upon cosmopolitanism and communism.  
A similar conception of harmonious peace can be found in Augustine’s 
                                                             
71 E.g Fernando Teson, ‘The Kantian Theory of International Law’, in: Columbia Law 
Review 1993, 92; Fernando Teson, Humanitarian Intervention. An Inquiry into Law and 
Morality, Ardsley: Transnational Publishers 2005. 
72 Miles Dawson (ed.), The Ethics of Confucius, New York: Cosimo 2005, p. 301. For 
different English translations of this ‘extreme peace’ see: K’ang Yu-Wei, Ta T’Ung Shu. 
The One-World Philosophy of K’ang Yu-Wei, New York/London: Routledge 2005 (Ta 
T’Ung Shu, 1902, translated by Laurence Thompson), p. 27-30. 
73 Dawson 2005, p. 301-302.This ideal of a world state is further developed by K’ang Yu-
Wei. Aside from there being no more sovereign states, it also means that the institution 
of family is abolished. See further K’ang Yu-Wei 2005, p. 37-48. 
74 K’ang Yu-Wei 2005, p. 301.  
75 Quoted in: K’ang Yu-Wei 2005, p. 28. See also: Dawson 2005, p. 303. 
165
JUS POST BELLUM AND THE NATURE OF PEACE 
 
  
theory. The only true peace for Augustine, pax, comes from God and can be 
achieved only spiritual realm.76 This perfect and eternal peace is the supreme 
good of the City of God. It is a situation of religious salvation as well as full 
justice: “the peace of freedom from all evil”.77 This peace of heaven, “is the 
perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God and of one another in 
God”.78 As in the Confucian system, the dimensions of peace are united: the 
inner peace of individuals (harmony of body and soul), peace between 
individuals and God (following the law of God), and peace between individuals 
(both in the household and within the political community) and kingdoms.79 
This concept of peace clearly transcends the political dimension, as it is built 
upon inner peace which is extended to outer peace. As Confucianism has 
shown, the world can only be orderly and in peace and order if the inner peace 
is first developed, and our hearts are set right. The Dalai Lama emphasizes this 
individual spiritual transformation and agrees that peace should be developed 
within an individual first. Once fundamental qualities as love, compassion and 
altruism are developed within an individual, this person can create an 
atmosphere of peace and harmony, and that atmosphere can be extended “from 
the individual to his family, from the family to the community and eventually to 
the whole world”.80  
As one might argue, this divine perfect peace describes a paradisiacal 
situation, an ideal but imaginary peace which occurs only in the non-human 
world.81 It is therefore only worthwhile to explore a perfect eternal peace for 
the earthly realm. Recently, such perspective on peace coming from a pacifist 
perspective is proposed by philosopher Matthew Fox.82 His proposal illustrates 
the radical difference compared to the purely negative conception of peace. The 
concept of peace he describes is based on cooperation, compassion and 
harmony.83 Inner peace and outer peace are strongly connected, as the latter is 
built upon the former. Necessary for the achievement of eternal peace is the 
development of the better side of human nature, and the human capacity to love 
                                                             
76 Johnson 2012, p. 21. 
77 Coady 2008, p. 267 and Augustine, City of God 1887, p. 943. 
78 Augustine, City of God 1887, p. 941. 
79 Andrej Zwitter & Michael Hoelzl, ‘Augustine on War and Peace’, in: Peace Review: A 
Journal of Social Justice 2014, 26/3, p. 320-321. 
80 Dalai Lama, Ethics for the New Millennium, New York: Riverhead Books 1999. 
81 Allan & Keller 2008, p. 98. 
82 Matthew Fox, Understanding Peace. A Comprehensive Introduction, New York/London: 
Routledge 2014. 
83 Fox 2014, p. 279.   
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one another, therewith creating a culture of peace. In this context, he sees a 
prominent role for peace education.  
More in general, people have to develop a ‘global outlook’, based on the 
ideals of cosmopolitanism, pacifism, global ethics and world government.84 Fox 
sees human rights as an important framework for this concept of peace, and 
argues that peace must be built upon the respect for human rights as the 
fundamental moral standard. He endorses a broad idea of human rights, 
including the so called third generation rights as e.g. the right to subsistence and 
the right to peace, but he includes also rights of animals and respect for the 
environment. This is unmistakably a fully positive peace, in which many 
desirable values are present: it is characterized by the realization of inner peace, 
the full spectrum of human and animal rights, and ideals of cosmopolitanism 
and world government.  
 
7.4 Peace as Goal of Just War Theory 
 
The previous section analyzed five main concepts of peace along a continuum. 
But which of these concepts can function as (normative) goal of just war 
theory? To answer that question, this section places the peace continuum in a 
lively debate in political philosophy on the role of feasibility constraints in 
normative theory.85 A systematization of the main positions in this debate 
made by David Estlund enables us first to eliminate two concepts of peace and 
hence expose the outside boundaries of the peace continuum for just war 
theory. It enables us second to make a comparative assessment of the remaining 
concepts of peace as potential goal of just war theory. It is demonstrated that a 
largely negative peace coincides with a concessive approach to normative 
theory that leans towards political realism, and a largely positive peace 
coincides with an aspirational approach to normative theory that leans towards 
moral idealism. 
                                                             
84 Fox 2014, p. 267-275. 
85 See e.g. Joseph Carens, ‘Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the Ethics of Migration’, 
in: The International Migration Review 1996, 30/1; Pablo Gilabert & Holly Lawford-
Smith, ‘Political Feasibility. A Conceptual Exploration’, in: Political Studies 2012, 60/4; 
Laura Valentini, ‘Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory. A Conceptual Map’, in: Philosophy 
Compass 2012, 7/9; Juha Raikka, ‘The Feasibility Condition in Political Theory’, in: The 
Journal of Political Philosophy 1998, 6/1; Zofia Stemplowska, ‘What’s Ideal about Ideal 
Theory?’, in: Social Theory and Practice 2008, 34/3; Zofia Stemplowska & Adam Swift, 
‘Ideal and Nonideal Theory’, in: David Estlund (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Political 
Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012. 
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7.4.1 Feasibility and Desirability 
 
Should political philosophy be able to offer practical guidance for the here and 
now? And to what extent do real world facts constrain normative theory? These 
questions are central to the idea of feasibility and the debate on non-ideal or 
realistic theory and ideal or utopian theory.86 Many contributors to this debate 
take Rawls’ idea of a ‘realistic utopia’ as their starting point. As Rawls argues, 
there are two desiderata that must be satisfied by a normative political theory: it 
must demand desirable ‘arrangements’ which can help to critically examine the 
status quo, but must at the same time be feasible.87 Feasibility takes the practical 
possibilities into consideration, and thus questions whether the implementation 
of ‘arrangements’ or the compliance with norms is realistically possible.88 
Specific feasibility constraints that influence the realization of normative theory 
are e.g. logical, biological (human nature), institutional, cultural, and 
psychological including motivational constraints.89 These constraints can be 
subdivided into strong and weak constraints, the former making the 
implementation of a certain arrangement impossible, the second making the 
implementation more difficult or costly but not impossible.  
 Seeking a middle position in this debate, Rawls has attracted criticism from 
both sides: Some theorists have criticized Rawls’ theory for giving in too much 
to political realism and being uncritical, while others have argued that Rawls is 
not realistic and fact sensitive enough, accusing him of naïve moralism.90 
Estlund offers a helpful systematization of the positions in this debate, and he 
                                                             
86 In a very insightful article, Laura Valentini argues that the debate on ideal and non-ideal 
theory should in fact be separated into three distinct meanings: 1. Full-compliance 
versus partial compliance theory, 2. Utopian/ idealistic versus realistic theory, and 3. 
end-state theory versus transitional theory. My concern here is primarily with the 
second and third meanings. Valentini 2012, p. 654. 
87 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness. A restatement, Cambridge: Harvard University Press 
2001, p. 4, 5. 
88 John Rawls, ‘The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus’, in: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 
1987, 7/1, p. 24. Gilabert and Lawford-Smith distinguish three stages in which 
combinations of feasibility and desirability yield different overall judgments of what to 
do in political contexts: the stage of formulation of core principles, the stage of the 
implementation of these principles through an institutional scheme, and the stage of 
political reforms to realize these institutional schemes. Gilabert & Lawford-Smith 
2012, p. 819- 821. 
89 Gilabert & Lawford-Smith 2012, p. 813.   
90 Rex Martin & David Reidy (eds.), Rawls’s Law of Peoples. A realistic Utopia?, Malden: 
Blackwell Publishing 2006, p. 7-8. 
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places these on a continuum: the two extreme positions are strict (political) 
realism and moral idealism (as utopianism), and in between are non-ideal 
theories that make moral demands that are possible to meet in theory, which 
are called concessive or aspirational.91 These gradually differ to the extent that 
concessions that are made regarding feasibility constraints, and hence which 
are more or less realistic, and more or less idealistic.  
7.4.2 Elimination: the Outside Boundaries of the Peace Continuum 
This debate sheds light on our peace continuum. While the continua cannot be 
simply taken together, a parallel can be drawn.92 As pointed out in the 
introduction, just war theory is an action guiding, non-ideal theory that 
occupies the middle ground between the extremes of political realism and 
moral idealism. Just war theory, in other words, reflects this balance between 
feasibility and desirability. Estlund’s systematization first shows that the purely 
negative and purely positive concepts of peace cannot be the goal of just war 
theory. As we have seen, the universal desire for peace means that wars are 
waged for the sake of peace. This claim can easily be accepted realizing that 
there are many different conceptions of peace. Even Augustine’s brutal robber 
desires peaceful relations with his associates and family.93 On this side of the 
continuum, when peace is understood as the mere absence of war – purely 
negative – it is essentially an empty concept lacking normative prescriptions, 
and indeed the most brutal aggressor aims for peace. Such peace is merely the 
self-interested realization of political goals by way of war, in other words, a 
‘victor’s peace’. This coincides with strict political realism that sets no moral 
standard and consequently prescribes no change to the status quo.94 It does not 
91 I do not strictly follow Estlund’s terminology. Estlund’s term for moral utopian is 
moral idealism, and in between are non-ideal theories. I think it makes more sense to 
refer to moral utopianism as the extreme position that does not factor in feasibility 
constraints, as the theories in between all propose a certain level of idealization, i.e. are 
not non-ideal. See further David Estlund, Democratic Authority, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 2008 and David Estlund, ‘Utopophobia’, in: Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 2014, 42/2. 
92 A pacifist idealist accepts an unjust peace because that is always better as war 
(Erasmus), however not as a normative principle, and a political realist could propose 
e.g. a decent peace if that is the best way to create stability and secure national interests.  
93 Augustine, City of God 1887, p. 930. 
94 This is the standard characterization of political realism, but does not come close to 
doing justice to the many different and more sophisticated versions of political realism. 
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prevent or limit war, and places no limits on what can be done after war. In the 
same way as states have the right to wage war, they have the right to create for 
themselves the most beneficial peace.   
This immediately indicates that a purely negative peace cannot be the goal of 
just war theory. Contrary to political realism, just war theory does hold that war 
is regulated by morality and it sets a moral standard in an attempt to limit the 
horrors of war. War can only be justified in exceptional circumstances – 
external aggression and extreme internal aggression, i.e. a humanitarian 
catastrophe – which means that some sorts of ‘peace’ are so unjust that they 
should not be accepted or can be replaced with a better, more positive peace. In 
a purely negative peace, individual wellbeing is severely compromised, and 
large scale human suffering and insecurity will remain even though the war has 
ended. This sort of peace replaces the violence of war with a ‘peace’ 
characterized by Galtung’s structural political violence to the extent that the 
regime violates the most fundamental human rights, and is cruel and 
humiliating towards its own population. This can in itself be a just cause for 
war, i.e. is the sort of peace that can justifiably be replaced with a ‘better’ peace. 
Clearly, when considering the concept of peace from the perspective of just war 
theory, there must be something more to peace than the mere absence of 
violence. This means that there must be some connection between peace and 
justice; the peace after war must at least be minimally just. Hence, a purely 
negative peace falls outside the confines of just war theory.  
On the other side of the peace continuum, the concept of a fully positive 
peace also falls outside the confines of just war theory. Evidently the divine 
paradisiacal concept of peace cannot be realized in this world. A heavenly peace 
as Augustine’s pax might be a possibility in the City of God, but not in the City 
of Man. But neither can the ideal positive peace as described by Fox. This 
concept of a fully positive peace coincides with moral idealism, i.e. utopian 
normative theorizing that does not take any feasibility constraints into account. 
As became clear, a fully positive peace can be achieved through a connection 
between the different dimensions of peace; inner, interpersonal and political 
peace, and involves harmony and compassion. The infeasibility of such a world 
peace that is built upon the inner peace of the citizens of the world hardly needs 
an explanation. Given that human nature is not purely peaceful and altruistic, a 
See e.g. Little and MacDonald’s recent article on so-called new realist approaches. 
Adrian Little & Terry Macdonald, ‘Introduction to special issue: Real-world justice and 
international migration’, in: European Journal of Political Theory 2015, 14/4. 
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fully positive world peace is a state of affairs that cannot be brought about.95 
This way, it sets an impossible standard. As it is generally assumed that ‘ought 
implies can’, many assume that a theory that sets a moral standard of which is it 
impossible to live up to, is in fact a false standard.96  
But whether a fully positive peace can function as a standard or not, the 
concept is certainly too idealistic and utopian to function as the goal of just war 
theory. In order for just war theory to be action-guiding and effective in limiting 
war, it must take at least some feasibility constraints into account and set a 
moral standard of which it is (at least theoretically) possible to live up to. 
Furthermore, just war theory has a limited scope: it is a normative theory that is 
specifically designed to regulate war. This means that the peace that is 
envisioned by just war theory is primarily the peace between states (or political 
groups) after a particular war. Just war theory is not concerned with 
establishing a perfectly just and eternal world peace, nor with the inner peace of 
individuals.97  
Seeing just war theory as the middle between strict political realism and 
moral idealism exposes the outside boundaries of the peace continuum. As a 
result, the purely negative and the fully positive concepts of peace must be 
eliminated as goal of just war theory, since they are compatible with strict realist 
or moral idealist normative theories, but incompatible with just war theory. 
Peace as the goal of just war theory is connected to justice, but it is not about 
perfect justice. As a result of this elimination, the three middle concepts on the 
peace continuum remain as potential goal of just war theory.  
 
7.4.3 Comparative Assessment  
 
Let us now turn to the comparative assessment of the remaining concepts of 
peace. All three concepts of peace are idealistic to the extent that they set a 
                                                             
95 Properly considering strong and weak feasibility constraints requires complex 
empirical analysis and estimates, a task that I cannot pursue here.  
96 This way, inability refutes a moral requirement. See e.g. further Estlund 2014, p. 116-
117. 
97 A note can be made here: first, it would be interesting to see whether there can be a 
fruitful just war theory that ignores inner peace. For example in South-Africa, would it 
be possible to create peace institutionally, without addressing the feelings of hatred 
living within people, which create tensions between people on the personal level? 
Problems can be expected if institutional reconciliation is not accompanied with 
personal reconciliation and forgiveness. The question whether just war theory is a 
coherent theory if inner peace is ignored would be interesting to resolve.  
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moral standard, but they take feasibility constraints into account: they do not 
demand the impossible. The balance between the two desiderata of feasibility 
and desirability, and hence the level of idealization, explain the gradual 
differences between them. A largely negative peace as normative principle 
coincides with a concessive approach since a relatively large concession is made 
to the desideratum of feasibility. Various feasibly constraints are taken into 
account, including weak constraints that have to do with the psychological 
motivation to realize peace. E.g. the fact that many states are (at least in part) 
concerned with their national interests is taken into account when setting the 
moral standard. When a normative principle poses a large obstacle to the state’s 
pursuit of its national interests, it is likely to be ignored. This can be a reason to 
state that the divergence between what is morally required and what is feasible 
must not be too big. This is what Steven Lee calls the ‘principle of tolerable 
divergence’.98 In order for just war theory to have a practical impact, it needs to 
take the way that states are likely to behave into account.  
Whereas the concept of a largely negative peace is a concessive goal, a 
largely positive peace is an aspirational goal that goes less far in making 
concessions to feasibility constraints. Here, it is assumed that the fact that a 
normative principle is unlikely to be followed does not influence its validity. 
Since the realization of a largely positive peace is possible in theory, it can be 
required as a goal of just war theory, despite the fact that, given e.g. empirical 
circumstances or motivation, it is unlikely that it will be realized. In other 
words, the strong feasibility constraints are taken into account, but not the 
weak constraints. The decent peace in between those two concepts is a more 
even balance between the two desiderata of feasibility and desirability.  
 
7.5 What Peace?  
 
With the conceptual tool kit developed in the previous sections, we can now 
shed light on the contemporary debate in just war theory and make the implicit 
positions on peace explicit. As such, this section shows how just war theorists 
understand peace, how they balance feasibility and desirability, and 
demonstrates that there is a shift in theorizing on peace in just war theory. As it 
appears, there are fundamental disagreements between what a ‘just and lasting 
peace’ entails, and those different understandings of peace are determined by 
three factors. The previous assessment indicates that concessive just war 
                                                             
98 Lee 2012, p. 21, 22. 
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theorists endorse a negative peace in which the balance inclines towards 
feasibility, and aspirational just war theorists will endorse a positive peace in 
which the balance inclines towards desirability. Aside from the level of 
idealization, the scope of just war theory is related and important as well. Some 
theorists are more restrictive and some more permissive on the just causes for 
war. Since the just cause influences the subsequent peace, it is expected that 
restrictive just war theorists endorse a minimal peace and permissive just war 
theorists endorse a just peace as the goal of just war theory.  
 And lastly, the foundation of just war theory is important for the concept of 
peace. As we have seen, peace is such an important value because it is the 
precondition for general human wellbeing.99 This human wellbeing and war’s 
negative impact on it also underlies just war theory. There are various moral 
underpinnings for just war theory – e.g. natural law, human rights, Kantianism, 
or utilitarianism – but many just war theorists simply avoid the question of the 
normative foundation, refer to our ‘commonsense morality’ or restrict 
themselves to some brief remarks.100 Nevertheless, the foundation of modern 
just war theory is often explained by a theory of rights.101 The historic idea of 
natural rights is replaced by the idea of universal human rights, both collective 
and individual. State-centered just war theorists that emphasize collective rights 
as national self-determination would likely endorse a negative peace, whereas 
cosmopolitan theorists that emphasize individual human rights would likely 
endorse a positive peace in which a full spectrum of human rights is realized. In 
the following, these factors are used to show that the remaining three concepts 
of peace can be allocated to various just war theorists. The early Walzer and 
Yossi Beilin endorse a largely negative peace, current Walzer and Anthony 
Coady a decent peace, current Brian Orend moves towards a largely positive 
peace, and Mark Evans, Mark Allman & Tobias Winright and Cecile Fabre  
endorse a largely positive peace.  
 
 
                                                             
99 According to Nigel Dower: “an absence of overt conflict is a precondition for the 
pursuit of most human activities, or at least their more effective pursuit.” Dower 2009, 
p. 143. 
100 E.g. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars. A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations 
(second edition, or. 1977), New York: Basic Books 2000, Coady 2008.  
101 Brian Orend, The Morality of War (second ed.), Peterborough: Broadview Press 2013, p 
5. 
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7.5.1 Walzer’s Largely Negative Peace  
 
Just war theory’s balance between feasibility and desirability is vivid in Walzer’s 
authorative book Just and Unjust Wars. As a theory of practical morality and a 
limitation of war, justum bellum norms need to be feasible in order to be 
effective. Arguments of prudence and realism have an important place in 
Walzer’s theory: “Just wars are limited wars; there are moral reasons for 
statesmen and soldiers who fight to be prudent and realistic.”102 This counts for 
a theory of ends in war as well; concessions are made to feasibility constraints 
since excessive idealism could result e.g. in the unnecessarily prolonging of 
wars.103 Furthermore, in order to be effective in limiting war, just war theory’s 
norms must be able to be generally accepted. Therefore, these norms must be 
“morally plausible to large numbers of men and women; it must correspond to 
our sense of what is right”.104 Clearly, Walzer sets a morally desirable standard 
which explains, supports and appeals to our ‘commonsense morality’.  
 The foundation of his just war theory (and hence on which we could agree) 
are principles of political independence, communal liberty and human life.105 
Given these values, Walzer emphasizes the right to collective self-
determination and he sees sovereignty of states as an expression of these 
values.106 Nevertheless, his theory is grounded ultimately in the human rights of 
individuals: it is “in its philosophical form a doctrine of human rights”.107 This 
means that state sovereignty is conditional; derivative of protection of the 
population’s individual rights.108 As will become clear later in this section, 
various theorists have pointed out that there is a tension between Walzer’s state 
centered theory and emphasis on sovereignty on the one hand, and this 
                                                             
102 Walzer 2000, p. 122. 
103 Walzer 2000, p. 116, 122-123. 
104 Walzer 2000, p. 133. 
105 Walzer 2000, p. 110 
106 Walzer 2000, p. 108. 
107 Walzer 2000, p. xxii. 
108 Walzer 2000, p. xxi, xxii. Classic just war theory was grounded in natural law and 
natural rights. Throughout history, the norms of just war theory rested on various 
foundations. Today, most theorists ground just war theory in a doctrine of rights, as 
Walzer does. As we will see however, whereas Walzer emphasizes collective rights of 
peoples, many recent theorists emphasize individual rights and reject any inherent 
value of states and state sovereignty.  
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foundation in individual human rights on the other hand.109 Despite that 
foundation, it appears as if his concern is more with national security than with 
human security.110 Additionally, Walzer’s just war theory is restrictive; the 
paradigmatic just war is self-defense against aggression, and humanitarian 
interventions are allowed only in very exceptional circumstances, i.e. in 
response to acts “that shock the moral conscience of mankind”.111 
Walzer states that: “Implicit in the theory of just war is a theory of just 
peace”.112 When we make this theory of just peace explicit, it appears that he 
endorses a largely negative conception of peace. However, the peace that 
Walzer considers to be the goal of just war theory is not a purely negative peace 
as the mere absence of fighting. The goal of war is not “just any peace”.113 
Conquest and unconditional surrender are in principle unjustified after war.114 
There is a relation between peace and justice, but this must be understood in a 
minimal way. The goal of just war theory remains a largely negative peace, 
understood as “peace-with-rights, a condition of liberty and security”.115  
What is the minimum level of justice in peace for Walzer? Brian Orend 
further develops Walzer’s theory on post war justice, and explains that this is 
essentially determined by the just cause for war: after the rights violation that 
was the cause for war is stopped, and those rights are vindicated, post war 
obligations end despite the added value.116 In principle, political reconstruction 
after war is therefore prohibited.117 This means that the object of war is 
                                                             
109 E.g. David Luban 1980, ‘The Romance of the Nation State’, in: Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 1980, 9/4; David Luban, ‘Just War and Human Rights’, in: Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 1980, 9/2; David Rodin, War and Self-Defense, Oxford: Clarendon Press 2003; 
Cecile Fabre, Cosmopolitan War, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012. 
110 Williams & Caldwell 2006, p. 314. 
111 This exception is based on his commitment to human rights, p. 108. 
112 Walzer, ‘Terrorism and Just War’, in: Philosophia 2006, 34/1, p. 4. 
113 Michael Walzer, ‘The Aftermath of War. Reflections on Jus Post Bellum’, in: Eric 
Patterson (ed.), Ethics beyond War’s End, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University 
Press 2012, p. 37. 
114 The exception is an extremely evil regimes such as the Nazi regime. Walzer 2000, p. 
112-113. 
115 Walzer 2000, p. 51. 
116 Brian Orend, Michael Walzer on War and Justice, Cardiff: University of Wales Press 
2000, p. 136-137. Walzer 2000, 120. Walzer later states that indeed “ad bellum 
anticipated post bellum”. Walzer 2012, p. 35. For a similar position on peace as a 
minimum normative goal grounded in the collective right to self-determination and 
individual human rights see: Williams & Caldwell 2006. Gary Bass also points to this 
connection between jus ad bellum and jus post bellum, Bass 2004, p. 386. 
117 The exception is an extremely evil regimes such as the Nazi regime. Walzer 2000, p. 
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therefore not a return to the status quo ante bellum, since that situation led to war 
in the first place, but a ‘better state of peace’: “more secure, less vulnerable to 
territorial expansion, safer for ordinary men and women and for their domestic 
self-determinations.”118 Since the paradigmatic just cause is a self-defense 
against external aggression, post war behavior is restricted to “resistance, 
restoration, reasonable prevention”.119 After that, the sovereignty of the 
defeated state should be restored as soon as possible. This means that here, the 
goal of just war theory is a minimal largely negative peace, which is stable and in 
which war is prevented, and in which the most fundamental rights to life, liberty 
and security are secured.  
A recent defense of such peace as normative principle comes from Israeli 
politician Yossi Beilin. Based on the horrific consequences of war in terms of 
human suffering, he argues that the first priority is to end war. And given 
feasibility constraints in the world today, aiming for a (largely) negative peace is 
more realistic, and has a better chance of success than aiming for a high ideal 
that can be accepted by all those involved as a just peace.120 Beilin points to the 
danger inherent in setting a high standard. To push for more than just any peace 
is dangerous, he argues, as this can be a reason to resist a peace that is perceived 
as unjust.121 By aiming high – for a (largely) positive peace – it is likely that the 
war continues as this sort of peace cannot be achieved, and that consequently 
more injustice is done to precisely those innocent people.122 In this way, the 
desire for perfect ideal justice stands in the way of achieving peace. Walzer 
indeed mentions several examples in which aiming for a largely positive peace 
kept the war alive and consequently resulted in a dramatically worse situation 
                                                                                                                                               
112, 113. 
118 Walzer 2000, p. 121-122.  
119 Walzer 2000, p. 121.  
120 A similar argument was made by Jan Gruiters, director of Pax, who stated on his blog 
on the situation in Syria in 2012 that because of the lack of realistic options to end the 
violence, we should aim for a ‘dirty peace’, because this would at least end the 
humanitarian catastrophe. Such ‘dirty peace’ would include a safe getaway for 
president Assad, securing Russia’s interests and forcing the opposition to accept 
compromises. See: https://jangruiters.wordpress.com/2012/10/17/smerige-vrede/.    
121 Yossi Beilin, ‘Just Peace. A Dangerous Objective’, in: Pierre Allan & Alexis Keller 
(eds.), What is a Just Peace?, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 130. 
122 As a matter of definition and terminology, it must be noted that Beilin considers only a 
mutual agreement between the former warring parties as an actual peace, and not an 
enforced peace such as the Pax Romana. This might still be desirable compared to a 
continuation of the war, but rather is a “different solution” which at least provides 
stability.   
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that would otherwise would have been the case.123 The general motivation 
behind a minimal goal as normative principle implicit in just war theory is that 
given the harsh political reality, such goal is most effective in limiting the 
negative effects of war, and such a goal proves to be difficult enough to achieve. 
  
7.5.2 Walzer’s and Coady’s Decent Peace  
 
Today, this concept of negative peace is no longer widely endorsed among just 
war theorists, and this has to do with a shift in just war theorizing. Steven Lee 
states that Walzer represents the ‘national defense paradigm’.124 This paradigm 
is reflected in just war theory as it developed since the two World Wars and 
which largely coincides with international law: there is a prohibition on 
aggression – the non-intervention principle – with the exception of a war of 
self-defense (or other-defense) against aggression. Hence, only a defensive war 
as response against an unjust offensive war can be justified. Inis Claude states 
that under this paradigm, the preservation of (negative) peace takes precedence 
over the promotion of justice.125 In the past decennia however, just war theory 
has become somewhat more permissive, and a humanitarian catastrophe has 
become an established just cause for war. In general, there is a firmer emphasis 
on individual human rights at the expense of the value of sovereignty and state 
rights. This shift is clear as well in political practice; e.g. UN peace building 
efforts, the development of the so called ‘responsibility to protect’ which 
includes the ‘responsibility to rebuild’, and emphasis on human rights in foreign 
policy.126  
This shift has affected Walzer himself also. As he states: “Ongoing 
disagreements, together with the rapid pace of political change, sometimes 
require revisions of a theory.” For Walzer, this means that he has become 
willing to allow humanitarian intervention, long-term military occupation and 
                                                             
123 Walzer mentions the examples of the Korean War, in which the post war situation 
would presumably have been better would South Korea and the US have restored the 
old boundary after having repelled North Korean aggression, and the situation in Israel 
which might have been better would Israel have given up the Gaza Strip and the West 
bank in 1967. Walzer 2012, p. 37. 
124 Lee 2012, p. 292. 
125 Inis Claude, ‘Just War: Doctrines and Institutions’, in: Political Science Quarterly 1980, 
95/1, p. 83-96, p. 94. 
126 See also Carsten Stahn, ‘Jus Post Bellum. Mapping the Discipline(s)’, in: Carsten Stahn 
& Jann Kleffner 2008, Jus Post Bellum. Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to 
Peace, The Hague: TMC Asser Press 2008, p. 99-101. 
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that he recognizes the need for including jus post bellum in just war theory.127 
Since as we have seen, the just cause is considered to limit what can be done in 
the subsequent peace, a more permissive humanitarian just cause influences the 
goal of peace. Vindicating violated rights means that the peace after a 
humanitarian intervention involves securing these rights for the affected 
population, which probably requires regime change and reconstruction abroad. 
As a result, after a humanitarian intervention (or a defense against inherently 
aggressive and murderous regimes), a new regime must be created in order to 
protect the right to life, liberty and prevent future aggression.128 That does not 
mean that Walzer now endorses a positive peace as the goal of just war theory, 
but rather that his goal resembles our concept of a decent peace. The 
connection between peace and justice is strong but minimalist, according to 
Walzer, “so as to sustain the recognition that peace itself is a value at which we 
can justly aim and sometimes live with, even if it is unjust”.129 More concretely, 
this means that the peace after war involves the reconstruction of a sovereign 
state which is a safe and decent society, determined by a minimal conception of 
human rights.130  
Despite Walzer’s broadening of the humanitarian exception to the non-
intervention principle, his just war theory remains restrictive. This is similar for 
Anthony Coady.131 Central to Coady’s just war theory is the collective right to 
self-determination. As sovereignty is an expression of this right, it is not 
absolute. It is connected to the right to self-government, which does not 
necessarily need to have the form of a democracy.132 Based on his appreciation 
of national self-determination together with a recognition of the evil of war, just 
war theory’s main goal is to limit war. Therefore, war is justified only in certain 
hard-to-satisfy conditions.133 According to Coady: “the evils of war are so great 
that restricting it to cases where the justification for resort to lethal violence is 
obvious and overwhelming is likely to have much better consequences than 
                                                             
127 Michael Walzer, Arguing about War, New Haven: Yale University Press 2004, p. xiii. 
128 Walzer 2012, p. 39. 
129 Walzer 2012, p. 37. 
130 Walzer 2012, p. 43- 45. 
131 And his take on just war theory might be even more restrictive. On aggression see 
Coady 2008, p. 69-72 and on humanitarian intervention p. 73-77. 
132 Coady 2008, p. 77-79. 
133 Coady 2008, p. 16. “There is a presumption against the moral validity of resort to war 
given what we know of the history of warfare, of the vast devastation it causes 
(nowadays even more so) and the dubious motives that have so often fueled it.” Coady 
2008, p. 73. 
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allowing a wider range of justifications that can easily be open to 
misinterpretation and abuse.”134 A self-defense against aggression can be 
justified, as can humanitarian interventions in exceptional circumstances. In the 
latter case, sovereignty is disconnected from the people’s right to self-
determination, and it is justified to aid a political community in a defense 
against their own state’s aggression.135   
As one would expect, this perspective on just war theory means that Coady 
also endorses something that resembles our decent peace as the goal of just war 
theory, although he himself refers to a ‘just peace’ and Augustine’s tranquillitas  
ordinis.136 He seeks a middle position, which is exactly what our concept of 
decent peace is: more robust than a purely negative peace, but it does not equate 
peace with justice. Such positive ideal of peace is too morally loaded, and Coady 
argues that we must aim for a more practically relevant peace,137 which reflects 
that balance between feasibility and desirability.138 Coady agrees with Walzer 
that there is a strong connection between the just cause and what can be aimed 
at after war. In other words, the legitimate war aims limit and determine the 
subsequent peace, and there is a presumption against political reconstruction of 
the defeated state.139 In general, Coady argues, it would be best to leave the 
political regime in tact – despite the inherent risks. Nevertheless, the central aim 
is to ensure that the population can again realize “an independent political life 
for themselves after the war”, and Coady seems to acknowledge that sometimes 
                                                             
134 Coady 2008, p. 74-75. The importance of feasibility constraints in Coady’s theory is 
obvious. Aside from the practical problems related to realizing humanitarian 
objectives, he wars for idealism in just war theory, which leads e.g. to a 
misunderstanding of cultural and political realities of the invaded state.  
135 Coady 2008, p.87. This way, Coady seems to sidestep grounding humanitarian 
intervention in the protection of individual human rights.  
136 Note here that I separate those two concepts in my analysis: to me, Coady endorses a 
more negative concept of peace as opposed to the more positive peace that Augustine’s 
tranquillitas ordinis is often considered to be, in the sense of a comprehensive just and 
lasting peace. Nevertheless, Coady does presents this concept as a middle position, and 
it is similar to the concept of decent peace in my systematization.  
137 Coady 2008, p. 267. This is reflected in Coady’s understanding of just war theory in 
general as incorporating, e.g. through the conditions of last resort, proportionality and 
change of success, realist concerns. Just war theorists can agree with their moral theory 
should be realistic, concerned with consequences and real world circumstances, and 
focused on international stability. Coady 2008, p. 56. 
138 While realism is essential in the settlement of a war, that does not mean that any end 
should be accepted. Negotiations are constrained by ideas of desirable outcomes. 
Coady 2008, p. 275. 
139 Coady 2008, p. 275, 277. 
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this might require regime change.140 In negotiating the peace terms between 
former belligerents, they must seek a compromise, but not a potentially unjust 
compromise such as defended by Margalit. Rather, at least some of the interests 
of the former belligerents are honored in such compromise, and it reflects 
compassion and attentiveness for the interests of others.141 The peace that 
Coady has in mind is stable for the medium term; the disposition to violence 
and hostility is quieted, but need not be completely eliminated. It is sufficient 
that a resumption of war is no longer imminent.  
Hence, Coady too remains modest with regard to the normative goal of 
peace. He warns that moralism can be not only imprudent but also morally 
questionable. As he argues: “Consciousness of one’s being justified in war 
combined with zeal for a particular political outlook or ideology can lead to 
illicit or imprudent imposition of reconstruction policies that not only work 
against peace but deny people a legitimate autonomy.”142 Imposing democracy 
or a certain religion after war would amount to ideological imperialism. Coady 
criticizes theorists that endorse a positive just peace for being naïve (discussed 
hereafter). Given the difficulties encountered today, it would be better, 
according to Coady, to be “less utopian, less lofty, and less consumed by our 
own righteousness, in prescriptions and principles for reconstructing 
conquered nations”.143   
 
7.5.3 Orend’s Comprehensive Decent Peace  
 
Turning back to the developments in just war theory, Steven Lee argues that 
just war theory moves from the ‘national defense paradigm’ to a new ‘human 
rights paradigm’.144 Under this new paradigm, there is more concern for 
human security than for national security. Essentially, there is more emphasis 
on individual human rights at the expense of collective rights as national self-
                                                             
140 Coady 2008, p. 276 and Anthony Coady, ‘The Jus Post Bellum’, in: Paolo Tripodi & 
Jessica Wolfendale (eds.), New Wars and New Soldiers. Military Ethics in the 
Contemporary World, Surrey: Ashgate 2011, p. 56. 
141 Coady 2008, p. 268. This means that after war, it is unrealistic to want to “negotiate 
only with the morally pure”, argues Coady. In negotiating a compromise, one must be 
realistic and aimed at achieving a desirable outcome, which might require negotiating 
with partners which are not morally or politically respective, and which do not operate 
with a highly moral version of good faith. Coady 2008, p. 273-274.  
142 Coady 2011, p. 53. For a similar warning see: Evans 2014, p. 41-42. 
143 Coady 2011, p. 54-55. 
144 Lee 2012, p. 292- 295. 
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determination and the value of state sovereignty that is the expression of that. 
As it appears, the promotion of justice takes precedence over the preservation 
of a negative peace, which means that there is a stronger connection between 
peace and justice than in Walzer’s and Coady’s just war theory. The theorists 
that made this shift are often, but not always, more aspirational in their 
approach to normative theory.  
Brian Orend is influenced by Michael Walzer, but is overall more idealistic, 
more permissive regarding the just causes for war, and places more emphasis 
on individual human rights.145 As a result, the concept of peace he holds to be 
central moves more towards the positive side of the continuum. Peace is not 
only defined by an absence of collective violence, and the most basic human 
rights, but also by a certain political structure and a full(er) range of human 
rights. The balance between feasibility and desirability is evident when Orend 
argues that: “I view just war theory as a set of rules designed to protect human 
rights as best they can be, amid the rough-and-tumble circumstances of war”.146 
Nevertheless, he is far more idealistic – even naïve according to Coady147 – than 
Walzer. Orend claims that there are cosmopolitan duties owed to foreign 
populations to realize minimal justice.148 As a result, the creation of a minimally 
just state is an important part of the peace after war. A state is minimally just 
when it makes every reasonable effort to: (i) avoid violating the rights of other 
minimally just communities; (ii) gain recognition as being legitimate in the eyes 
of the international community and its own people; and (iii) realize the human 
rights of all its individual members”.149 The human rights that are most 
                                                             
145 Chapter 6 showed that Orend’s position on jus post bellum clearly changed throughout 
the years that he works on this subject, in line with the general shift in just war theory 
here described. Today, Orend defends the ‘rehabilitation model’ after war, which aims 
to realize a far more comprehensive and positive peace than in his earlier years. See e.g. 
Brian Orend, ‘Justice after War’, in: Ethics & International Affairs 2002, 16/1; Brian 
Orend, ‘Justice after War’, in: Eric Patterson (ed.), Ethics beyond War’s End, Washington 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press 2012. This also means that some theorists 
targeting Orend’s position are no (longer) correct in doing so (on these grounds). See 
e.g. Evans 2014, p. 34, still labeling Orend’s position on jus post bellum as ‘restricted’ 
(minimalist). 
146 Orend 2013, p. 5. 
147 Coady 2011, p. 54-55. 
148 Minimal justice is the threshold level for cosmopolitanism according to Orend, which 
means that above this threshold, states are permitted to give greater weight to the 
interests of the national population.  
149 Brian Orend, ‘Jus Post Bellum: A Just War Theory Perspective’, in: Carsten Stahn & 
Jann Kleffner, Jus Post Bellum. Towards a Law of Transition From Conflict to Peace, The 
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essential are the rights to security, subsistence, liberty, equality, and 
recognition.150 Realism makes Orend acknowledge that we cannot require 
perfection when it comes to the realization of human rights; but serious efforts 
and sincere intentions are required.151  
Obviously, Orend places more emphasis on individual rights. Sovereignty is 
conditional and can be easily overridden: whenever a state does not make a 
genuine effort to realize the human rights of its citizens, sovereignty is 
forfeited. After war, there is a presumption in favor of forcible regime change 
by the just victor in the defeated aggressor. While this might be difficult and 
costly, this is what a just war theory that factors in cosmopolitan duties should 
aim at.152 Orend clearly endorses a more comprehensive and positive peace as 
compared to Walzer and Coady, that we could call a comprehensive decent 
peace.  
 
7.5.4 Evans’s, Allman & Winright’s and Fabre’s Largely Positive Peace  
 
Mark Evans also emphasizes a ‘just and durable peace’ as the goal of just war 
theory. Evans’ concept of peace seems to have even more positive 
characteristics than the peace that Orend endorses. Indeed economic 
reconstruction is part of building a just peace (the distribution of material 
resources), but also the reconstruction of the physical infrastructure and 
reestablishment of socio-cultural institutions, practices and relationships.153 
The latter means that Evans presses on forgiveness and reconciliation as an 
essential part of the peace after war.154 There is an obligation to: “take full and 
proactive part in the ethical and socio-cultural processes of forgiveness and 
reconciliation that are central to the construction of a just and stable peace”.155 
As Evans indeed points out, while this largely positive concept of peace as 
normative goal of just war theory is part of non-ideal theory, it is clearly 
                                                                                                                                               
Hague: TMC Asser Press 2008, p. 43. 
150 Orend 2013, p. 35-36, 189. 
151 Orend 2013, p. 38. 
152 Orend 2013, p. 216. 
153 Mark Evans, ‘“Just Peace”. An Elusive Ideal’, in: Eric Patterson (ed.), Ethics beyond 
War’s End, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press 2012, p. 207-208. 
154 While not strictly necessary for reconciliation, forgiveness regards the emotional inner 
life of individuals and requires a certain feeling of ‘being at peace’ with what might have 
happened before or during the war. This means that in this respect, Evans moves to a 
fully positive peace that connects the outer and inner dimensions of peace.  
155 Evans 2012, p. 208-210. 
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oriented towards achieving an ideal concept of a just peace.156 Nevertheless, 
just war “theory itself does not shoulder an entire morality of peace 
building”.157 
Moving even further towards the positive side of the continuum is the peace 
endorsed by Mark Allman & Tobias Winright. They defend an aspirational 
Christian just war theory based on ‘love for one’s neighbor’, which includes 
respect for the enemy’s dignity.158 Hence, they reject a (largely) negative 
concept of peace as merely the cessation of violence and imposition of abstract 
principles. They declare to aim higher: as they state, there is a strong connection 
between peace and justice: “peace is an enterprise of justice”.159 And justice is 
understood as inclusive and substantive, negating self-interest, and envisaging 
an equitable peace in which reconstruction delivers systematic transformation 
and not merely regime change.160 The goal of just war theory is a just peace, 
explained as Augustine’s tranquillitas ordinis, which is restorative and 
reconciling in nature for both the victim and the aggressor nation.161 
Restoration after war is more comprehensive than merely realizing a minimally 
just state as Orend proposes.162 A just peace requires a certain political system 
which protects and guarantees human rights and pursues the common good. 
Consequently, they state that their Christian background leads them to endorse 
a just and lasting peace inclusive of robust human rights and “social, political, 
economic, religious, and cultural conditions that allow citizens to flourish, to 
pursue lives that are meaningful and worthy of creatures made in the image and 
likeness of God”.163  
A just peace is also reconciling in nature, which means that Allman & 
Winright require something more than relative stability and a satisfactory status 
quo. They emphasize reconciliation after war; and relations of respect, trust and 
friendship are part of the just peace they endorse. “The reconciliation phase 
seeks to turn enemies into friends and to bring emotional healing to the victims 
                                                             
156 Evans 2014, p. 35. 
157 Evans 2014, p. 36. 
158 Mark Allman & Tobias Winright, After the Smoke Clears. The Just War Tradition and Post 
War Justice, New York: Orbis Books 2010, p. 13. 
159 Allman & Winright 2010, p. 6. 
160 Allman and Winright here quote Adrian Pabst, whom they say to agree with on his 
vision on justice after war. Allman & Winright 2010, p. 75. 
161Allman & Winright 2010, p. 8-9. 
162 Allman & Winright 2010, p. 152-160. 
163 Allman & Winright 2010, p. 159. 
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of war.”164 This results in long term stability. Although Allman & Winright 
state that the establishment of a just and lasting peace cannot be a cause for war, 
the just cause does not limit the subsequent peace as we have seen earlier. Their 
concept of peace encompasses many more positive characteristics than the 
vindication of the violated rights.  
And lastly, we should consider a cosmopolitan just war theorist. Taking 
serious the foundation of just war theory in individual human rights means, for 
various contemporary theorists under the name of ‘revisionism’, that just war 
theory should be seriously revised.165 Revisionist just war theory is 
cosmopolitan and individual-centered, instead of state-centered. On that basis, 
they propose different norms of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, which often means 
that the jus ad bellum becomes more permissive.166 Furthermore, as Seth Lazar 
and Laura Valentini interestingly pointed out recently, revisionists are 
aspirational, which is the third factor that indicates that revisionists would likely 
endorse a largely positive peace as the goal of just war theory.167  
                                                             
164 Mark Allman & Tobias Winright, ‘Growing Edges of Just War Theory. Jus Ante Bellum, 
Jus Post Bellum, and Imperfect Justice’, in: Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 2012, 
32/2, p. 102. 
165 E.g. Jeff McMahan, Killing in War, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009; Rodin 2003; 
Fabre 2012 etc. See further e.g. the Stanford entry on War by Seth Lazar: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/.  
166 Whereas it can also mean that the jus ad bellum becomes more restrictive, e.g. by 
rejecting a self-defense against a so-called ‘bloodless invasion’ as David Rodin does. 
Rodin 2003. 
167 Lazar and Valentini pointed out that the disagreement on the discrimination principle 
is a proxy battle for a deeper disagreement between traditionalists and revisionists 
about the nature and purpose of political philosophy. One of these deeper 
disagreements is precisely that balance between feasibility and desirability. As they 
demonstrate, traditional theorists defend the discrimination principle on concessive 
grounds. There are feasibility constraints that render it highly unlikely that a norm 
prohibiting the killing just combatants would be followed: it is very difficult for 
combatants to determine whether they fight a just war and whether their enemies are 
liable to be killed; as a feature of human nature, it is psychologically impossible for 
combatants to adhere to strict moral norms in the extreme circumstances of war in 
terms of dire peril, deaths, psychological trauma that they face; and combatants will 
nonetheless convince themselves that they are fighting a just war, which is often 
stimulated by propaganda and selective information of their political leaders. 
Revisionists acknowledge these constraints, but argue that the fact that it is unlikely 
that combatants comply with revised jus in bello norms does not render the norms 
invalid. Furthermore, they are much more optimistic with regard to the possibilities: it 
might be difficult for combatants to make this distinction, but it is certainly possible if 
they make enough effort. Seth Lazar & Laura Valentini, ‘Proxy Battles in Just War 
Theory. Jus In bello, the Site of Justice, and Feasibility Constraints’, in: David Sobel, 
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As revisionists have mainly considered the jus ad bellum and jus in bello, 
Cecile Fabre is one of the most eloquent revisionists, and also the first to give a 
systematic account of the character of the peace and jus post bellum after war.168 
Her account is founded on cosmopolitanism in which individuals are the 
primary units for moral analysis and concern.169 Fabre distinguishes between 
basic human rights (following Henry Shue) which protect goods and freedoms 
needed for individuals to lead a humane life (worthy of a human being), and 
non-basic human rights which protect goods and freedoms needed to lead a 
flourishing life.170 Placing the threshold higher than Orend, Fabre holds that 
cosmopolitan justice requires that individuals are capable of leading not only a 
minimally decent life (or minimal justice for Orend), but a flourishing life.171 As 
a result, peace for Fabre is: “a state of affairs where all individuals actually enjoy 
their human rights to the freedoms and resources they need to lead a 
flourishing life”.172 The capability to flourish means that individuals are 
autonomous – able to pursue their own conception of the good – and includes 
bodily integrity, basic health, emotional and intellectual flourishing and control 
over material resources and political environment.173 An example of a non-
flourishing life is having to take on repetitive, uncreative work, or being unable 
to enjoy the “cultural fabric of their society”.174 As it appears, this means that in 
Fabre’s just peace, outer and inner peace are connected. 
Compared to Walzer and Coady, who emphasize sovereignty and hold that 
collective rights as self-determination of a political community have intrinsic 
                                                                                                                                               
Peter Vallentyne, Steven Wall (eds.) Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy (vol. 3), 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2017. Draft available online: 
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/56301fcfe4b0b0dc3b73f211/t/5771d7149de4
bbb95cf21310/1467078422924/Proxy+Battles+Final+11-4.pdf.  
168 Fabre 2016. In this chapter I cannot do justice to Fabre’s complex and well-constructed 
argument.  
169 Fabre 2016, p. 2.  
170 Fabre 2016, p. 3. Fabre adjusted her position in Cosmopolitan War: instead of seeing a 
just world as one in which individuals enjoy opportunities for a minimally decent life, 
she now states that this is not demanding enough; there is a duty to ensure that all 
individuals can lead a flourishing life. Fabre 2012 and Cecile Fabre, ‘Rights, Justice, and 
War. A Reply’, in: Law and Philosophy 2014/33, p. 402. 
171 “One all have the resources required for a flourishing life, (…) the well-off have as a 
matter of right the personal prerogative to confer greater weight to their own goals and 
life-projects at the expense of the less well-off.” Fabre 2016, p. 4. 
172 Fabre 2016, p. 12. 
173 Fabre 2012, p. 19. 
174 Fabre 2014, p. 404. 
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value, Fabre’s states that these are completely reducible to the individual rights 
of the members of such political community.175 Hence, state sovereignty is only 
instrumentally valuable, e.g. for the discharge of cosmopolitan duties and for 
the promotion of human rights. Despite Fabre’s emphasis on individual human 
rights and wellbeing, her just war theory is far more permissive than 
‘Walzerian’ just war theory.176 It opens the door for additional just causes, as 
she allows e.g. for the possibility of ‘subsistence wars’: wars in defense of 
subsistence rights in cases of severe deprivation of the global poor against the 
global affluent.177 Finally, Fabre also argues that there must be long term 
stability and reconciliation between former enemies; it is not enough that 
former belligerents “no longer have a justified grievance against each other”.178 
As expected, Fabre endorses a largely positive peace as the goal of just war 
theory.  
 
7.6 Decent Peace 
 
Now let us turn to the central question: How should a just war theorist 
concerned with jus post bellum understand peace? There is obviously agreement 
on the fact that the peace that is aimed for is not a restoration of the situation 
quo ante bellum, but a better state of peace. Developments in just war theory 
result in a further shift towards a more positive understanding of peace. 
However, it is not quite clear how far this shift should go. How much better 
must the peace be? Must a just and lasting peace be understood as a decent 
peace or as a largely positive peace? Given the factors that determine how just 
war theorists think about peace, this is not a question answered easily. It namely 
involves passing judgment on deeper disagreements as to the appropriate level 
of idealization in just war theory, the scope of just war theory, and the right 
balance between collective and individual rights. Settling these disagreements 
in a satisfying way is not a task that is pursued here. Even so, this section 
                                                             
175 For a critique on this argument see: Anna Stilz, ‘Authority, Self-Determination, and 
Community in Cosmopolitan War’, in: Law and Philosophy 2014, 33/3. 
176 Statman forcefully objects to Fabre’s conception of just war theory, arguing that it is 
too demanding in some respects (not allowing self-defense to protect national 
sovereignty), and too permissive in other respects, notably the wide range of just 
causes for war and the justification for targeting non-combatants in war. Daniel 
Statman, 'Fabre's Crusade for Justice. Why We Should not Join', in: Law and Philosophy 
2014, 33/3. 
177 Fabre 2012. 
178 Fabre 2016, p. 12. 
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attempts to answer this question. Before that, it is noted that the differences 
between the two remaining positions on what constitutes a just and durable 
peace are smaller than they appear, since they revolve around the meaning of 
‘justice’ in just war theory, and since a corrective strategy is often adopted. 
Nevertheless, these differences cannot be completely dismissed, and a decent 
peace is defended as the proper normative goal of just war theory, based on the 
action guiding character of just war theory, its limited nature, and the risk for 
moral imperialism.   
 
7.6.1 Justice in Just War Theory 
 
The difference between theorists that endorse a decent peace and a positive 
peace – which they all call a just and lasting peace – revolves around the 
question as to what one understands to be ‘just’ in just war theory. As we have 
seen, some just war theorists balance ideal principles of perfect justice and 
prudential considerations in order to generate the best practical effects.179 
There is a relatively small gap between ‘ought’ and ‘can’. What is considered to 
be ‘just’ is a combination of different concerns such as these ideal principles, 
peace as absence of war, individual wellbeing and feasibility and prudence. This 
approach reflects what Evans calls an understanding of ‘justice as a rectificatory 
concept’, applicable to problems that arise in our flawed world.180 Aspirational 
just war theorists set the standard higher and press for ideal principles 
(distinguished from strict moral idealism as utopianism, since the non-ideal 
occurrence of war is acknowledged). These ideal principles reflect what Evans 
calls ‘justice as a pristine concept’,181 and they are also called ‘first best 
principles for war’, the ‘deep morality of war’, or in the case of peace, a ‘just 
peace simpliciter’.182 This concept of peace begins by ‘ought’ and as a 
consequence, the gap between ‘ought’ and ‘can’ is much larger. This means that 
our moral ideals are less compromised and that a positive peace as normative 
goal sets a more critical standard to assess current practice.  
                                                             
179 Compare Larry May’s concept of meionexia. Larry May, After War Ends. A Philosophical 
Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012, p. 6-10. 
180 Evans 2014, p 31.  
181 These remarks are part of a very interesting exploration of the meaning of justice in 
just war theory. See further: Evans 2014, p. 28-32. 
182 Fabre 2016, p. 12.  
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Could the main difference between those positions on peace be merely a 
matter of terminology about what is called ‘just’?183 One might think so, as it 
appears that while aspirational just war theorists set a higher standard, they 
ultimately correct these demanding moral norms. Although they appear 
aspirational, they are so primarily in theory, but not (necessarily) in practice. 
Feasibility constraints slip in through the backdoor as a corrective strategy. This 
correction can either be a part of the moral framework, e.g. as corrective just 
war criteria, or externally as an additional test; a correction independent of the 
demands of just war theory. Fabre follows both strategies. As we have seen, she 
defends a permissive just war theory. She however admits that the ad bellum 
criteria of proportionality and necessity are likely to stand in the way of a 
subsistence war being overall just: a war of the global poor against the global 
affluent would generally do poor people more harm than good. In effect, the 
just war theory she defends is permissive in theory, but might not justify more 
wars than the established self- or other-defensive wars and humanitarian 
interventions in practice.  
But feasibility constraints also work as a correction independent of what is 
deemed ‘just’ in the aftermath of war.184 Fabre distinguishes between a ‘just 
peace simpliciter’ and a ‘justified peace all things considered’. It is not always 
possible to realize a just peace in reality due to epistemic uncertainty, scarcity of 
resources and psychological constraints. Therefore, this ideal can justifiably be 
traded off in practice. “A justified all things considered peace is a compromise 
between ensuring that individuals’ human rights are secure and acknowledging 
that realizing a just and peaceful world is simply not possible.”185 This concept 
of a justified as opposed to a just peace brings us back to our concept of a decent 
peace. Namely, a justified peace is a peace in which individuals cannot lead a 
                                                             
183 Laura Valentini considers what she calls a ‘conciliatory’ attitude regarding similar 
differences in the positions of Jean Cohen and John Rawls. Valentini 2012, p. 657-658. 
184 Another notable example of this strategy is Jeff McMahan. McMahan challenges the 
discrimination principle, and argues that unjust combatants cannot justifiably kill just 
combatants since they lack moral guilt. While he acknowledges feasibility constraints, 
such as the inability of combatants to properly assess the justness of their cause due to 
the complexity and epistemic uncertainty, he rejects that these should influence the 
morally valid norms (‘the deep morality of war’). Nevertheless, given the problematic 
consequences of institutionalizing these moral rules, the legal framework must uphold 
the traditional discrimination principle. Jeff McMahan, ‘The Morality of War and the 
Law of War’, in: David Rodin & Henry Shue (eds.), Just and Unjust Warriors. The Moral 
and Legal Status of Soldiers, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008, p. 32. 
185 Fabre 2016, p. 13. 
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flourishing life, but in which nevertheless their basic rights are secured and they 
can lead a minimally just life. A post war situation that falls below this threshold 
would amount to injustice. Regarding restitution after war for example, Fabre 
holds that reparations for wrongdoings of war is a component of a just peace, 
but resources and epistemic constraints mean that they must be replaced by 
non-reparative reconstruction efforts (economic redistribution) in a justified 
peace. Furthermore, in this realistic justified peace, the addressees of these 
reconstruction efforts are not only the former belligerents but also outsiders.186 
Hence for Fabre, there are different gradations of justice: a peace can be unjust 
((largely) negative peace), justified (decent peace), or just tout court (largely 
positive peace).187  
The last strategy is also followed by the other theorists that endorse a largely 
positive concept of peace. Feasibility constraints constitute for Evans an 
additional test separate from this theory of the justice of the aftermath of war. If 
a just peace cannot be achieved in practice, then we must be prepared to settle 
for a “suboptimal acceptable peace”.188 Evans is very clear that this 
‘compromise’ is not a part of justice in the aftermath of war; it is rather a 
subsidiary principle that, in the case of the practical impossibility to secure 
justice, determines what actions are then justified (but not just) all things 
considered.189 Even Allman & Winright, the most idealist of the bunch, admit 
that in rare cases, we might have to settle for a tolerably just, or ‘suboptimal 
acceptable peace’. But aside from this very small concession to feasibility 
constraints, they argue that “any stepping back from this rigorous 
interpretation of the criteria (a just and lasting peace) makes for a less honest 
just war theory”.190 As such, they primarily warn for entering this “slippery 
slope” of allowing political realism into just war theory.191  
This shows that just war theorists disagree less than initially appeared. 
Whereas some consider a decent peace to be a just peace, and others consider a 
decent peace an acceptable justified peace, they largely agree on its substance – 
basic human rights are secured – and that this is likely to be the goal of just war 
theory in practice. The main difference however is not merely one of 
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terminology. While a largely positive peace might (often) be unachievable in 
practice, the importance of setting this normative goal for just war theory 
cannot be dismissed that easily. Walzer will not aim for a largely positive peace 
because he considers that undesirable, while Fabre will not aim for a less than 
largely positive peace when that is not necessary. In other words, theorists as 
Fabre hold onto this concept of peace as the regulative ideal of just war theory, 
guiding the aftermath of war in a certain direction. The question is whether that 
is desirable.  
 
7.6.2 Defense of Decent Peace  
 
As opposed to Evans, Allman & Winright and Fabre, this chapter suggests we 
should not seek a just positive peace after war, while being prepared – all things 
considered – to settle for justified decent peace. Rather, a decent peace after war 
is a just peace. Three arguments are presented for this claim.  
 First, a decent peace is the appropriate normative goal given the specific 
character of just war theory. As became clear, just war theory recognizes that 
war is a great evil in terms of overall death, suffering and destruction, but it also 
recognizes that war is a part of real world politics. It is premised upon this 
recognition of the evil of war, and just war theory’s main and most important 
task is to limit the horrors that are inherent to it. It is an action guiding theory, 
applicable to the flawed non-ideal world that we live in ‘here and now’. As we 
have seen, a balance between feasibility and desirability is therefore essential. In 
order to be effective, just war theory needs to offer norms which are both 
achievable in and after real world wars, as well as desirable – explained often, 
but not necessarily in terms of human rights.  
 This means that circumstances and psychological motivations must be 
incorporated in just war theory insofar as they constrain the feasibility of 
limiting war and achieving peace in the real world. It must make concessions to 
constraints regarding e.g. politics, institutions and culture (e.g. that imposing 
democracy has proved far more difficult in the absence of certain social 
structures) as well as to psychological constraints, and prescribe norms that are 
neither overly demanding to the extent that they intolerably diverge from what 
national interests require, nor are at odds with our commonsense morality.192 
One can of course disagree on the proper balance between feasibility and 
desirability. Nevertheless, Joseph Carens’ comments in this respect might be 
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helpful, “the assumptions (a realistic or idealistic approach) we adopt should 
depend in part on the purposes of our inquiry.”193 Given the theory’s role as 
action guiding normative theory, feasibility constraints are not only a part of 
just war theory, but are part and parcel of it. Hence, the balance between 
feasibility and desirability in the concept of decent peace seems the most 
appropriate.  
Second, we do not need a positive peace as regulative ideal – based on a 
‘pristine’ conception of an ideal just world194 – to guide just war theory and 
shape jus post bellum, since that would exceed the limited nature of just war 
theory. The shift in just war theory means that a just peace is not only backward 
looking, but also forward looking. Nevertheless, its limited nature suggests that 
we should not look forward too far. Just war theory is not a vector for the 
realization of human rights broadly perceived, but instead is there to protect the 
most fundamental values in the messy and complex reality of war and its 
aftermath. It is a problem centered theory, designed to regulate the specific 
occurrence of war. As a result, its branches offer norms and imposes 
obligations that are far more narrow and limited than any general ideal or 
aspirational normative theory. Setting such a high standard overpromises what 
victors after war could and should achieve. As Steven Lee points out, the idea 
that war can serve morally lofty goals increases the danger that it will be used 
without the sort of restraints that are central to just war theory. A positive peace 
will not be achieved in the foreseeable future, and this makes jus post bellum an 
ongoing process with no clear end in sight, guided by some ideal of a just world 
in the distant future. Given the specific domain that just war theory applies to, 
this greatly overstretches the theory’s boundaries. Jus post bellum could easily 
become a ‘never ending story’ instead of being applicable to the temporary 
transition in the aftermath of war.  
And third, an additional problem that was noted already by Coady and 
Rawls, is the questionable universality of the comprehensive ideology that 
could be entailed in a positive peace. There is nowadays a fairly large agreement 
on the interdependence and universality of human rights.195 However, the 
                                                             
193 Carens 1996, p. 169. 
194 Evans 2014, p. 31. 
195 See the World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Program of Action, 
A/CONF.157/23 1993 (Vienna Declaration); UN General Assembly, World Summit 
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implementation of the full range of rights after war, especially if there is an 
emphasis on ‘liberal rights’, increases the risk for the well-known critique of 
moral imperialism, ethnocentrism and imposition of ‘Western’ values.196 This 
risk is particularly high when victors after war are considered to be obligated, as 
part of jus post bellum, to realize these human rights so that people in the war 
effected area can lead a ‘flourishing life’. If steps towards a positive peace are 
taken, this takes place outside the specific domain of just war theory; it cannot 
and should not be part of justum bellum. Seeking a just peace after war is a 
transitional process that ends whenever a sufficiently just peace, i.e. a decent 
peace is achieved. After the aftermath of war, just war theory seizes to be 
applicable and is substituted by a general theory of global justice.  
 
7.7 Conclusion  
 
The answer to Evans’ question “is it, indeed, justice to which we turn at war’s 
end?” would be yes.197 Or no, depending on what is understood to be just. 
‘Justice’ in just war theory might be misleading if one thinks of justice in terms 
of ideal, ‘pristine’ or perfectly just principles. From the outset, this is not what 
justice in just war theory can be. War is the lesser of two evils, and we should 
not be deluded into thinking that this lesser evil is actually something good. 
Walzer eloquently states: in the exceptional domain of war, “justice is always 
under a cloud”.198 There is a relation between just war theory and a general 
theory of justice (such as global justice), but just war theory’s domain is limited 
and protects only the most important values. This relation does not therefore 
mean that the general theory and its regulative ideal should be incorporated. 
                                                                                                                                               
Outcome stress the universality of human rights, they also acknowledge the ‘regional 
particularities’. Human rights “must be considered in the context of a dynamic and 
evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the significance of 
national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural and religious 
backgrounds”, and “the significance of national and regional particularities and various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind”. 
196 I cannot begin to cover this debate here, suffice for me here to point to the danger of 
imposing duties to realize certain human rights abroad as part of just war theory. See 
e.g Henry Shue, Basic Rights, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996; James Nickel, 
Making Sense of Human Rights, Malden: Blackwell Publishing 2007; William Talbott, 
Which Rights Should be Universal?, Oxford: Oxford Unversity Press 2005; and James 
Griffin, On Human Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2008.  
197 Evans 2014, p. 27. 
198 Walzer 2004, p. x. 
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We should not misappropriate the goal of a theory of global justice and try to 
realize it as part of just war theory. Just war theory is designed to prevent the 
worst excesses, not to realize or take steps towards an ideal just world, which is 
what a (largely) positive peace would amount to.  
More specifically, this chapter has argued that endorsing a largely positive 
peace as normative goal for just war theory is a bad idea for various reasons: it is 
ineffective since it sets a moral standard so high that it will not be achieved in 
practice; undesirable since it allows ongoing (even never ending) peace building 
with no clear end in sight, which goes well beyond the limited nature of just war 
theory; and potentially immoral, since it nearly conflates peace with a ‘pristine’ 
concept of justice, explained in terms of human rights broadly perceived, 
accompanied by a certain political structure and economic system, of which the 
universality might be contested. In the messy reality of war and war’s aftermath, 
it is wise to be modest. Therefore, this chapter warns against a too radical shift 
in just war theorizing.  
What should be realized at war’s end is a ‘just and lasting peace’ understood 
as a decent peace which is stable for a substantial period of time, in which basic 
human rights are secured, and which includes forward looking provisions to 
relieve the post war deprivation as e.g. food and shelter in the immediate 
aftermath of war. And while it might be difficult to precisely determine when a 
decent peace is reached, this goal makes just war theory most effective in 
limiting the awfulness of war. It provides a standard critical enough to assess 
the current practice and can be realized in the aftermath of war. What does this 
conclusion mean for the third branch of just war theory regulating the 
transition to peace?  As a decent peace shapes the scope and content of jus post 
bellum, it does not come as a surprise that this chapter suggests a similar 
moderate understanding of jus post bellum, that specifies how a just and lasting 
peace can be achieved after war. Jus post bellum would be a valuable part of the 
justum bellum system – conceptually sound, consistent qua character and an 
effective body of norms – when it is understood as moderate jus post bellum, 
concerned with individual wellbeing but remaining modest in what can and 
should be realized after war. This chapter hopes to have shown the necessity of 
further exploring such moderate jus post bellum. 
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8.  Decent Peace and Medium Jus Post Bellum  
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
The disastrous aftermath of the Iraq war shows the difficulties of post war 
peace building. The coalition partners rushed into a war without properly 
considering what to do once the war was ‘over’. There was, in other words, no 
adequate exit plan. An important lesson drawn by the Iraq Inquiry report is that 
it is better to have realistic and limited objectives than idealistic and overly 
optimistic objectives.1 Instead of setting the bar too high, the report suggests 
that caution is advisable. Situations such as this have contributed to the 
realization that, when it comes to war and subsequent peace building, we 
should better be more modest, deliberate and careful, e.g. by considering the 
risks and consequences, setting realistic goals, making a feasible plan, reserving 
funds, and acknowledging that actions can create responsibilities. This is 
reflected in the UN ‘Brahimi Report’. It recommends that in order to be 
effective, UN peacekeeping missions must be properly resourced and equipped, 
and operate under clear and operationally achievable, i.e. realistic mandates.2 
Strangely enough, just war theory seems to develop into an opposite 
direction. Not restrained by the cautionary approach resounding in the political 
reality of today, there is a shift towards an ever more encompassing jus post 
bellum. The shift towards maximalism means that more and more general 
values and individual human rights are incorporated, to the point that it appears 
as if a complete theory of global justice is brought into just war theory. 
Moreover, the underpinnings of that theoretical development are questionable. 
There remains substantial vagueness with regard to the concept of jus post 
bellum, that is not addressed to the extent that it should be. Fundamental 
                                                             
1 Iraq Inquiry, Executive Summary 2016, p. 134-136. 
2 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, A/55/305–S/2000/809 (Brahimi 
Report, p. 10-12.  Online at:  
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Gray, ‘The Use of Force and the International Legal Order’, in: Malcolm Evans (ed.), 
International Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2014, p. 645 and Alex Bellamy, 
Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect. From Words to Deeds, New York/London: 
Routledge 2011, p. 173.  
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questions have to do with the relevant duty bearers, the appropriate scope and 
content of post war norms, and the central goal that jus post bellum aims to 
realize.  
This book addressed that vagueness and critically assessed the concept of jus 
post bellum. Three questions were raised by the Iraq war: What do we want to do 
after war? What can we do? And what should we do? While we delved into the 
last question, this book showed that we cannot in fact separate these three 
questions. Moreover, the first two questions are essential when trying to 
answer the third: what we should do after war is determined by the right balance 
between what we ideally would want to achieve, and what we can achieve in 
practice. That balance between desirability and feasibility results in the defense 
of a modest ‘decent peace’ as the normative goal of just war theory, and a 
corresponding medium jus post bellum with an emphasis on responsible duty 
bearers. Hence, this book pleads for modesty in post war justice and warns for a 
too radical shift.  
This last chapter takes stock of the arguments made throughout – i.e. the key 
findings – and reassesses the main goal of this research in order to contribute to 
the development of a more consistent, coherent and effective jus post bellum. 
Finally, it returns to the three general challenges for just war theory and points 
out areas of future research.     
 
8.2 Key Findings 
 
The first aim of this book was to flesh out the concept of jus post bellum, and 
reduce vagueness and lack of clarity. In order to fully understand the concept of 
jus post bellum, the research topic was contextualized in chapters 2 and 3, both 
in terms of its alternatives and its historical perspective. The application to the 
Gaza war gave an idea of some problematic aspects of just war theory: the 
complex reality on the ground to which it is applicable, and the epistemic 
problems that make its norms, hence also jus post bellum, vulnerable for abuse. 
Furthermore, it was shown that jus post bellum is rooted in classic just war 
theory, and Vitoria’s and Grotius’ principle of moderation inspired the here 
developed contemporary understanding of jus post bellum. Regarding the 
critical assessment and development of jus post bellum, the key findings are 
drawn from chapters 4 to 7. 
Could jus post bellum improve just war theory? An integration – thus 
essentially a reintegration – of jus post bellum can indeed make just war theory 
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better equipped to cope with the changed character of war(fare) and the blurry 
boundaries between war and peace. Additionally, integrating jus post bellum 
benefits the general goal of just war theory: limiting war and realizing a just and 
lasting peace. Chapter 5 affirmed that it is not only desirable to integrate jus post 
bellum, but contrary to jus ante bellum, also possible to do so. Namely, jus post 
bellum is connected to just war theory’s other branches; offers norms that are 
independent but similar qua character; which applies to war related activities; 
can be grounded in the limited moral framework of just war theory; and (as 
general just war theory) addresses primarily (former) belligerents. However, 
these arguments are mainly valid for a limited conception of jus post bellum. 
That indicates that limited jus post bellum is more consistent with just war 
theory as a whole than a comprehensive maximalist jus post bellum.  
Although integrating jus post bellum can indeed improve just war theory, 
uncertainty on the responsible duty bearers still seriously jeopardizes this third 
branch. Who is responsible for jus post bellum? Seven conditions were proposed 
as foundation for post war duties: moral responsibility; outcome responsibility; 
causality; benefit; capability; community; and role responsibility. A system for 
assigning post war duties in concrete situations was developed. It was argued 
that such system should combine these seven – backward and forward looking 
– conditions. A tentative answer was given as to how we balance these 
conditions in concrete situations.  
The first step – as a precondition – in assigning post war duties is an 
assessment of the condition of capability. In order to halt post war deprivation 
and to help create a just and lasting peace, potential duty bearers need to be 
capable of making an effort to achieve this result. The second step entails an 
assessment of the conditions of moral, outcome and role responsibility. Thus, 
former belligerents are most likely responsible for jus post bellum. As third step, 
the conditions of causality, benefit and community further help in the 
distribution of post war duties. Based on this system, a nuanced version of the 
‘belligerents rebuild thesis’ was defended. If former belligerents are not capable 
of bearing that duty, other actors are responsible instead. In that case, the 
responsibility does not shift to an indeterminate ‘international community’, but 
this system aims at assigning post war duties to specific actors. Admittedly, it 
remains difficult to assign duties based on these conditions in practice, but this 
system does offer a guideline with regard to responsibility for jus post bellum.  
Next, the content and scope of jus post bellum was analyzed and the 
contemporary positions were mapped. The debate on jus post bellum is often 
197
JUS POST BELLUM AND THE NATURE OF PEACE 
characterized as an opposition between minimalism and maximalism, as 
regards: a short versus long timeframe; negative versus positive obligations; a 
limited versus a large array of norms; and the just cause as end versus achieving 
more than just that. It was demonstrated that this distinction is not appropriate 
to frame the contemporary positions on jus post bellum. Nevertheless, there are 
gradual variations qua content and scope of jus post bellum. A larger perspective 
is needed to pinpoint these variations, which shows that the content and scope 
of post war norms depend on two factors: the particular situation to which just 
war theory applies, and the general view on just war theory and international 
relations that is adopted. More concretely, the type of war and the nature of the 
involved state, coupled with a particular view on international relations – the 
role of the use of force, the concept of sovereignty, the rise of a cosmopolitan 
morality and the emphasis on individual human rights – explain the shift 
towards a more comprehensive maximalist understanding of jus post bellum.  
To fully understand this shift, we need to take an even larger perspective and 
assess the concept of peace that is central to just war theory. The maximalist 
shift in jus post bellum is part of a larger shift within just war theorizing towards 
a more positive concept of peace. Contemporary just war theorists understand 
a ‘just and lasting peace’ in two ways: as a ‘decent peace’ or as a ‘largely positive 
peace’, in connection with justice either as a ‘rectificatory’ or as a ‘pristine’ 
concept. Is that shift towards a positive ‘pristine’ peace and a comprehensive 
maximalist jus post bellum a good idea? This book warned for a too radical shift, 
and ultimately pleaded for understanding a ‘just and lasting peace’ as a decent 
peace that is ‘just enough’, accompanied by a medium jus post bellum that 
specifies how such peace must be achieved. Three arguments were presented 
for that claim. First, a decent peace is the appropriate goal given the specific 
character of just war theory as an action guiding theory. In order to be effective 
in limiting war, just war theory needs to offer norms that are both achievable in 
the real world, as well as desirable in terms of human rights or individual 
wellbeing. Feasibility constraints are part and parcel of just war theory, and a 
decent peace best accommodates these constraints while setting a desirable 
moral standard. A largely positive peace on the other hand, is more ambitious 
and therefore expectedly less effective.   
Second, maximalist jus post bellum aimed at a largely positive peace would 
exceed the limited nature of just war theory. Just war theory wants to protect 
the most important values in the messy reality of war. As such, just war theory 
inhabits an exceptional moral domain, more narrow and limited than our 
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‘normal morality’, and hence is distinct from general theories of e.g. global 
justice. Setting a largely positive peace as regulative ideal for the distant future 
would overstretch the boundaries of just war theory, and increases the risk that 
the theory is used for lofty goals disregarding the restraints that are central to it. 
As a problem centered theory, just war theory should not look too far beyond 
the war that it regulates. The third and last argument is the danger of imposing 
the values that make up a largely positive peace. Obligations to realize a broad 
array of human rights after war run the risk of moral imperialism, 
ethnocentrism and the imposition of Western values. Despite the unmistakable 
globalization and proliferation of individual human rights, respect for other 
peoples and cultures demands tolerance and modesty in just war theory.  
 
8.3 A more Consistent, Coherent and Effective Jus Post Bellum  
 
As is clear, jus post bellum can improve just war theory and make it better 
equipped to face contemporary challenges. But what type of jus post bellum 
should be integrated? A minimalist jus post bellum, aimed at restoring the status 
quo ante bellum, is not able to make the required improvement. And although 
maximalist jus post bellum appears to be better tailored for the political reality of 
today, the findings show the disadvantages of integrating such conception of jus 
post bellum. They rather suggests that we should aim to find a moderate middle 
way – inspired by Grotius’ principle of moderation – that one could call 
medium jus post bellum, which aims at realizing a just and lasting peace 
understood as a decent peace. This is similar to the ‘limited maximalist’ position 
as described in chapter 6. Although spelling out the specifics of this path to a 
decent just and lasting peace remains to be done, this appears to be a more 
consistent, coherent and effective jus post bellum.  
First, a medium conception of jus post bellum improves the theory. It offers 
more than a return to the status quo ante bellum, but remains more consistent 
with just war theory as a whole than maximalist conceptions. Medium jus post 
bellum offers norms that are related to and compatible with the other just war 
norms. As opposed to maximalist jus post bellum, medium jus post bellum does 
not exceed the limited nature of just war theory as a problem centered theory; is 
tolerant with regard to cultural differences and other, less fundamental values; 
and does not overstretch the theory’s boundaries. Therefore, integrating 
medium jus post bellum brings together the different aspects of just war theory, 
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makes it better equipped to face the post war challenges faced today, and is 
conceptually consistent with the character of just war theory.  
Second, medium jus post bellum, in which it is relatively clear who bears 
responsibility for what, is internally coherent as a body of norms. In short, it 
aims to create a decent and safe society after war, and is concerned with 
individual wellbeing but also with collective self-determination of peoples. 
Medium jus post bellum is determined by a selection of the most important 
human rights, notably to life, liberty and security. After the horrors of war, safety 
and security for the population are of the utmost importance. This means that 
the peace must be relatively stable, and that the grievances of former belligerents 
are quieted (although not necessarily disappeared).  
If there is a power vacuum, or the regime in place is not able to secure these 
most important human rights, imposed political reconstruction may be part of 
jus post bellum. Political reconstruction is limited and does not require the 
creation of a liberal democracy. In practice, this would usually mean that the just 
cause for war determines the scope of jus post bellum; the political regime after a 
self-defense against aggression might remain intact when the aggression is 
repelled and prevented for the foreseeable future, while a humanitarian 
intervention almost inevitably entails political reconstruction of the regime 
responsible for the humanitarian catastrophe. Nevertheless, jus post bellum 
should not look forward too far, and must try to restore sovereignty as soon as is 
reasonably possible, namely whenever it can facilitate people’s right to self-
determination. If the right to life is jeopardized by a lack of means of subsistence 
due to the war, providing these basic necessities of life is part of jus post bellum. 
Former belligerents are responsible for realizing jus post bellum, although other 
actors can be assigned post war duties when former belligerents are incapable. 
The system for assigning post war duties improves the coherence of medium jus 
post bellum.  
Third, medium jus post bellum is most effective in limiting the horrible 
effects of war. This has been an important theme throughout this book. Just war 
theory is an action guiding theory that aims to limit war, halt and remedy the 
damage, destruction and deprivation inherent to it, and build a just and stable 
peace. Just war theory will only be able to achieve these aims if it finds an 
appropriate balance between feasibility and desirability. Medium jus post bellum 
sets a high enough moral standard that is concerned with individual and 
collective wellbeing, but not so high that will not be achieved in practice (and is 
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therefore demotivating). Medium jus post bellum spells out the path towards a 
lasting peace which ‘just enough’, instead of perfectly just.  
 
8.4 Challenges and Further Research 
 
Is Walzer right in speaking of the ‘triumph’ of just war theory? If he is, just war 
theory nonetheless copes with significant challenges. We have seen three of 
those challenges: the vagueness and epistemic problems (chapter 2 and 5); the 
changing character of war (chapter 2 and 4); and the revisionist critique 
(chapter 7). Jus post bellum can be a partial answer to the changing character of 
war and the revisionist emphasis on the importance of individual human rights. 
Nevertheless, further research remains necessary.  
The first challenge to just war theory are the epistemic problems and the risk 
of abuse and manipulation. Just war theory offers norms that are to be applied 
to the variety of real world wars. One side of the coin is that these norms must 
be sufficiently general to be able to be widely applicable. However, the other 
side of the coin is that these norms are to a certain extent ‘vague’ and open for 
interpretation. The same norms can thus yield different conclusions regarding 
particular wars, as chapter 2 makes clear with regard to the Gaza war in 
2008/2009 and chapter 5 with regard to the Iraq war that started in 2003. It 
might be difficult to determine who is the ‘just’ belligerent and who is the 
aggressor. Often, both sides claim to be justified ad bellum, and they might both 
genuinely believe to be so. It is well possible that insufficient information is 
available to make a definitive judgment. Also, it is possible that both sides have 
some justness on their side, as Anthony Coady argues: “there will usually be a 
constellation of grievances and perceived wrongs on both sides that go to make 
up the casus belli”.3 This compelling idea of comparative justice means that there 
are rights and wrongs on the side of all belligerents.  
Not only does the general nature of the norms of the justum bellum lead to 
difficulties regarding application, it also means that they are prone to abuse and 
manipulation. As some critics argue, just war theory is used by political leaders 
as propaganda, giving their unjust wars an aura of legitimacy. In connection 
with the Iraq war, Andrew Fiala argues that “politicians use just war concepts to 
                                                             
3 Anthony Coady, Morality and Political Violence, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 2008, p. 90. 
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justify wars that are often chosen for other, less noble reasons.”4 It provides 
political leaders with the tools to sell their military adventures as ‘just wars’. 
The problems with application and abuse are a serious challenge for just war 
theory. However, this does not in itself invalidate the theory or diminish its 
value.5 Although just war theory is not always able to provide clear cut answers 
in every situation, it nonetheless structures the debate by providing an adequate 
moral framework. Just war theory can function as a critical theory, 
differentiating just and unjust wars. With regard to the Iraq war, the American 
government might have used just war language to justify that war, but it became 
clear that the Iraq war was in fact an unjust war.  
The second challenge is the contemporary character of war and warfare. 
The face of war has changed significantly throughout history, depending on 
factors such as political constellations and technical developments. The 
implications of two important aspects are not addressed in this book: the 
growing number of civil wars and the asymmetric character of these wars due 
to the prominence of non-state actors.6 A case in point is how to apply the 
criterion of legitimate authority to non-state actors. Chapter 2 provides another 
example: how to apply the principle of discrimination when it is particularly 
difficult to make that distinction – e.g. when a national army fights irregular 
militias, who refrain from wearing uniforms and attack from within densely 
populated areas. These ‘new’ characteristics of war give rise to the question: 
How to modify just war theory to these contemporary armed conflicts? 
Ideally, just war theory provides guidance for the great variety of 
international, civil and internationalized civil wars that exist today. The 
challenge for just war theory is to adapt itself as a flexible theory and seek ways 
in which its norms can be modified where necessary, in order to fit the political 
reality. This way, it remains capable of providing the needed guidance.7 This 
counts also for jus post bellum; when this concept is more fully developed, a next 
step is to give careful thought to the application of this branch to the aftermath 
                                                             
4 Andrew Fiala, The Just War Myth. The Moral Illusions of War, Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers 2008, p. ix. 
5 Michael Walzer, Arguing about War, New Haven: Yale University Press 2004, p. xii: 
disagreements don’t invalidate a theory.  
6 Many other developments in contemporary war(fare), such as the use of (unmanned) 
drones, could be mentioned here.  
7 For an important contribution in this regard see:  
Martin Rochester, The New Warfare. Rethinking Rules for an Unruly World, New York/ 
London: Routledge 2016. 
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of civil wars. This will not have radical implications for the here developed 
understanding of jus post bellum. Rather, jus post bellum could be adapted to 
these new characteristics, e.g. the system for the distribution of post war    
duties could be refined so that it accommodates non-state actors.    
Finally, there has long been a remarkable consensus on traditional just war 
theory as formulated by Walzer in 1977. This position is now challenged, and 
an alternative revisionist understanding has been developed by authors such as 
Jeff McMahan, David Rodin and Cecile Fabre. This is the third serious 
challenge to just war theory. This research has taken the ‘Walzerian’ position as 
point of departure, including its basic premises, such as exceptionalism 
(because of its specific characteristics, war is a separate moral domain), its 
foundation in a combination of collective values and individual human rights, 
the state centric perspective and focus on international wars. These premises 
are challenged by revisionists: they reject the fact that war is a separate moral 
domain, but instead argue that it is covered by the same morality that is valid in 
everyday life. They regularly use artificial examples as the ‘fat man’ to defend 
their moral claims. Revisionist just war theory is not statist (or collectivist) but 
fiercely individualist. That all means that revisionists reach different 
conclusions when it comes to the norms of jus ad bellum and jus in bello.  
With regard to jus ad bellum, revisionists question the permissibility of self-
defense (e.g. in response to a ‘bloodless invasion’ that does not harm the 
individual human rights of the population) but they are more permissive when 
humanitarian issues are at stake. With regard to the jus in bello, combatant 
equality is rejected and a revision of the discrimination principle is proposed. 
Traditional just war theory holds that just and unjust combatants have an equal 
moral standing. Revisionists however argue that just and unjust combatants 
cannot be morally equal. While just combatants are allowed to kill unjust 
combatants, the reverse is not the case. It is argued that “combatants fighting 
for wrongful aims cannot do anything right, besides lay down their weapons”.8  
The challenge is to assess how revisionism would work out for jus post 
bellum. Initially, it appears that there is a tension between this perspective and 
the more realistic perspective on jus post bellum here developed. Fabre (and 
other revisionists) propose more idealistic norms. At a practical level, however, 
a post hoc feasibility test can correct these ‘pristine’ norms. Given the specific 
character of just war theory, this might be a shortcoming in revisionist theory. 
The feasibility constraints are so fundamental that they must be integrated into 
8 Stanford entry on War.  
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just war theory on a theoretical level, so it is claimed here. In other words, 
feasibility must be part of the ‘justice test’. Nevertheless, the revisionist 
emphasis on individual human rights unquestionably influenced both this 
research and just war theorizing more generally. Furthermore, revisionists 
point to logical inconsistencies in the ‘Walzerian’ position. Given that one seeks 
to resist their radical conclusions, this shows the necessity of finding more solid 
foundations to strengthen this position.  
 
8.5 Relevance  
 
A modern just war theory must take the issue of post war justice into account. 
In sum, the findings provide the needed theoretical clarity on this relatively new 
and arguably important topic, and contribute to the development of jus post 
bellum. But over and above, the greatest hope of this research is that integrating 
this branch in just war theory indeed limits the negative effects of war, and 
supports the reestablishment of peace after real world wars. A medium jus post 
bellum, aimed at the transition to a decent peace, with an emphasis on the 
responsible duty bearers has the best chance to do that. This understanding of 
jus post bellum might be modest, but still could improve many post war 
situations such as in Iraq. 
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Summary 
Justice after War 
This book begins with the disastrous aftermath of the Iraq war, which 
demonstrates both the complexity and importance of post war peace building. 
Situations such as this raise three crucial questions: What do we want to do after 
war? What can we do? And what should we do? The first is a matter of hopes 
and ideals, the second a matter of strategy, and the third a matter of post war 
justice. Post war justice has come to the forefront of contemporary debates in 
the last decade, because the example of Iraq illustrates a broader development; 
characterized by the changing character of war, the increasing importance of 
the post war phase for military operations, and the complexities of 
contemporary peace building.  
Just war theory is a thriving part of legal and political philosophy, and is the 
leading normative theory on issues of war and peace. Traditional just war 
theory consists of two sets of norms: jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Satisfaction of 
the first justifies a certain war as a whole, and satisfaction of the second justifies 
the different acts that compose a war. Traditional just war theory gives little 
thought to the aftermath of war. Given the outlined development, the lack of 
guidance is now seen as problematic. Some theorists argue that the most 
difficult problem posed by contemporary warfare is achieving a stable, secure 
ending to it. Due to the urgent need for a coherent and effective body of norms 
governing the situation after war, just war theorists note that the theory is 
incomplete. This has led to a newcomer in just war theory: jus post bellum. This 
third branch is supposed to offer similar norms for the complex aftermath of 
war; its satisfaction justifies the peace after war. That is the subject of this 
research: post war justice in just war theory, or jus post bellum.  
Jus post bellum is welcomed today as part of the solution to post war 
challenges. The first proposal for jus post bellum dates from 1994 and since 
around 2004, there has been a steady trickle of publications on this new branch. 
In general, jus post bellum determines permissible action after war, and consists 
of norms that can roughly be divided into different categories: creating safety 
and security in the war affected area, achieving some form of reconstruction 
(political and general), compensation and reparations for the damage of war, 
pursuing criminal justice for crimes that have been committed both before and 
in the war, and enabling reconciliation between former enemies. However, 
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despite that important theorizing, there remains a problem in jus post bellum 
and the reflection thereon. As this third branch of just war theory is relatively 
new, it is not fully constructed or crystallized and there remains substantial 
vagueness. Furthermore, it is well-established that the goal of just war theory is 
a just peace, but that has yet to be clearly defined. As jus post bellum regulates the 
transition to peace, it is crucial to have a better grip on the concept of a ‘just 
peace’, in addition to the concept of a ‘just war’. Ergo, although jus post bellum is 
embraced by the majority of just war theorists, it is not yet quite mature as a 
full-fledged body of norms.  
The central problem that this research addresses is jus post bellum’s 
vagueness and lack of clarity. This leads to the following central question: How 
to clarify and develop the concept of jus post bellum? This general question 
results in more specific sub questions: How are just war theory’s norms applied 
to specific wars? What was the status of (what is now called) jus post bellum 
throughout the history of just war theory? Would jus post bellum conceptually 
fit into the contemporary theory? Who are the relevant duty bearers? What is 
the content and scope of jus post bellum? What are the strengths and weaknesses 
of the main positions? And what is the ultimate goal of just war theory and jus 
post bellum? These questions are answered in the subsequent chapters of this 
book. 
The book builds mainly on existing literature concerning just war theory and 
jus post bellum. The debate on jus post bellum is mapped and analyzed, key 
concepts, arguments and positions are systemized, and aspects of general just 
war theory, legal philosophy, and political philosophy are applied to questions 
of post war justice as a way to address unresolved issues. The aim of this 
research is twofold. The first aim is to flesh out the concept of jus post bellum. 
That way, this book reduces vagueness and aims to contribute to a good 
understanding of just post bellum. The second aim is a more critical assessment 
of jus post bellum. In order to really improve the theory, jus post bellum should be 
consistent with just war theory as a whole, form a coherent body of norms, 
should be well tailored for the political reality of today and effective in limiting 
the negative effects of war. This is the normative part of this research. This 
book ultimately pleads for modesty in post war justice, and defends a medium 
jus post bellum, emphasizing the importance of allocating post war duties to 
responsible duty bearers. 
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Inter Arma Silent Leges? About the Law's Problematic Relationship to 
War 
 
The second chapter discusses just war theory in general, applies its norms to a 
particular war, and raises two challenges: the epistemic problems and the 
complex reality on the ground. While the moral concepts of just war theory 
dominate the way many people think about war and peace, there are two rival 
perspectives on the ethics of war and peace. Pacifism takes the moral 
prohibition on killing – especially in conflicts between political communities – 
so seriously, that it rejects war. War can never be morally justified, and one 
must always seek nonviolent measures to address injustice. Realists reject the 
idea that moral principles are altogether applicable to international affairs. The 
international arena is characterized by struggle and power; and war is simply a 
part of this political reality. This chapter rejects these alternatives in favor of 
just war theory. It is argued that moral principles are applicable to the issue of 
war, and they can help in forming rational and well considered judgments. Just 
war theory offers the most important building blocks for discussions about 
particular wars.  
What are these building blocks? The three branches of just war theory 
provide different sets of norms and principles which can help to regulate war. 
The jus ad bellum entails the criteria of just cause, legitimate authority, right 
intention, last resort, reasonable chance for success, and proportionality. Three 
criteria fall under jus in bello: necessity, proportionality, and discrimination. The 
jus post bellum offers criteria that prevent the occurrence of ‘victor’s justice’. 
These criteria of jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum create an image of a 
just war that is initiated by one of the parties with just cause, waged by both 
parties in a limited fashion, and which ends with a just and lasting peace.  
These norms are subsequently applied to the Gaza War in 2008/2009. The 
debate on the justice of that war is considered, and this reveals two problematic 
aspects of just war theory’s norms: the complex reality on the ground, and the 
epistemic problems that make its norms, hence also jus post bellum, vulnerable 
for abuse. The complexities of the reality of today make the application of these 
abstract norms quite difficult. The Gaza war is not a clear-cut case of aggression 
and self-defense, which raises questions as to how the just war criteria should be 
applied. Furthermore, since they are very general, their application depends to a 
certain extent on a certain interpretation of the norms itself, a reading of the 
facts and on political preferences. In other words, while norms such as self-
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defense, proportionality, and non-combatant immunity are widely used in the 
public debate, this particular war shows that their application is often contested, 
and that they are susceptible to manipulation. 
 
Just War Theory in Historical Perspective and the Roots of Jus Post 
Bellum  
 
While jus post bellum appears to be a modern invention, this third branch is not 
entirely new. The third chapter consists of a historical contextualization of just 
war theory, with an eye to jus post bellum. It outlines four major periods: classic 
just war theory, the transition to the law of nations, the heyday of positivism, 
and the present revival of just war theory.  
1. Already in early history, just war theorists reflected on the morality of war. 
A comprehensive account of the idea of a just war, based on universal 
natural law, was developed by the Cicero (106-43 BC). Cicero identifies a 
central idea of just war theory, namely that the normal state of affairs is 
peace, and that war forms the exception that can only be justified as an 
instrument to protect or reestablish that peace. Saint Augustine (354-430) 
also emphasizes that peace is the ultimate end of war; which makes war a 
goal oriented activity. Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) confirms that 
teleological character of war. Even those who seek war desire peace; they 
want to replace a ‘defective peace’, in which they are at peace on terms 
contrary to their desires, by a ‘more perfect peace’. But while this laid the 
foundation for jus post bellum, these post bellum norms were still quite 
general. This changed with the theory of Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1546), 
who provides a comprehensive and clear account of all three branches of 
just war theory. Moderation after the war is needed, as well as humility and 
proportionality.  
2. A clear shift in theorizing about war and peace took place after the brutal 
religious wars in Europe. The Peace of Westphalia gave rise to modern 
nation-states. These sovereign states needed to regulate their external 
affairs, which led to the codification of international rules: the so-called law 
of nations. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) marks the difference between 
traditional natural law and the law of nations (jus gentium), the latter being 
international law based on the will of independent nations. In this new 
‘dualist’ system, these two systems are distinct. Although this law of nations 
imposes few restraints on victors after war, the victor should however be 
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guided by the moral principles of moderation and clemency. Grotius 
claimed that it is essential to keep in mind the prospect of peace in the midst 
of a war, and therefore to let considerations of humanity govern both the 
hostilities and the period after the war. 
3. The following period was the heyday of positivism. This period set the stage 
for modern international law, with an enormous growth of codified legal 
rules. Questions of war and peace were considered from a purely legal 
framework, and moral just war theory became marginalized. War was an 
accepted instrument of states in the pursuit of their national policy goals. 
Consequently, war was seen as a ‘normal’ condition in international 
relations. There was no more reference to moral post bellum principles; the 
era of ‘victor’s justice’ had well and truly arrived.  
4. The outbreak of the First World War marks the beginning of the present 
period. War became a matter of legal and moral consideration again. 
Certain key principles of traditional just war theory reappeared, such as just 
cause, and space was opened for (the revival of) jus post bellum. In this 
period, the League of Nations and subsequent United Nations were 
established. War was gradually rejected as a normal instrument in the hands 
of states. Today, war is perceived as a matter of global concern, and peace is 
again the normal ‘default’ state of affairs. Both legal norms and norms 
derived from just war theory are invoked in discussions on war and peace. 
For the jus post bellum, this means that the way states act after war is no 
longer a matter of discretion of the states involved. While the UN system is 
far from perfect, the organization plays an increasingly important role in 
post war peace building. Its focus on a durable peace after a war led to the 
1995 ‘Agenda for Peace’ and the 2005 ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine. A 
Peace Building Commission was established to help states in the transition 
from war to a durable peace. These developments show the contemporary 
emphasis on postwar justice. Moreover, now that norms of jus ad bellum and 
jus in bello are increasingly codified, it seems time to do the same for jus post 
bellum. 
 
The Blurry Boundaries between War and Peace. Do we Need to Extend 
Just War Theory? 
 
The fourth chapter addresses another challenge for contemporary just war 
theory (in addition to the challenges raised in the second chapter). While just 
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war theory is often said to be the leading position on the morality of war, it is in 
fact struggling to keep up with the changing international reality. It is premised 
upon a certain conception of war – as armed conflict between two states – and 
on a clear demarcation line between the situation of war and the situation of 
peace. This however, seems to no longer fit the political reality. Many agree that 
war itself and the way in which it is waged are different today as compared to 
earlier in history (the debate on the ‘new and old wars’). An important trend is 
that the number of wars between the armies of two states has declined since the 
Second World War. Also, it is often unclear whether a violent conflict qualifies 
as war, making it more difficult to separate the paradigm of war from that of 
peace. More often than not, we find ourselves in a grey area. This political 
reality, the changed character of war(fare), and the often blurry boundaries 
between war and peace raises questions of relevance and applicability.  
An extension of just war theory seems to be a sensible way to ‘modernize’ 
just war theory, making it better equipped to face this challenge. A branch called 
jus ante bellum, preventive peacemaking, is sometimes suggested to precede jus 
ad bellum. Its norms would apply in peacetime, in the absence of a particular war 
or threat of war. The content of what is proposed for this branch varies: jus ante 
bellum is proposed in order to prepare for war in general (e.g. instructing the 
military on jus in bello), or it is proposed in order to prevent war from occurring 
at all. This latter conception of jus ante bellum is also referred to as jus in 
abolitione belli or ‘just peacemaking’. Jus post bellum, justice after the war, is the 
welcomed branch that could provide post war guidance. It is used to refer to 
either a body of legal norms or moral norms, or both, aimed at regulating the 
transition from war back to a ‘normal’ state of peace. As such, it provides a 
framework guiding political and military action, and it forms a standard which 
can be used to evaluate and judge specific post war situations.  
This chapter explores a prima facie case for a four partite just war theory. 
Nevertheless, it is argued that it is not a good idea to integrate jus ante bellum 
into just war theory. It does not conceptually fit in as it consists of general 
guidelines instead of moral norms, the regulated activities and the addressees 
deviate from the established branches, and the foundation must be located 
entirely outside just war theory. Moreover, the goal of a just and durable peace 
would not, as perhaps expected, benefit from an integration of jus ante bellum 
because its guidelines are too indeterminate, idealistic and demanding 
compared to traditional just war theory. Aside from these conceptual 
difficulties and the infeasibility, adopting jus ante bellum would run the general 
240
 SUMMARY  
 
 
risk of inflating just war theory as a whole.  
On the contrary, jus post bellum can be integrated. Namely, jus post bellum is 
conceptually connected to just war theory’s other branches, it offers norms that 
are independent but similar qua character and content, these norms apply to 
war related activities, they can be grounded in the limited moral framework of 
just war theory, and (as general just war theory) they address primarily (former) 
belligerents. However, these arguments are mainly valid for a limited 
conception of jus post bellum: minimalist jus post bellum is more consistent with 
the entirety of just war theory than a comprehensive maximalist jus post bellum. 
Integrating only a limited account of jus post bellum into the theory would be a 
good idea. This way, just war theory is more ‘complete’ in offering the required 
moral guidance in the contemporary political reality while at the same time 
conceptually leaving just war theory intact, and minimizing the risk of inflating 
and devaluating the theory.  
 
On the Duty to Reconstruct after War. Who is Responsible for Jus Post 
Bellum?   
 
After war, how should we distribute post war duties? It is far from clear who is 
responsible for realizing jus post bellum. This uncertainty about specific duty 
bearers might lead to a situation in which no one will properly acquit these 
duties, and the critique could be raised that jus post bellum is in fact merely 
empty rhetoric. For the theory to be action guiding and effective, it is crucial to 
distribute post war duties. In the contemporary debate on jus post bellum, 
responsibility is assigned to different actors, based on different moral or 
prudential arguments. Two main positions can be distinguished. The first 
position holds that post bellum duties should be assigned to the states that took 
part in the war: the former belligerents. Michael Walzer is an important 
representative of the ‘belligerents rebuild thesis’. This position is based on the 
idea that post bellum duties are implied in the cause for war, and on the idea that 
the just victor is responsible based on the Pottery Barn Rule: ‘you break it, you 
own it.’ Others, among them James Pattison, reject the ‘belligerents rebuild 
thesis’, because assigning post bellum duties to belligerents leads to unfair and 
imprudent outcomes. These theorists defend the second position, the ‘universal 
rebuild thesis’, which holds that the international community as a whole is 
responsible for rebuilding after war. But if this is so, then there need to be 
certain conditions that can distribute specific duties (e.g. to reconstruct) to 
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specific actors. This means that we need a comprehensive theory on 
responsibility for jus post bellum.  
The fifth chapter explores the issue of responsibility, and answers two 
questions: 1. Which conditions can serve as the foundation for post war duties?; 
and 2. How to balance these conditions in concrete situations? David Miller’s 
theory on responsibility is used to address these questions, since the question 
on how to assign post war duties is essentially a question about collective 
remedial responsibly: Which states are responsible for remedying postwar 
damage and destruction? Six conditions for assigning remedial responsibility 
are discussed and applied to various post war situations: moral responsibility 
(guilt), outcome responsibility (contribution to a certain outcome), causality, 
benefit (past or future benefits), capability, and community. A seventh 
condition further helps to gain insight into the foundation for remedial 
responsibility after war: H.L.A. Hart’s concept of role responsibility.  
The second question involves setting up a system for assigning the duty to 
reconstruct to specific actors in concrete situations. It is argued that instead of 
picking one of these conditions as the foundation for post war duties, we need a 
system that combines these seven backward and forward looking conditions. 
Such comprehensive system should do justice to the morally relevant 
considerations, while at the same time remaining focused on the aim of halting 
post war deprivation. The first step in allocating post war duties is determined 
by the condition of capability, which functions as precondition for assigning 
remedial responsibility. In order to halt post war deprivation and help create a 
just and lasting peace it is prerequisite that an actor is capable to achieve (part 
of) this goal. The second step is determined by the conditions of moral, 
outcome, and role responsibility. War involves intentional and collectively 
inflicted destruction, and is a great evil. Since there is a strong presumption that 
actors bear the burdens of their own actions, moral and outcome responsibility 
must remain important considerations when assigning the duty to reconstruct. 
Also, states can be responsible for post war reconstruction because of their 
specific role (e.g. as humanitarian intervener) and the promise of achieving 
certain results, which creates legitimate expectations. As third step, the 
conditions of causality, benefit and community further help in the distribution 
of post war duties.  
This system thus presumes that belligerents are responsible for 
reconstruction after war. Nevertheless, it is assumed that it is morally 
unacceptable for people to be left in a deprived situation after war. Therefore, 
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the aim of halting post war deprivation and of building peace compels us to 
widen the scope of responsibility beyond the belligerents in certain situations. 
The ‘belligerents rebuilt thesis’ must therefore be understood in a more 
nuanced way than it initially appeared: belligerents are not solely responsible. If 
they cannot bear the duty to reconstruct themselves, other actors are remedially 
responsible instead. In that case, the duty to remedy post war deprivation does 
not shift to an indeterminate ‘international community’. Rather, the various 
conditions can be used to assign the duty to reconstruct to other specific actors. 
And while this might not make indisputably clear who is responsible after war, 
this system does help to distribute post war duties, which is essential for an 
effective jus post bellum. 
 
Jus Post Bellum. A Case of Minimalism versus Maximalism?  
 
The debate on jus post bellum is often characterized as a debate between two 
opposing camps: the so-called ‘minimalists’ versus the ‘maximalists’. How are 
these two positions characterized and what is the difference between them? 
The minimalistic or restricted position on just post bellum supposedly aims to 
restrict post war behavior and, therefore, consists mainly of negative moral 
imperatives. For example, there is a presumption against reconstruction of the 
defeated state. Victors are permitted to secure the cause that justified the war, 
but nothing more than that. This stems from the wish to prevent excesses by 
victors acting out of self-interest. This restricted understanding of post war 
norms means that they are relevant during a fairly short time-span: they apply 
to the end of war and its immediate aftermath. 
The maximalist or extended position on jus post bellum is more ambitious. Jus 
post bellum is said to consist mainly of positive obligations, determining what 
actors are allowed or even obliged to do after war. Instead of fear for victors 
taking advantage of the defeated party, thus doing too much, maximalists fear 
that victors will leave having done too little. Maximalist jus post bellum therefore 
goes beyond addressing the injustice that was the cause for the war. The norm 
of political reconstruction is more broadly interpreted and additional norms 
are: forgiveness and reconciliation, reconstruction of infrastructure, economic 
development, and compensation for environmental damage. As a consequence 
of these broad and varied commitments, more time will be needed for the 
acquittal of these obligations. Therefore, maximalist jus post bellum continues to 
be applicable for a longer period after the end of the war.  
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However, sixth chapter makes clear that we cannot make this distinction so 
easily; it is simply not this ‘black and white’. More often than not, contributions 
to the debate can hardly be labeled as either minimalist or maximalist. While the 
prevailing characterization of these two positions (negative versus positive 
obligations, limited versus extensive norms, a short versus long timeframe, 
limited versus unlimited by the just cause) might have counted for a position 
called ‘minimalism proper’, this position is today abandoned. Therefore, this 
characterization has lost its usefulness. In essence, all contemporary accounts of 
jus post bellum are maximalist to a certain extent. Maximalism is the new 
standard of normative thinking about jus post bellum.  
There are nevertheless gradual differences between the main positions. 
What then determines the content and scope of jus post bellum? A larger 
perspective is needed to pinpoint these variations. This shows that the content 
and scope of post war norms depend on two factors. First, the particular 
situation to which just war theory applies, notably the type of war and the 
nature of the involved state. Second, the general view on just war theory and 
international relations that is adopted, including ideas on the role of the use of 
force, the value of sovereignty, the rise of a cosmopolitan morality and the 
emphasis on individual human rights. Together, these factors explain the shift 
towards a more comprehensive maximalist understanding of jus post bellum.  
 
Just Peace after War        
 
The axiomatic goal of just war theory is a ‘just and lasting peace’. Strangely 
enough, it is far from clear what that is exactly. This is a problem: the concept of 
peace is central to just war theory, and jus post bellum in particular, but it often 
remains implicit and vague. The shift towards a more comprehensive, 
maximalist jus post bellum makes this problem even more pressing. Hence, the 
central question in the seventh chapter is: How should a just war theorist 
understand peace, insofar that peace is the goal of just war theory, taking into 
account the theory’s middle position between political realism and moral 
idealism?  
This first part of this chapter aims to construct a conceptual toolkit. The 
general nature of peace is analyzed, and three different facets are discussed: the 
temporal element of peace (temporary versus eternal), the spatial element of 
peace (inner versus outer), and the character of peace (negative versus positive). 
This is used to sketch a continuum of five concepts of political peace, ranging 
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from a purely negative peace, to a fully positive peace and in between a largely 
negative peace, a decent peace, and a largely positive peace. Which concept of 
peace can be the goal of just war theory? David Estlund’s theory on the role of 
feasibility constraints in normative political philosophy helps to shed light on 
this question. This explains: 1. Just war theory’s position in between strict 
political realism and moral idealism; 2. Why the outer two concepts cannot be 
the goal of just war theory; and 3. How to compare and assess the remaining 
three concepts of peace as potential goal of just war theory.  
In the second part of this chapter, the proposed tool kit is used to map the 
debate and make explicit the sometimes implicit positions on peace. It appears 
that although most just war theorists agree that a ‘just and lasting peace’ is the 
goal of just war theory, they in fact fundamentally disagree on what constitutes 
such a just peace. Also, there is a shift in just war theorizing towards a more 
positive concept of peace. Contemporary just war theorists understand a ‘just 
and lasting peace’ in two ways: as a ‘decent peace’ or as a ‘largely positive peace’. 
Michael Walzer is a representative of a decent peace. The connection between 
peace and justice is strong, but minimalist, he argues. More concretely, this 
means that the peace after war involves the reconstruction of a sovereign state 
which is a safe and decent society, determined by a minimal conception of 
human rights, and an emphasis on collective self-determination. Other just war 
theorists move further towards the positive side of the continuum. Cecile Fabre 
is cosmopolitan, individual-centered, and overall more idealistic. Fabre holds 
that a just peace after war entails that individuals are capable of leading not only 
a minimally decent life but a flourishing life, and that requires e.g. bodily 
integrity, basic health, emotional and intellectual flourishing and control over 
material resources and political environment. 
Upon a closer look however, it seems that these aspirational theorists are so 
primarily in theory, but not in practice. They correct that goal of a largely 
positive peace, but this is an ex post feasibility test. For example, Fabre 
distinguishes between a ‘just peace simpliciter’ and a ‘justified peace all things 
considered’. Because it is not always possible to effectuate a just peace in reality, 
that ideal can justifiably be traded off. This concept of a justified as opposed to a 
just peace brings us back to our concept of a decent peace. As a result, the goal 
of a largely positive peace, or just peace simpliciter, functions as regulative ideal.  
How should a just war theorist, concerned with jus post bellum, understand 
peace? The shift towards a more positive understanding of peace should not go 
too far, even if it functions primarily as regulative ideal. This chapter argues that 
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we should not seek a largely positive peace after war while being prepared – all 
things considered – to settle for justified decent peace. Rather, it might be that a 
decent peace after war is a just peace. Three arguments are presented for this 
claim.  
The first is related to the specific character of just war theory. Just war 
theory wants to limit the awfulness of war. It is an action guiding theory, 
applicable to the flawed non-ideal world that we live in. In order to be effective, 
just war theory needs to offer norms which are both achievable in the real 
world, as well as desirable – explained often in terms of human rights. This 
means that just war theory must make concessions to circumstances (politics, 
institutions and culture, e.g. imposing democracy might be difficult in the 
absence of certain social structures) and psychological motivations, insofar as 
they constrain the feasibility (practical possibility) of limiting war and achieving 
peace in the real world.  
Second, we do not need a largely positive peace as regulative ideal since it 
would exceed the limited nature of just war theory. Just war theory is not a 
vector for the realization of human rights broadly perceived, but instead is there 
for protecting the most fundamental values in the messy and complex reality of 
war and its aftermath. It is a problem-centered theory, designed to regulate the 
specific occurrence of war. The idea that war can serve morally lofty goals 
increases the danger that it will be used without the sort of restraints that are 
central to it. Setting a largely positive peace as regulative ideal – based on an 
overambitious human rights approach – will make jus post bellum an ongoing 
process with no clear end in sight, guided by some ideal of a just world in the 
distant future. Given the specific domain to which just war theory applies, this 
greatly overstretches the theory’s boundaries.  
Third and related, there is the danger of moral imperialism, ethnocentrism 
and imposition of ‘Western values’. The implementation of the full range of 
rights after war, especially when emphasizing ‘liberal rights’, increases the risk 
for the well-known critique of Western imperialism. This risk is particularly 
high when victors after war are obligated, as part of jus post bellum, to realize 
these human rights so that people in the war affected area can lead a ‘flourishing 
life’. If steps towards a positive peace are taken, that should take place outside 
the domain of just war theory.  
Hence, endorsing a largely positive peace as normative goal for just war 
theory is a bad idea for various reasons: 1. It is ineffective since it sets a moral 
standard so high that it will not be achieved in practice; 2. Undesirable since it 
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allows ongoing peace building with no clear end in sight, which goes well 
beyond the limited nature of just war theory; and 3. Potentially immoral, since it 
nearly conflates peace with a ‘pristine’ concept of justice, explained in terms of 
human rights (broadly perceived), potentially accompanied by a certain political 
structure and economic system, of which the universality is contested. In the 
messy reality of war and war’s aftermath, it is wise to be modest.  
What should be realized at war’s end is a ‘just and lasting peace’ understood 
as a decent peace, which is stable for a substantial period of time and in which 
basic human rights are secured. This might require forward looking provisions 
as part of jus post bellum – e.g. food and shelter – to relieve post war deprivation 
in the immediate aftermath of war. And while it can be difficult to precisely 
determine when a decent peace is reached, or what it entails exactly, this goal 
makes just war theory most effective in limiting the awfulness of war.  
 
Decent Peace and Medium Jus Post Bellum  
 
The examples of wars with disastrous aftermaths have led to a more cautionary 
approach in the political reality of today. International reports stress the 
importance of e.g. considering the risks of military interventions, setting 
realistic goals and a feasible exit strategy. Oddly enough, just war theory seems 
to develop in an opposite direction: there is a shift towards an ever more 
encompassing jus post bellum. This book critically assessed the concept of jus 
post bellum. Three questions were raised by the Iraq war: What do we want to do 
after war? What can we do? And what should we do? While this book delved 
into the last question, it shows that these three questions cannot, in fact, be 
separated. Moreover, the first two questions are essential when trying to 
answer the third: what we should do after war is determined by the right balance 
between what we ideally would want to achieve, and what we can achieve in 
practice. That balance between desirability and feasibility results in the defense 
of a ‘decent peace’ as the normative goal of just war theory. Hence, this book 
pleads for modesty in post war justice and warns for a too radical theoretical 
shift.  
The path to a decent peace is a medium jus post bellum, with an emphasis on 
responsible duty bearers. This moderate middle way – inspired by Vitoria’s and 
Grotius’ principle of moderation – appears to be the most consistent, coherent 
and effective understanding of jus post bellum. First, as opposed to minimalism it 
improves the theory, and as opposed to maximalism, it remains more 
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consistent with the character of the entirety of just war theory: it does not 
exceed its limited character, is tolerant with regard to cultural differences and 
other values, does not conflate the theory with a theory of global justice, and 
offers similar norms qua character, content and addressees. Second, medium jus 
post bellum, in which it is relatively clear who bears responsibility for what, is 
internally coherent as a body of norms. It aims to create a decent and safe 
society after war in which basic human rights are secured, and is concerned 
with both individual wellbeing as the collective self-determination of peoples. 
Limited political reconstruction may be part of jus post bellum in case of a power 
vacuum. Moreover, if the right to life is jeopardized by a lack of means of 
subsistence, providing these basic necessities is also part of jus post bellum. 
Former belligerents are responsible for realizing jus post bellum, although other 
actors can be assigned post war duties when former belligerents are incapable. 
Third, medium jus post bellum is most effective in limiting the horrible effects of 
war. It sets a high enough moral standard, while making sure it is not so high 
that will not be achieved in practice. Medium jus post bellum spells out the path 
towards a lasting peace which is ‘just enough’, instead of perfectly just.  
The book concludes that a modern just war theory must take the issue of 
post war justice into account. The findings provide the needed theoretical 
clarity on this relatively new and arguably important topic, and contribute to 
the development of jus post bellum. Finally, over and above, the greatest hope of 
this research is that integrating this branch in just war theory will indeed limit 
the negative effects of war, and support the reestablishment of peace after real 
world wars. A medium jus post bellum, aimed at the transition to a decent peace, 
with an emphasis on the responsible duty bearers has the best chance to do that. 
This understanding of jus post bellum might be modest, but has the potential to 
improve many post war situations. 
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Nederlandse samenvatting  
 
Rechtvaardigheid na de Oorlog  
 
Dit boek begint met een korte beschrijving van de rampzalige nasleep van de 
oorlog in Irak, wat de complexiteit en tegelijkertijd het belang laat zien van na-
oorlogse vredesopbouw. Dergelijke situaties, waarvan we er helaas meer zien 
vandaag de dag, roepen drie belangrijke vragen op: Wat willen we bereiken na 
de oorlog? Wat kunnen we doen? En wat moeten we doen? De eerste vraag gaat 
over hoop en idealen, de tweede over strategie en de derde over naoorlogse 
rechtvaardigheid. Naoorlogse rechtvaardigheid staat tegenwoordig hoog op de 
agenda. Dat komt omdat voorbeelden zoals Irak een bredere ontwikkeling laten 
zien: het karakter van oorlog is veranderd en de nasleep van oorlog is belang-
rijker geworden. Tegelijkertijd is hedendaagse vredesopbouw zeer complex.  
 De theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog is een toonaangevende theorie als het 
gaat om morele kwesties van oorlog en vrede. Traditioneel bestaat deze theorie 
uit twee onderdelen: het jus ad bellum en het jus in bello. Het eerste biedt normen 
die bepalen wanneer het rechtvaardig is een oorlog te beginnen, het tweede biedt 
normen die bepalen welke militaire acties in een oorlog rechtvaardig zijn. Er is 
binnen deze theorie relatief weinig aandacht voor de nasleep van oorlog, en 
gezien de geschetste ontwikkeling is dat nu problematisch. Daarom is er een 
nieuwkomer binnen de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog: het jus post bellum. 
Dit derde onderdeel biedt vergelijkbare normen die van toepassing zijn op de 
situatie na afloop van een oorlog. Dat is het onderwerp van dit boek: naoorlogse 
rechtvaardigheid in de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog, ofwel het jus post 
bellum.   
 Het jus post bellum wordt verwelkomd als oplossing voor de moeilijkheden 
die zich na afloop van een oorlog voordoen. Het eerste voorstel voor jus post 
bellum dateert van 1994 en sinds 2004 wordt er regelmatig over dit onderwerp 
gepubliceerd. In het algemeen bepaalt het jus post bellum wat het moreel juiste 
gedrag is na de oorlog. Wat is rechtvaardig wanneer de oorlog eenmaal is afgelo-
pen? Het jus post bellum omvat normen op het gebied van orde en veiligheid, 
politieke wederopbouw, strafrechtelijke rechtvaardigheid, restituties, reparaties 
en compensaties, algemene reconstructie en verzoening tussen voormalige 
vijanden.  
 Maar ondanks deze belangrijke theoretisering blijft er een probleem bestaan 
in de reflectie op het jus post bellum. Omdat dit onderdeel van de theorie van de 
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rechtvaardige oorlog relatief nieuw is, is het niet volledig uitgekristalliseerd en 
blijven wezenlijke elementen onduidelijk. Bovendien is het algemene doel van 
de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog het bereiken van een rechtvaardige en 
duurzame vrede, terwijl het helemaal niet duidelijk is wat zo’n vrede precies 
inhoudt. Omdat het jus post bellum de transitie naar vrede reguleert, is het van 
cruciaal belang om beter grip te krijgen op het concept ‘rechtvaardige vrede’ in 
aanvulling op het concept ‘rechtvaardige oorlog’. Dit vormt het centrale 
probleem dat in dit boek aan de orde komt: de vaagheid en onduidelijkheid van 
het jus post bellum. Hoe kunnen we het concept jus post bellum verhelderen en 
verder ontwikkelen? Deze centrale vraag leidt tot verschillende subvragen: Hoe 
worden de normen van de theorie van de rechtvaardig oorlog toegepast op 
specifieke oorlogen? Wat zijn de uitdagingen waarmee de theorie kampt? Wat 
was de status van het jus post bellum in de geschiedenis van deze theorie? Past 
het jus post bellum conceptueel gezien binnen de hedendaagse theorie van de 
rechtvaardige oorlog? Wie zijn de verantwoordelijke actoren, ofwel de dragers 
van naoorlogse plichten? Wat is de inhoud en reikwijdte van het jus post bellum? 
Wat zijn de sterke en zwakke kanten van de verschillende posities? En wat is het 
uiteindelijke doel van de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog en het jus post 
bellum? Met andere woorden: hoe ziet een rechtvaardige vrede eruit? 
 Deze vragen worden beantwoord op basis van een literatuuronderzoek. Het 
debat ten aanzien van het jus post bellum wordt in kaart gebracht en geanalyseerd, 
belangrijke concepten, argumenten en posities worden gesystematiseerd, en 
aspecten uit de algemene theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog, rechtsfilosofie en 
politieke filosofie worden toegepast op naoorlogse rechtvaardigheid om ondui-
delijkheden op te helderen. Het doel van dit onderzoek is tweeledig: 1. Het 
concept van jus post bellum verder uitwerken teneinde bij te dragen aan een beter 
begrip ervan (analytisch); en 2. Het jus post bellum kritisch beoordelen (norma-
tief). Met betrekking tot het laatstgenoemde doel is de veronderstelling dat, om 
de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog werkelijk te verbeteren, het jus post bellum 
consistent moet zijn met de theorie als geheel, een intern coherent geheel moet 
vormen, moet aansluiten bij de hedendaagse realiteit, en effectief moet zijn in het 
beperken van de negatieve effecten van oorlog. Deze kritische beoordeling leidt 
uiteindelijk tot een pleidooi voor een bescheiden opvatting van naoorlogse 
rechtvaardigheid.  
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Inter Arma Silent Leges? Over de Moeizame Verhouding van het Recht 
tot de Oorlog 
 
Het tweede hoofdstuk behandelt de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog in het 
algemeen, inclusief de twee belangrijke alternatieve posities. Ook wordt de 
theorie toegepast op een daadwerkelijke oorlog teneinde twee belangrijke uitda-
gingen te laten zien: de epistemologische problemen en de complexe realiteit van 
oorlog.  
 In het denken over oorlog en vrede is vandaag de dag de morele begrippen-
wereld van de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog dominant geworden. Er zijn 
echter twee alternatieven: het pacifisme en het realisme. Het pacifisme neemt het 
verbod op doden dermate serieus, zeker in de context van een strijd tussen 
politieke gemeenschappen, dat het oorlog op morele gronden afwijst. Oorlog 
kan nooit moreel gerechtvaardigd zijn en er moet altijd gezocht worden naar 
geweldloze middelen om onrecht aan de kaak te stellen. Het realisme stelt 
daarentegen dat morele onderscheidingen er helemaal niet toe doen in oorlog. 
Geweld wordt gereduceerd tot iets onvermijdelijks dat samenhangt met de aard 
van de mens, maar zich aan diens beslissingsmacht onttrekt. In oorlog tellen 
alleen machtsverhoudingen en eigenbelang, de raison d’état. Beide alternatieven 
worden in dit hoofdstuk verworpen omdat zij geen van beide morele onder-
scheidingen maken ten aanzien van oorlog; onderscheidingen die wel degelijk 
gemaakt kunnen en moeten worden. Morele principes zijn van toepassing op 
oorlog, en de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog biedt belangrijke bouwstenen 
voor de beoordeling van concrete oorlogen.   
 Hoe zien deze bouwstenen eruit? De drie onderdelen van de theorie van de 
rechtvaardige oorlog bieden verschillende (maar gerelateerde) sets van normen 
en principes die helpen om oorlog te reguleren. Het jus ad bellum specificeert 
wanneer een oorlog op een gerechtvaardigde manier kan worden begonnen. Er 
moet worden voldaan aan zes criteria: zwaarwegende reden, bevoegde autoriteit, 
juiste intentie, laatste redmiddel, redelijke kans op succes en proportionaliteit. 
Gezien het zware instrument van oorlog moet men een zeer zwaarwegende 
reden hebben om over te gaan tot militair geweld, bijvoorbeeld zelfverdediging 
tegen agressie. Vaak wordt dit criterium uitgelegd in termen van het herstellen 
van geschonden rechten. Alleen het hoogste, bevoegde gezag mag deze zware 
beslissing nemen. De intentie moet goed zijn; de oorlog is gericht op het herstel 
van onrecht en is geen excuus voor het verwezenlijken van een verborgen 
agenda. Bovendien mag alleen tot oorlog worden overgegaan als alle andere 
251
JUS POST BELLUM AND THE NATURE OF PEACE 
 
  
mogelijkheden om het aangedane onrecht te herstellen zijn uitgeput. Oorlog is 
een ultimum remedium. Ook moet er een redelijke kans zijn dat de oorlog 
succesvol zal zijn. Zinloze oorlogen en massaal geweld zijn verboden. Tot slot 
moet een afweging worden gemaakt tussen de schade die met de oorlog wordt 
aangericht en het voordeel dat door deze vorm van ‘rechtsherstel’ wordt 
bereikt. De kosten van het voeren van de oorlog moeten, met andere woorden, 
in een proportionele verhouding staan tot de baten. 
 Op grond van het jus in bello moet alles worden gedaan om het oorlogsge-
weld zelf zo beperkt mogelijk te houden. Dat gebeurt op grond van drie criteria: 
noodzakelijkheid, proportionaliteit en discriminatie. Het eerste criterium geeft 
aan dat oorlogsgeweld alleen mag worden ingezet als dat militair gezien 
noodzakelijk is. De proportionaliteiteis houdt in dat niet méér geweld wordt 
gebruikt dan nodig is om de doelstelling – bijvoorbeeld het behalen van militair 
voordeel of het winnen van een bepaalde slag – te bereiken. Het gaat dus om een 
afweging tussen de gevolgen van specifieke militaire acties en het daarmee te 
bereiken doel. Op grond van het discriminatiebeginsel moet een strikt onder-
scheid worden gemaakt tussen legitieme en niet-legitieme doelen en tussen com-
battanten en non-combattanten. De immuniteit van burgers, ofwel non-
combattanten, dient te worden gerespecteerd. 
 Het jus post bellum geeft vervolgens aan welke eindtoestand gerealiseerd moet 
worden. Dit onderdeel van de theorie biedt criteria die ervoor zorgen dat de 
overwinnaar geen misbruik maakt van zijn positie. Op die manier draagt het bij 
aan het beperken van de negatieve effecten van oorlog, door bijvoorbeeld voor 
te schrijven dat er geen economisch misbruik wordt gemaakt van de verliezer, 
dat er geen marionettenregering wordt geïnstalleerd en dat er geen onrechtvaar-
dige vredeseisen worden opgelegd. Samengevat laten deze criteria van het jus ad 
bellum, jus in bello en jus post bellum een beeld zien van een rechtvaardige oorlog 
die begonnen is met een zwaarwegende reden, op een beperkte manier wordt 
gevoerd en met een rechtvaardige en duurzame vrede eindigt.  
 Deze normen worden vervolgens toegepast op de Gaza-oorlog in 2008-
2009, en gebruikt om het debat ten aanzien van de rechtvaardigheid van deze 
oorlog te analyseren. Dat  maakt duidelijk dat de normen van de theorie van de 
rechtvaardige oorlog een grote rol hebben gespeeld. Maar deze analyse laat ook 
het problematische karakter van de theorie zien: de concrete toepassing van de 
abstracte normen op de complexe realiteit van oorlog is uitermate moeilijk. 
Aangezien de Gaza-oorlog geen duidelijk geval van zelfverdediging tegen 
agressie is, rijst de vraag hoe we de criteria moeten toepassen. Omdat ze vrij 
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algemeen en plooibaar zijn, hangt de toepassing ervan bovendien van een 
bepaalde lezing van de feiten af, en van politieke voorkeur. Er rijzen allerlei 
epistemologische problemen, zoals: In hoeverre kennen we de feiten waarop we 
de normen toepassen?; En hoe interpreteren we de abstracte principes? Met 
andere woorden: terwijl begrippen zoals zelfverdediging, proportionaliteit en 
non-combattantenimmuniteit regelmatig worden gebruikt in het publieke debat, 
laat dit hoofdstuk zien hoe moeilijk de toepassing op de weerbarstige realiteit is, 
dat conclusies op basis van deze criteria alsnog kunnen worden betwist, en dat 
het risico bestaat dat ze gemanipuleerd of misbruikt worden.  
 
De Theorie van de Rechtvaardige Oorlog in Historisch Perspectief en de 
Oorsprong van het Jus Post Bellum 
 
Hoewel het jus post bellum een moderne uitvinding lijkt te zijn, is dit onderdeel in 
feite niet geheel nieuw. Het derde hoofdstuk biedt een kort historisch overzicht 
van de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog, met het oog op het jus post bellum. 
Vier belangrijke periodes worden achtereenvolgens geschetst: de klassieke 
theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog, de overgang naar het volkenrecht, de 
hoogtijdagen van het positivisme en het huidige systeem van internationale 
organisaties. 
1. Er wordt sinds jaar en dag nagedacht over de moraliteit van oorlog. De term 
‘rechtvaardige oorlog’ werd al gebruikt door Aristoteles (384-322 v. Chr.). 
Een uitgebreidere uiteenzetting van deze theorie, gebaseerd op universele 
natuurwetten, werd ontwikkeld door de Romeinse bestuurder en filosoof 
Cicero (106-43 v. Chr.). Cicero identificeert een belangrijk uitgangspunt van 
de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog, namelijk dat de normale toestand in 
de wereld vrede is en dat oorlog een uitzondering is die alleen kan worden 
gerechtvaardigd als een instrument om deze vrede te beschermen of te 
herstellen. In de eerste eeuwen van onze christelijke jaartelling kreeg het 
pacifisme de overhand. Vroegchristelijke kerkvaders zoals Tertullianus 
predikten absolute geweldloosheid. Dat veranderde echter in de vierde eeuw 
na Christus. De Kerk kreeg politieke macht en de pacifistische afwijzing van 
oorlog vormde een struikelblok voor de nieuwe politieke aspiraties. 
Augustinus (354-430) – samen met Cicero een van de grondleggers van de 
theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog – probeerde het christelijke pacifisme te 
verenigen met de politieke wens om oorlog in bepaalde gevallen goed te 
keuren. Zijn theorie bepaalt dan ook dat zowel defensieve oorlogen ter 
253
JUS POST BELLUM AND THE NATURE OF PEACE 
 
  
bescherming van de christelijke gemeenschap, als offensieve oorlogen ter 
bestraffing van kwaad, in bepaalde omstandigheden rechtvaardig kunnen 
zijn. Augustinus benadrukt bovendien dat vrede het ultieme doel is van de 
oorlog. Thomas van Aquino (1224-1274) bevestigt dit teleologische karakter 
van oorlog. Hij voert aan dat ook het beginnen van oorlog gebeurt vanuit een 
verlangen naar vrede; men wil een ‘gebrekkige vrede’ vervangen door een 
‘volmaaktere vrede’. Maar hoewel deze opvattingen de basis leggen voor het 
jus post bellum, is dat nog steeds vrij algemeen. Dat veranderde met de het 
werk van Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1546), die een complete uiteenzetting 
geeft van alle drie de onderdelen van de theorie. Voor Vitoria is een recht-
vaardige oorlog een reactie op onrecht. Ten aanzien van het jus post bellum 
schrijft hij voor dat de overwinnaar de verliezer niet mag ruïneren. Wat de 
overwinnaar wel mag doen na de oorlog wordt beperkt door het herstellen 
van de geschonden rechten. Van het grootste belang na de oorlog zijn de 
principes matiging, nederigheid en proportionaliteit. De winnaar kan deze 
principes toepassen door zichzelf te zien als een rechter die een onpartijdig 
oordeel velt.  
2. Een duidelijke verschuiving in de theorievorming over oorlog en vrede vond 
plaats na de religieuze oorlogen in Europa. De Vrede van Westfalen vormde 
het begin van een nieuwe internationale gemeenschap van soevereine natie-
staten. Deze soevereine staten wilden hun onderlinge relaties reguleren, en 
dat leidde tot de codificatie van internationale regels: het volkenrecht. Hugo 
de Groot (1583-1645) scheef in deze periode zijn klassieke werk: Over het 
recht van oorlog en vrede. Hij maakte een duidelijk onderscheid tussen het 
morele natuurrecht en het juridische volkenrecht (ius gentium). En hoewel het 
volkenrecht de strijdende partijen maar weinig beperkingen oplegt, hecht 
Hugo de Groot toch veel belang aan de morele principes als een manier om 
de negatieve effecten van oorlog te beperken. Evenals de klassieke theoretici 
was hij ervan overtuigd dat de normale toestand in de wereld vrede is, en 
oorlog de uitzondering die slechts is toegestaan als bepaalde rechten zijn 
geschonden. Ten aanzien van het jus ad bellum focust hij op het natuurrecht, 
en hij onderscheidt verschillende zwaarwegende redenen voor oorlog: de 
verdediging tegen (de dreiging van) agressie, het terugnemen van wat de staat 
toebehoort en de bestraffing van onrecht. Voor wat betreft het jus post bellum 
schrijft Hugo de Groot voor dat de overwinnaar zich moet laten leiden door 
de morele principes van matiging en clementie. Het is essentieel, zo stelt hij, 
de toekomstige vrede tijdens de oorlog in het oog te houden. Humanitaire 
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overwegingen moeten de boventoon voeren zowel tijdens de vijandelijk-
heden als na afloop van de oorlog.  
3. De volgende periode wordt gekenmerkt door de hoogtijdagen van het 
positivisme, waarin de basis gelegd voor het moderne internationale recht. 
Het aantal gecodificeerde rechtsregels groeide aanzienlijk. Dit betekende 
echter dat kwesties van oorlog en vrede uitsluitend werden bezien vanuit een 
zuiver juridisch kader. De morele principes van de theorie van de rechtvaar-
dige oorlog verdwenen naar de marge. Oorlog was een geaccepteerd instru-
ment van staten die hun eigenbelang en machtspositie wilden veiligstellen of 
vergroten. Bijgevolg werd niet vrede maar oorlog gezien als de normale 
toestand in de wereld. De morele principes van de theorie van de rechtvaar-
dige oorlog raakten volledig uit beeld. In dit tijdperk bepaalde de overwin-
naar de regels na afloop van de oorlog.  
4. Het uitbreken van de Eerste Wereldoorlog markeert het begin van de huidige 
periode, en de laatste grote verschuiving in de theorievorming over oorlog en 
vrede. De theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog kwam weer in beeld. In deze 
periode werd de Volkenbond opgericht, na de Tweede Wereldoorlog opge-
volgd door de Verenigde Naties. De verschrikkingen en omvang van deze 
mondiale conflicten gaven een sterke impuls om oorlog af te wijzen als een 
normaal beleidsinstrument van staten. Dit resulteerde in een algemeen 
verbod op het gebruik van militair geweld. Tegenwoordig is oorlog slechts bij 
wijze van uitzondering te rechtvaardigen, namelijk als er een zwaarwegende 
reden aanwezig is zoals zelfverdediging tegen agressie. Oorlog en vrede zijn 
onttrokken aan de discretionaire bevoegdheid van staten en worden nu 
gezien als een zaak van mondiaal belang. Hierdoor is er ook meer ruimte 
voor een terugkeer van naoorlogse principes. Dat betekent voor het jus post 
belllum dat de overwinnaar weer aan banden wordt gelegd. En hoewel het 
huidige VN-systeem verre van perfect is, speelt deze organisatie een belang-
rijke rol bij het richting geven aan vredesopbouw. Het belang dat gehecht 
wordt aan een duurzame vrede na oorlog leidde tot het rapport Agenda for 
Peace in 1995 en de bekende doctrine Responsibility to Protect in 2005. Ook is 
een Peace Building Commission opgericht om lidstaten te helpen bij de over-
gang van oorlog naar een duurzame vrede. Deze ontwikkelingen laten zien 
dat naoorlogse rechtvaardigheid hoog op de agenda staat. Bovendien, nu 
zowel de normen van het jus ad bellum als het jus in bello in belangrijke mate 
zijn gecodificeerd, lijkt het een goed idee datzelfde te doen voor het jus post 
bellum.   
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De Vage Grenzen tussen Oorlog en Vrede. Moet de Theorie van de 
Rechtvaardige Oorlog Worden Uitgebreid?  
 
Het vierde hoofdstuk begint met een andere uitdaging voor de hedendaagse 
theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog (in aanvulling op de twee uitdagingen die in 
het tweede hoofdstuk worden besproken). Hoewel de theorie toonaangevend is 
op het gebied van oorlog en vrede, lijkt zij achter te lopen op de veranderende 
internationale realiteit. De theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog is gebaseerd op 
een bepaalde opvatting van oorlog, namelijk als een gewapend conflict tussen 
twee staten, en op een duidelijk onderscheid tussen oorlog en vrede. Dit beeld 
van oorlog is echter niet meer representatief voor de huidige politieke realiteit.  
 Verschillende onderzoekers zijn het erover eens dat zowel het karakter van 
oorlog als de manier waarop oorlog wordt gevoerd heel anders is dan vroeger 
(het gaat hier om het debat ten aanzien van de ‘nieuwe en oude oorlogen’). Een 
belangrijke verandering is dat conventionele oorlogen – die van start gaan met 
een oorlogsverklaring, tussen twee professionele legers worden uitgevochten en 
met een vredesverdrag eindigen – tot het verleden lijken te behoren. Ook is het 
vaak onduidelijk of een bepaalde situatie überhaupt wel een oorlog genoemd kan 
worden. Denk hierbij aan vredesoperaties, militaire bezettingen, burgeroorlo-
gen, de ‘oorlog tegen het terrorisme’ en luchtaanvallen door onbemande drones 
buiten oorlogsgebied. Het kan lastig zijn om het paradigma van oorlog en het 
paradigma van vrede strikt te scheiden. Vaak bevinden we ons in een grijs 
gebied. Deze politieke realiteit, het veranderende karakter van oorlog(voering) 
en de vage grenzen tussen oorlog en vrede roepen vragen op naar de praktische 
relevantie en toepasbaarheid van de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog. Is de 
theorie nog van deze tijd?  
 Een uitbreiding met twee ‘nieuwe’ onderdelen lijkt een zinvolle manier om de 
theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog te ‘moderniseren’, waardoor deze beter 
aansluit bij de huidige realiteit. Dat kan ten eerste door de introductie van het jus 
ante bellum, dat voorafgaat aan het jus ad bellum. Het gaat hier om normen die 
gelden in vredestijd, wanneer er geen specifieke oorlog of oorlogsdreiging is. De 
inhoud van wat onder deze noemer wordt voorgesteld varieert: het jus ante 
bellum is bedoeld als algemene voorbereiding op oorlog (bijvoorbeeld soldaten 
trainen in het jus in bello) of het is bedoeld om oorlog juist helemaal te voor-
komen. Deze  laatste opvatting van het jus ante bellum wordt ook wel aangeduid 
als jus in abolitione belli of just peacemaking. De theorie van de rechtvaardige 
oorlog kan ten tweede worden uitgebreid door het jus post bellum, dat als laatste 
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onderdeel van de theorie volgt op het jus ad bellum. Onder deze noemer wordt 
verwezen naar een geheel van juridische of morele normen, of beide, ter regule-
ring van de overgang van oorlog terug naar vrede. Als zodanig biedt het jus post 
bellum regels die richting geven aan politieke en militaire beslissingen en acties 
na afloop van de oorlog. Bovendien vormt het een standaard die kan worden 
gebruikt om de nasleep van oorlogen te evalueren en beoordelen. 
 Dit hoofdstuk verkent verschillende prima facie argumenten voor een 
vierdelige theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog. Desalniettemin wordt betoogd 
dat het geen goed idee is om het jus ante bellum te integreren in de theorie van de 
rechtvaardige oorlog: het gaat om algemene richtlijnen in plaats van morele nor-
men, het gaat niet om aan de oorlog gerelateerde activiteiten, is gericht op ande-
re actoren en de fundering ervan moet geheel buiten de theorie van de rechtvaar-
dige oorlog worden gezocht. Bovendien zal het doel van een rechtvaardige en 
duurzame vrede niet gemakkelijker worden bereikt door het jus ante bellum te 
integreren. De richtlijnen zijn daarvoor hoogstwaarschijnlijk te vaag, te 
idealistisch en te veeleisend. En afgezien van deze conceptuele moeilijkheden en 
praktische belemmeringen brengt het integreren van het jus ante bellum een 
serieus risico met zich mee: door te veel onder de theorie van de rechtvaardige 
oorlog te scharen vermindert de theorie als geheel in waarde en raakt zij 
overbelast. We moeten ervoor waken de theorie op deze manier op te blazen.   
 Het jus post bellum kan daarentegen wél worden geïntegreerd. Het is 
conceptueel verbonden met de andere onderdelen van de theorie: het biedt 
normen die onafhankelijk zijn maar vergelijkbaar qua aard en inhoud, de 
normen zijn van toepassing op aan de oorlog gerelateerde activiteiten, kunnen 
worden gefundeerd in het beperkte morele kader van de theorie van de 
rechtvaardige oorlog en, zoals de andere onderdelen van de theorie, richt het jus 
post bellum zich in de eerste plaats op (voormalige) strijdende partijen. Deze 
argumenten gelden echter met name voor een beperkte opvatting van het jus post 
bellum; alleen zo’n opvatting is consistent met de theorie als geheel. Dat is een 
goede reden om slechts een beperkt jus post bellum in de theorie op te nemen. Op 
die manier is de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog ‘completer’ en beter 
toegerust om de hedendaagse oorlogen te reguleren, terwijl zij tegelijkertijd 
conceptueel gezien in tact blijft en er een minimaal risico bestaat dat de theorie 
als geheel in waarde vermindert. 
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Naoorlogse Verplichtingen. Wie is Verantwoordelijk voor het Jus Post 
Bellum? 
 
Hoe moeten we de taken verdelen na de oorlog? In de discussie over het jus post 
bellum is het verre van duidelijk wie verantwoordelijk is voor het realiseren 
ervan. Die onzekerheid is problematisch, omdat het ertoe kan leiden dat 
niemand die taken oppakt. Dat zou betekenen dat het jus post bellum niets meer is 
dan een lege huls. Wil de theorie effectief zijn in het beperken van de negatieve 
effecten van oorlog, dan is het cruciaal om naoorlogse taken aan specifieke 
actoren toe te wijzen.  
 Als we naar het huidige debat kijken, zien we dat theoretici verplichtingen 
aan verschillende actoren toewijzen, op basis van verschillende morele of 
prudentiële argumenten. Daarbij kunnen twee posities worden onderscheiden. 
De eerste positie stelt dat naoorlogse verplichtingen moeten worden 
toegewezen aan de voormalige strijdende partijen. Michael Walzer is een 
belangrijke vertegenwoordiger van deze ‘belligerents rebuild thesis’. Deze positie is 
gebaseerd op de overtuiging dat naoorlogse verplichtingen voortvloeien uit de 
zwaarwegende reden voor de oorlog, én het idee dat de overwinnaar verant-
woordelijk is gebaseerd op de Pottery Barn Rule: als je iets kapot maakt, moet je 
het betalen. Andere theoretici, onder wie James Pattison, verwerpen deze 
belligerents rebuild thesis. Het toewijzen van naoorlogse verplichtingen aan 
strijdende partijen leidt tot oneerlijke uitkomsten, zo stellen zij (bijvoorbeeld 
wanneer de staat die intervenieert om een humanitaire catastrofe te stoppen 
wordt verplicht dat gebied daarna weer op te bouwen). Deze theoretici 
verdedigen daarom de tweede positie, de universal rebuild thesis, die inhoudt dat 
de internationale gemeenschap als geheel verantwoordelijk is voor het jus post 
bellum. Maar als dat inderdaad zo is, zullen we ook moeten bepalen hoe speci-
fieke taken (bijvoorbeeld reconstructie) aan specifieke actoren worden toegewe-
zen. Daarom is een uitgebreide theorie ten aanzien van verantwoordelijkheid 
voor het jus post bellum nodig. 
  Het vijfde hoofdstuk onderzoekt deze kwestie van verantwoordelijkheid en 
geeft antwoord op twee vragen. Welke voorwaarden kunnen als basis dienen 
voor naoorlogse verplichtingen? En hoe wegen we deze voorwaarden in con-
crete situaties? David Millers theorie over verantwoordelijkheid wordt gebruikt 
om deze vragen te beantwoorden, omdat de vraag naar het toewijzen van 
naoorlogse verplichtingen in wezen een vraag is naar collectieve herstellende 
verantwoordelijkheid: welke staten zijn verplicht de schade als gevolg van de 
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oorlog te herstellen? Ter beantwoording van de eerste vraag worden zes voor-
waarden besproken en toegepast op verschillende naoorlogse situaties: morele 
verantwoordelijkheid (de schuldvraag), resultaatverantwoordelijkheid (verant-
woordelijkheid op basis van een bijdrage aan een bepaalde uitkomst), causaliteit, 
voordeel (reeds ontvangen of toekomstige voordelen), capaciteit en de gemeen-
schap. Een zevende voorwaarde helpt nog verder inzicht te krijgen in de basis 
voor herstellende verantwoordelijkheid na de oorlog: het concept van H.L.A. 
Harts rolverantwoordelijkheid (verantwoordelijkheid op basis van een bepaalde 
rol of gedane beloftes).  
 De beantwoording van de tweede vraag vereist een beoordeling en systema-
tisering van deze voorwaarden. Het doel is om een bijdrage te leveren aan het 
ontwikkelen van een systeem voor het toewijzen van naoorlogse verplichtingen 
aan specifieke actoren in concrete situaties. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat in plaats 
van een van deze voorwaarden te kiezen als de basis voor naoorlogse verplich-
tingen, een systeem vereist is dat deze zeven voorwaarden combineert. Een 
dergelijk uitgebreid systeem doet recht aan relevante morele overwegingen, 
terwijl het tegelijkertijd is gericht is op het herstellen van schade en het aanpak-
ken van naoorlogse ontberingen.  
 De eerste stap bij de toewijzing van naoorlogse verplichtingen wordt bepaald 
door de capaciteit van actoren; een noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor het 
toewijzen van herstellende verantwoordelijkheid. Met het oog op een 
rechtvaardige en duurzame vrede moet een actor in ieder geval in staat zijn om 
(een deel) van dit doel te bereiken. De tweede stap wordt bepaald door de 
voorwaarden morele verantwoordelijkheid, resultaatverantwoordelijkheid en 
rolverantwoordelijkheid. Oorlog is een vorm van directe en collectief toe-
gebrachte schade en van geweld, en daarmee een groot kwaad. Op basis van de 
sterke morele intuïtie dat actoren de lasten moeten dragen van hun eigen daden, 
moeten morele- en resultaatverantwoordelijkheid belangrijke overwegingen zijn 
bij het toewijzen van de plicht tot wederopbouw. Staten kunnen ook 
verantwoordelijk zijn als gevolg van de uitoefening van een specifieke rol 
(bijvoorbeeld als ‘humanitaire redder’). Als er in het kader daarvan beloften 
worden gedaan ten aanzien van bepaalde resultaten, dan kunnen die leiden tot 
legitieme verwachtingen. Als derde stap helpen de voorwaarden causaliteit, 
voordeel en gemeenschap verder bij het toewijzen en verdelen van naoorlogse 
verplichtingen.  
 Zowel de beoordeling van deze voorwaarden als basis voor naoorlogse 
verantwoordelijkheid als de afweging tussen die voorwaarden in concrete 
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situaties veronderstelt aldus dat de strijdende partijen in beginsel verantwoorde-
lijk zijn voor de wederopbouw na de oorlog. Zij zullen echter niet altijd in staat 
zijn om aan deze verplichting te voldoen. Omdat het moreel onaanvaardbaar is 
om mensen aan hun lot over te laten in erbarmelijke naoorlogse 
omstandigheden, kan het noodzakelijk zijn dat we de verantwoordelijkheid 
breder trekken dan de strijdende partijen. Dit leidt tot een nuancering van de 
belligerents rebuild thesis: strijdende partijen zijn niet alléén verantwoordelijk. Als 
ze niet aan hun verplichtingen kunnen voldoen, zijn andere actoren secundair 
verantwoordelijk. Mocht dat het geval zijn, dan verschuift de verantwoordelijk-
heid niet naar een onbepaalde 'internationale gemeenschap', maar kan dit sys-
teem helpen bij het toewijzen van naoorlogse verplichtingen aan andere 
specifieke actoren.  
 Er zijn ook redenen voor scepsis ten aanzien van de effectiviteit van het jus 
post bellum. De ontwikkeling van het internationale recht is een geleidelijk proces 
en een nieuwe Geneefse Conventie die het jus post bellum regelt ligt vooralsnog 
niet in de lijn der verwachting. Bovendien ontbreekt een institutioneel kader 
voor de toewijzing van herstellende verantwoordelijkheid. Ondanks het feit dat 
het jus post bellum door velen wordt verwelkomd als onderdeel van de theorie 
van de rechtvaardige oorlog, is de realiteit dat het internationaal recht en mon-
diale instituties achterblijven op de morele theorie. Als gevolg daarvan blijft het 
jus post bellum enigszins vrijblijvend, waardoor de verantwoordelijke actoren 
hun naoorlogse verantwoordelijkheid kunnen negeren. Toch kan het jus post 
bellum een nuttige rol vervullen. Juist in de afwezigheid van een juridisch en 
institutioneel kader schuilt het belang van een goed doordacht systeem voor het 
toewijzen en verdelen van naoorlogse verplichtingen. Hoewel het moeilijk kan 
zijn onomstotelijk vast te stellen wie verantwoordelijk voor het jus post bellum 
draagt, kan dit systeem bijdragen aan een goed onderbouwd oordeel.  
 
Jus Post Bellum. Minimalisme versus Maximalisme? 
 
Het debat over het jus post bellum wordt vaak gekenschetst als een debat tussen 
twee tegengestelde posities: minimalisme versus maximalisme. Hoe worden 
deze twee posities normaliter gekarakteriseerd? De minimalistische of beperkte 
opvatting van jus post bellum is vooral bedoeld om gedrag na de oorlog te 
beperken. Daarom bestaat het met name uit negatieve morele verplichtingen; 
partijen moeten na de oorlog vooral veel dingen niet doen. Zo is gedwongen 
politieke reconstructie na de oorlog in beginsel niet toegestaan. Overwinnaars 
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mogen de geschonden rechten herstellen (dat is de zwaarwegende reden voor de 
oorlog) maar niet meer dan dat. Deze benadering komt voort uit de wens om 
victor’s justice – wat ertoe kan leiden dat opportunistische overwinnaars excessen 
begaan – te voorkomen. Deze beperkte opvatting van jus post bellum betekent 
ook dat de normen in een kort tijdsbestek van toepassing zijn: ze reguleren de 
directe nasleep van de oorlog en kijken niet ver vooruit.   
 De maximalistische of uitgebreide opvatting van jus post bellum is veel 
ambitieuzer. Dit jus post bellum bestaat voornamelijk uit positieve verplichtingen, 
die bepalen wat actoren mogen of zelfs moeten doen na de oorlog. In plaats van 
bezorgd te zijn dat overwinnaars na de oorlog te veel doen, en daarmee profite-
ren van de verliezer, vrezen maximalisten juist dat overwinnaars te weinig doen. 
Deze uitgebreide opvatting van jus post bellum gaat dus veel verder dan het her-
stellen van de geschonden rechten die de oorzaak waren van de oorlog. De norm 
van politieke wederopbouw wordt veel ruimer geïnterpreteerd en er worden 
allerlei extra normen voorgesteld. Daarbij gaat het bijvoorbeeld om vergeving en 
verzoening, wederopbouw van de infrastructuur, economische ontwikkeling en 
compensatie voor milieuschade. Als gevolg van deze ruime en gevarieerde ver-
plichtingen is er veel meer tijd nodig om het jus post bellum te realiseren, 
waardoor het voor een langere tijd van toepassing is.  
 Dit zesde hoofdstuk laat echter zien dat we dit onderscheid niet gemakkelijk 
kunnen maken; het is gewoonweg niet zo zwart-wit. Vaak passen bepaalde voor-
stellen voor jus post bellum niet naadloos binnen een van deze posities. De karak-
terisering van deze tweedeling (negatieve versus positieve verplichtingen, 
beperkte versus ruime en gevarieerde normen, korte versus lange termijn, 
beperkt versus onbeperkt door de zwaarwegende reden voor de oorlog) zou 
kunnen opgaan voor ‘echt’ minimalisme en ‘echt’ maximalisme, maar die eerste 
positie wordt tegenwoordig niet meer verdedigd. Het verschil tussen de 
verschillende posities is daardoor minder groot dan op basis van de tweedeling 
zou kunnen worden verwacht. In wezen zijn alle huidige opvattingen van jus post 
bellum in zekere zin maximalistisch. Maximalisme is daarmee de dominante 
manier van denken over het jus post bellum. 
 Toch zijn er wel degelijk graduele verschillen tussen de verschillende opvat-
tingen. Maar wat bepaalt dan de inhoud en reikwijdte van het jus post bellum? 
Om deze vraag te kunnen beantwoorden moeten we een stap terug doen; er is 
een groter perspectief nodig om deze variaties te duiden. Het blijkt dat de inhoud 
en reikwijdte van naoorlogse normen met name afhangen van twee factoren. 
Ten eerste, de situatie waarop de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog van 
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toepassing is. Daarbij gaat het om het type oorlog – is er bijvoorbeeld sprake van 
zelfverdediging of een humanitaire interventie? – en de aard van de betrokken 
staat. Drie aspecten zijn daarbij van belang: het oorspronkelijke karakter van de 
staat (was deze agressief?), de toestand na de oorlog (is er sprake van interne 
chaos of falen van de staat?) en vooral het beoogde karakter van de staat (hoe 
moet de staat eruit gaan zien?). Ten tweede, de achterliggende visie op de theorie 
van de rechtvaardige oorlog en internationale betrekkingen in het algemeen. 
Daarbij gaat het om ideeën over de rol van het gebruik van geweld, de waarde 
van soevereiniteit, de opkomst van een kosmopolitische moraal en de nadruk op 
de individuele rechten van de mens. Deze factoren verklaren de verschuiving 
naar een maximalistisch jus post bellum.  
 
Rechtvaardige Vrede na de Oorlog 
 
Het doel van de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog is een rechtvaardige en 
duurzame vrede. Nu lijkt dit wellicht vanzelfsprekend, maar het is onduidelijk 
wat een rechtvaardige vrede precies is. Theoretici besteden hieraan relatief wei-
nig aandacht. De kans bestaat dat zij het met elkaar oneens zijn als ze dieper 
ingaan op de specifieke kenmerken van vrede. Dat wijst op een fundamenteel 
probleem: vrede staat centraal in de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog, maar 
wordt als concept niet grondig geanalyseerd en blijft daarom impliciet en vaag. 
Dit probleem wordt pregnanter wanneer we ons realiseren dat de theorie van de 
rechtvaardige oorlog zich ontwikkelt in de richting van een maximalistisch jus 
post bellum, en dus ook richting een breder en meeromvattend begrip van vrede – 
een positieve vrede. Het is de vraag of het inderdaad een goed idee is om een der-
gelijke positieve vrede als normatief doel te omarmen. De centrale vraag die in 
dit zevende hoofdstuk aan de orde komt is dan ook: Hoe moeten we vrede zien, 
als het doel van de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog, rekening houdend met 
de middenpositie van de theorie tussen politiek realisme en moreel idealisme?  
 Het eerste deel van dit hoofdstuk probeert het benodigde conceptuele kader 
te ontwikkelen. Daartoe wordt het algemene concept van vrede verkend. Hierbij 
komen drie verschillende facetten aan bod: het temporele element van de vrede 
(tijdelijk versus eeuwig), het ruimtelijk element van de vrede (innerlijk versus 
intermenselijk), en het karakter van de vrede (negatief versus positief). Op basis 
hiervan wordt een  continuüm van vijf concepten van de politieke vrede geschetst, 
variërend van een louter negatieve vrede tot een volledig positieve vrede en 
daartussenin een overwegend negatieve vrede, een fatsoenlijke vrede, en een 
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overwegend positieve vrede. Welk concept van vrede zou kunnen functioneren 
als het doel van de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog?  David Estlund werpt 
licht op deze vraag met zijn opvatting over de rol van praktische beperkingen in 
normatieve politieke filosofie. Dat verklaart: 1. De positie van de theorie van de 
rechtvaardige oorlog tussen strikt politiek realisme en moreel idealisme; 2. 
Waarom de twee buitenste concepten op het continuüm niet het doel van 
theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog kunnen zijn; en 3. Hoe we de resterende drie 
concepten van vrede moeten vergelijken en evalueren als het potentiële doel van 
de theorie. 
 In het tweede deel van dit hoofdstuk wordt het voorgestelde conceptuele 
kader gebruikt om de discussie in kaart te brengen en de impliciete posities ten 
aanzien van vrede expliciet te maken. Hoewel de meeste theoretici het erover 
eens zijn dat een ‘rechtvaardige en duurzame vrede’ het doel is van de theorie van 
de rechtvaardige oorlog, blijkt dat ze het in feite fundamenteel oneens zijn over 
wat een dergelijke vrede inhoudt. Ook is er een verschuiving naar een positievere 
opvatting van vrede zichtbaar. Vandaag de dag kunnen de belangrijkste posities 
worden gekarakteriseerd als een ‘fatsoenlijke vrede’ en een ‘overwegend positie-
ve vrede’. Michael Walzer onderschrijft een fatsoenlijke vrede. Dat is geen vrede 
die louter wordt gekarakteriseerd door de afwezigheid van geweld. De relatie 
tussen vrede en rechtvaardigheid is sterk maar minimalistisch, aldus Walzer. 
Deze vrede is niettemin stabiel en het jus post bellum is gericht op de wederop-
bouw van een soevereine staat. Het doel is bovendien een veilige en fatsoenlijke 
samenleving, die wordt bepaald door een minimale opvatting van de mensen-
rechten, waarin in ieder geval de rechten op leven, vrijheid en veiligheid 
gerealiseerd zijn. 
 Dan zijn er theoretici die verder opschuiven naar de positieve kant van het 
continuüm. Cecile Fabres theorie over vrede is gebaseerd op het kosmopolitis-
me (waarbij individuen de primaire objecten van morele analyse zijn) en is 
individualistisch en idealistisch. Fabre maakt onderscheid tussen fundamentele 
mensenrechten die nodig zijn om een menswaardig leven te kunnen leiden en 
niet-fundamentele mensenrechten, noodzakelijk voor het leiden van een bloei-
end leven. Wat betreft het normatieve doel van vrede legt zij de lat hoog: kosmo-
politische rechtvaardigheid betekent dat individuen niet alleen een minimaal 
fatsoenlijk leven kunnen leiden, maar dat zij een bloeiend leven kunnen leiden. 
Dit verwijst naar de autonomie om een bepaalde opvatting van het goede te 
kunnen nastreven, naar mogelijkheden tot zelfontplooiing, emotioneel en intel-
lectueel welzijn en naar het gewaarborgd weten van lichamelijke integriteit, 
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basisgezondheidszorg, en invloed op materiële goederen en politiek. Als voor-
beelden van een niet-bloeiend leven noemt Fabre het moeten doen van eentonig 
werk en het niet kunnen deelnemen aan het culturele leven van de samenleving.  
 Bij nader inzien blijkt echter dat het verschil tussen deze twee opvattingen 
minder groot is dan het lijkt. De realistische theoretici als Walzer combineren 
ideale principes met pragmatische overwegingen om het beste effect te genere-
ren. Dit past bij een opvatting van rechtvaardigheid als corrigerend concept; er is 
weinig verschil tussen wat ‘hoort’ en wat ‘kan’. De idealistische theoretici zoals 
Fabre benadrukken juist deze ideale principes van rechtvaardigheid. Rechtvaar-
digheid wordt hier gezien als een zuiver concept; er is een groot verschil tussen 
wat ‘hoort’ en wat ‘kan’.  
 Deze verschillende visies ten aanzien van de betekenis van rechtvaardigheid in 
de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog verhelderen het verschil tussen de 
opvattingen over vrede. Bij Walzer maken pragmatische overwegingen als het 
ware deel uit van de rechtvaardigheidstest. Maar ook voor Fabre zijn deze over-
wegingen van belang. Zij maakt een onderscheid tussen een ‘rechtvaardige vrede 
simpliciter’ en een ‘alles in ogenschouw nemende gerechtvaardigde vrede’ (justified  
peace all things considered). Het is in de praktijk niet altijd mogelijk een 
rechtvaardige vrede te realiseren, zo erkent Fabre. In het geval van praktische 
onhaalbaarheid moeten we water bij de wijn doen en de lat lager leggen. 
Praktische overwegingen werken hier als een ex post rechtvaardigheidstest. Dit 
brengt ons terug naar de fatsoenlijke vrede. Niettemin blijft bij theoretici als 
Fabre het concept van een overwegend positieve vrede overeind als regulatief 
ideaal van de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog, dat richting geeft aan het jus 
post bellum. Het is de vraag of dat wenselijk is.   
 Nu de vraag: Welk begrip van vrede zou moeten functioneren als doel van de 
theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog? In dit hoofdstuk wordt verdedigd dat we na 
de oorlog geen ideale positieve vrede als normatief doel moeten stellen, terwijl 
we – alles in ogenschouw nemend – bereid moeten zijn een gerechtvaardigde fat-
soenlijke vrede te accepteren. Een fatsoenlijke vrede na de oorlog ís namelijk een 
rechtvaardige vrede. Drie argumenten worden daarvoor aangedragen.  
 Een fatsoenlijke vrede is allereerst het juiste normatieve doel, gezien het 
specifieke karakter van de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog. Het is in essentie 
een action guiding theory: een theorie die praktische richtlijnen biedt die van 
toepassing zijn op de hedendaagse onvolmaakte wereld. De lat te hoog leggen 
werkt demotiverend en daarmee wordt de theorie minder effectief in het 
beperken van de negatieve gevolgen van oorlog. Om doeltreffend te zijn moet de 
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theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog normen bieden die zowel haalbaar als 
wenselijk zijn. Dat komt het beste tot zijn recht in een fatsoenlijke vrede. 
 In de tweede plaats hebben we geen positieve vrede als regulatief ideaal – op 
basis van een ‘zuivere’ conceptie van een ideale wereld – nodig om richting te 
geven aan de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog en het jus post bellum in het 
bijzonder. Het is een probleemgerichte theorie, ontworpen voor het specifieke 
probleem van oorlog. Het is geen instrument voor de realisatie van mensen-
rechten in het algemeen en geen manier om een ideale rechtvaardige wereld te 
creëren. Integendeel, de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog dient ter bescher-
ming van de meest fundamentele waarden en het voorkomen van de grootste 
excessen in de chaos van oorlog en de nasleep daarvan. Zoals Steven Lee 
opmerkt, brengt de overtuiging dat oorlog gebruikt kan worden voor verheven 
idealen het gevaar met zich mee dat de theorie gebruikt wordt zonder het soort 
beperkingen die juist centraal staan. De theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog 
moet aldus niet worden gelijkgesteld aan een theorie van mondiale rechtvaardig-
heid.  
 Een derde, gerelateerd argument is de twijfelachtige universaliteit van de 
brede, veelomvattende ideologie die deel uitmaakt van een positieve vrede. Er is 
tegenwoordig een vrij grote overeenstemming over de onderlinge afhankelijk-
heid en de universaliteit van de mensenrechten. We moeten echter voorzichtig 
zijn: het realiseren van een breed scala aan mensenrechten na de oorlog, vooral 
met nadruk op liberale rechten, verhoogt het risico op de bekende kritiek van 
moreel imperialisme en het opleggen van de westerse waarden. Dat risico is 
bijzonder groot wanneer overwinnaars na de oorlog, als onderdeel van het jus 
post bellum,  verplicht worden deze mensenrechten te realiseren opdat de men-
sen in het voormalige oorlogsgebied een bloeiend leven kunnen leiden. Als er 
stappen in de richting van een positieve vrede worden genomen, vinden deze 
plaats buiten het domein van de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog. Ná de na-
sleep van de oorlog is de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog niet langer van 
toepassing en moet de theorie plaats maken voor een algemene (ruimere) 
theorie van mondiale rechtvaardigheid.  
 Dit hoofdstuk concludeert aldus dat het omarmen van een positieve vrede als 
normatief doel van de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog geen goed idee is. Het 
is inefficiënt omdat een onbereikbaar hoge standaard demotiverend werkt. Dit 
maakt de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog minder effectief in het beperken 
van de schade, ontberingen en het menselijk lijden als gevolg van oorlog. De 
theorie is pragmatisch van aard en het doel moet daarbij aansluiten en praktisch 
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haalbaar zijn. Bovendien past een positieve vrede niet bij een theorie die van 
toepassing is op het specifieke probleem van oorlog, maar veeleer bij een 
algemene theorie van mondiale rechtvaardigheid. Een positieve vrede integreren 
in de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog staat voortdurende – of zelfs oneindige 
– vredesopbouw toe zonder duidelijk eind in zicht. Dat overschrijdt het beperkte 
karakter van de theorie ruimschoots. Het zou tot slot zelfs immoreel kunnen 
zijn, aangezien het vrede gelijkstelt aan een ‘zuiver’ ideaal van rechtvaardigheid, 
begrepen in termen van mensenrechten breed opgevat, vergezeld van een be-
paalde ideologie, politieke structuur en economisch systeem waarvan de uni-
versaliteit kan worden betwist. In de chaotische en complexe realiteit van oorlog 
en de nasleep daarvan is het verstandig bescheiden te zijn. Daarom is een waar-
schuwing tegen een te vergaande verschuiving in de theorie van de rechtvaardige 
oorlog op zijn plaats.  
 
Fatsoenlijke Vrede en Gematigd Jus Post Bellum 
 
De voorbeelden van oorlogen met een rampzalige nasleep hebben in de 
internationale politiek geleid tot een kritischere houding. Er wordt bijvoorbeeld 
in belangrijke rapporten aangegeven dat er meer rekening moet worden gehou-
den met consequenties en risico’s van oorlogen en interventies, dat er realis-
tische doelen gesteld moeten worden, dat er voldoende budget moet zijn en dat 
een haalbare exit-strategie van het grootste belang is. Het wekt daarom verba-
zing dat de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog zich lijkt te ontwikkelen in de 
tegengestelde richting: er is een steeds verder gaande verschuiving zichtbaar 
naar een uitgebreidere opvatting van het jus post bellum.  
 Dit boek biedt een kritische beschouwing van het jus post bellum. In de 
introductie werden drie vragen genoemd: Wat willen we doen na de oorlog? Wat 
kunnen we doen? En wat moeten we doen? Terwijl de laatste vraag het aankno-
pingspunt was voor dit onderzoek, laat het boek zien dat deze drie vragen 
eigenlijk verbonden zijn. De eerste twee vragen zijn namelijk essentieel om de 
derde vraag te kunnen beantwoorden: wat we moeten doen na de oorlog wordt 
bepaald door de juiste balans tussen wat we idealiter zouden willen bereiken, en 
wat we kunnen bereiken in de praktijk. Dat evenwicht tussen wenselijkheid en 
haalbaarheid, tussen idealisme en realisme, resulteert in de verdediging van een 
bescheiden opvatting van naoorlogse rechtvaardigheid en een ‘fatsoenlijke 
vrede’ als normatief doel van de theorie van de rechtvaardige oorlog. Een 
266
NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING 
 
 
fatsoenlijke vrede is stabiel voor een substantiële periode en waarborgt 
fundamentele mensenrechten.  
 Deze fatsoenlijke vrede kan bereikt worden door een gematigde opvatting 
van jus post bellum, met een sterke nadruk op de verantwoordelijke actoren. Deze 
middenweg – geïnspireerd door het principe van matiging van Vitoria en 
Grotius – lijkt de meest consistente, coherente en effectieve opvatting van jus 
post bellum te zijn. Ten eerste, in tegenstelling tot minimalisme verbetert een 
gematigd jus post bellum de theorie en in tegenstelling tot maximalisme sluit het 
er goed bij aan (consistentie): het past bij het beperkte karakter, is tolerant ten 
aanzien van culturele verschillen en minder fundamentele waarden, stelt de 
theorie niet gelijk aan een theorie van mondiale rechtvaardigheid en biedt 
normen die vergelijkbaar zijn met de bestaande normen qua karakter, inhoud en 
actoren waaraan verplichtingen worden toegewezen.  
 Ten tweede is een gematigd jus post bellum, waarbij het in grote lijnen 
duidelijk is wie waarvoor verantwoordelijkheid draagt, intern coherent als een 
geheel van normen. Het doel is een fatsoenlijke en veilige samenleving waarin 
fundamentele mensenrechten zijn gewaarborgd. Zowel individueel welzijn als 
collectieve zelfbeschikking is belangrijk. In geval van een machtsvacuüm is poli-
tieke wederopbouw, in beperkte mate, deel van het jus post bellum. Bovendien is 
het verstrekken van basisvoorzieningen, bijvoorbeeld voedsel en onderdak, 
onderdeel van het jus post bellum als het recht op leven in gevaar is door een 
gebrek aan middelen van bestaan als gevolg van de oorlog. Dit moet de naoor-
logse ontberingen verlichten. Voormalige strijdende partijen zijn in beginsel 
verantwoordelijk voor het realiseren van het jus post bellum, hoewel deze 
verplichtingen aan andere actoren kunnen worden toegewezen als zij daartoe 
niet in staat zijn. Ten derde is een gematigd jus post bellum het meest effectief in 
het beperken van de verschrikkelijke gevolgen van de oorlog. Het legt de lat 
hoog genoeg zonder te ambitieus te zijn. Een gematigd jus post bellum laat zien 
hoe een fatsoenlijke vrede kan worden bereikt – een vrede die rechtvaardig 
genoeg is in plaats van perfect rechtvaardig.  
 Het boek eindigt met de stelling dat de hedendaagse theorie van de  
rechtvaardige oorlog rekening moet houden met naoorlogse rechtvaardigheid. 
De bevindingen scheppen theoretische duidelijkheid over dit relatief nieuwe 
onderdeel van de theorie, en dragen bij aan de verdere ontwikkeling van het jus 
post bellum. Bovenal is de belangrijkste wens van dit onderzoek dat de integratie 
van het jus post bellum een bijdrage levert aan het beperken van de negatieve 
effecten van oorlog, en dat het ondersteuning biedt bij het creëren van vrede na 
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concrete oorlogen. Een gematigd jus post bellum, gericht op de transitie naar een 
fatsoenlijke vrede, met nadruk op de toewijzing van verplichtingen aan 
specifieke actoren, heeft de beste kans om dat te doen. Deze opvatting van jus 
post bellum mag dan misschien bescheiden zijn, maar kan juist daarom situaties 
zoals Irak verbeteren.  
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opposed to minimalist and maximalist understandings of jus post bellum, it is argued that 
medium jus post bellum improves just war theory, does not exceed its limited character, is 
internally coherent, and above all, is most effective in limiting the horrible effects of war.
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